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Rulemaking undertaken by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) between 
2010 and 2016 for the regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) commodity derivatives 
comprised an essential component in the implementation of the post-financial crisis Dodd-
Frank Act reforms. This study analyzes how the CFTC determined which OTC commodity 
derivatives would be regulated pursuant to the Dodd-Frank regime, examining the 
administrative agency’s rulemaking for commodity and trade options in addition to the so-
called forward contract exclusion. The rulemaking analysis is informed by the theoretical 
framework of Cultural Political Economy (CPE). In following this analytical approach, this 
research identifies and assesses how semiotic and extra-semiotic factors interacted and co-
evolved to influence how CFTC policymakers constructed the regulation of OTC commodity 
derivatives and, thus, variation in, and the selection and retention of, these officials’ codified 
regulatory stance(s) towards these same financial instruments. This study also posits a Dodd-
Frank imaginary, and traces how, and explains why, it evolved over the multi-step OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking sequence. It is demonstrated that, as well as explained 
why, CFTC policymakers’ construction of OTC commodity derivative regulations changed 
over the course of the six-year rulemaking span to largely exclude or exempt from regulation 







This study examines the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) rulemaking 
for OTC commodity derivatives (i.e., a type of financial instrument, or contract, in energy or 
metals) between 2010 and 2016. More specifically, this research project analyzes how the 
CFTC determined which OTC commodity derivatives it would regulate under the post-
financial crisis reforms of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. This is accomplished by assessing 
rulemaking for the regulation of commodity and trade options as well as for the so-called 
forward contract exclusion. Together, these rule-makings define which OTC commodity 
derivatives the CFTC elected to regulate pursuant to the new Dodd-Frank regulatory regime. 
This research seeks to explicate how the CFTC policymakers constructed the regulation of 
OTC commodity derivatives, and to analyze the influences that conditioned regulatory 
formation and, thus, the selected regulatory approach(es) for determining which OTC 
commodity derivatives would be regulated. 
 
To accomplish as much, the study begins by providing the reader with the requisite 
vocabulary needed to engage with the later analysis of the 2010 through 2016 rulemaking 
period. The thesis then turns to reviewing existing literature on the administrative process of 
rulemaking, as well as explaining the study’s theoretical and methodological commitments 
and procedures, respectively. The last part of the study provides historical context to the 
analyzed rulemaking sequence and comprises an analysis of the 2010 through 2016 OTC 
commodity derivatives rulemaking period. In short, it is found that at each rulemaking 
juncture, CFTC policymakers constructed the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives 
differently and, accordingly, defined which OTC commodity derivatives would be regulated 
in (at least slightly) different ways. This was the case because of the variable and intersecting 
influences that contested and conditioned the various rule-makings for commodity (and 
trade) options as well as for the forward contract exclusion.  
 
Most notably, after the arrival of new CFTC leadership in 2014, the CFTC – led by then-
Chairperson Timothy Massad – undertook a review of the OTC commodity derivative 
regulations made between 2010 and 2012 under the direction of his predecessor, Chair Gary 
Gensler, in an effort to address the concerns of a significant portion of business actors who 
utilized these derivative instruments. As a result, the CFTC relied on many of the formal rule-
related comment letters submitted by these actors to inform the revised rules which defined 
the OTC commodity derivatives that would be regulated under Dodd-Frank. The effect of this 
was that OTC commodity derivative transactions of most business actors would either be 
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In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, political leadership in the United States 
(U.S.) sought to reform financial markets through the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010. As part of the adoption of this legislation, U.S. administrative agencies were directed 
by Congress to implement, through undertaking rulemaking, the law’s reforms. To put it 
simply, rulemaking was the process through which these agencies wrote the financial 
regulations prescribed by Dodd-Frank. One of the administrative agencies that was 
empowered to engage in rulemaking was the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC, Commission). Through this administrative agency process, the CFTC codified and 
promulgated numerous Dodd-Frank era regulations that affected various financial markets 
and financial instruments, including OTC commodity derivatives.  
Since its establishment in the 1970s, the CFTC has been tasked with the regulation 
of commodity derivatives (i.e., contracts for the future purchase or sale of commodities 
whose value is derived from the contracted commodities) in the U.S. While the primary 
thrust of this administrative agency’s initial regulatory task was to regulate the futures 
markets – central exchange markets which, at that time, were principally used for 
commodity derivative-related transactions – through the Dodd-Frank Act, the law 
empowered the Commission to regulate much of the country’s bilaterally transacted over-
the-counter (OTC) derivative activity, such as those swap contracts1 that gained notoriety as 
contributing factors to the aforementioned financial crisis. Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, and, on 
occasion, in conjunction with other U.S. administrative agencies, the CFTC was responsible 
for both elaborating on which OTC derivatives would be subject to the new Dodd-Frank 
 




regulatory regime, and on how these instruments would be regulated. Although the answer 
to the latter was, generally, to apply the logic of existing futures (exchange) market 
regulation to OTC derivatives, answering the former required that Commission 
policymakers consider a multitude of derivative contract-related factors in order to codify a 
thorough definition of a Dodd-Frank-regulatable OTC derivative. This was particularly the 
case with regard to determining which OTC commodity derivatives would be regulated in 
the context of the heterogeneous commodities marketplace. That matter constitutes the 
precise policy-related subject into which this thesis inquires.  
 Notwithstanding their relatively small share of the overall OTC derivatives 
marketplace, at least in terms of notional value (Helleiner 2018: 199), OTC commodity 
derivatives (i.e., those derivative contracts in energy and metals) are anything but limited in 
prevalence of use for the functioning of modern societies. For instance, a contract entered 
into by a homeowner for the future delivery of heating oil is an OTC commodity derivative. 
Other examples include the purchase for future delivery of a firm amount of iron and coal 
by a state-owned steel mill, or the future sale into the national electrical grid of a variable 
amount of electricity produced by a collection of off-shore wind turbines controlled as a 
joint venture between publicly-traded companies. Nevertheless, OTC commodity 
derivatives can also be, and have been, employed in speculative capacities so as to allow a 
transacting party the ability to profit from commodity price fluctuations and price arbitrage 
opportunities. These sorts of OTC commodity derivative transactions often do not result in 
the transfer of ownership of the underlying commodity (e.g., the commodity is not 
delivered to the purchaser of the OTC commodity derivative contract), are more 
complicated in nature than the above examples (i.e., having exotic and complicated 
contractual structure), and typically involve parties with, at least, a degree of sophistication 
3 
 
and experience in OTC commodity derivative trading, such as multinational corporations 
like BP and ExxonMobil.   
Given the diversity in uses for, the varied contractual structure of, and the range of 
parties to OTC commodity derivatives, adequately defining which of these derivative 
instruments would be regulated and, thus, subject to the transparency enhancing and 
systemic risk reducing regulatory architecture promoted by the post-financial crisis Dodd-
Frank Act, was foundational to the CFTC’s regulatory efforts under that new legislative 
regime. Through the administrative rulemaking process – one which can be influenced by a 
range of factors, and one in which contestation from regulatory stakeholders routinely 
occurs – the Commission accomplished this feat. Determining which OTC commodity 
derivative were to be regulated was completed between 2010 and 2016 through both the 
CFTC rules for commodity and trade options as well as for the so-called forward contract 
exclusion to the ‘swap’ definition. 
 These rule-makings, in each of their iterations, are the policy-specific focal points 
of this study’s inquiry into OTC commodity derivative rulemaking. Exploring the 
construction of the regulations contained therein and assessing those factors that 
interacted and co-evolved to condition their construction through rulemaking serve as the 
analytical foci of this thesis. While many other matters are touched upon in the pages that 
follow, sight on this focus should not be lost.  
It bears noting that this study’s research into which OTC commodity derivatives the 
CFTC would regulate is novel, and, as such, it fills an important gap in the emerging 
literature on Dodd-Frank era rulemaking at the Commission. Existing literature on 
rulemaking at the CFTC from this period has yet to delve into the agency’s definitional 
rulemaking. Rather, this extant research has, predominantly, either broadly analyzed the 
4 
 
influence of business and non-business actors on overall Dodd-Frank-related Commission 
rulemaking, or examined rules relating to how the agency would regulate an OTC derivative 
(e.g., the position limits rule). Nevertheless, forming an understanding of how CFTC 
policymakers determined which OTC commodity derivatives would be regulated is of 
central importance to literature on Dodd-Frank era rulemaking at the Commission given 
that such an understanding can provide critical insight into a bedrock – and highly 
contested – component of the CFTC’s Dodd-Frank regulatory infrastructure. Therefore, the 
instant research contributes to this scholarship, a longitudinal, qualitative analysis of 
Commission OTC commodity derivative rulemaking from 2010 through 2016. 
In addition to contributing to the emerging literature on Dodd-Frank era 
rulemaking, this research also contributes to the broader administrative agency rulemaking 
scholarship. Contributions to general rulemaking literature include the following: (1) a 
structured case study that spans the entire rulemaking spectrum, from the pre-proposal 
stage to revisions to once finalized rules; (2) an integrated micro- through macro-level 
analysis of rulemaking, which engages with considerations from rule content to those 
relating to political economy; and (3) a prime example of the contingency of outside party 
(e.g., regulatee) influence on rulemaking as well as of the importance of under-researched 
considerations such as the recontextualization of existing regulatory precedent during 
rulemaking and an agency chairperson’s influence on the character of rulemaking. 
 While making a novel contribution to existing rulemaking literature is the primary 
motivation behind this study, a secondary motivation is also worth noting. Namely, this 
researcher worked extensively on formulating a compliance regime for the OTC commodity 
derivative regulations explored herein while being employed in the energy industry. As 
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such, keen interest was spurred as to how the analyzed regulations were constructed by 
CFTC policymakers.  
The analysis of both the commodity (and trade) options and the forward contract 
exclusion to the ‘swap’ definition rulemaking will provide the requisite information to 
answer this thesis’s main research question: how CFTC policymakers constructed the 
regulation of OTC commodity derivatives between 2010 and 2016. Additionally, this 
analysis will provide perspective on the following sub-research questions that were 
developed as based on this research project’s theoretical framework (discussed below): (1) 
What imaginaries pertaining to the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives were present 
during rulemaking? (2) To what regulatory considerations did CFTC policymakers grant 
significance during rulemaking? (3) Why were certain regulatory approaches selected and 
retained by CFTC policymakers when rulemaking, and what influenced this selection and 
retention? (4) Did the imaginaries change during the OTC commodity derivative rulemaking 
process? If so, how? 
 To fully explore these questions, this study is informed by the theoretical 
framework of Cultural Political Economy (CPE). By taking a CPE approach to the analysis of 
rulemaking, those factors that conditioned the construction of OTC commodity derivative 
regulations will be identified. Furthermore, the analysis will assess how these variables 
interacted and co-evolved to condition the construction of OTC commodity derivatives 
regulations. As core concept from CPE is the existence of (policy) ‘imaginaries’ (i.e., 
approximate frames of reality which emerge as a by-product of actors’ attempts at 
complexity reduction). The analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking will also 
consider the notion of a Dodd-Frank imaginary – one through which policymakers viewed 
their regulatory efforts to increase transparency and reduce the systemic risk of OTC 
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derivatives – and how that imaginary’s meaning, in relation to OTC commodity derivatives, 
may have changed during the administrative process of rulemaking.  
Following a CPE approach to the analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking 
advances this theoretical framework into a field of research (i.e., rulemaking) currently left 
unexplored in CPE-related literature. One benefit of utilizing CPE is that it allows the 
researcher to go beyond the analytical limitations of existing approaches to rulemaking 
analysis. As such, employing CPE to inform an analysis of an agency’s rulemaking can elicit a 
nuanced micro- through macro-level, multifaceted understanding of this administrative 
process. 
 In terms of an advance roadmap regarding the route to be taken in this thesis on 
OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the CFTC between 2010 and 2016, the present 
Introduction is to be followed by three separate and distinct Parts – each with their own 
chapters – and a Conclusion, which endeavors to complete the circle or finish the tapestry 
woven by the study’s various strands.  
 Part I consists of two chapters which provide requisite background information for 
the reader to wholly engage with the later analysis of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking. Chapter 1 defines key derivative-related terminology and explores the two 
markets – exchange-traded and OTC – in which derivatives are transacted. Chapter 2 
introduces the U.S. system of administrative agencies, the rulemaking process, and the 
CFTC.  
 Part II comprises three chapters, and provides the analytical grounding for the 
study’s analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking. Chapter 3 is composed of a two-
section literature review. The first section provides an overview of how existing literature 
conceptualizes rulemaking and approaches the analysis of this administrative process. The 
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second section explores what the extant rulemaking literature has identified as important 
considerations, or factors, to the construction of rules. Herein, three bodies of rulemaking-
related literature are critically discussed: (1) that examining the CFTC’s Dodd-Frank 
rulemaking process and the influences thereon, (2) that regarding the influences on and 
inputs into administrative agency rulemaking in general, and (3) that pertaining to theories 
of regulatory capture. Chapter 4 sets out and explains the central tenets of the CPE 
theoretical framework and its relation to other analytical approaches to the study of 
rulemaking, the theory’s application in existing literature, and how this project employs CPE 
to its OTC commodity derivative rulemaking research focus. Chapter 5 details this study’s 
data selection and collection practices and its methodology. In its elaboration on 
methodology, Chapter 5 develops a methodological procedure to be followed in the CPE-
informed analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking. 
 Part III of this study is composed of five chapters, with the latter four, together, 
comprising the analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the CFTC between 2010 
and 2016. Chapter 6 reviews the CFTC’s historical involvement with the regulation of OTC 
derivatives, broadly, and OTC commodity derivatives, specifically. This review traces OTC 
(commodity) derivative regulatory developments from the agency’s inception in 1974 until 
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, and discusses various themes that will be re-
examined in ensuing chapters. Chapter 7 discusses the Commission’s promulgated advance 
notices of proposed rulemaking for ‘Agricultural Swaps’ – the precursor release to the 
agency’s proposed rule for commodity (and trade) options – and for the definition of a 
‘swap’. Chapter 8 presents and analyzes the proposed rule for commodity (and trade) 
options and the proposed forward contract exclusion to the ‘swap’ definition rule. Chapter 
9 then assesses the final versions of these rule-makings. Chapter 10 concludes the overall 
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analysis by engaging with the CFTC’s revisions to the commodity (and trade) options rule 
and its revisions to the forward contract exclusion. 
 In this research inquiry’s Conclusion, the study’s main findings will be reiterated, 
the research questions will be once more raised and, then, answered, the study’s 
contributions to the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 will be made, and a few ideas for 
further rulemaking research will be presented. To generally foreground the findings, during 
each of the demarcated junctures in this rulemaking process (e.g., proposed rulemaking 
and final rulemaking), CFTC officials constructed the regulation of OTC commodity 
derivatives in slightly different ways. These changing regulatory constructions were 
influenced by the variable interaction and co-evolution of several relevant factors. 
Moreover, as rulemaking progressed, the Dodd-Frank imaginary itself, the very lens through 
which agency policymakers viewed their regulatory endeavors, evolved because of these 
same intersecting influences. The approach to defining which OTC commodity derivatives 
would be regulated that Commission policymakers ultimately adopted reflected a view that 
the OTC commodity derivative transactions of most marketplace participants – such as 
energy companies and other non-financial enterprises – would be either largely excluded or 
exempted from regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act (i.e., not subject to compliance with 
the Act’s regulatory infrastructure). As a result, for these same commercial parties, the 





PART I – BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS TO OTC COMMODITY DERIVATIVE RULEMAKING  
 
PREFACE 
This first portion of the thesis consists of two chapters. These chapters provide background 
information necessary for the reader to engage with the analysis of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking. In the first chapter, derivative-related terms are defined, and an 
exploration the two markets – exchange-traded and over-the-counter – in which derivatives 
are transacted is carried out. The second chapter introduces the U.S. system of 
administrative agencies and the rulemaking process. This chapter then presents the 
administrative agency responsible for regulating OTC commodity derivatives – the CFTC. In 


























Chapter 1 – Derivatives and the Two Principal Markets 
 
As alluded to in the Introduction, and as will be elaborated below, a financial derivative (or, 
a derivative) is a type of contractual financial security (instrument).2 Derivatives have 
existed in some form since the intersection of written language and commerce (Weber 
2009: 434). For instance, contracts for the future delivery of an asset at an agreed to price – 
i.e., forward contracts – have likely been in use since as early as the fourth to second 
millennium BCE (Weber 2009: 434; Swan 2000). More complex derivatives, such as option 
contracts, have their first recorded use – as referenced in Aristotle’s Politics – with Thales of 
Miletus (624-546 BCE) in Asia Minor (Taleb 2012: 173f). The development of these early 
derivatives revolved around transactions for the future purchase and sale of commodities, 
such as wood, barley, and sesame seeds, and emphasized the credibility of an individual’s 
promise to fulfill a forthcoming obligation (Weber 2009: 434). Some of these derivatives, 
such as forward contracts, served to manage risks associated with the future deliverable 
quantity of and potential future price for commodities, while other derivative agreements, 
like the option agreements employed by Thales of Miletus for the future right to use local 
olive presses (Taleb 2012: 173f), were speculative in nature. Although myriad derivative 
products are presently available for use, and their utilization in contemporary finance is 
widespread, modern derivatives maintain the same fundamental feature of their ancient 
predecessors – the contracted future performance of an obligation undertaken to either 
manage risk(s) or to speculate.  
 The first derivative transactions are posited to have been traded in an over-the-
counter manner (Weber 2009: 432). This means that two or more individuals came 
together, negotiated, and agreed upon the terms and conditions of the transaction. With 
 
2 ‘Financial derivatives’ are understood to be synonymous with the colloquial term ‘derivative’.  
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the development and exchange of so-called Monte shares3 in Renaissance Italy, a new 
market for transacting derivatives began to emerge – exchange markets (Weber 2009: 438). 
By the 16th century, the first centralized exchange market for large scale trading of 
derivative contracts developed in Antwerp (Poitras 2009: 21). Similar to exchange 
derivative trading of the present day, at the Antwerp exchange, derivative transactions 
neither necessitated the physical transference of the contracted commodity (Weber 2009: 
439) nor required that the two parties initiating the transaction be the same parties 
completing the transaction (Poitras 2009: 16). Rather, money could be delivered in lieu of 
the contracted commodity and the contract itself – not physical commodity – could be 
made available to trade, respectively (Poitras 2009: 15).  
 Given the topic of this thesis, it is pertinent to consider that the historical 
development of derivatives, and the two markets in which these financial instruments are 
transacted, has been intimately tied to commodity transactions. To this day, derivatives are 
extensively traded in both over-the-counter and exchange markets. The following sections 
will explore key categories and features of derivatives in addition to providing an overview 
of these two markets. In discussing over-the-counter markets, the master, or paradigmatic 
form of agreement – i.e., International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) agreement 
– governing over-the-counter derivatives transactions will be introduced. Undertaking this 
two-part exploration will build the vocabulary necessary to engage OTC (over-the-counter) 





3 City-state bonds with transferable obligations which allowed these securities to be traded to and 




In the abstract, a derivative is a financial security (instrument) which derives its value from 
an underlying asset (Koppenhaver 2010: 6). Such an asset may be, but is not limited to, a 
physical commodity, a share of common stock, an index of stocks or commodities, another 
derivative, or myriad other referents (Raines and Leathers 1994: 197). Practically, however, 
a derivative is a contractual agreement between two or more parties for future 
performance of contracted terms, and whose value is derived from an underlying asset or 
transaction (Koppenhaver 2010: 6). While manifold names are attributed to specific 
derivatives, derivatives can be understood to fall under four general categories: forwards, 
futures, options, and swaps. Those OTC commodity derivatives referenced in the 
rulemaking analysis undertaken in Part III of this thesis fall under the broad categories of 
OTC forwards, options, and swaps that are used to transact energy (e.g., natural gas) and 
metal (e.g., aluminum) commodities, and include more specifically named OTC commodity 
derivative instruments like ‘commodity options’ and ‘trade options’.   
Forward contracts are agreements to buy or sell a specific asset at a specific time in 
the future for an agreed upon price (Hull 2014: 6). These contracts are generally entered 
into between two parties in an over-the-counter manner, are of non-standardized terms 
and conditions, and often result in the actual delivery of the contracted asset (Hull 2014: 
6f). Forward contracts are utilized across many product (e.g., commodity, currency) 
markets. 
 For instance, a forward contract might be used by a multinational bank in the 
Maldives to lock in a 3-month forward exchange rate of Maldivian rufiyaa to U.S. dollars by 
privately negotiating the transaction with a U.S. multinational bank. Similarly, a midstream 
petroleum company in Oklahoma might use a forward contract to purchase 1,000 barrels of 
crude oil per day from an upstream petroleum company for the next 6 months at $50 per 
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barrel, and then use another forward contract to sell for $57 per barrel the same 1,000 
barrels of crude oil per day to a downstream petroleum company for the 6 months during 
which it receives delivery of the oil from the producer. In both of these examples, there 
exists an underlying asset referent – an exchange rate, and crude oil, respectively – and the 
future obligation of performance – delivery of the 3-month forward exchange rate, and 
delivery of the crude oil, respectively.  
Similar to forward contracts, futures contracts are agreements to buy or sell a 
specific asset at a specific future time for an agreed upon price. There exist, however, three 
key differences between futures and forward contracts. First, futures contracts are entered 
into and traded on exchanges, not over-the-counter (Hull 2014: 1f, 24). Second, these 
contractual agreements are standardized – in that the terms and conditions of the contract 
are not privately negotiated, but are pre-set by the exchange on which the agreements are 
offered (Hull 2014: 24). Third, futures contracts are frequently financially settled, thus 
actual delivery of the asset that serves as the underlying referent rarely takes place (Hull 
2014: 24). This last point is important because it allows for futures contract users to utilize 
the agreement for speculative or hedging purposes.4 Hedging with a futures contract is 
often linked – particularly in relation to commodities transactions – with contractual 
performance under a forward contract.  
An example of a futures transaction in the contemporary electronic trading 
environment would be of a buyer selecting to purchase 5,000 bushels of wheat for 1-month 
delivery at $2.00 per bushel from a pre-set futures sales contract with the same terms on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME) electronic trading infrastructure. To highlight the 
 
4 Often, a futures agreement is entered into in an effort to hedge the position of an underlying 
forward contract (i.e., a forward contract for the purchase of a certain amount of soybeans is hedged 
by a futures contract for the sale of the same amount of soybeans).  
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decision to financially settle as opposed to the requirement to receive delivery of the 
wheat, the purchaser of this futures contract could close out its futures position by entering 
into an opposite trade for the same amount and delivery date – thus, eliminating its 
requirement to physically settle the contract – the day before it was scheduled to take 
delivery of the wheat. 
The third commonly traded financial derivative is an option. Option contracts come 
in two main forms: calls and puts (Hull 2014: 7). Call options give the option holder the 
right, but not the obligation, to buy an asset for a certain price on or up to a certain date 
(Hull 2014: 7).5 Put options give the option holder the right, but not the obligation, to sell 
an asset for a certain price on a certain date (Hull 2014: 7).6 When the option is entered 
into – thus purchased for a price called the option premium – the option contract is 
executed. If the optional right to buy or to sell is invoked, the option is said to be exercised. 
Regarding the trading environment of options contracts, trading can be done either on 
exchanges or in an over-the-counter manner (Hull 2014: 7, 227). Options are distinguished 
from both forwards and futures in that performance under the contract is at the discretion 
of the holder (Hull 2014: 210). Nevertheless, like futures contracts, options can be used for 
speculative and hedging purposes (Hull 2014: 11).  
  As a practical example of both a call and a put option, consider the following. 
Should an investor wish to speculate on a price increase of a Henry Hub natural gas futures 
contract from, let us say, a current price of $4.50 per 10,000 MMBTU,7 the investor could 
access the CME Group exchange platform and purchase a one-month call option with a so-
 
5 Connoted by this is that the counterparty to this transaction maintains the obligation to sell the 
asset for a certain price at a certain time should the option be exercised – this is known as ‘writing an 
option’.  
6 Likewise, the counterparty to this transaction maintains the obligation to buy the asset for a certain 
price at a certain time should the option be exercised. 
7 An MMBTU is equal to 1,000,000 British thermal units, or BTUs.  
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called strike price of $5.50 per 10,000 MMBTU for a $0.50 option premium. In the event 
that the natural gas futures contract rises above $6.00 per 10,000 MMBTU during the one-
month duration of the contract, then the investor could exercise the call option and realize 
a profit. If, however, for whatever reason, the investor decides not to exercise her call 
option, she will not lose any more than the $0.50 option premium. Unlike with futures 
contracts, losses associated with options are capped to the amount paid in option premium 
(Hull 2014: 17).  
 Likewise, if an investor wishes to hedge an investment in 100 owned shares of 
common stock, purchasing a put option on the same shares of stock, through an optional 
sale of the 100 shares, may be of use.8 This hedge could be done in the over-the-counter 
market whereby the investor negotiates a put option directly with a bank. Once executing 
the put option, the investor will maintain the right to sell 100 shares of that common stock 
at a predetermined strike price until the expiration of the contract. While hedging with a 
put option in this instance will not result in profit, by locking in a specific sale price for the 
common stock, it does serve as a sort of insurance against the decline of the stock’s price. 
As with the aforementioned call option on Henry Hub natural gas, losses associated with 
this put option cannot exceed the option premium (Hull 2014: 17). 
 The final general category of financial derivatives is the swap. Of the four 
referenced categories, swaps are the most recently developed – the first swaps being 
transacted between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s (Hull 2014: 158; Decovny 1998). 
Notwithstanding their relatively new development, swaps have become an integral 
component of the financial derivatives market (Hull 2014: 158). In its basic form, a swap is a 
contractual agreement to exchange cash flows in the future (Hull 2014: 158). Such 
 
8 Consider that owning shares of common stock is valuable only if the share price increases. 
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transactions have historically only taken place in an over-the-counter manner,9 and much 
like futures and options, can be used for speculative and hedging purposes (Kuserk 2010: 
45; Decovny 1998).  
 Although myriad forms of swaps exist given their bespoke crafting, there are five 
principal classes of swaps – each corresponding to an asset referent. These classes of swaps 
include interest rate, currency, credit, equity, and commodity swaps. On the basis of 
notional value, interest rate swaps comprise the largest segment of the swaps 
marketplace,10 while, by that same measure, commodity swaps comprise the smallest 
segment (BIS 2017).  
As the particular name of each of the five classes of swaps suggests, each swap 
involves the exchange of cash flows in the future relating to its named asset referent. For 
instance, in its basic, “plain vanilla” form, an interest rate swap is a contractual agreement 
to exchange the cash flows of a fixed interest rate on a notional principal for the cash flows 
of a floating interest rate on the same principal at various junctures over an agreed upon 
term (Hull 2014: 158f). A currency swap is somewhat similar in that it involves the exchange 
of interest payments – thus, cash flows – denominated in one currency for those 
denominated in another currency (Hull 2014: 178, 183f).11 Credit swaps, specifically credit 
default swaps (CDS), are means of insuring against the risk of default by a company or 
country (Hull 2014: 187f). Generally, these swaps entail one party agreeing to make 
periodic payments to a counterparty for a set amount of time in exchange for the right to 
 
9 As will be discussed throughout this thesis, under the new Dodd-Frank regulatory regime, a 
fundamental policy objective has been to move swap trading from over-the-counter markets to 
exchange markets.   
10 Total face value of an asset position; not the amount of money paid for the asset position or owed 
to the counterparty. See the following: 
http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/SwapsReports/ExplanatoryNotes/index.htm. 
11 Depending on the contractual terms, the principal on which the interest is being paid may or may 
not be exchanged as well (Decovny 1998: 53f).  
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sell the counterparty’s bonds – and the counterparty’s obligation to buy these bonds – at 
their face or mid-market value in the event that the counterparty goes into default by a 
certain date (Hull 2014: 187f). An equity swap is an agreement whereby the parties 
exchange the payments of the returns of an equity (stock) index as applied to a notional 
principal for the payments of a fixed or floating interest rate as applied to that same 
principal for an agreed upon duration (Hull 2014: 189, 495).  
The final class of swap is the commodity swap. A commodity swap involves the 
agreement to exchange a series of cash flows based on a fixed price for a commodity, over 
a period of time, in return for the cash flows from a floating, market-based price of the 
same commodity, over a set period of time (Hull 2014: 189, 497). As a commodity swap 
entails a physically deliverable asset referent, it is important to note that the underlying 
commodity is not delivered when performance of the swap contract is achieved. 
Commodities used as asset referents for these swap contracts range from agricultural 
products (corn, wheat, soybeans), to metals (copper, gold, silver), to energy products 
(crude oil, natural gas, and electricity), among others. An example of a commodity swap is 
when a natural gas consuming electric utility agrees to pay $5.00 for 10,000 MMBTU of 
natural gas on the 28th of each month for one year to a natural gas pipeline company in 
exchange for receiving, from the pipeline company, the cash flows generated from the 
floating, market price of natural gas for 10,000 MMBTU as settled on the 28th of each 
month for one year.  
In relation to their regulation, having a basic understanding of these four categories 
of derivatives is important for one primary reason – the disparate structures and risk 
management features of each category of derivative can necessitate likewise disparate 
approaches to their regulation. Although myriad other derivative products can themselves 
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be derived from these four categories, each of these will maintain key features of either 
forwards, futures, options, and/or swaps. Owing to their individually-tailored nature, 
derivatives which amalgamate structures and risk management features from across any of 
the categories of derivatives are largely created and traded in over-the-counter markets. 
Since this specific research project has its focus centered on OTC commodity derivative 
regulations alone, futures contracts, futures markets, and their regulation receive no more 
than passing reference and the attention necessary to provide contextual background. 
Nevertheless, as the workings of and the regulations governing exchange markets12 have 
ostensibly provided a partial framework for regulating OTC markets under the Dodd-Frank 




Derivative exchanges have their earliest recorded organization in the early 1700s in Osaka, 
Japan (Blank et al. 1991: 2f; Schaede 1989).13 Here, at the Dōjima exchange, futures 
contracts on rice were traded at a physically located marketplace (Blank et al. 1991: 3; 
Schaede 1989). Then, by 1848, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was established in the 
U.S., giving that country the first organized physical venue at which to trade futures 
contracts on a variety of commodities (Kolb 1991: 4). The CBOT, in similar fashion to many 
other derivative exchange markets of the 19th and 20th centuries, traditionally used an 
open-outcry system of trading (Hull 2008: 3). Open-outcry involves traders meeting in a 
trading pit or on a trading floor and either shouting bids (purchase price) or offers (sell 
 
12 Recall above that futures contracts are exclusively traded in exchange markets.  
13 While the Osaka exchange is the first historical example of an organized derivative exchange, the 
origins of futures exchange markets can be traced to Europe in the Middle Ages (Hull 2008: 2; 
Chancellor 2000: 6-10). 
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price) or using hand signals to indicate one’s bids or offers for derivative products. Through 
this system, the derivative positions that a trader takes are, in principle, known to the other 
traders (Kolb 1991: 5).  
Presently, however, while open-outcry systems of derivative trading on exchanges 
such as the CBOT remain in vestigial existence – thus, at least in name, warranting the 
categorization of derivative exchanges as markets or marketplaces – trading of futures and 
options on exchanges has increasingly transitioned to electronic platforms with a user 
interface (i.e., on computers) (Hull 2008: 3). Nevertheless, many of the benefits associated 
with open-outcry trading are not perceived to be lost because of the transition to electronic 
trading platforms. Through the electronic exchange’s continual re-pricing of and re-
statement of prices on derivative products resulting from the bids or offers of electronic 
traders using the platform, electronic trading platforms are designed to virtually replicate 
many of the interactions that take place in the trading pit. 
As noted in the previous section, all futures contracts and some options contracts 
are traded in exchange markets. Both futures and options contracts which are traded on 
exchanges have their terms and conditions standardized by the exchange on which they are 
traded. This means that it is the exchange which presents the traders with the contracts – 
detailing product quantity, quality, delivery location, and delivery time – on which they 
make bids or offers (Blank et al. 1991: 3). The exchange originates the terms and conditions 
of the derivative contracts which it then supplies to prospective buyers and sellers, and 
then facilitates the purchase or sale transactions on behalf of the traders. Thus, private 
negotiation between traders of contractual terms and conditions does not occur.  
The regulations with which the operations of derivative exchange markets must 
comply spring from self-established rules, rules of clearinghouses utilized by the exchanges, 
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rules of the non-governmental National Futures Association (NFA), and federal government 
regulations (Blank et al. 1991: 9; Kolb 1991: 27-32). Substantial academic literature on the 
history of exchange market regulations exists,14 however the development of such rules 
and regulations is not the focus of this study. Nevertheless, several concepts and terms 
associated with these rules and regulations are germane to understanding the regulation of 
OTC commodity derivatives under the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime. These include the 
following: clearing, clearinghouse, novation, margin requirements, and position limits. 
Standardization of contacts, briefly described above, is another key feature of exchange 
markets; but nothing more will be here added to that discussion. 
When a trade (purchase or sale) is executed for a derivatives contract on an 
exchange, the process of clearing the transaction is undertaken. Clearing begins with a 
clearinghouse – a party often separate from but serving as an adjunct to the exchange – 
assuming the trader’s position: either the purchase or sale (Kolb 1991: 8; Edwards 1983: 
370). This act of assuming the derivatives transaction is known as novation (Griffith 2013: 
14). At this time, the clearinghouse also matches the transaction with a trader taking the 
opposite position – either a sale to a purchase or a purchase to a sale – and novates this 
position (Kolb 1991: 8f). Thus, the clearinghouse “adopts the position of buyer to every 
seller and seller to every buyer” (Kolb 1991: 8). The result is that traders have contractual 
obligations solely to the clearinghouse and that the clearinghouse guarantees the 
performance of all exchange market trades for which it is responsible (Kolb 1991: 8; 
Edwards 1983: 370). Given that a clearinghouse becomes the counterparty to the 
transactions on a derivatives exchange, it is sometimes referred to as a central 
counterparty (CCP). 
 
14 See, for example, Pashigian (1986), Markham (1987), and Keaveny (2005). 
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Once the transaction is novated by the clearinghouse, the clearinghouse is 
responsible to maintain margin from the buyer and seller. Margin is the predetermined 
amount of capital15 that a trader must deposit when he or she executes a derivative 
transaction in an exchange market (Blank et al. 1991: 10f). This is known as initial margin 
(Kolb 1991: 11). As derivative transactions involve the passage of time before the 
fulfillment of contractual terms – e.g., the purchase of a futures contract on May 1st for 
delivery of 1,000 barrels of crude oil on June 1st – they are subject to continual revaluation. 
The initial margin account will reflect these changes in value. Thus, due to a decline in the 
value of a derivative contract beyond a predetermined threshold (i.e., maintenance 
margin), a margin call may be issued for the trader to replenish his or her margin account 
(i.e., variation margin) (Kolb 1991: 11).  
The final concept that is important to note is that of position limits. Position limits 
denote the maximum number of derivative contracts that a trader may hold (Hull 2008: 25, 
195). Historically, these limits have been set by the exchange on which the contracts are 
traded (Hull 2008: 195). Further, position limits generally only apply to those traders who 
engage in speculation as opposed to those engaging in hedging (Kolb 1991: 38). This means 
that traders who purchase or sell exchange derivatives without an underlying stake in the, 
or a similar, derivative asset referent are subject to position limits; but that those traders 
who purchase or sell exchange derivatives with an underlying stake in the, or a similar, 
derivative asset referent are not subject to such limitations.  
Each of these concepts serve an essential role in the operation of derivative 
exchange markets. Standardization of contracts, for instance, are posited to cultivate a 
broad and deep market of potential buyers and sellers (Carlton 1984: 238), to improve 
 
15 This can include money or monetary instruments including, but not limited to, stocks and bonds.  
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liquidity16 (Taleb 1997: 29), and to reduce costs associated with moral hazard17 of potential 
buyers and sellers (Telser and Higinbotham 1977: 970f). Additionally, the process of 
clearing and the function of clearinghouses are meant to assure the financial integrity of 
both derivative exchange transactions and of those traders clearing their transactions 
through the clearinghouse (Edwards 1983: 370). Moreover, requiring margin serves to 
mitigate the credit risk18 posed to the derivative exchange by traders and to ensure that 
traders honor the contractual obligations of their derivative positions (Hull 2008: 29; Kolb 
1991: 10). Finally, position limits are understood to prevent any one trader from unduly 




As stated in this chapter’s opening paragraph, the first derivative contracts were traded in 
an over-the-counter manner. It is important to understand that the use of the term OTC 
does not refer to a specific, well-defined physical or electronic market in which derivatives 
are traded; unlike exchange markets. Rather, OTC should be understood to be a method of 
transacting derivative contracts. To engage in OTC derivative trading, a trader must simply 
follow a set of off-exchange negotiating and trading practices with, at least, one other 
trader as counterpart. The negotiating and trading practices referenced comprise a few key 
features: the setting of trading, non-standardized terms and conditions of the derivative 
contract, the use of an ISDA agreement, and collateral requirements. 
 
16 Per Taleb (1997: 68), “the ease with which a [trader] can enter and exit [the market] for a given 
block of securities.” 
17 Moral hazard occurs when a trader is not incentivized to act “honestly or with due prudence” (Law 
and Smullen 2008: 293).  
18 The risk that a trader may default on his or her monetary obligations (Brealey et al. 2007: 133).  
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 The setting of OTC derivative contract trading is dependent on the type of 
agreement being transacted. Forward contracts can be traded in-person (resulting from in-
person contractual negotiations), telephonically, or electronically (e.g., email, instant 
messaging, etc.). While off-exchange options can likewise be traded in these three settings, 
options (predominantly) and swaps (exclusively) are traded telephonically or electronically 
(Hull 2008: 4). Further, such transactions usually involve the use of a derivatives dealer 
from whom the trader either buys, or to whom the trader sells derivatives (Hull 2008: 4). 
These dealers serve as market makers – institutions quoting both bids and offers for the 
derivatives being traded (Hull 2008: 4).19   
 Another defining feature of OTC trading is the non-standardization of contractual 
terms and conditions of derivative contracts. In OTC markets, derivative contracts are 
individually negotiated by traders to include mutually agreed upon terms and conditions 
(Hull 2008: 4). For instance, product price, delivery amount, product quality, and delivery 
date, among other terms and conditions, can all be negotiated by the traders. Nevertheless, 
such individually tailored contracts are often governed by an overarching master 
agreement between the transacting parties – known as an ISDA agreement (Poloner 2010: 
226).20 It is worth noting here that this agreement – developed by and named after the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association – governs the relationship between the 
parties transacting OTC derivatives by setting forth general credit standards, operational 
standards, and tax representations to which the parties must adhere if they are to trade 
OTC derivatives with each other (Poloner 2010: 226).  
 
19 Dealers that transact with other dealers are termed to engage in ‘interdealer’ markets, while 
dealers that transact the non-dealers are termed to engage in ‘customer’ markets.  
20 ISDA agreements are utilized for the transaction of options and swaps. Forward contracts, while 




 A final key feature of the OTC markets is the posting of collateral by traders. Under 
the terms of a collateralization agreement – often included as an amendment to the ISDA 
agreement, or in the basic terms and conditions of the actual derivative contract – the 
parties to the derivative transaction are required to pledge a certain value of assets21 to 
each other and to replenish the collateral pledge as the derivative contract is continually 
revalued (Hull 2008: 29). For instance, if trader A and trader B agree to a commodity swap 
based on the price of natural gas, and from day-to-day the price of natural gas changes and 
increases the value of the commodity swap to trader A, trader B must pay collateral to 
trader A which is equal to the change in the commodity swap’s value. If, however, the 
change in price favors trader B, trader A must pay collateral equal to the change in the 
commodity swap’s value to trader B. In the event that the value of the pledged collateral 
declines – e.g., 1,000 long futures contracts in natural gas which are no longer worth what 
they were at the time that they were pledged – then additional collateral must be posted to 
ensure full collateralization of the derivative agreement. 
 These key features of the OTC markets serve several important functions. Unlike 
with the anonymous matching of derivative positions that occurs with exchange market 
trading, the open setting of OTC markets allows for traders to negotiate amongst 
themselves. This supports the non-standardization of derivative contract terms and 
conditions, which in turn allows for OTC markets to foster an environment in which large, 
complex, and individually-tailored derivative deals can be transacted (Hull 2008: 4). Further, 
the ISDA agreement provides options and swaps traders with potentially legally enforceable 
contracted standards to which they must adhere, thus arguably mitigating various risks 
associated with OTC derivative trading. Finally, collateral requirements, in the absence of 
 
21 This can be money, monetary instruments, or monetized instruments.  
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exchange market-imposed margin commitments, ostensibly reduce the credit risk borne by 
the parties to the OTC transaction (Hull 2008: 29).22 
  
 
22 It should be intimated that margin and collateral are different, especially insofar as what assets 
qualify as margin (as set by an exchange, clearinghouse, or federal government regulation) and as 
collateral (as privately negotiated or as defined by generally accepted accounting standards). 
Moreover, as noted by Hull (2008: 29), collateralization agreements can allow a trader to increase his 
or her (or its) leverage (debt obligations) in connection with the trader’s derivatives activity. This, 
arguably, weakens the notion of collateral as a tool to mitigate credit risk as, in this specific case, the 
assumption of increased leverage would make the trader increasingly fragile to decreases in 
derivative position valuation (Taleb 2012; Minsky 2008). Thus, the trader, while posting collateral to 
limit perceived credit risk, increases his or her (or its) exposure to other forms of risk.  
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Chapter 2 – U.S. Administrative Agency Rulemaking and the CFTC 
 
Prior to exploring a condensed regulatory history of OTC commodity derivatives, it is useful 
to have a broad understanding of the U.S. government’s regulatory structure. The hallmark 
of this structure is the devolution from Congress of rulemaking, market surveillance, rule 
compliance, and regulatory enforcement powers to administrative agencies. Through a 
review of administrative agency rulemaking, the reader will have a broad comprehension of 
the legal structure governing the U.S. CFTC’s crafting of OTC commodity derivatives 
regulations. Along these lines, the formal rulemaking process and judicial oversight will be 
described. From there, the CFTC – the regulator of OTC commodity derivatives – will be 
introduced, with its legislative origin and administrative structure being discussed. It should 
be noted that this chapter does not undertake a social science analysis of either legal 
structure or law-in-action. Rather, this chapter simply articulates the legislated legal context 
in which rulemaking occurs in the U.S. regulatory system.  
 
RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT 
Within the U.S. federal system of regulation, the complex realities of daily life can militate 
against it being either the Congress or the President who actually exercises the regulatory 
powers which either constitutionally possesses (Aman and Mayton 1993: 9-12). Instead, it 
is often delegated by either entity of government to a delegatee (i.e., an administrative 
agency), which either the Congress or the President has previously established or created, 
that exercises such regulatory power (i.e., rulemaking as well as regulatory surveillance, 
compliance, and enforcement). Apart from the constitutional dimension of governmental 
regulatory power, it must also be noted that there is a separate statutory dimension. Here, 
reference is made to the federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, the basic law 
adopted by the Congress that sets forth the procedures to be followed by all government 
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regulatory agencies when moving forward to adopt rules and standards affecting those the 
agencies oversee.23 Essentially, the Administrative Procedure Act provides for a two-step 
process in connection with the formulation and implementation of agency regulations, and 
for the granting of judicial oversight to all agency actions.24 
 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, when a regulatory agency decides to 
exercise delegated authority to provide rules and standards that affected commercial 
enterprises are required to meet, the agency first undertakes the tentative, exploratory 
step of issuing what is referred to as a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.25 The nature of the 
notice can run the gamut from a rather lengthy list of detailed rules cast in the language of 
regulations the agency is considering adopting, to a more general notice of what and how 
the agency would like to regulate (Aman and Mayton 1993: 296-300). Its publication 
appears in an official government document that is put out daily to the public known as the 
Federal Register. The proposed rulemaking specifically asks for comments to be submitted 
to the agency concerning what is being proposed. Such comments are then to be received 
by and reflected upon by the agency, due attention being given to the possibility of revising 
the original proposals when deemed appropriate (Pierce et al. 1992: 300f). 
 Following an allotted comment and review period, generally lasting anywhere from 
30 days to more than 180 days, the concerned agency then proceeds to the second step: 
issuance in the Federal Register of a so-called Final Rule.26 In addition to the actual language 
of the so-called Final Rule, its issuance also contains a catalogue and discussion of the 
comments received on the Proposed Rule, accompanied by a recounting of the agency’s 
thinking about what comments received during the proposed rulemaking process were 
 
23 See 5 United States Code (U.S.C.) sections (secs.) 551-559. 
24 On judicial oversight of agency regulatory action, see 5 U.S.C. secs. 701-706. 
25 See 5 U.S.C. sec. 553(b-c). 
26 See 5 U.S.C. sec. 553(d). 
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either accepted or rejected. One obvious reason for such a catalogue and discussion of the 
agency’s thinking relates to the possibility that the adoption and application of any Final 
Rule might, at some juncture, be subject to legal challenge by an entity or enterprise 
governed by the regulation. On this score, for instance, the Administrative Procedure Act 
explicitly prohibits agencies from exercising delegated power in a manner that would be 
considered “arbitrary and capricious” and allows courts to set aside and invalidate all such 
non-compliant rules.27 Ignoring or dismissing serious, substantive comments received about 
proposed rules would fall into that category (Pierce et al. 1992: 303-307). 
 Notwithstanding from those instances in which a regulatory agency has adopted 
rules and standards in a manner considered “arbitrary and capricious,” the Administrative 
Procedure Act provides that power is assigned to U.S. courts to overturn or nullify 
regulations in certain other instances.28 Since the judiciary’s primary responsibility is to 
assure that a government of limited powers is not acting in a manner beyond its specific 
powers, or otherwise acting inconsistent therewith, the courts are often regarded as having 
substantial (and superior) authority to set aside and invalidate the actions of regulatory 
agencies (Pierce et al. 1992: 331f). While that is largely true, when looking at the 
jurisprudence of the courts in the United States on that matter, it is apparent that, perhaps, 
such a view can be carried too far. The leading case on this matter is the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1984 decision on Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., in which 
it was recognized that, notwithstanding the judiciary’s expansive review authority, 
 
27 See 5 U.S.C. sec. 706(2)(A).  
28 One such instance is the overturning or nullification of a rule which fails the ‘logical outgrowth 
test.’ The doctrine of logical outgrowth stipulates that a Final Rule must be the logical outgrowth of 
the Proposed Rule; thus, the former should be “presaged adequately” in the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (Kannan 1996: 214f). 
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interpretations and understandings of a regulatory agency about its own rules and 
governing statutes are entitled to deference by the judiciary.29 
 Essentially, while it is correct that the courts may be the final arbiter of what the 
law (regulatory or statutory) should mean, unless the courts determine that an agency’s 
interpretations and understandings are incorrect – because there is only a single accurate 
interpretation and understanding that can be had – it often allows the agency’s 
interpretations and understandings to remain intact (Pierce et al. 1992: 348-353). In many 
situations, there is no single interpretation or understanding. Several interpretations or 
understandings are reasonable. And, as long as the relevant agency has selected one of the 
reasonable possibilities, then the courts – who are not the experts in the matters dealt with 
by the agency on a daily basis – often defer to the interpretation or understanding of the 
agency, despite the fact that the court itself would have chosen one of the other 
reasonable alternatives (Pierce et al. 1992: 348-353). It requires noting, however, that the 
Chevron ruling has, over the years, caused consternation of the part of many who feel it 
encourages agency over-reach.30 Thus, political efforts have been made, through the 
appointment of federal judges hostile to the so-called Chevron Doctrine, to cultivate activist 
courts favoring a particular policy agenda in order to erode agency regulatory power.31 
 
THE CFTC 
With the CFTC Act of 1974, Congress established the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission as a federal administrative agency.32 Passed by a Democratic House of 
 
29 See 467 U.S. 837 (Sup. Ct. 1984). This ruling is colloquially known at the ‘Chevron Doctrine.’ 
30 See Aman (1988: 1223-1236) and Farina (1989). 
31 What must always be kept in-mind, though, is that measures of this sort can cut both ways. With 
shifting political winds can come the filling of judicial vacancies that would threaten earlier prevailing 
ideological objectives. 
32 Public (Pub.) Law No. 93-463, 88 Statute (Stat.) 1389 (1974). 
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Representatives and a Republican Senate, and signed into law by Republican President 
Gerald R. Ford, Jr., the establishment of the CFTC created an agency separate from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which would be specifically responsible for 
regulating commodity transactions (Markham 2002: 45).33 Further, the CFTC replaced its 
predecessor organization, the Commodity Exchange Authority – a regulatory agency within 
the Department of Agriculture that was established by the Commodity Exchange Act of 
1936 (Markham 2002: 44f).34  
The formation of the CFTC in the early 1970s came during a period of pronounced 
macroeconomic and commodity market instability. An important contributing factor to this 
instability was the development and proliferation of novel financial instruments, such as 
unregulated commodity options35 and leverage contracts,36 in addition to the rapid 
expansion of futures market activity (Markham 2002: 43). Congress sought to address the 
perceived ineffectiveness of the earlier Commodity Exchange Act in managing changes and 
disruptions to commodity (derivative) markets during this period through the 
establishment of the CFTC (Rechtschaffen 2014: 318; Markham 2002: 44ff; Greenstone 
1977). Like its predecessor, the Commodity Exchange Authority, the CFTC was tasked with 
administering the Commodity Exchange Act (Lower 1978: 1111), and, thus, with regulating 
commodity derivatives.  
 
33 The SEC served as regulator of securities, such as equities (stocks).  
34 The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 itself being derived from three preceding acts: The Cotton 
Futures Act of 1917; Futures Trading Act of 1921, which was ruled unconstitutional by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1922 and again in 1926; and the Grain Futures Act of 1922, which was upheld by 
the U.S. Supreme Court (Rechtschaffen 2014: 321; Lower 1978: 1100; Clark 1978: 1183).  
35 Per the CFTC Glossary, “An option on a commodity or a futures contract.” See: 
http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.htm#C. 
36 Publicly marketed over-the-counter contracts for the future right to a commodity which require 
buyers to make an initial down payment and to occasionally pay fees to the seller of the contract 
(White and Stein 1987: 342).  
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The CFTC Act structured the Commission to be composed of five commissioners, of 
which one serves as chairperson (Rechtschaffen 2014: 319).37 Each commissioner is 
appointed by the U.S. President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to a five-year 
term, with the chairperson selected from among the five commissioners by the President 
(Rechtschaffen 2014: 319). To maintain a degree of political party independence, the 
Commission is prohibited from having more than three commissioners from the same 
political party at any time (Rechtschaffen 2014: 319). Further, housed within the CFTC are 
various divisions in charge of legal matters, market oversight, and regulatory enforcement, 
among other specializations. While the exact titles and the number of these divisions have 
changed since the CFTC’s inception, all divisions play an integral role in the Commission’s 
rulemaking, surveillance, and enforcement endeavors.   
As an independent federal administrative agency, the CFTC was provided with 
rulemaking power in the domain of commodity derivative markets. Additionally, the CFTC 
was granted oversight and enforcement authority regarding these markets (Markham 2002: 
45). Enforcement authority was also given to the CFTC, and takes the form of agency-led 
investigations and prosecutions of not only entities violating the Commodity Exchange Act, 
but of those not adhering to the agency’s regulations, or improperly marketing and selling 
commodity futures or options products to their customers (Rechtschaffen 2014: 320; 
Markham 2002: 45). Nevertheless, as an administrative agency established by Congress, the 
CFTC is subject to Congressional reauthorization, with presidential assent, roughly every 
three to four years. 
 
 
37 See Appendix A for a table of all CFTC chairpersons since January 22, 1993 and all commissioners 
active since 2001. 
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Moving from the presentation of background considerations, the second portion of the 
thesis provides the analytical grounding for the analysis of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking between 2010 and 2016. The first of this part’s chapters, and the third chapter 
overall, comprises a two-section literature review and explains the research fields to which 
this study on OTC commodity derivative rulemaking contributes. The second of this part’s 
chapters, and the fourth overall, explicates the following relating to Cultural Political 
Economy (CPE): (1) the central tenets of the CPE theoretical framework and how it can move 
beyond existing approaches to rulemaking analysis, (2) how it is applied in existing 
literature, and (3) how the instant study employs CPE in relation to its OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking research focus. The third chapter of this part, and the fifth overall, 
details this research project’s data collection procedures and its methodology. This chapter 
presents the eclectic methodological procedure followed in the CPE-informed analysis of 
























Chapter 3 – Literature Review 
 
To situate the forthcoming analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the CFTC 
within its scholarly domain, a review of extant literature must be conducted. Broadly 
speaking, this analysis seeks to contribute to a better understanding regarding the field of 
rulemaking within an administrative agency. More narrowly, however, the effort endeavors 
to advance scholarly insight into financial regulatory rulemaking at the CFTC during the 
Dodd-Frank era. As the central theme involves how CFTC policymakers constructed the 
rules for regulating OTC commodity derivatives during the Dodd-Frank rulemaking period, 
literature relating to this theme (i.e., rulemaking) is the basic focus in this chapter. To 
inquire into how existing scholarly research engages with the construction of rules and 
regulations at the administrative agency level (a domain subsumed under the broad 
headings of ‘public policy’ and ‘regulatory governance’), this chapter is divided into two 
sections; each of which explores distinct elements of administrative agency rulemaking 
research. 
 The first section provides an overview of how existing literature conceptualizes 
rulemaking and approaches the analysis of this administrative process. For instance, in 
much of the literature, reference is made to rulemaking as a contested process that 
involves a variety of actors – external and internal to the administrative agency – who seek 
to affect the development of regulation(s) at various sites and scales. As such, approaches 
to the analysis of rulemaking range from narrow rule content analysis (of the notices, 
comments, and replies) to examining the roles played by advocacy coalitions and/or 
industry interests. This section will present those actors and factors identified in the 
literature as significant to rulemaking, and will then concisely, yet critically, engage with a 
few approaches to analyzing this administrative process. The chief contribution of this 
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section is that it highlights the need for an analysis of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking to be multifaceted in its conceptual and analytical approach, such as can be 
accomplished through the adoption of a Cultural Political Economy approach (see Chapter 
4).   
 The second section explores what the extant rulemaking literature has identified as 
important considerations, or factors, to the construction of rules. Additionally, as this 
section explores those influences significant to rule development, some criticisms of the 
reviewed studies’ in light of the instant project’s research focus are concomitantly made. 
This section comprises three subsections emphasizing different strands of literature. 
The first body of literature explored under this section’s heading is that gauging the 
CFTC’s Dodd-Frank rulemaking process and the influences thereon, in particular. This 
addresses the single-most closely related matter to this research project’s central focus – 
the under-researched domain of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking – and critically 
examines what other authors have suggested were the influences on Commission 
policymakers’ formulation of the OTC (commodity) derivative rules. Starting from a more 
general vantage than the first, the second body of literature to be taken up involves the 
influences on and inputs into administrative agency rulemaking in general, CFTC aside. This 
implicates Susan Webb Yackee’s insightful analyses of government agency rulemaking 
processes, among contributions from other authors, and extends well-beyond the working 
of such processes within the CFTC itself. Finally, the third body of literature examined 
involves the well-established studies on, and recent advances in, theories of regulatory 
capture. More theoretically driven than the preceding two bodies of literature, it shares 
with the second a focus not confined to CFTC Dodd-Frank rulemaking. Instead, the 
regulatory capture literature provides a critical examination of how agencies can become 
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the servants of those they are charged with supervising. Consequently, this literature 
provides a unique twist on one’s perspective when it comes to the OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking process.  
 
RULEMAKING AND ITS ANALYSIS IN THE LITERATURE 
Conceptualizing the Rulemaking Process in the Literature 
Rulemaking is the means through which statutory public policy is implemented (Anderson 
2006). As such, the rulemaking process is a key component of overall policymaking in the 
U.S. federal governmental system (Crow et al. 2017: 1319). Much like the enactment of 
legislation (e.g., the Dodd-Frank Act or the Commodity Exchange Act), the development of 
regulations through the construction of rules is an inherently political process that affects a 
multitude of stakeholders and that can be influenced by a range of factors, and one in 
which contestation can occur across a variety of rulemaking events.  
 In conceptualizing rulemaking, existing literature emphasizes the role of various 
actors – external and internal to an administrative agency – in conditioning the regulations 
developed by an agency through this administrative process (Moe 2012). One such 
approach to understanding rulemaking posits the existence of an ‘iron triangle’ of actors 
involved in regulatory formation (Duffy 2003). In this conception of rulemaking, outside 
interest groups (e.g., collections of businesses), Congress (e.g., through its various 
administrative agency oversight committees), and internal administrative agency 
bureaucrats are joined together – thus forming the ‘iron triangle’ – as key cogs in the 
rulemaking relationship (Duffy 2003). Most notably, this notion of rulemaking posits that 
internal agency bureaucratic actors are captive to the whims of Congressional actors and to 
the demands of external interest group actors; thus, developing regulations that largely 
reflect these outside actors’ policy preferences (Bernstein 1955). Nevertheless, Heclo 
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(1977) and Golden (1998) have critiqued the ‘iron triangle’ approach to conceptualizing 
rulemaking as not being expansive enough in that other actors might be involved and that 
the relationship between the three posited actors in the triangle may not always be one 
denoted by bureaucratic captivation. 
 Similar approaches to conceiving of the rulemaking process invoke the importance 
of one or more political actors external to an administrative agency. For instance, 
numerous authors posit the primacy of Congress as the powerbroker in the rulemaking 
process (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins et al. 1987; Calvert et al. 1989; Huber 
et al. 2001; Moe 2012: 7). Although agency bureaucrats themselves physically write the 
rules, this literature argues that Congress exercises its power over rulemaking through its 
agency oversight functions (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984), the general provision or 
restriction of financial appropriations (Natow 2015: 372), the Senate’s confirmation process 
of administrative agency leadership (Ketcham-Colwill 2014: 1640), and/or the issuance of 
limitation riders which forbid an agency from spending Congressionally-allocated funds on 
Congressionally-specified uses (MacDonald 2010). Conversely, other researchers have 
grappled with the idea that it is in fact the President who arguably has discretion over 
rulemaking, either through his or her position as ultimate head of the Executive Branch of 
the U.S. government under which the administrative agency is located (Sargentich 1993) or 
by virtue of the contemporary development of mandatory presidential suite-level review of 
codified rules and regulations (Ketcham-Colwill 2014; Pasachoff 2016; Haeder and Yackee 
2018). Moreover, some authors have combined these two external political actors38 to 
suggest that administrative agencies serve as agents to their Congressional and Presidential 
 
38 While not per se acting as a principal to the administrative agency, other literature notes the 
power of the Judiciary, with its judicial review authority of agency regulations (see Chapter 2), 




principals, and that rulemaking outcomes are controlled by these principals (McCubbins et 
al. 1987; Waterman and Meier 1998; Yackee 2003). 
 Those external agency actors not a part of the formal U.S. governmental system39 
likewise figure prominently into literature conceptualizing rulemaking. As referenced above 
through the notion of an ‘iron triangle’ of actors, outside interest groups – comprising 
business firms or entities representing the interests of businesses – are identified by many 
authors as critical actors in the development of administrative agency rules (Stigler 1971; 
Yackee and Yackee 2006; Wagner et al. 2011; Carpenter and Moss 2014). Individual 
business firms, such as a corporation commenting on a rule, can also serve as potentially 
vital actors in the rulemaking process. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section, this is often hypothesized due to the presumed privileged position occupied by 
prospective business regulatees in the national economy (Lindblom 1977: 175) and/or 
because of these interests’ ability to provide technical data, information, and other 
intellectual resources to the regulator in connection with the rules under construction 
(Wagner 2010; Weber 2012; McCarty 2014). In relation to this last point, non-industry 
actors, such as public interest groups and public advocacy coalitions (see below), have 
similarly been understood as entities capable of providing vital intellectual resources to 
regulators as well as facilitating exchanges of non-technical perspective relating to public 
sentiment on regulatory matters (Farina et al. 2012; Ziegler and Woolley 2016).  
Importantly, these external, non-governmental actors typically have access – 
though not always on an equitable basis vis-à-vis business interests and non-business 
interests (Ziegler and Woolley 2016: 261) – to a range of venues through which to 
potentially affect regulatory development within the rulemaking process (West 2004; West 
 
39 Individual citizens, or members of the general public, can also be included in this class of actors 
(Farina et al. 2012).  
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2009). Such venues, or rulemaking-related events, include the pre-proposal stage of 
rulemaking (i.e., before a proposed rule is codified and promulgated), notice and comment 
periods during formal rulemaking, informal meetings with regulators, roundtable 
discussions, and conferences, to name a few. The significance of these regulatory events – 
particularly as it relates to the pre-proposal time period, the notice and comment 
sequence, and informal meetings – will be discussed at length in the subsequent section of 
this chapter.  
As can be gleaned from the literature reviewed above, there exists extensive 
scholarship on the role that actors outside of an administrative agency play in rulemaking. 
Moreover, as can be inferred from the above review, much research either omits the 
significance of internal agency bureaucrats to the rulemaking process or, when their 
presence is mentioned, like in the ‘iron triangle’ conceptualization, relegates these internal 
actors to nothing more than the pawns of external actors. Nevertheless, actors internal to 
administrative agencies – such as chairpersons, commissioners, and other policymakers – 
can be significant players in rulemaking, and can exercise pivotal discretion and individual 
agency over this administrative process (Rourke 1969; Niskanen 1971). For example, as 
reviewed in Chapter 2, administrative agencies are delegated authority by both the 
Executive and Legislative branches of government to implement rules and regulations 
(Kerwin and Furlong 2011), and depending on the expansiveness of the authorizing 
legislation – which in the case of the Dodd-Frank Act resulted in abundant rulemaking 
discretion for the CFTC – this delegated authority, as exercised by agency policymakers, can 
be broad and impactful to rulemaking (Stone 2002; Kerwin and Furlong 2011). Such 
discretion can be exercised for specific and intentional purposes given that internal agency 
actors – like their external counterparts – possess their own policy preferences (Knott and 
Miller 1987; Potter and Shipan 2019) and that some have the capacity to set the agency’s 
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regulatory agenda (West and Raso 2013) as well as to determine the content of rules 
(Golden 1998). 
The above review of literature emphasizing the place of actors – external and 
internal to an administrative agency – in a conception of rulemaking highlights the 
importance of considering a variety of actors when conceiving of (and analyzing) this 
administrative process; something that is not, however, consistently done across the 
spectrum of rulemaking literature, such as in the ‘iron triangle’ model. It is vital to note that 
scholarship definitively establishing which actors have the most sway in regulatory matters 
across the expanse of rulemaking process remains unsettled (Yackee 2003; Natow 2015: 
362). As such, determinations for as much necessitate being concretely established on a 
case-by-case basis. This is particularly evident when determining actors’ actual influence on 
rule content (i.e., linking specific actor speech acts, or other inputs, to the text of an 
enforceable regulation), which is at the core of regulations (Rashin 2020). Additionally, 
while actors undoubtably possess the capacity to influence regulatory formation, other 
critical non-actor-specific factors might also be significant to rulemaking and can, thus, be 
included in a conception thereof. 
One such factor is the impact of ideational considerations, and more specifically, 
agency policymakers’ beliefs regarding regulation (Gaventa 1980; Lukes 2005). For example, 
a chairperson of an administrative agency might articulate a regulatory vision for which he 
or she is deeply committed to advancing (e.g., the removal of certain regulatory 
requirements on a specific class of business actors who, in the chair’s view, have been 
unnecessarily burdened), and through his or her endowed bureaucratic discretion as 
agency head, be able to achieve the advocated policy change. As noted in the literature on 
policymaker beliefs and rulemaking, beliefs can motivate policymakers to pursue particular 
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rulemaking outcomes as well as efficacious regulatory relationships with other like-minded 
actors (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Lukes 2005; Sabatier and Weible 2007).  
Another variable that can be considered when conceiving of the rulemaking process 
is that of context (e.g., institutional, social, economic, political). In such conceptions, 
changing contexts can impact actor actions, reconstitute regulatory relationships (internal 
and external to the administrative agency), and can prompt policy shifts (Sabatier 1986; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). For instance, the recomposition of an agency’s 
leadership, changes to the political party in control of Congress (Shapiro 2007), economic 
crises (Kerwin 2003; Kerwin and Furlong 2011), and alterations to institutional design (e.g., 
the creation of intra-agency rulemaking groups) (Terman 2012) are all contextual factors 
that might be relevant to an understanding of rulemaking.  
A final factor that can be considered here, but one that is often overlooked in 
rulemaking literature, is that of agency history (Terman 2012: 16). While researchers have 
posited that administrative agencies develop identifiable behaviors (Senge 2006; Riley 
2007), it is less clear as to what effect existing regulatory approaches – i.e., a developed 
pattern of regulatory action – might have on the formation or selection of new rule 
content. For instance, and as will be discussed in Part III of this thesis, extant agency 
precedent in one derivative domain can provide policymakers with informative content that 
can be used in the construction of new regulations in another derivative domain (e.g., 
applying futures-style regulations to newly regulatable swaps). 
As has been reviewed in the literature covered in this subsection, rulemaking is a 
contested process that engages a range of an actors and factors across a variety of 
rulemaking events. Nevertheless, as has been shown above, not all conceptualizations of 
this administrative process incorporate the spectrum of actors discussed, and many omit 
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potentially significant factors like ideational persuasions, contextual considerations, and 
agency history and regulatory precedent. Thus, when conceiving of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking, and when approaching the analysis of the construction of these 
financial instruments’ regulation, it is essential to sample broadly on those actors and 
significant factors that influenced the creation of the codified rules.   
 
Analyzing Rulemaking in the Literature 
The character of approaches to analyzing rulemaking in the literature reflects the analytical 
focus of the inquiry. As noted directly above, there exist a plethora of potentially important 
actors and factors for which a rulemaking analysis could take into account. In this 
subsection, a succinct critical review of select approaches to the analysis of rulemaking is 
undertaken in order to provide preliminary efficacy to the Cultural Political Economy-based 
theoretical approach taken in this thesis. 
 The scholarship analyzing rulemaking employs a diverse set of analytical foci that 
range from rule content to broader public policy themes taken from non-rulemaking-
specific literature. Micro-level approaches to analyzing rulemaking include those studies 
that examine the development of rule content (i.e., the text of administrative agency rules) 
in order to establish the influences (e.g., from regulatee comment letters) that conditioned 
the regulations’ codification (Rashin 2020).40 While such research analyzes the important 
core of rulemaking (i.e., the writing of regulations) and can provide linkage between the 
speech acts of outside interested parties (e.g., the written comments of prospective 
regulatees or public interest advocacy groups) and rule text – thus, empirically establishing 
 
40 Other studies in this same vein seek to examine the impact of the volume of comments on final 
rules (Balla 1998) as well as how stylistic changes to the language of final rules can be explained by 
expressed the ‘regulatory sentiments’ of commenting parties (Kirilenko et al. 2014).  
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the influence of these parties on the regulation’s content – its narrow focus can fail to 
consider other variables important to rule construction, such as synchronicities in the 
ideational persuasions of key policymakers and regulated entities as well as more general 
contextual considerations. Drawing on literature from public policy, other approaches to 
rulemaking analysis utilize the researcher Kingdon’s notion of ‘multiple streams’ (i.e., the 
convergence of problems, politics, and policy which give rise to ‘windows’ of opportunity to 
create new policies or rules – Kingdon 2003) as well as Kingdon’s related conception of 
‘agenda setting’ (i.e., how policy issues are incorporated into an administrative agency’s 
implementation agenda – Kingdon 2003) to explain how rules develop (Kamieniecki 2006; 
Rinfret 2009). Although this approach can be used to account for a diverse set of factors – 
e.g., those actors or macroeconomic (contextual) factors affecting the ‘politics’ stream – 
that condition policymaking, such analyses may not include analysis of granular-level rule 
content and could, thus, benefit from the incorporation of additional analytical 
perspectives (e.g., the analysis of discourse or content analysis).  
 Also coming from the public policy literature is the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) as a guide for examining policy processes (Sabatier 1988; Weible et al. 2011). While 
ACF will be further discussed in the next chapter, a brief synopsis of this framework is worth 
presenting here as it has been applied to rulemaking-specific research (Natow 2013). ACF 
provides a relatively expansive view of the policymaking process with its analytical focus 
being that of the meso-level ‘policy subsystem’, or the issue-specific domain in which 
groups of actors with similar beliefs seek to influence policymakers (who may or may not 
share these same beliefs and who, theoretically, may or may not be a part of these same 
groups) and, ultimately, policy outputs that reflect advocated for beliefs (Sabatier 1988; 
Weible et al. 2011: 351). As such, ACF incorporates several of the key considerations 
reviewed in the preceding subsection of this chapter, with its focus on ‘advocacy coalitions’ 
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(i.e., groups of actors holding shared beliefs41 who seek to impact policymaking), ‘policy 
brokers’ (e.g., high-level policymakers at an administrative agency), ‘policy learning’ (i.e., 
the acquisition and selective internal translation of new information) all operating as a part 
of a ‘policy subsystem’ (Sabatier 1998; Weible et al. 2009; Cairney 2012). Although ACF 
seeks to bring together multiple policymaking considerations – such as important actors 
and institutional factors – into a policymaking analysis (or, in this case, a rulemaking 
analysis), and in doing so can provide a detailed account of policy processes, it does suffer 
from a couple key limitations in specific relation to an analytical approach for rulemaking.  
One such limitation is that actors involved in rulemaking – specifically, prospective 
regulatees - may not per se be bound together by shared beliefs, but rather by 
serendipitously converging economic interests, like multiple disparate business entities 
commenting in favor of exceptions to potentially costly derivative reporting regulations 
(Kim and Roh 2008). Thus, while beliefs are important, idiosyncratic interests of specific 
actors within a ‘policy subsystem’ can also be noteworthy (Kim and Roh 2008). Another 
limitation – which will serve as a partial launchpad for this project’s Cultural Political 
Economy-based approach to OTC commodity derivative rulemaking – is that ACF’s focus on 
a ‘policy subsystem’ with its advocacy coalitions (residing at the meso-level) might miss 
important policy process phenomena at the micro- and macro-levels (e.g., the speech acts 
of policymakers or prospective regulatees and matters of political economy as well as 
history, respectively) (Radaelli 1995; Kim and Roh 2008). 
 The central inference that can be drawn from the foregoing critical review of 
existing approaches to analyzing rulemaking is that, given the multitudinous actors and 
 
41 ACF distinguishes between four types of beliefs: (1) “deep core beliefs” which are virtually 
unmovable, (2) “policy core beliefs,” (3) “policy core policy preferences,” and (4) “secondary 




factors that might be of relevance in an understanding of the constructions of rules, an 
appropriate analytical approach for examining this administrative process must allow for 
myriad considerations to be contemplated. Moreover, such an approach must also explore 
considerations from the micro-level (e.g., rule content) through to the macro-level (e.g., 
broader political and economic variables). As will be discussed in the next chapter, meeting 
these standards is the primary benefit of the Cultural Political Economy approach employed 
in this thesis.    
 
IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF RULES: AT THE CFTC, DURING 
RULEMAKING IN GENERAL, AND BROADLY RELATING TO REGULATORY CAPTURE 
Moving from a review of how the extant literature conceptualizes rulemaking and 
approaches the analysis of this administrative process, this section of Chapter 3 presents 
what the existing rulemaking literature has identified as important considerations, or 
factors, to the construction of rules at the CFTC, specifically, and in general across U.S. 
administrative agencies. 
 
On Dodd-Frank Era OTC (Commodity) Derivative Rulemaking at the CFTC 
In the wake of the crisis, U.S. financial regulators, under pressure from Congress and the 
citizenry alike, were compelled to collectively re-imagine and re-conceptualize their 
approaches to the regulation of financial markets (Carpenter 2010). Thus, the entrenched 
regulatory approaches of roughly four decades of financial regulation were rendered (at 
least) fluid and open to varying degrees of new inputs at multiple governmental levels 
(Underhill 2015; Carruthers 2013); with influences on the administrative agency process of 
rulemaking serving as key considerations to understanding the financial regulatory efforts 
and outcomes during the Dodd-Frank Act implementation period. Literature on over-the-
counter derivative rulemaking at the CFTC after the enactment of Dodd-Frank can be 
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segmented into two categories: research engaging the development of particular OTC 
derivative rules; and research engaging the organizational conditions specific to the 
Commission which can affect the rules that the agency puts in place. This subsection begins 
with an analysis of existing research on the Commission’s development of specific OTC 
derivative rules. It should be noted that as Dodd-Frank era OTC rulemaking was only 
ostensibly completed in 2016 with the long-awaited codification of a final rule on position 
limits, literature engaging either the formation of specific OTC derivative rules, or the CFTC 
organizational conditions during the Dodd-Frank rulemaking era, remain relatively nascent 
fields of inquiry.  
One central research article on Dodd-Frank era rulemaking in the domain of OTC 
derivatives — the first of the two categories just referenced — comes from Ziegler and 
Woolley (2016). In their study, the researchers examined two cases of Dodd-Frank financial 
reforms – the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), and the 
construction of (non-commodity-related) OTC derivative regulations at the CFTC. Through 
this they sought to elaborate on the matter of influences faced by Commission 
policymakers (Ziegler and Woolley 2016). The researchers based their analysis on three 
assumptions.  
First, the acceptance by regulators of “deregulatory policy” in the three decades 
preceding the 2007/2008 financial crisis resulted in exposing financial firms to both 
increased competition associated with reduced barriers to entry, and entrenched 
arguments for “industry self-regulation” and of “free-market principles” (Ziegler and 
Woolley 2016: 251). Second, because of these reduced entry barriers, traditional notions of 
regulatory capture – to be discussed later in this chapter – were transformed into “a diffuse 
but pervasive sort of intellectual capture” (Ziegler and Woolley 2016: 251). This meant that 
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financial firms (and those transacting derivatives) had to rely on public acceptance of their 
activities as being central to the functioning of the U.S. economy in order to exert influence 
over their regulation; rather than being able to influence their regulation simply through 
their privileged position (Lindblom 1977: 175) as a profit-generating cog in a capitalistic 
system. Thus, Ziegler and Woolley (2016: 251f) assert that financial firms’ intellectual 
position to influence financial regulations was open to contestation by “policy 
entrepreneurs and activists” when the financial crisis struck. Third, in the post-enactment 
phase of Dodd-Frank, two distinct advocacy networks (coalitions) formed to influence 
administrative agency rulemaking in favor of either stringent regulations or continued self-
regulation: the “stability alliance” and the “self-regulatory alliance,” respectively (Ziegler 
and Woolley 2016: 252).  
From these assertions, Ziegler and Woolley endeavor to analyze the roles that 
these advocacy networks had in the creation of the FSOC and the CFTC’s development of 
OTC derivative rules. (Since this manuscript engages the regulation of OTC commodity 
derivatives, only the OTC case will be discussed.) The researchers juxtapose the existence of 
the stability alliance and the self-regulatory alliance with the notion of regulatory capture 
and business power. In doing so, Ziegler and Woolley examine the self-regulatory alliance’s 
ability to minimize regulatory interference through the assertion of their economic position 
in the economy. Additionally, this juxtaposition allows for a critical assessment of the 
possible role of the stability alliance in both thwarting the self-regulatory alliance’s 
influence and in shaping OTC derivative rules. 
Through an analysis of rule comment letters, final rules, court cases, and 
policymaker interviews, Ziegler and Woolley arrive at a few conclusions regarding the 
influence of the stability alliance and the self-regulatory alliance on OTC derivative 
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rulemaking at the CFTC. The main finding was the stability alliance’s success in influencing 
Commission rulemaking towards its end of more stringent OTC derivative regulation 
(Ziegler and Woolley 2016: 272f). As the researchers note, this finding does not conform to 
the implications of traditional notions of regulatory capture, in that in spite of the stability 
alliance’s lack of monetary resources and absent a structural position in the economy, it 
was, nonetheless, able to both curtail the influence of the self-regulatory alliance and 
provide extensive intellectual support to the rulemaking process (Ziegler and Woolley 2016: 
261). Supporting this position, the researchers posited that in a rulemaking environment 
still under the specter of financial crisis, the ideational undergirding of the self-regulatory 
alliance was subject to contestation and effective counter-argument (Ziegler and Woolley 
2016: 272). Further, insofar as the CFTC was mandated by Congress to codify rules bringing 
OTC derivative transactions under its purview – a marketplace of which the authors assert 
that the CFTC had limited knowledge – an opportunity existed for the stability alliance to 
provide the Commission with intellectual and legal resources42 for purposes of fulfilling the 
agency’s directive (Ziegler and Woolley 2016: 271f). In this specific case, a crisis-induced 
rupture in the ideational hegemony of the otherwise non-regulated, coupled with the need 
of the CFTC to develop regulations in (largely) unregulated markets, facilitated conditions in 
which the power and influence of key economic actors resulted in them playing second 
fiddle to the intellectual positions of a small, yet cohesive alliance of non-economic actors. 
Nonetheless, as alluded to in passing by Ziegler and Woolley (2016: 261f), these factors 
 
42 The notion that non-industry individuals or groups are able to influence rulemaking through their 
ability to leverage intellectual and legal resources reflects what Carstensen and Schmidt (2016: 323-
326) refer to as “power through ideas.” Originating in discursive institutionalist thought, “power 
through ideas” refers to the ability of individuals or groups to persuade policymakers to “accept and 
adopt their views” (Carstensen and Schmidt (2016: 323). Specific to the case described by Ziegler and 
Woolley (2016), in the terminology of Carstensen and Schmidt (2016: 324), the stability alliance can 
be understood to have made “cognitive arguments” that successfully defined problems that CFTC 
rulemaking sought to solve, provided the Commission with an adequate solution, and that were 
coherent with the CFTC’s mission to regulate OTC derivative markets.   
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alone were not sufficient to ensure the success of the stability alliance, since it still 
remained critical that CFTC policymakers perceived regulatory change as warranted.  
While Ziegler and Woolley’s account of Dodd-Frank era OTC derivative rulemaking 
at the CFTC provides a pertinent analysis of the roles of ideas, expertise, advocacy 
coalitions, and “knowledge regimes” in influencing this regulatory process, a few criticisms 
are appropriate. First, Ziegler and Woolley’s paper lacks a clear methodological approach. 
Aside from stating their analysis of rules, comment letters, court cases, and interviews, the 
means by which the authors arrive at their conclusions are largely anecdotal and 
speculative; lacking a robust framework from which to derive their findings. Second, the 
article fails to acknowledge the historical relationship that the CFTC had with OTC markets 
since the Commission’s inception (see Chapter 6). This is important because, throughout 
the roughly four decades preceding the drafting of the Dodd-Frank era rules, the CFTC and 
other government organizations (e.g., the GAO) developed knowledge about OTC 
derivatives through their interactions with and studies of these instruments and their 
markets.43  
Thus, to the third criticism. Specifically, given that the CFTC possessed, at least in 
general, knowledge of the functioning of OTC derivatives, the principal line of inquiry into 
why the CFTC developed the OTC derivative regulations it did should move beyond 
analyzing competing “knowledge regimes” to assessing the range of factors that 
conditioned CFTC policymakers’ construction of a particular regulatory approach – such as 
the influence of an agency chairperson and his or her regulatory vision, and the impact of 
existing regulatory precedent. Fourth, and finally, it is possible that Ziegler and Woolley’s 
 
43 See, as stated in Chapter 6, the CFTC’s and GAO’s analyses of Exempt Commercial Markets for OTC 
commodity derivatives: CFTC (2007) and GAO (2007). 
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findings might not be replicable over other, unexamined Dodd-Frank era CFTC rule-
makings. (This point will be reexamined in this study’s conclusion.) 
Notwithstanding these critiques, this article does give prominence to the influence 
of ideas in OTC derivative market regulatory policymaking. Further, the work of Ziegler and 
Woolley provides an empirical example of the limits of theories of regulatory capture in 
explaining policy outcomes, while also serving as a solid basis for understanding ideational 
aspects of Dodd-Frank era OTC derivative market regulations. Additional research in this 
domain could benefit from a more detailed and critical exploration of the range of factors 
influencing policymakers’ construction of regulatory approaches. 
Emphasizing the perceptions of CFTC policymakers during Dodd-Frank rulemaking, 
another important article comes from Krug (2015). In short, Krug (2015) describes the 
intent behind agreeing to a financial transaction by developing two categories: investing 
and pretending. The former category, as Krug (2015: 1559) argues, explains the purpose 
behind securities (equities) transactions, while the latter category denotes the intended 
purpose behind a swap transaction. (It is worth pointing out that the author’s definition of 
swap conforms to that used in Chapter 1 of this thesis, and not the statutory definition of a 
‘swap’ adopted by the CFTC post-Dodd-Frank. Thus, for Krug (2015), options and other 
financial instruments containing a variable commitment are not included in the author’s 
argument, even though they are subject to regulation as swaps by the CFTC – as discussed 
in-depth later in this paper.) 
In the article’s analysis of the CFTC’s formulation of Dodd-Frank era rules regulating 
swap dealers, Krug (2015) uses the notion of “pretending” as the determinative perception 
held by Commission policymakers regarding the nature of a swap agreement. Policymakers 
treated swaps as if their intended purpose was rooted in “pretending”; thus, speculating on 
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the value of an asset referent without purchasing or selling the asset, unlike with 
“investing” (Krug 2015: 1562). This, in turn, influenced how regulators at the CFTC drafted 
rules concerning swap dealers. The result being, as argued by Krug (2015: 1559), a 
pretense-based regulatory regime of swaps and swap dealers that burdens OTC derivative 
end-users and “excessively hinder[s] swap use.” Krug (2015: 1610-13), concludes that for 
the Commission to achieve the Dodd-Frank Act’s objectives, it must exchange its current 
perception of swaps as instruments of pretense which conceives of swaps as speculative, 
yet information-providing, financial instruments. Accepting the Commission’s current 
pretense perception would seem to require only a regulatory regime of extensive 
information disclosure, like that associated with securities (equities) investing, in order to 
achieve the Act’s objectives. 
 Two critiques of the Krug article can be presented. First, the author does not offer 
an account of the phenomena that may have led CFTC policymakers to formulate their 
perception of swaps as financial instruments of “pretending.” The article, however, posits 
that swaps are self-evident instruments of “pretending,” and, that as evidenced by the fact 
that the swap regulations did not conform to the intended spirit of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(Krug 2015: 1594ff), then CFTC policymakers must simply have been aware of the 
instrument’s self-evident nature and viewed swaps accordingly. Second, the author fails to 
consider the implications of the statutory definition of a swap adopted by the CFTC – a 
definition that explicitly identifies variable commitments (optionality) in a derivative 
contract as being the hallmark of a swap.44 Including a discussion of the CFTC’s definition of 
 
44 For instance, see the CFTC’s release entitled Final Rules and Interpretations i) Further Defining 
“Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; ii) Regarding “Mixed 
Swaps”; and iii) Governing Books and Records for “Security-Based Swap Agreements” at page 5 for a 
discussion on the inclusion of optionality into swap determinations. Available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/fd_factshe
et_final.pdf. This notion of how the Commission determines the nature of a swap in the context of 
OTC commodity derivatives will be a focal point of later analysis and discussion in this thesis.  
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a swap could provide for a different conclusion regarding the primary lens (i.e., away from 
“pretending”) through which Commission officials viewed their regulation of swaps (and, 
more generally, OTC derivatives). Finally, emphasizing the need for further research on the 
CFTC rulemaking following the passage of Dodd-Frank, Krug (2015: 1587) states that 
“virtually no attention” has been paid by academicians to the Commission’s OTC derivative 
rulemaking. 
Recently, however, the works of Helleiner (2018) and Pagliari (2018) have provided 
general insight into the CFTC’s Dodd-Frank era rulemaking efforts. In Helleiner (2018), the 
author posits that through the Commission’s crafting of its position limits rule, agency 
policymakers sought, among other things, to bolster “transparency and resilience” (i.e., the 
Dodd-Frank imaginary; see Chapter 4 and 6) of the marketplace for commodity derivatives. 
Furthermore, the author suggests that several important variables conditioning this rule 
were evident, such as “interest group mobilization,” “historical norms,” and agency 
precedent (Helleiner 2018: 220). Although the forthcoming analysis of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking does not investigate the formation of position limit regulations, 
Helleiner’s remarks on the potential influence of these factors is worth bearing in-mind as 
these are relevant considerations for the instant study.  
Regarding the Pagliari (2018) article, this author considers the political economy of 
Dodd-Frank Act rule implementation between 2010 and 2015. The central proposition 
advanced by Pagliari (2018) is that during the implementation of Dodd-Frank (i.e., the 
administrative agency rulemaking phase), some the Act’s reforms, though not all, were 
“watered down” as a result of lobbying by various industry interests. Pagliari analyzes the 
2010 through 2015 rulemaking period from a general perspective, and posits that across 
the rule-makings of both the CFTC and SEC, there existed “formal and informal coalitions” 
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between financial (e.g., banks) and non-financial (e.g., major commodity companies, such 
as Cargill and Shell) actors that were, occasionally, successful in influencing the agencies’ 
regulations in favor of these groups’ business interests (Pagliari 2018: 163). While Pagliari’s 
research complements some of the key themes found in the forthcoming analysis of OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking, the researcher’s study of Dodd-Frank rule 
implementation does suffer from a central flaw. Namely, Pagliari (2018) does not consider 
any factors, other than the influence of interest groups (and advocacy coalitions), that may 
have conditioned policymakers’ rulemaking endeavors. Thus, potentially significant 
variables that affected the implementation of Dodd-Frank era rules were omitted in the 
author’s research. With this in-mind, the study of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking 
conducted in this thesis does account for a variety of factors – beyond those discussed by 
Pagliari (2018) – which influenced CFTC policymakers’ construction of OTC commodity 
derivative rules.  
Moving to broader considerations on possible influences on CFTC policymakers’ 
rule-making, a few items from the relevant literature are worth discussing. While produced 
by the notoriously anti-regulation think tank Mercatus Center, Peirce (2014) suggests that, 
among other things, during its Dodd-Frank era rulemaking, the CFTC experienced internal 
and external pressures to hastily write OTC derivative rules. Such pressures to pursue 
expeditious rule writing, as Peirce (2014: 61ff) argues, resulted in the Commission drafting 
and adopting incomplete or error-filled rules with policymakers operating under the 
assumption that these shortcomings would be corrected at a future date through the 
issuance of staff letters and agency interpretations and through further rulemaking.  
Other literature, while not specific to rulemaking at the CFTC, provides insight into 
various aspects of the Commission as an organization. This research engages the second of 
55 
 
the two categories of research alluded to in the opening paragraph of the current section of 
the instant study (i.e., organizational conditions that can affect rulemaking policy choices). 
For instance, in research examining the cultural differences between the CFTC and SEC, Im 
(2013) posits three organizationally-defining features of the CFTC: (1) a commitment to the 
soundness and promotion of competitive markets; (2) less emphasis on market participant 
information disclosure than its securities regulating counterpart; and (3) a professional 
culture dominated by economists which espouses economic empiricism in rulemaking and 
encourages competition within even regulated markets. As argued by Im (2013), these 
three features are functions of the historical context in which the CFTC was founded, the 
sophistication of futures and options market participants, a commitment—stemming from 
its economic-focused regulatory approach—to reducing costs, and the Commission’s 
organizational structure. This account of the CFTC corroborates and expands on similar 
research by Markham (2009) and Muellerleile (2015), which loosely examine the 
Commission’s culture by tracing historical, legal, and legislative developments pertinent to 
the agency. Although variations in such organizational culture can occur with the arrival of 
new, Presidentially-appointed leadership and their selected staff, accounting for cultural 
considerations can enrich research into administrative agency rulemaking by providing 
sociological context to an analysis. 
 
On Administrative Agency Rulemaking 
Turning to literature focusing on the myriad influences during, and inputs into, rulemaking 
processes generally, and not in the context of Dodd-Frank OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking particularly, the extensive empirical work of Susan Webb Yackee, as well as 
research complementing this work, must be considered.  
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 Findings from Yackee’s research concerning influences on rulemaking processes 
covered herein can be segmented into three categories: (1) Congressional influence on 
rulemaking; (2) external stakeholder influence on rulemaking; and (3) influence attributed 
to rule comments.  
With regard to the first category, Yackee and Yackee (2016) analyzed the frequency 
with which 17 U.S. administrative agencies, between 1947 and 1987, actually promulgated 
final rules in accordance with a statutory delegation enacted by Congress.45 Their analysis 
found that final rules were promulgated 41% of the time when Congress delegated 
authority for rulemaking, and 63% of the time when Congress mandated that the 
administrative agency finalize a rule (Yackee and Yackee 2016: 395, 437). In explaining their 
findings, Yackee and Yackee (2016: 437-441) carefully suggest that while Congressional 
mandates matter when understanding if a rule is promulgated, the agency’s responsiveness 
to the policy preference of the then-extant Congress (and not the delegating Congress) may 
be pivotal in determining promulgation. The notion of an administrative agency being 
responsive to the policy preferences of a contemporaneous Congress has also been put 
forth in the works of Moe (1985), Ferejohn and Shipan (1989), Scholz (1991), and Shipan 
(2004).46 Concerning the quantitative research of Shipan (2004: 478), this author goes 
beyond the suggestion of Yackee and Yackee (2016) to posit that under certain 
circumstances (e.g., the left or right political-ideological composition of Congressional 
committees), agencies do indeed respond to Congressional preferences – such as an agency 
 
45 The study extended the timeframe for dataset to 1990 for administrative agency rules only (i.e., if 
a statute was by Congress in 1987 and resulted in rulemaking in 1990, then it was included) (Yackee 
and Yackee 2016: 412f).  
46 Other quantitative research, such as that of Carpenter (1996) on the influence of, among other 
variables, the Congress, has, however, yielded mixed results concerning Congressional influence on 
administrative agency decisions. As noted by Shipan (2004: 468), the central problem with the 
research of, for instance, Carpenter (1996), is that such studies lack a detailed examination of the 
conditions “under which Congress might matter.” 
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becoming less activist in its rulemaking as its Congressional oversight committee takes on a 
more conservative political persuasion. 
Along a similar line of inquiry, Yackee and Yackee (2009) examined the impact of a 
divided government47 on the output of administrative agency rules. By analyzing those 
proposed and final rules with a concomitant Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the U.S. 
Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Activities dataset between 1983 – 2005, 
and 1985 – 2005, respectively, Yackee and Yackee (2009: 140f) found that during periods of 
divided government, administrative agencies are – by a statistically significant margin – less 
likely to promulgate proposed and final rules, than during periods marked by single-party 
government. Thus, administrative agency policymakers are “less willing and less able to 
change the regulatory status quo” and engage in legally binding rulemaking when differing 
political parties control different elected federal institutions (Yackee and Yackee 2009: 140). 
   As it pertains to external stakeholder influence on rulemaking, Yackee (2011: 386) 
posits that during the pre-proposal stage of rulemaking – in this case, before a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking is issued – interests groups can favorably affect the policy content of 
the to-be-proposed rule through ex parte (informal, off-the-record) contacts with 
administrative agency policymakers. Further findings from this research on the pre-
proposal period of rulemaking reveal that “informal participants” can provide “technical 
and political information” to policymakers at a higher rate than those not informally 
lobbying when rulemaking is inchoate, and that ex parte lobbying can provide interest 
groups with opportunities to successfully engage in regulatory “agenda setting” and, to a 
larger degree, “agenda blocking” at this early stage (Yackee 2011: 387ff). The implications 
 
47 Defined as when “a different political party controls one of both houses of Congress and the 
presidency” (Yackee and Yackee 2009: 133). For an overview of the potential impacts of presidential 
power alone on administrative agency rulemaking, see Bruff (1979). 
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of these findings being that in certain cases, the early-stage influence of external 
stakeholders through informal means can have iterative effects throughout the entirety of 
the rulemaking process.48 Moreover, Yackee’s study represents an exploration of what 
West (2009) terms the “black box” of rulemaking (i.e., the pre-proposal stage). As such, 
Yackee (2011) contributes to the notably under-researched area of factors conditioning the 
development and the content of an agency’s advance notices of proposed rulemaking and 
its proposed rules.  
 Other research done by Yackee, which explores interest group competition and 
lobbying coalitions, likewise provides critical insights into the influence of external 
stakeholders on rulemaking. For example, in assessing the influence of competing interest 
groups on the content of final rules promulgated by an administrative agency, McKay and 
Yackee (2007: 349f) find that while a greater volume of comments by an interest group’s 
side of a regulatory issue influences – in that side’s favor – the content of the final rule, 
opposing sides seem not to compete, as evidence of counteractive comment and response 
is lacking. While this study admittedly requires an “expanded time horizon” to “yield better 
generalizability of the results,” its support of the notion that policymakers respond 
positively to interest groups on the dominant side of commenting is important to keep in-
mind and to assess when examining OTC commodity derivative rulemaking. Additional work 
studying lobbying coalitions – i.e., coordinated interest groups advancing a shared agenda – 
points to favorable outcomes (whether advancing preferred policies and agendas or 
thwarting unwanted policies and agendas) for coalitions engaged in influencing pre-
proposal agenda setting and final rules through comment submissions (Nelson and Yackee 
2012: 351). Moreover, Nelson and Yackee (2012: 351) establish that consensus around 
 
48 Similar findings can be found in Kerwin (2003) and West (2004). 
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coalition messaging and increased coalition size are important determinants of the 
effectiveness of coalition lobbying on rulemaking.  
 Finally, Yackee and Yackee (2006) analyze the influence of business on rulemaking 
by tracing changes between proposed rules and final rules through an analysis of 40 rules 
from four administrative agencies between 1994 and 2001. The researchers’ findings 
suggest that through formal commenting, business can influence agencies into altering final 
rules to “suit the[ir] expressed desires” (Yackee and Yackee 2006: 135). Furthermore, this 
study found that for the analyzed dataset, business gained an even greater influence over 
changes to proposed rules when it provided a high proportion (90%) of total comments 
(Yackee and Yackee 2006: 136). Nevertheless, as noted by Yackee and Yackee (2006: 137) in 
their concluding remarks, their findings leave open the possibility that well-formed counter-
industry groups that actively comment after a rule has been proposed could mitigate 
business influence. Additionally, Yackee and Yackee (2006: 136f) suggest that their findings 
do not support the claim that business commenters more adequately communicate 
“information or expertise” than do other commenters; thus, making it unlikely that 
“business expertise” is responsible for this group’s dominant influence on changes to the 
content of final rules. 
 In regard to the specific influence of rule comments on rulemaking outcomes, 
findings from three studies are worth noting. First, in Yackee’s 2009 collaborative study on 
the influence of commenters during “agency rule development,” it was concluded that for 
rules originating with an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, commenters – especially 
those comprising a cohesive interest group – were able to influence rule content in their 
favor and/or thwart unwanted, nascent regulations (Naughton and Schmid, et al. 2009: 
274). Similarly, although not in relation to early-stage rulemaking, in analyzing 40 rules from 
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4 federal agencies between 1994 – 2001, Yackee (2006a) determined that administrative 
agency policymakers largely respond positively to the comments of interest groups by 
altering final rules to reflect the regulatory changes proposed by these groups. Finally, in 
assessing the influence of interest group comments on the content of final rules under 
conditions of both Presidential and Congressional attention,49 Yackee (2006b) again 
confirmed that interest group comments can influence the content of final rules in their 
favor. Nevertheless, Yackee (2006b: 742) stipulated that this holds true only when 
Presidential and Congressional attention on rulemaking is low, and that in cases where only 
Congress is attentive to rulemaking, such attention can reduce the influence of interest 
group comments on agency regulations.  
 The findings of Yackee’s research offer important insights into the focus of this 
current paper’s research – OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the CFTC during the 
Dodd-Frank era. Of these insights, the most salient is that rule commenting matters and can 
affect – under certain conditions more than others – the content of the final rules codified 
and promulgated by an administrative agency. Thus, in analyzing rulemaking, it is essential 
to engage with interested party comments and policymaker responses thereto. 
While Yackee’s research provides empirical evidence of influences on rulemaking, it 
does suffer from a few limitations that could prevent the corpus of her work from being 
generalizable to this paper’s case study. These include: (1) a lack of data from financial 
regulatory rulemaking; (2) the sourcing of data from non-significant, low salience rules50; 
 
49 Presidential attention being defined as a function of whether the Office of Management and 
Budget believed the rulemaking to be significant and the preference of the President for regulation 
(Yackee 2006b: 736f). Congressional attention being defined as a function of (1) whether Congress 
required the agency to engage in rulemaking, (2) whether a Congressional committee held a hearing 
regarding the rule, (3) whether Congress gave a deadline for the completion of rulemaking, and (4) 
whether Congresspersons submitted a comment during rulemaking (Yackee 2006b: 735f). 
50 Yackee states as much in each study; see, for instance, Yackee (2006a: 118f).  
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and (3) no studies analyzing rulemaking data from the post-financial crisis period. 
Furthermore, Yackee’s analyses of rulemaking are predominantly quantitative in nature. 
Although this renders such analyses sensitive to textual coding errors, missed linguistic 
nuance in rule comments, and the possibility of limited generalizability of specific results, it 
also means that the work on quantitative rulemaking research could be advanced through 
the addition of detailed qualitative studies, and that any qualitative rulemaking research 
can be complemented by considerations derived from existing quantitative work. As 
indicated in Yackee (2019), the author is cognizant of the need to also examine rulemaking 
from a qualitative perspective in order for research in this field to explore the minutiae and 
complexities of rulemaking. Examples of often overlooked subtleties include the ideological 
persuasion of an agency’s chairperson, the role of expressed regulatory visions and 
missions of an agency’s head in impacting rulemaking, and an agency’s use of interpretive 
guidance, and other documentary genres, in lieu of a rule (Yackee 2019).  
To this point, it should be noted that scholarship on the influence of an agency’s 
chairperson on rulemaking – whether it be the initiation of rulemaking or the character and 
content of codified regulations – is limited (Moe 1982; Ho 2010). Given that, as discussed in 
the first section of this chapter, administrative agencies often possess bureaucratic 
discretion over rulemaking, and that their policymakers have latitude in determining the 
content of rules, assessing the role of an agency’s chair in guiding rulemaking efforts could 
fill an important gap in the rulemaking literature.51 This is particularly relevant as whomever 
is in the position of chair at an independent administrative agency controls that agency’s 
agenda and ostensibly has influence over its regulatory outputs (Datla and Revesz 2013: 
818). 
 
51 This could be especially true for those situations in which the chair exercises discretion over on-




On Capture Theories 
This final subsection briefly covers capture theories—the third of the three research 
categories referenced earlier in this chapter. In short, capture theories seek to explain why 
or how regulations were created and took the form they did. As the predominant notion of 
capture – ‘regulatory capture’ – originated with George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic 
Regulation,”52 this subsection will begin with an examination thereof. Other capture 
theories will also be presented, with each successive theory modifying the preceding 
generation. Concluding this subsection will be a critical discussion of one of the latest 
capture theories, and one which closely relates to financial regulation – ‘knowledge 
capture’.  
 At its core, regulatory capture seeks to explain why government regulation of 
private enterprise occurs (Stigler 1971). In “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Stigler 
posits that often, regulation is sought by private enterprise – thus, supplied by the 
government – and that such regulation is “designed and operated primarily” for the benefit 
of the regulatee (Stigler 1971: 3). Although this position may seem counterintuitive given 
the usually vociferous opposition by industry to regulation – with the protracted non-
regulation of OTC derivatives being a prime example (see Chapter 6) – Stigler’s claim is best 
viewed from the angle of industry protection: firms seek regulation to protect their 
profitable activities from competition, but do not want (increased) regulation of their 
profitable activities. Additionally, regulatory capture holds that policymakers are utility 
maximizers – thus, not acting in the public interest. And that, through the supply of political 
 
52 According to Posner (2014), the study of regulatory capture has its origins in Marver Bernstein’s 
1955 book entitled, “Regulating Business by Independent Commission.” This work, as Posner (2014: 




patronage to the politically motivated and self-interested policymakers, in return, regulated 
industry attains the rewards (regulation) which it has sought (Stigler 1971). Simply put, the 
theory of regulatory capture holds that regulators are often beholden to the interests of 
the regulatee (Carrigan and Coglianese 2016: 2f; Pan 2012; Gowlan 1990).  
 As noted earlier, the theory of regulatory capture is rooted in an economic 
argument for regulation – one based on supply and demand between self-interested actors. 
While the term’s progenitor defined regulatory capture with the regulatee’s desire for 
profit-protecting regulation in-mind (Stigler 1971), historically, the term has been used to 
refer to occasions in which the regulatee subverts the regulatory endeavors of the regulator 
(Posner 2014: 49) through an exercise of regulatee’s structural53 (Tienhaara 2013: 166) and 
instrumental54 (Culpepper and Reinke 2014: 428) power. (Refinements to the notion of 
structural power have been made in the literature on business influence on rulemaking. For 
instance, Young (2015) posits that regulators may respond positively to “structural 
prominence” – i.e., the standing of a business in an economy as measured by its assets, 
total number of employees, etc. – in that “structurally prominent” firms may receive more 
desired regulatory concessions from regulators than their less “structurally prominent” 
counterparts.)  
Although a surfeit of literature on regulatory capture exists, the theory is subject to 
numerous critiques. First, in its originally defined sense, regulatory capture fails to account 
for industry preference for both non-regulation and deregulation.55 Second, the 
characterization of policymakers as simple utility maximizers underestimates the 
complexity of their being. Research from Perry and Wise (1990) and Perry et al. (2010) 
 
53 Derived from a firm’s position within an economy. 
54 Relational power stemming from activities such as lobbying, political donations, or future private-
sector job opportunities. 
55 In explaining private enterprises’ desire for less regulation, see Carpenter (2014).  
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suggest that a confluence of factors, including myriad motivations and a sense of ethics, 
among others, can be present in the being of the policymaker; not singly the influence of 
rational utility maximizing. Third, the theory of regulatory capture does not consider the 
possibility that non-regulatee advocacy groups may overcome regulatee influence and, 
thus, shape administrative agency regulations, as evidenced by some of the rulemaking 
research highlighted in the preceding subsections. 
 While this is not an exhaustive list of critiques to the traditional conception of 
regulatory capture, it evidences its shortcomings and provides a springboard to exploring 
other capture theories which have both expounded and modified this original 
understanding of regulation. One such capture theory is ‘cultural capture.’ Proposed by 
Kwak (2014), cultural capture suggests that there are factors beyond rational self-interest 
which serve to influence the regulator-regulatee dynamic. For instance, Kwak (2014: 80) 
states that shared identity, similar socioeconomic and intellectual status, and mutual 
relationships with the regulatees are factors influencing “regulators’ beliefs and actions.”56 
Through a sense of shared identity, regulators may craft rules to satisfy the demands of 
those they “perceive as being in their in-group”; e.g., the revolving door between banking 
and financial regulatory agencies making membership in one of the sectors 
indistinguishable from the other (Kwak 2014: 80, 83). Additionally, when a regulator 
perceives the regulatee as having similar or greater “social, economic, [and/or] intellectual” 
status, the regulator may accede to the regulatory position advanced by the regulatee as a 
way of signaling or improving its own status (Kwak 2014: 80, 86-89). Finally, a regulatee 
 
56 In Kwak (2014), the notion of cultural capture does not grant the regulatee exclusive claim to the 
three sources of potential influence. Non-industry stakeholders could likewise benefit from shared 
identity, similar socioeconomic and intellectual status, and mutual relationships with regulators.  
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that is a member of a regulator’s social network increases the likelihood that its position is 
advanced by its regulator (Kwak 2014: 80, 91-93).   
 Other capture theories pertinent to the development of financial regulation include 
‘information capture’ and ‘complexity capture.’ In moving beyond the economic rationale 
for capture, as espoused by Stigler, information capture is grounded in the process of 
administrative rulemaking and seeks to explain how regulation is developed under 
conditions of increasing information costs (Wagner 2010). In short, information capture 
contends that regulators can become captured – even unintentionally – by external 
stakeholders because the rulemaking requirement for public comment (1) increases 
information costs for regulators having to assess the comments, which results in (2) 
regulators seeking to constrain information costs by giving deference to those comments 
providing the agency with the highest degree of informational resources for rule 
development (Wagner 2010). Complexity capture advances the centrality of information to 
rulemaking as found in information capture, but situates financial regulatory rulemaking in 
increasingly complex financial markets (Weber 2012). The central proposition of complexity 
capture is that in this increasingly complex domain, financial regulators face an enlarging 
epistemic gap between “what they are able to know and what they need to know” (Weber 
2012: 644f) to effectively regulate. Thus, according to McCarty (2014), regulators defer to 
the expertise of financial firms – whether it be through the revolving employment door or 
through rule comments, among others – when formulating regulation under conditions of 
complexity. The result being industry-captured financial regulators.  
Each of these three modifications to the basic notion of regulatory capture provide 
important insight into possible influences on policymakers at administrative agencies. Aside 
from noteworthy insights, these capture theories move beyond explaining why regulation 
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happens – as in “The Theory of Economic Regulation” – to analyzing what influences on 
rulemaking exist and how these affect regulatory outcomes. The final capture theory to be 
discussed – ‘knowledge capture’ – continues this analytical trend and draws heavily on 
information and complexity capture to propose an updated, Dodd-Frank era notion of 
financial regulatory capture.  
 The premise of ‘knowledge capture’ is that contemporary financial regulation seeks 
to regulate increasingly complex57 financial markets and, thus, necessitates that regulators 
have access to data, information, and knowledge about these increasingly complex markets 
in order to regulate effectively (Becker 2016).58 Emphasizing the role of knowledge and 
expertise, knowledge capture argues that because financial markets complexify, an 
asymmetry opens between the regulator’s knowledge of the financial market and the 
market’s actual workings (Becker 2016: 240). To bridge this chasm, regulators “turn to their 
regulatees” to solicit relevant data, information, and expertise; thus, establishing a 
relationship of dependency with the regulatee (Becker 2016: 239f). As Becker (2016: 231-
234, 240) indicates, this relationship is reinforced by policymaker bounded rationality,59 the 
 
57 Becker (2016: 67), in citing Weber (2012), defines ‘complexity’ as being distinct from ‘complicated’ 
in that that which is complex entails (1) non-linear, reciprocal, and unpredictable interactions 
between objects, (2) the potential for small perturbations to the object producing significant effects 
and large perturbations producing no effects, and (3) the existence of a simultaneous state of 
robustness and fragility (i.e., the complex object appears stable and robust to most internal and 
external changes, but can nonetheless breakdown as a result of endogenous or exogenous factors). 
Moreover, as Becker (2016: 67) notes, that which is complex exhibits interconnectedness with other 
objects. In regards to the complexity of the contemporary financial system, Becker (2016: 66) 
distinguishes between three levels of financial complexity: systemic complexity, organizational 
complexity, and financial product complexity. Each of these levels exhibit the same fundamental 
traits of complexity, but at different sites and scales.  
58 Citing the work of Becker and Willke (2013), Becker (2016: 163) defines ‘data’ as the “observed 
differences about that state of the world surrounding us.” Furthermore, Becker (2016: 163) contends 
that data is the fundamental unit from which information is created. ‘Information,’ according to 
Becker (2016: 164), is the (largely) subjectively determined message (whether linguistic or 
otherwise) drawn from data. Information represents data in its useable form. Finally, as posited by 
Becker (2016: 164f), ‘knowledge’ denotes purely subjective know-how and, generally, flows from 
experience and practice in connection with the knowledge object. 
59 Simply, ‘bounded rationality’ is the limited capacity of a human being to process information 
(Becker 2016: 183). This notion originates in the work of Simon (1955) and rests on fours 
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absence of non-industry expertise, and – similar to the position of Wagner (2010) – the 
nature of the rulemaking process. Additionally, Becker (2016: 236-239) proposes that 
knowledge capture is cyclical: regulator reliance on regulatee expertise is high during 
periods of financial stability and at the initial point of financial crisis, but recedes as public 
and political awareness of the crisis increases, only to return to its pre-crisis level once 
public attention fades and financial regulatory rulemaking becomes technical and 
specialized. 
 Notwithstanding its applicability to studies of financial regulation at administrative 
agencies, and its seeming fit as a theoretical framework to the empirical examination 
undertaken by Ziegler and Woolley (2016) (see the first subsection above), a few critiques 
of knowledge capture can be levied. First, knowledge capture lacks robust empirical 
underpinning (Becker 2016: 253). Although Ziegler and Woolley seemingly provide the 
beginnings of empirical work on knowledge capture, this capture theory has neither been 
operationalized as an analytical toolkit nor empirically tested or supported.   
Second, the definition of ‘knowledge’ utilized by Becker (2016) is contestable, with 
any contestation related thereto having iterative effects on the author’s main argument. 
Specifically, Becker (2016: 190), in drawing upon Millo and MacKenzie (2009), argues that 
the financial system produces its own facts, with the veracity of any statement about the 
financial system being determined self-referentially or from its “relevancy and usefulness 
for particular groups.” While financial regulators and industry participants may act as if they 
have knowledge of the financial system (or, their specific domain within the financial 
system), as will be explored in the subsequent chapter, objects to which knowledge refer 
 
assumptions stated by Becker (2016: 200): No being has the capacity to (1) attach “definite pay-offs 
to outcome decisions,” (2) specify “the nature of these outcomes,” (3) bring “the pay-offs into a 
consistent order,” and (4) define “the probabilities of the respective outcomes.”  
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neither express the full extent of their capacity nor are defined by the expression of their 
capacities alone.60 Thus, positing that “facts” are produced by a system whose ontological 
state61 is denoted by inherent withdrawal of its full range of capacities results in the 
veracity of these “facts” being contingent on the temporal state of the system, and negates 
claims to truthfulness as the state of the system changes. Although Becker (2016: 239f) 
appears aware of the constraints to knowledge that complexity imposes on both market 
participants and regulators, the notion of knowledge capture could be advanced and 
improved by an inclusion of ontological considerations, such as those from realist 
ontologies (e.g., Assemblage Theory and Object-oriented Ontology). 
Flowing from the second criticism of the notion of ‘knowledge capture’, the third 
pertains to the perception of policymakers that financial industry participants (or other 
interest groups) have veritable expertise in the domains sought to be regulated. Becker 
(2016: 232) explicitly states that knowledge capture does not “depend on a specific 
perception of the public servant,” when it indeed does – the perception that external 
stakeholders possess requisite knowledge and expertise. Exploring why policymakers 
perceive that these stakeholders possess such expert knowledge, given that their claim to 
knowledge is contestable, would be useful in refining this version of capture theory.  
 
FINAL REMARKS 
This chapter has critically reviewed scholarship on the administrative agency process of 
rulemaking – the academic literature in which this research project on OTC commodity 
 
60 This assertion derives from realist ontology and is central to the ontological position taken in the 
subsequent chapter. Although it will be discussed in greater detail then, for further consideration of 
this notion, see Sum and Jessop (2013: 3-6), Harman (2016a), Harman (2016b), DeLanda (2016), and 
DeLanda and Harman (2017).  
61 It is important to note that nowhere in Becker (2016) is an exploration of ontology undertaken. 
Rather, the author’s argument is generated from epistemological propositions. 
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derivative rulemaking is situated and to which it can contribute. In doing so, it has 
examined important conditions and factors that previous research into rulemaking have 
considered to be formative when assessing the construction of administrative agency rules. 
As such, the above review forms the basis for the selection of the multifaceted Cultural 
Political Economy approach for examining CFTC OTC commodity derivative rulemaking 
between 2010 and 2016.  
There are two key takeaways from this chapter as it relates to this study into OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking and its contribution to the wider scholarship on this 
administrative agency process. The first is that there is a gap in the literature on CFTC Dodd-
Frank era rulemaking concerning the formulation of OTC commodity derivative regulations, 
and, specifically, how the Commission defined ‘swaps’ (i.e., derivative instruments which 
were to be regulated) in the context of the commodity derivatives marketplace. Although 
Pagliari (2018) provides some preliminary commentary on the potential influence of 
businesses on OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the CFTC, the topical domain of 
OTC commodity derivative rulemaking remains largely unresearched, and, given the 
rulemaking’s high salience to industry (as, at their most stringent construction, these OTC 
commodity derivative rules would have affected countless firms involved in the sale and/or 
purchase of myriad everyday energy and metal commodities), it deserves further inquiry. 
The second point is that research on OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the CFTC 
provides the extant literature on general administrative agency rulemaking with a valuable 
contribution. This is the case because this research contributes a qualitative, longitudinal 
study that highlights how sets of regulations were constructed and why they evolved over a 
period of time, and, therefore, includes an assessment of those varied, yet significant 
factors – such as the under-researched area of agency chairperson influence – that 










The foregoing chapters have established definitional and administrative considerations 
necessary to embarking on an analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the 
CFTC. Moreover, existing literature engaging both CFTC rulemaking specifically, and 
administrative rulemaking generally, has been presented in order to situate the analysis in 
its research domain. Having done this, the current chapter will establish the theoretical 
framework upon which this project’s analysis is based. To reiterate, the analysis answers 
the question of how CFTC policymakers constructed the regulation of OTC commodity 
derivatives between 2010 and 2016. Answering this question necessitates the use of a 
multipronged analytical approach to rulemaking that can identify and assess those factors 
that conditioned the regulations’ construction. 
 Before discussing the choice of such an analytical framework, it is worth briefly 
returning to the reviewed literature of the last chapter and its implications for this selective 
decision. As indicated in Chapter 3, rulemaking is a contested process that can be populated 
by diverse actors and be additionally influenced by a range of other factors. Thus, any 
approach to the analysis of this administrative process must take into consideration a range 
of items that are relevant to the researched case. Some existing approaches attempt to do 
this – such as the ACF – but, as previously noted, they are subject to important limitations. 
To move beyond the limitations presented in the preceding chapter, what is needed to 
analyze OTC commodity derivative rulemaking is a multifaceted approach whose analytical 
lenses can be applied from the micro- to macro-level, and, as such, an approach that 
includes room for the exploration of the textual creation of rule content (i.e., the semiotic) 
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through to assessments of material factors and other contextual matters (i.e., the extra 
semiotic) that influenced the regulations’ development. 
 Given all this, the instant thesis utilizes Cultural Political Economy (CPE) as the 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the construction of OTC commodity derivative 
regulations. Although a relatively recent contribution to the realm of political economy, CPE 
is increasingly being used to inform research ranging from the privatization of educational 
systems (Verger et al. 2017), to the study of geopolitics (Jessop and Sum 2018), to 
conceptions of and policy response to financial crises (Sum and Jessop 2013). Choosing CPE 
to inform the analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking was done because (1) its 
analytical lenses (i.e., semiosis and structuration – see below) allow for an exploration of a 
multiplicity of influences on rule development (including, where applicable, those 
highlighted in the above reviewed literature), (2) it goes beyond the ACF, among other 
previously reviewed approaches, in that its analytical lenses facilitate a coherent analysis 
that can engage with micro-level considerations (e.g., the articulated regulatory vision of 
CFTC leadership) through to those at the macro-level (e.g., historical considerations as well 
as contextual matters of political economy and relating to an ‘imaginary’ – see below), and 
(3) its efficacy in structuring an analysis of rule construction (i.e., one utilizing rule content 
as the analytical entry-point before moving onto an assessment of those semiotic and 
extra-semiotic influences that interacted and co-evolved to condition this regulatory text, 
or regulation).  
 Through the application of CPE to this research project, the theoretical framework 
can itself be advanced while allowing for a contribution to current understandings of OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking at the Commission, specifically, and administrative 
agency rulemaking, broadly. To the former, the use of CPE as a theory supporting an 
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analysis of rulemaking advances the framework into an applicable domain left untouched 
by current CPE-based literature – that of administrative agency rulemaking. And, to the 
latter, exploring this administrative process from a CPE perspective can both complement 
existing rulemaking literature and provide for a more nuanced understanding of rulemaking 
stemming from the theoretical framework’s micro through macro analytical approach, its 
introduction of guiding (policy) ‘imaginaries’ into this area of administrative agency 
scholarship, as well as the emphasis that it places on the interaction and co-evolution of 
semiotic (discursive) and extra-semiotic (material and other contextual) factors as the 
driving force conditioning regulatory formation.   
 To set forth Cultural Political Economy as the theoretical framework for this project, 
this chapter comprises three sections before concluding with a few final remarks. The first 
section provides a general overview of CPE, the theory’s basic ontological and 
epistemological foundations, and its situation in relation to other potential theoretical 
approaches to rulemaking (e.g., the ACF). Among other things, this section provides the 
requisite CPE-related vocabulary necessary to engage extant CPE literature, and to 
comprehensively formulate the CPE approach to be utilized in this research endeavor. In 
the second section, existing CPE literature will be reviewed with a focus on how the theory 
has been used and from whence criticisms of its application have arisen. The third, and final 
section of this chapter is composed of a detailed and critical presentation of the CPE 
approach in the context of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking.  
 
A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CULTURAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Developed by Ngai-Ling Sum and Bob Jessop, CPE differentiates itself from other 
approaches to political economy – including similar critical approaches to the field – 
through its focus on the “semiotic dimensions of political economy” (Sum and Jessop 2013: 
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viii). While the terms ‘semiotic’, and its nominative counterpart, ‘semiosis’, will be 
discussed in greater detail below, these terms denote the process of sense- and meaning-
making (Sum and Jessop 2013: viii). The inclusion of the semiotic dimension of inquiry aims 
to support the theory’s position that it represents a “cultural turn” in the study of political 
economy (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008: 1155). This means that CPE pays serious attention 
to the process of intersubjective meaning-making in influencing “economic and political 
conduct” (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008: 1156). Moreover, in moving beyond the theory’s 
initial intellectual inspirations – the Regulation Schools of thought,62 Gramscian thought,63 
and various forms of discourse-linguistic analyses64 (Belfrage and Hauf 2017; Belfrage and 
Hauf 2015) – CPE seeks to integrate into its analytical framework the pivotal co-evolution of 
semiotic and ‘extra-semiotic’ factors and processes; thus ensuring that it accounts for both 
discursive and ‘material’ considerations (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008: 1156). The “cultural 
turn” notwithstanding, as indicated by Sum and Jessop (2013: 21f), at its foundational level, 
CPE rests, both analytically and ontologically, in a “complexity turn” – one privileging the 
complex nature of things and emphasizing the primacy of complexity reduction in both the 
apprehension of phenomena, and as a basis for acting. To elaborate on these and others 
 
62 The approaches to political economy espoused by these Schools advance, as Sum and Jessop 
(2013: 81) note, the argument that the “institutional separation” – i.e., the structural influence of 
one on the other – that exists between the economic and political spheres changes at different 
points in time and is constructed as based on, and mediated in and through, conceptions of 
economic and political systems. Thus, “ideas, beliefs, and legitimization” are incorporated into the 
study of political economy (Sum and Jessop 2013: 72). For a description of the influence of the 
Regulation Schools on the development of CPE, see Sum and Jessop (2013: 80-87).  
63 While Sum and Jessop (2013: 72) claim that Antonio Gramsci was a “proto-cultural political 
economist,” his intellectual contributions were made in the early-20th century. From these 
contributions, Sum and Jessop (2013: 73) highlight Gramsci’s notion of the “historic specificity” of 
economic relations – as expressed by naturalized yet contingent social relations, collective thought, 
and the articulation thereof, etc. – is what conditions an economic system. Thus, an economic 
system and its relations cannot be understood to be a transcendental universal maxim, but is subject 
to variegation through social contestation. See Sum and Jessop (2013: 72-76) for an exploration of 
Gramsci’s influence on CPE.  
64 See Sum and Jessop (2013: 96-144) for a complete overview of both the semiotic analytical 
foundations of CPE and for those discourse analytical frameworks that are compatible with the CPE 
research program.  
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concepts central to CPE, the following pages first explore complexity reduction and the 
processes through which CPE posits that human beings both ‘go on’ in the world – semiosis 
and structuration – and that undergird the construction of ‘imaginaries’, before then 
discussing CPE’s ontological and epistemological assumptions.  
 
CPE: The Basics 
In its original formulation, CPE espoused that the ‘world’ and its concomitant processes and 
phenomena are too complex to be wholly grasped (apprehended) (Sum and Jessop 2013: 
3). Take for example the phenomenon of a boat sailing on a large river. To an observer 
acquainted with humankind’s ability to engineer and operate boats, this phenomenon may 
appear routine. Nevertheless, this appearance belies the complexity of this occurrence. For 
instance, does the observer perceive the manifold properties of the material comprising the 
boat’s hull allowing, in part, for its capacity to remain buoyant? Moreover, does the 
observer apprehend the capacities of both the boat (and its crew) and the river to produce 
an outcome other than what the person is currently witnessing? While this is not an 
exhaustive list of questions, both examples reveal that apprehending the totality of this 
phenomenon is necessarily limited.65  
Stemming from the overriding complexity of things, CPE posits that human beings 
must find a way to navigate this complexity to “go on” in a world that cannot be completely 
understood. Thus, CPE maintains that individuals engage in complexity reduction, but not 
complexity mastery (Sum and Jessop 2013: 3, 21). This process of complexity reduction, as 
understood by CPE, is made manifest through two processes: semiosis and structuration. 
 
65 The notion that the observer’s apprehension of a phenomenon is incomplete can be developed 
from two angles: resulting from the nature of the observer and resulting from the nature of the 
observed object. CPE maintains that both are responsible for limits to apprehension (Sum and Jessop 
2013: 3).  
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Through the active employment of semiosis and structuration, individuals bring structure to 
otherwise unstructured complexity, and meaning to what otherwise might seem chaotic 
and meaningless (Jessop 2010: 338). In the context of the above boat example, these two 
processes involved in complexity reduction – especially in their combined terminal form as 
a sedimented ‘imaginary’ – would allow the observer the comfort of assuming boats sail 
without being bogged down by the complex and emergent processes allowing for sailing (or 
that appear absent in the phenomenon). 
 As explained by CPE, the process of complexity reduction through semiosis is one of 
sense- and meaning-making (Sum and Jessop 2013: x; Jessop and Sum 2010). By sense-
making, Sum and Jessop (2013: x, 3) specify that this process is one of “apprehension of the 
natural and social world[s]” in their myriad virtual and real presentations. Meaning-making 
is inextricably tied to sense-making, and refers to “processes of signification and meaningful 
communication” expressed through linguistic and non-linguistic means (Sum and Jessop 
2013: x, 3). Together, through these sensory and analytical processes, respectively, semiosis 
“give[s] meaning to the world” and provides individuals with accessible and expressible 
construals of the natural and social worlds (Sum and Jessop 2013: 3). In a similar effort to 
reduce complexity, individuals engage in structuration: an enforced limitation (through 
selection) of “compossible” relations66 at any given moment (Sum and Jessop 2013: 4).67 
Thus, from innumerable potential possibilities, through structuration, the amount of 
possibilities that can occur in relation to one another is reduced to a smaller subset of 
“compossibilities.” While semiosis and structuration are distinct means of complexity 
 
66 Meaning things, or possibilities, which can exist in conjunction with one another. 
67 The use of structuration by Sum and Jessop (2013) is distinct from the concept of structuration 
advanced in Giddens (1976), Giddens (1979), and Giddens (1984). In the case of the latter, 
structuration refers to the process of reproducing social structures and social systems through 
individual action (van Rooyen 2013: 498; Leydesdorff 2010: 2139), while in the case of the former, 
structuration refers to an ongoing process of limiting “compossible” (social) relations to reduce 
complexity (Sum and Jessop 2013: 3).  
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reduction, as posited by CPE, they should not be seen as mutually exclusive processes; 
rather, they are dialectically related68 and maintain equal standing in their importance to 
complexity reduction (Jessop and Sum 2017).69  
 In CPE, the central concept emerging from complexity reduction is the formation of 
‘imaginaries.’ Imaginaries are semiotic ensembles, or systems, that “frame individual 
subjects’ lived experience of an inordinately complex world and/or inform collective 
calculation about that world” (Jessop 2010: 344; Levy and Spicer 2013).70 Simply put, they 
are meaning systems through which one can understand the world; albeit in a simplified 
manner (Mayblin 2016: 821). While imaginaries are formed at the individual level, they can 
be held at a collective level as a way for groups to “relate to their environments, make 
decisions, or pursue more or less coherent strategies” (Jessop 2013: 235). Irrespective of 
the form that the imaginary takes (e.g., economic, political, social, or other referents), the 
potential exists for it to become sedimented71 through a process of variation, selection, and 
retention.  
 Every imaginary begins as a construal of some material or social process formed via 
complexity reduction through semiosis (Mayblin 2016: 821). As construals are subjectively 
formed, boundless variation exists as to the form that the construal may take (i.e., the 
 
68 Semiosis and structuration co-evolve in relation to a material reality, and this evolution produces a 
result that is irreducible to the parts from which it arises – thus, Sum and Jessop’s (2013) use of the 
term “emergent properties.” 
69 It should be noted that while complexity may be reduced and made comprehensible through these 
two processes, the product of this reduction should not be conflated with the totality of that which 
has been reduced. Any reduction of complexity necessarily results in the elimination of 
idiosyncrasies and subtleties of a heterogeneous whole in favor of a homogeneous construal. It 
follows that such movement from whole to construal introduces a degree of fragility and 
incompleteness into the homogeneous reduction (Taleb 2012) – a fact that is significant in relation to 
the to-be-discussed formation and use of imaginaries. 
70 This is similar to the conception of a ‘frame’ as defined by Rein and Schön (1991: 262). 
71 Generally, in the context of CPE, ‘sedimented’ can be understood to be the assumption of material 
form (through continuous practice or belief) by a construal, idea, imaginary, or institutional practice 
or arrangement. This term will be discussed and defined in greater detail below.  
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process of variation). Over time, a construal can be privileged for selection over the 
multitude of other construals (i.e., the process of selection). The selection of a construal is 
partially a function of the constraint of compossibility resulting from structuration through 
four “selectivities”: structural, discursive, technological, and agential (Belfrage and Hauf 
2017: 255).72 Through on-going material verification and social realization of the construal, 
it can be retained as a sedimented imaginary (i.e., the processes of retention and 
sedimentation). Although imaginaries are per se discursive73 constructions that can be 
communicated by and shared amongst individuals, their formation involves discursive as 
well as material and other contextual considerations. Throughout the process of variation, 
selection, and retention, fluidity exists in what may be considered a discursive-material 
continuum,74 which can aid or prevent imaginaries from being selected, retained, and 
potentially sedimented (Belfrage and Hauf 2017: 256f).   
Within CPE, imaginaries assume an essential position: they form the ideational 
lenses through which individuals perceive the world as it was, is, and could be. They 
constitute the ultimate achievement of complexity reduction through the processes of 
semiosis and structuration. Yet, as alluded to above, they are incomplete representations of 
 
72 Structural selectivity denotes the “asymmetrical configuration of structural constraints and 
opportunities” on individuals and groups to pursue their desires (Sum 2015: 214). Discursive 
selectivity refers to the constraints imposed on linguistic expressivity by the medium and means 
through which that language is being expressed (Sum 2015: 214). Technological selectivity is defined 
by two aspects: (1) the “material and intellectual” aspects of producing objects and the associated 
“technical and social relations” to such production, and (2) the power/knowledge of an individual or 
institution to both discipline individuals or groups and to limit the imagining of alternatives to a 
particular way of acting (Jessop 2015: 21f). Finally, agential selectivity means the capacity of an 
individual or group to significantly influence moments of time through its (or their) ability to “exploit 
structural, discursive, and technological selectivities” (Jessop 2015: 22).   
73 As noted by Sum and Jessop (2013: 97), the term ‘discourse’ denotes the practice of “sense- and 
meaning-making” at the levels of linguistics and semantics. A corollary flowing from this position is 
that ‘discourse’ must be situated within broader contextual considerations.  
74 This continuum implies that at various moments of time, discursive considerations may be 
weighed greater by individuals or groups in the formation of a construal or of an imaginary, or when 
seeking verification of the construal or of the imaginary, while at other times, material 
considerations may play a more prominent role; see Sum and Jessop (2013: 403f).  
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the reality to which they refer. An example being an imaginary holding that housing prices 
only increase (i.e., pre-2007/8 financial crisis); only to have that imaginary challenged by 
the reality of sharp price declines. Thus, imaginaries are subject to contestation, and even 
those seemingly occupying hegemonic intellectual standing are susceptible to ruptures in 
their acceptance.  
Again, as emphasized in this chapter, CPE holds that imaginaries are influenced by 
semiotic and extra-semiotic factors, and cannot be reduced to or explained by any one of 
these. Thus, CPE-based research must include discursive as well as material considerations, 
as these considerations dialectically influence the formation of imaginaries through the 
complexity reducing processes of semiosis and structuration.  
 
CPE: Ontology and Epistemology 
With CPE’s concepts and analytical positions in-mind, it is advantageous to take a step back 
and briefly highlight the ontology75 and epistemology76 undergirding this theory. In doing 
so, perspective on the rationale behind these concepts and positions can be further 
clarified.  
The ontological foundations of CPE derive from the theory’s commitment to the 
philosophy of critical realism (Jessop and Sum 2017: 345). Developed by Roy Bhaskar, 
critical realism stems from the tradition of philosophical realism, but rejects both naïve 
realism77 as applied in positivist research and strict constructivism78 (Fairclough 2005). Key 
to this philosophy is the notion that there does exist a material reality beyond the linguistic 
 
75 Ontology meaning philosophical inquiry dealing with the nature of being. 
76 Epistemology meaning philosophical inquiry concerned with knowledge.  
77 See Braver (2007) for a summary of traditional realist commitments. For a discussion of these 
commitments, see DeLanda and Harman (2017: 27-48). 
78 See Mir and Watson (2000), Woodside (2003), and Latour and Woolgar (1986) for the 
commitments held by constructivists.  
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constructions and interpretations of human beings – hence its claim to realism (Assiter 
2013). Simply put, reality cannot be reduced to language (Peters et al. 2013: 338). 
Moreover, critical realism, posits that non-discursive events – such as a lightning strike – 
can influence social processes and reality; language does not have sole claim as influencer 
of the social (Harré and Bhaskar 2001). Nevertheless, critical realism does not posit that the 
social can be reduced to the material alone – hence its claim to a critical version of realism 
(Archer et al. 1998). Rather, at various levels, modes, and scales of existence, the material 
and the social worlds cannot be wholly separated from each other and can even be seen to 
engage interactively (Peters et al. 2013: 338).    
CPE retains the commitments of critical realism and its progenitors related to this 
ontology in a few key ways. For instance, drawing on the critical realism of Bhaskar (1975), 
Sum and Jessop (2013: 9) posit that the social world is informed by dialectical relations 
between semiotic and material elements. Thus, to CPE’s authors, social action in the natural 
world can cause change in this realm (e.g., the ecological impacts of diamond mining for 
wedding rings) and, likewise, the non-social can influence the social (e.g., the issuance of 
Plague Orders during London’s Great Plague of 1665-166679). While CPE acknowledges the 
existence of a “real world” which predates human beings’ attempts to reduce the 
complexity of its phenomena, it maintains that neither actors nor observers have “direct 
access” to the “real world” and its myriad objects (Sum and Jessop 2013: 3). Moreover, as 
Sum and Jessop (2013: 3) state that all “permutations of social relations” are not “realizable 
in the same time-space,” CPE commits itself to the irreducibility of these relations to their 
effects alone, and implies that, at any point in “time-space,” the relations do not reveal the 
totality of their potential expressions.  
 
79 See Defoe (2010) for an exposition of these orders.  
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Similar to its ontological position concerning the lack of direct access to the ‘world’, 
from an epistemological standpoint, CPE assumes that activities producing knowledge can 
“never exhaust the complexity of the world” (Sum and Jessop 2013: 5). This leads CPE’s 
authors to posit that knowledge is “always partial, provisional, and incomplete” and its 
production – through scientific means or otherwise – is a “continuing but discontinuous 
process” (Sum and Jessop 2013: 5f). Further, drawing on its ontological wellspring, CPE 
differentiates between the actual – that which is actualized and observable – and the real – 
those capacities with which the intellect may contemplate but that are not sensed. This 
allows CPE to advance its skeptical position towards the accrual of knowledge. Given the 
ontological difference between the actual and the real, CPE rejects the strict inference of 
causation from “empirical regularities” – (complete) observation of or interaction with the 
actual does not wholly reveal the capacities of the real (Sum and Jessop 2013: 9). Finally, 
CPE adopts the epistemological positions that knowledge claims are both inevitably 
situated in a broader context – thus requiring this context be explored to more thoroughly 
understand the claim – and that the knowledge of an object is not passive in relation to the 
object (Sum and Jessop 2013: 5f).80 
 
Situating CPE in Relation to Other Approaches to Rulemaking 
Before reviewing how CPE is utilized in existing research, and how this thesis intends to 
employ CPE to study OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, it is worth briefly returning to, 
 
80 Supporting this epistemological position, CPE advances the notions of intransitive and intransitive 
moments of scientific inquiry (Jessop and Sum 2016: 106). The inclusion of these moments stems 
from CPE’s adoption of a critical realist ontology. By intransitive, CPE’s authors mean “the external 
world” that is “taken as an object of inquiry”; thus, that which is operates independently of the 
observer (Jessop and Sum 2016: 106). The transitive, however, refers to the practices, communities, 
and bodies of socially produced knowledge about the intransitive, external world (Jessop and Sum 
2016: 106; Sum and Jessop 2013: 6). Knowledge, according to Sum and Jessop (2013: 6), is thus the 
result of the interplay between intransitive and transitive dimensions of inquiry and capable of being 
influenced not only by seemingly disinterested observations but also by the pre-existing knowledge 
regimes afforded by the transitive.  
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and commenting on, this theoretical framework’s situation in relation to other approaches 
to engaging rulemaking.  
As noted in Chapter 3, and as presented in the introductory remarks of the instant 
chapter, CPE has been chosen to inform the analysis of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking because its multifaceted nature and analytical lenses allow for a micro- to 
macro-level examination of rulemaking. Moreover, in having this perspective, CPE 
facilitates the exploration of those semiotic and extra-semiotic factors that interacted and 
co-evolved to condition the OTC commodity derivative regulations’ development. In 
contrast to the other analytical approaches that were critically reviewed in Chapter 3 – such 
as the ACF and narrow rule content analyzes – CPE is both sufficiently broad and 
conceptually developed so as to permit additional potentially significant variables that 
might be missed in these other approaches to be considered in an analysis of rulemaking. 
These include the impact of discursive considerations on rulemaking (e.g., the conditioning 
effect of existing agency regulatory precedent on the formation of a new rule; seen from 
both the standpoint of the semiotic as well as the discursive selectivity), the influence of 
chairpersons on this administrative process (as seen through the agential selectivity), and 
the relevance (and importance) of ‘imaginaries’ to policymakers’ rulemaking endeavors. 
While CPE advances beyond existing analytical approaches to rulemaking (e.g., the ACF), it 
should not, however, be seen an incompatible with these. 
For instance, CPE does not diminish the potential impact of advocacy coalitions on 
policymaking (Jessop 2010: 339). A CPE-informed analysis might suggest that an advocacy 
coalition’s success in having its views on a regulatory matter reflected in the prescriptive 
content of a rule be explained by more than a simple synchronicity in beliefs between the 
dominant external coalition actors and internal agency policymakers with the discretion to 
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write rules. Although intersecting harmonious beliefs might play a role influencing 
policymakers’ selection (and potentially retention) of a particular regulatory approach, CPE 
demands that other pertinent semiotic and extra-semiotic considerations be assessed to 
explain why such a position was adopted (e.g., the expressed policy beliefs of the external 
coalition advocating for fewer regulations through comment letters being appropriated and 
translated into rule text given agency policymakers’ interest in keeping the institution’s 
legal enforcement costs down given budgetary cuts imposed by Congress and the 
opposition of a newly elected President to pervasive regulatory enforcement proceedings).   
Additionally, CPE undoubtably does not prevent analyses from engaging with rule 
content, which can be a central component of a CPE-backed rulemaking analysis, and, in 
fact, serves as the analytical entry-point into this study’s exploration of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking. Rather than espousing an analysis that solely focuses on identifying 
the discursive links between rule text and submitted outside party comment letters to 
understand the construction of a regulation, a CPE-informed analysis would seek to explore 
the broader and co-evolving semiotic and extra-semiotic milieu in which the rule’s 
development is situated; thereby establishing a more detailed picture of how the rule in 
question was constructed, and why the regulatory approach contained therein was selected 
and retained by policymakers. This could, for example, mean assessing an administrative 
agency’s appropriation of informative regulatory content from a comment letter into rule 
text alongside factors such as the influence of an agency’s chairperson whose articulated 
regulatory vision is compossible with, and overtly sympathetic to, the adopted regulatory 
position, and who both possesses the voting support of a majority of agency commissioners 
and has the ability to set the institution’s regulatory agenda. 
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Given the above reviewed situation of CPE in relation to other approaches engaging 
rulemaking, it can be suggested that such presented approaches can even be seen as 
complementary to a CPE-based analysis of rulemaking. While this study of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking does not endeavor to conduct a grand synthesis of policymaking 
frameworks, where applicable, it will make reference to important considerations derived 
therefrom (e.g., the impact of aligned external public advocacy groups, or coalitions, on the 
OTC commodity derivative rulemaking process). Furthermore, and as intimated earlier, in 
moving beyond the existing approaches to analyzing rulemaking, employing CPE can further 
knowledge of those potentially vital considerations to this administrative process that are 
largely missing from current rulemaking scholarship, such as the chair’s influence on 
regulatory formation (as seen through the lens of CPE’s agential selectivity), linking the 
production and content of rule texts to the interaction and co-evolution of semiotic and 
extra-semiotic factors, and the implications of ‘imaginaries’ to rulemaking.  
 
THE APPLICATION OF CPE IN EXISTING RESEARCH 
Having set out the core principles of CPE, this section explores how CPE has been applied in 
existing research. Providing an overview of previous use of CPE as a research program 
serves as a springboard into the application of CPE in this study’s analysis of OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking (a matter detailed in the section to follow). In focusing on 
a range of research emphasizing various aspects of CPE, this section includes work by the 
theory’s authors – Sum and Jessop – and other authors similarly concerned with CPE as a 
research tool. It should be made clear that this section does not intend to provide for a 
comprehensive review of all research employing CPE as a theoretical framework. Rather, 
drawing on selected works considered germane to the CPE approach to be taken in this 
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paper’s research on OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, this section enunciates how 
these selected works used CPE to inform their research and to derive their central findings.   
 One such piece, comprising a chapter in Sum and Jessop’s seminal book on CPE, 
Towards a Cultural Political Economy, deploys the theory to provide an account for how the 
2007-2008 financial crisis was construed, and how these construals influenced the 
subsequent economic recovery (Sum and Jessop 2013). As OTC (commodity) derivative 
rulemaking emerged as a response to this same financial crisis, briefly exploring how the 
CPE-based framework for analyzing financial crisis construals was structured can provide 
insight into how CPE may be used in connection with the upcoming analysis of rulemaking.  
In their chapter on financial crisis construals, Sum and Jessop (2013: 395ff) begin by 
situating their case within the context of ‘crisis.’ The authors assert that ‘crises’ are periods 
of time in which “accepted views of the world and how to ‘go on’ within it” are disrupted, 
thereby potentially opening new avenues for construals of events, circumstances, and 
policy paths forward (Sum and Jessop 2013: 395f). Additionally, Sum and Jessop (2013: 397) 
posit that as ‘crises’ are “never purely objective,” such occurrences do not result in a 
preordained outcome; rather, intense fluidity may exist regarding both the apprehension of 
the causes and meaning of the crisis, and the determination of remedies to the crisis.  
 Because ‘crises’ are not “purely objective” phenomena capable of being 
apprehended in their totality, individuals (and social actors) engage in complexity reduction 
through the processes of semiosis and structuration (as defined in the preceding section) to 
interpret these events in an effort to ‘go on’ in the world (Sum and Jessop 2013: 397). It is 
at this juncture that the CPE research program analyzing these complexity-reducing 
mechanisms begins. Sum and Jessop (2013: 402-405) focus their analysis on the variation, 
selection, and retention of construals during the period of potential ideational fluidity 
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afforded by the financial crisis. In this case, the authors note that myriad construals of the 
financial crisis existed in the event’s early phases; i.e., the notion of variation (Sum and 
Jessop 2013: 404). Nevertheless, as time passed, and as these construals both competed 
with each other and were tested for their meaningfulness in interpreting and making sense 
of the crisis, many construals were disregarded and failed to be selected (Sum and Jessop 
2013: 404).  
Yet, according to Sum and Jessop (2013: 404f), the construals of the financial crisis 
that were selected exhibited certain characteristics. Specifically, and congruent with the 
conceptual propositions of CPE, the selection of a crisis construal was, according to the 
authors, subject to validation from both semiotic and – in their words – “extra-semiotic” 
factors (Sum and Jessop 2013: 404f). In regard to the semiotic, for example, Sum and Jessop 
(2013: 404f) state that the political efficacy of certain narrated construals and their 
resonance with the articulated political and social agendas of stakeholders (e.g., 
policymakers and social movements) were important criteria for the selection of a crisis 
construal. Furthermore, in keeping with the CPE research program, the authors posit that 
the aforementioned semiotic factors do not alone account for the selection of a construal, 
but that the discursive, structural, agential and technological selectivities (defined above) of 
the “extra-semiotic” are also crucial components (Sum and Jessop 2013: 405). For instance, 
Sum and Jessop (2013: 405) propose that “the organization and operation” of the media 
that is responsible for broadcasting a construal, and the social positions of those individuals 
associated with a crisis construal, are, among other ‘extra-semiotic factors,’ noteworthy 
aspects in determining a construal’s selection.  
For those financial crisis construals which were selected, there existed the 
possibility for their retention and ensuing sedimentation as ‘imaginaries’ – those ‘semiotic 
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ensembles’ capable of structuring complexity and serving as the lens through which to 
apprehend the world. As Sum and Jessop (2013: 405) note, the retention of a construal – 
and its subsequent sedimentation – was dependent on its verification through its achieving 
(real or the perceived-to-be real) compossibility with existing “material interdependencies” 
and “social relations.” This means that, in the case of financial crisis construals, their 
retention (and sedimentation) was contingent on continued narrative efficacy and 
resonance – as semiotic aspects – as well as their viability both when embedded within sets 
of social relations, and in relation to non-social, real events – as ‘extra-semiotic aspects’ 
(Sum and Jessop 2013: 405).  
 The structure of the authors’ approach to their CPE analysis of crisis construals is a 
function of their central research object – non-objectively determined construals. As 
alluded to above, analyzing this research object within a CPE framework necessitates 
examining factors such as context, semiosis, and structuration. This is undertaken with the 
result being both the development of a “heuristic schema” (Sum and Jessop 2013: 403) 
accounting for the factors shaping financial crisis construals, and an understanding of how 
these construals may become sedimented and institutionalized in the form of an imaginary, 
which can potentially influence policy decisions. In relation to the specific research focus of 
this current thesis, Sum and Jessop’s application of CPE to the analysis of financial crisis 
construals provides a useful means of structuring a case study involving an examination of 
potential influences on policymaker perceptions during and in response to financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, as will be discussed in the following section, some modifications to this CPE 
structure will be made for the case of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking in the post-
financial crisis, Dodd-Frank era. 
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 Another work substantially applying CPE to the study of policymaking comes from 
the above referenced Ngai-Ling Sum. In Sum (2015: 211), the author analyzes the 
articulation of “competition, competitiveness, and competition policies” in Asia by the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Although 
Sum (2015) generally engages the gamut of CPE concepts in this piece, the analytical focus 
of and entry-point for the work are the four selectivities proposed in CPE: the discursive, 
the structural, the agential, and the technological. In using the selectivities to guide its 
research aim, Sum examines how these selectivities interacted to change and to sediment 
“policy discourses and practices” of the two banking institutions as pertaining to their aim 
to enhance economic competitiveness and reduce poverty in Asia after the 1997 financial 
crisis (Sum 2015: 211). The justification given for structuring this CPE-based research 
approach is that the four selectivities enable, shape, and influence the process of variation, 
selection, and retention, respectively, within the broader context of the co-evolution of 
semiosis and structuration (Sum 2015: 214).  
 Sum (2015: 216f) begins the analysis of the articulation of competitiveness and 
competition – and its related policies – by accounting for the post-Asian financial crisis 
structural context (selectivity). In this, the author emphasizes that during the Doha Round 
of the WTO’s international trade negotiations, many developing Asian countries opposed 
the outright market liberalization policies espoused by international institutions (e.g., the 
World Bank) as part of the Washington Consensus81 (Sum 2015: 2016f). Although this 
opposition was, according to Sum (2015: 216f), successful in preventing certain 
“competition policy issues” from being included in the final trade negotiations, the author 
 
81 A set of economic reform policy instruments and recommendations for developing countries that 
centered around fiscal austerity and market liberalization and that were promoted by the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the U.S. government (Black et al. 2017). 
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notes that this failure of Washington Consensus policies to be perpetuated did not spell an 
end to the market liberalization ideas advanced by institutions such as the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank. Rather, these institutions exploited discursive, agential, and 
technological selectivities to re-contextualize and re-articulate liberalization policies using a 
palliative narrative focused on alleviating poverty through knowledge transfer, competition, 
and growth; which would become known as the post-Washington Consensus (Sum 2015: 
225). Namely, this shift in narrative (discursive) and the concomitant development of rules, 
tools, and methods aimed at measuring and ensuring the viability of the post-Washington 
Consensus policies (technological) under the direction of elite actors (agential) – such as the 
famous economist Joseph Stiglitz – enabled the World Bank and Asian Development Bank 
to continue contested liberalization reforms in Asia (Sum 2015: 225). 
 In arriving at this conclusion – one which illustrates the ability of a sedimented 
economic imaginary (i.e., the need for market liberalization) to be re-contextualized when 
challenged – Sum (2015) engages, albeit generally, the key aspects of the CPE. 
Nevertheless, this is done in an idiosyncratic manner as the four selectivities are utilized as 
the analytical entry-point, as opposed to the bottom-up, ‘construal to imaginary’ approach 
taken by Sum and Jessop (2013). The CPE approach taken by Sum (2015) highlights the 
importance of the four selectivities to the theory’s research program, in addition to 
demonstrating the malleability of CPE when applied in practice. 
 Other applications of CPE have been made across a spectrum of academic 
disciplines. These works apply CPE in a variety of ways, ranging from ‘practising’ CPE by 
drawing on one or a few of its noteworthy concepts, to following the entirety of CPE’s basic 
framework. Many of the studies ‘practising’ the theory use CPE’s concept of imaginaries 
and their potential effects on policy as the cornerstone of their analyses. Although using 
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imaginaries as an analytical entry-point is feasible, providing a robust, defensible 
explanation of the development and influence on policy of these imaginaries necessitates 
at least an engagement with the co-evolution of semiosis and structuration (and their 
attendant processes and selectivities). This is something which many of the imaginary-
focused research pieces lack. Moreover, as can be seen in several of these works, the 
notion of imaginaries adopted by the authors is not tied to economic referents (i.e. 
economic imaginary), but engages a panoply of non-economic referents.  
One such example of a CPE imaginary-inspired piece comes from Levy and Spicer 
(2013). In this work, the authors propose the existence of four ‘climate imaginaries’82 and 
then analyze how these imaginaries influence activities of industry and policymakers as 
concerns climate change. It is important to note that, in this research, the authors do not 
elaborate on the construction of the four imaginaries, but simply posit their existence as 
derived from “observation and analysis of the various framings and positions adopted by 
actors and the media” (Levy and Spicer 2013: 663). This omission notwithstanding, the 
authors use the presupposed imaginaries to reflect on their influence on climate and 
energy policy debates from the 1990s until the article’s publication, and then analyze why 
certain ‘climate imaginaries’ attained hegemony over this period (Levy and Spicer 2013: 
667-72). Through their analysis, Levy and Spicer (2013: 675) conclude that policy responses 
by “firms, governments and NGOs” to climate change will reflect the dominant ‘climate 
imaginary’ at the time of the imaginary’s formulation.  
 
82 The imaginaries are as follows: (1) Fossil fuels forever, (2) climate apocalypse, (3) techno-market, 
and (4) sustainable lifestyles (Levy and Spicer 2013: 663). As the names suggest, the imaginaries refer 
to perceived perpetual use of fossil fuels, a climactic catastrophe, a market-based technological 
solution to climate change, and the adoption of simpler, less materialistic lifestyles to halt climate 
change, respectively.  
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Although Levy and Spicer (2013) weave a cogent argument concerning the 
influence of ‘climate imaginaries’ on the climate policy actions of various stakeholders, they 
do not consider how these actors may themselves shape the imaginaries. This stems from 
the paper’s exclusive analytical foci on the influence of ‘climate imaginaries’ and why 
certain ‘imaginaries’ become dominant at a given time. Thus, in the spirit of only ‘practising’ 
CPE, Levy and Spicer omit discussion of complexity reduction, semiosis, structuration 
through the four selectivities, as well as variation, selection, and retention.  
A further example of using the concept of imaginaries to ‘practise’ CPE comes from 
Grubbauer (2014). In this piece, imaginaries are used as the focal point for research into 
architectural practices in urban development. Specifically, Grubbauer (2014) employs the 
notion of an economic imaginary in conjunction with an analysis of the architecture of 
specific office buildings in Vienna. The position developed is that a perceived mode of 
organizing economic activity (i.e., an economic imaginary) has greater salience if expressed 
materially through architectural design. To arrive at this conclusion, Grubbauer (2014) 
examines how these economic imaginaries are discursively and visually articulated in local 
planning debates, and in business marketing advertisements. Like Levy and Spicer (2013), 
this author’s analytical focus on CPE-posited imaginaries neglects to account for other 
aspects of the theory, but does so intentionally. Grubbauer (2014: 339) explicitly states that 
the research is limited to an exercise in “practising CPE” as opposed to assiduously 
following each tenet of the CPE research framework.  
Heinrich (2015), likewise, ‘practises’ CPE in exploring the imaginaries posited to 
develop European Union (EU) policy in response to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. While not 
formally engaging the CPE derived processes of semiosis and structuration, Heinrich (2015) 
does analyze the interplay between semiotic and ‘extra-semiotic’ features influencing the 
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reproduction of imaginaries informing EU policymaker responses to the financial crisis. 
Heinrich (2015: 701f) posits that sedimented discourses emphasizing competition, in 
response to, and de-emphasizing structural problems (such as banking and regulatory 
mishaps), as causes of, the financial crisis (semiotic), served, in addition to the EU’s 
situation as an international economic power (‘extra-semiotic’), to influence EU policy 
response so it broadly perpetuated the pre-crisis economic status quo. Moreover, Heinrich 
(2015: 702) notes that although the EU’s response to the financial crisis was, at least in part, 
informed by a pro-market imaginary, undertaking this response served to further embed 
(sediment) this imaginary into the minds and institutional practices of EU policymakers. 
Thus, while the imaginary resulted from an interplay of semiotic and ‘extra-semiotic’ 
factors, the validation of this imaginary in a moment of crisis – through its ability to 
perceptibly structure the complexity of such an event – has further influenced EU economic 
policy discourses and the EU’s chosen route on economic matters.  
Authors Su, et al., (2018) similarly focus on the dialectic between semiotic and 
‘extra-semiotic’ factors – in their words, “cultural/semiotic and economic/political 
dimensions” – in assessing heritage tourism83 in urban settings. These authors, however, do 
not engage CPE in their analysis beyond the foregoing dialectically-related division, even 
excluding the notion of imaginaries in favor of the term “framing” (Su et al. 2018: 30). 
Nevertheless, their application of CPE to a domain seemingly unrelated to political 
economy does shed light on the interrelations between the “cultural/semiotic and 
economic/political dimensions” of a tourist site, and the meaning of the site as intuited or 
arrived at by tourists (Su et al. 2018: 36ff).  
 
83 Although this term is not defined in Su et al. (2018), one can infer from the paper that heritage 
tourism means tourism of historical and traditional sites.  
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Finally, in contrast to the preceding articles ‘practising’ CPE through their 
application of one or a few of the theory’s concepts, Mayblin (2016) utilizes the full 
theoretical framework, as put forth in Sum and Jessop (2013), to analyze UK asylum policy. 
In this work, Mayblin (2016) begins with an analysis of the ‘pull factor’84 idea of asylum 
seeking with a presentation of current United Kingdom (UK) asylum policies. The author 
then proceeds to engage the notions of complexity reduction, semiosis, structuration, as 
well as variation, selection, and retention to test if and, ultimately, to explain why, the ‘pull 
factor’ is the dominant imaginary informing UK asylum policy. By following the CPE research 
program, and in analyzing the semiotic and ‘extra-semiotic’ influences on the process of 
variation, selection, and retention, Mayblin (2016: 823-26) concludes that the ‘pull factor’ is 
the dominant imaginary informing UK asylum policymaking because it provides a simple, 
ostensible narrative concerning asylum-seeking, and is affirmed by institutional practices 
such as strictly categorizing migrants either as asylum seekers or as economic migrants. 
Thus, key to this work is complexity reduction as a means by which policymakers make 
sense of a situation, and then use those impressions when undertaking (or not undertaking) 
policy interventions (Mayblin 2016: 825). Obviously, this process will be of importance to 
the analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking.  
 The above examples of the application of CPE in existing research reveal that CPE-
informed research may be structured in a variety of different manners – ranging from 
following the bulk of the CPE research program, such as in the work of Sum and Jessop 
(2013), as well as Mayblin (2016), to using specific CPE concepts as an entry point into the 
analysis of a phenomenon, such as in the work on ‘climate imaginaries’ undertaken by Levy 
and Spicer (2013). This range in CPE structure stems from the differences in analytical foci 
 
84 This is the idea that better economic and social rights in certain countries attracts, or ‘pulls’, 
migration of individuals from other countries.  
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of these research projects. Thus, it can be assumed that as a theoretical framework, CPE 
may be operationalized in a relatively heterogeneous fashion. In the upcoming section of 
this chapter, the approach to CPE, taken in conjunction with the case of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking at the CFTC between 2010 and 2016, will be set forth in detail. 
 
A CPE APPROACH TO OTC COMMODITY DERIVATIVE RULEMAKING 
Considering the heterogeneity of current research applications of CPE, this project 
approaches CPE from the standpoint of both engaging in its ‘practise’ while following the 
bulk of its research program. As such, the key concepts of CPE’s analytical gaze – such as 
complexity reduction through semiosis and structuration, the evolutionary process of 
variation, selection, and retention (sedimentation), and imaginaries – will centrally inform 
the later unfurled analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking. Unlike those articles 
that simply ‘practise’ CPE by using a selection of its concepts, this research project will 
explore each of these concepts in relation to the case at-hand. Thus, this study’s approach 
to CPE will be similar to that of Sum and Jessop (2013) and Mayblin (2016) in that it engages 
with the full spectrum of the theoretical framework’s concepts. Nevertheless, given that in 
the instant thesis, the CPE theoretical framework is being used to inform research in a new 
domain where not used before – financial regulatory rulemaking – certain modifications to 
the application of the theory are necessary. These adjustments arise in response to both a 
critical reading of CPE, and the information derived from this particular project’s dataset. 
 In further explication of the approach to CPE reflected herein, it should be noted 
that the following matters will be taken up at this section’s outset. First, a clarification of 
the term ‘material’, and its analogous uses in the context of CPE. And second, a recital of 
how each of the CPE concepts discussed in this chapter’s first section are treated and 
utilized in connection with OTC commodity derivative rulemaking will be presented. (This 
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recital serves as the basis for sub-lines of inquiry into the OTC commodity derivative case, 
and for the methodological approach that will be discussed in the next chapter, Chapter 5.)  
 
On the Definition of ‘Material’ 
One of the centerpieces of the CPE framework is its position that political-economic 
phenomena have both semiotic and ‘extra-semiotic’ dimensions (Jessop 2004: 163f). For 
instance, a country’s energy policy cannot be solely explained by internal political debates 
or perceived cultural affinities with energy-rich foreign regimes (as examples of the 
semiotic), but must include considerations such as the historical development of energy 
infrastructure, tax treatments for energy sources, or even the country’s geological situation 
(as examples of the ‘extra-semiotic’). Although the preceding may appear as an intuitive 
example of the divisions between the semiotic and ‘extra-semiotic’ dimensions to energy 
policy within the context of CPE, a subtle, yet crucial distinction pertaining to the ‘extra-
semiotic’ must be made. Namely, the difference between the geological situation – taken 
symbolically – and the two preceding variables (energy infrastructure and tax treatments). 
Making this distinction – as will be done below – is helpful in elucidating how this paper will 
approach the term ‘extra-semiotic,’ or ‘material,’ within the CPE framework.  
 As per Sum and Jessop (2013: 158), what divides the semiotic from the ‘extra-
semiotic’ is discursive influence. In the case of the former, a “semiotic moment” is 
characterized by the influence of discourse, and in the case of the latter, a “non-semiotic 
moment” is characterized by the influence of non-discursive, “structural (‘material’)” 
factors (Sum and Jessop 2013: 158). Nevertheless, CPE-informed research often includes 
elements of the discursive in its categorizations of the ‘extra-semiotic’ or ‘non-semiotic’ 
(Jessop 2010: 338). Turning back to the above example, a reasonable argument could be 
made that both the historical development of a country’s physical energy infrastructure and 
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taxation schemes have, at some point and to some degree, been, or, currently are, 
influenced by (broadly speaking) discourse. Moreover, to an example specific to CPE, the 
theory often treats social relations and institutions as falling within the taxonomy of ‘extra-
semiotic’ (Starrico 2017: 335). Yet, as with the previous example, a valid argument could be 
made that neither social relations nor institutions are wholly exempt from the influence of 
the discursive (DeLanda 2016; Jones 2008: 393). The geology of a country (e.g., its 
transform faults, astroblemes, anticlines, etc.), however, is not dependent on discourse in 
order to exist (DeLanda and Harman 2017: 37ff). 
 Given that CPE’s treatment of ‘extra-semiotic’ may include both those things 
subject to discursive influences (e.g., existing tax structures, sets of social relations and 
structures) and those that are not (e.g., radiation from a uranium deposit), and that ‘extra-
semiotic’ may, nonetheless, be used interchangeably with the term ‘material,’ making a 
distinction as to how this research interprets the term ‘material’ is crucial.85 The first part of 
this distinction is straightforward: ‘material’ will not correspond to Hegelian-Marxian-
inspired forms of materialism. The second part is to define ‘material’ as being that which 
exists independent of discourse (DeLanda and Harman 2017: 6-11). The final part is to view 
CPE’s notion of ‘extra-semiotic’ as comprising two variables: that which is treated as if it is 
‘material’, and that which is material. To return once more to the above example, the 
historical development of energy infrastructure (i.e., the context it provides to current 
energy policy, but not the actual crude oil reservoirs, or the sun’s photons reaching the 
Great Basin) and energy tax treatments (i.e., as a social practice subject to revisions by the 
 
85 It is worth noting Levi Bryant’s criticism of the term ‘materialism’ and its corollary ‘material’: “[…] 
materialism has become a terme d’art which has little to do with anything material. Materialism has 
come to mean simply that something is historical, socially constructed, involves cultural practices, 
and is contingent” (Bryant 2014: 2). Although CPE admirably attempts to differentiate between the 
semiotic (discursive) and the ‘extra-semiotic’ (‘material’), it does not do so fully and can be subject to 
Bryant’s critique.  
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International Accounting Standards Board or the Financial Accounting Standards Board) 
would be viewed – because they do not exist wholly independent of discourse – as if they 
are ‘material’ dimensions within the semiotic–extra-semiotic dichotomy. But only the 
country’s geological situation would be interpreted – because it exists wholly independent 
of discourse86 – as ‘material’. 
Making this distinction serves as a clarification of one of CPE’s central concepts, and 
not as a rebuttal of the importance of the extra-semiotic in influencing complexity 
reduction through semiosis and structuration. Elucidating this point, however, is not 
without precedent. Sum and Jessop (2013) routinely refer to the ‘natural world’ (i.e., 
objects outside of the ‘social world’) when discussing ‘material’ aspects of the extra-
semiotic, and, as noted above in the case of financial crisis construals, the authors 
reference such ‘material’ aspects separately from, but in conjunction with, social relations 
which are treated as if ‘material.’87 Moreover, as will be further explored below, CPE’s 
notion of ‘sedimented’ can confer a sense of materiality onto an imaginary (i.e., a semiotic 
ensemble). Nevertheless, given that a sedimented imaginary requires, at some level, 
continued semiotic expressivity to remain sedimented, such sedimented imaginary can at 
most be interpreted as if it is ‘material,’ and not actually material. For instance, as Sum and 
Jessop (2013: 37, 90) state, sedimented is synonymous with “taken for granted”; thus, 
 
86 As stated above in citing Peters et al. (2013), the social world may, however, influence the material 
world and its constituent objects. For instance, from a realist ontological perspective, although the 
Earth’s lithosphere can be posited to exist irrespective of our discursive awareness of it, human 
consumption of fossil fuels – potentially undertaken to carry out discursively articulated energy 
policies – may affect the lithosphere either through the deposition of layers of fossil fuel-related soot 
or through the extraction of the fossil fuels from the lithosphere.  
87 Additional instances of this abound across these authors’ research, including Jessop and Sum 




implying that its ‘materiality’ is constituted by its treatment as if ‘material,’ and not by the 
sedimented entity’s actual enduring qualities.  
 Regarding how this view of the term ‘material’ intersects with this research into 
OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, two points must be made. The first is that, where 
deemed significant to rulemaking, material objects will explicitly be included in the analysis 
of the semiotic–extra-semiotic dialectic, a dialectic which influences the complexity 
reducing processes of semiosis and structuration. And second, explicitly granting equal 
ontological status to those potentially significant objects which are divorced from discourse 
ensures that the approach to CPE taken herein retains what can be described as a flat 
ontology, by not privileging institutional arrangements, social practices, and sedimented 
discourses (among other examples of the extra-semiotic) over material objects, (events) 
such as a computer network failure during a critical stage of rulemaking.  
 
CPE and OTC Commodity Derivative Rulemaking 
As stated at the beginning of this section, the approach to CPE to be taken in this research 
project is one of applying the concepts generated by the theoretical framework to OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking. Thus, an engagement with the intersection of OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking and the concepts of complexity reduction through 
semiosis and structuration, the process of variation, selection, retention, and 
sedimentation, and imaginaries form the core of the forthcoming analysis. This is done in a 
manner largely consistent with the utilization of CPE in Sum and Jessop (2013) and Mayblin 
(2016). By employing CPE in this way, the analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking 
identifies the semiotic and extra-semiotic variables conditioning the construction of OTC 
commodity derivative regulations, as well as examining how these factors interact and co-
evolve to influence the variation, selection, and retention of such regulations over the 
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researched rulemaking period. The information derived therefrom is then utilized in the 
context of CPE’s notion of an imaginary to determine if a rulemaking imaginary – which 
serves as a guide along which policymakers organize rulemaking efforts – was sedimented, 
was refined, or evolved, given stable or changing semiotic and extra-semiotic supports. 
Together, this approach, grounded in above reviewed CPE literature, provides for an 
exploration of how CFTC policymakers constructed OTC commodity derivative regulations. 
 To further set out how this research project sees OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking through the lens of CPE, the remainder of this section now turns to explicating 
this research project’s theoretical commitments.  
 In keeping with CPE’s foundational position, it is assumed that the fundamental 
nature of objects – be they social, material, etc. – presents beings with an ontological 
dilemma in that they are unable to wholly apprehend the totality of the objects’ 
complexity. With regards to rulemaking, this means that neither policymakers nor other 
stakeholders wholly apprehend, and subsequently understand the entirety of, that to which 
their gaze is turned (e.g., regulated objects). Although CPE places emphasis on the 
observer’s inability to perceive the totality of an object as the starting point for the need to 
reduce complexity (see above), a complementary notion originating from the purely realist 
ontology of ‘Object-Oriented Ontology’ should also be considered here. Simply, it is that all 
objects are characterized by withdrawal, in that an object is never manifested, in full, to an 
observer (DeLanda and Harman 2017: 105f, Harman 2016a: 10f, Morton 2013: 14f, 77). 
These complementary perspectives concerning the nature of objects and their complexity 
are adopted in this research project: policymakers and other financial regulatory 
stakeholders always apprehend less than the totality of any object.  
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 To ‘go on’ in this environment characterized by the above limitation, it is accepted 
that policymakers are parties to semiosis and structuration as they seek to fulfill their 
requisite regulatory responsibilities (i.e., ‘to go on’).88 For those aspects of an object that 
are apprehended, policymakers may attach particular significance. This attachment process 
can draw upon the existing “meaning systems”89 held by the policymakers (Mayblin 2016: 
821). As such, the identification of those things to which policymakers granted significance 
during OTC commodity derivative rulemaking constitutes an important aspect of this 
paper’s analysis, which in this study include, among others, the following: the nature of the 
regulated derivative instrument and of the party transacting the agreement, the regulatory 
constraints and opportunities afforded by the statute authorizing rulemaking (i.e., the 
Dodd-Frank Act), the CFTC’s existing regulatory precedent in the OTC commodity derivative 
marketplace, communicative interactions with external parties, and the Chairperson’s 
regulatory vision (or policy preference) for the implementation of the statute.  
 Furthermore, it is assumed that what has been awarded significance serves as the 
basis for a given regulatory approach to OTC commodity derivatives. For instance, a 
discourse advanced by CFTC leadership directing agency officials to draft regulations 
amenable to particular OTC commodity derivative marketplace participants can be viewed 
as a significant semiotic influence on, and potential wellspring for, the drafted regulatory 
approach. As accepted herein, any approach taken to the regulation of OTC commodity 
derivatives is subject to either part or the entirety of CPE’s posited model of variation, 
selection, and retention. For an example germane to the case of OTC commodity 
 
88 As noted above, this use of the term structuration is not to be conflated with the concept of 
structuration advanced in the work of Anthony Giddens.  
89 Such meaning systems are the product of historical process of complexity reduction through 
semiosis and structuration (Jessop 2010: 338). This implies that a policymaker should not be 
assumed to be a tabula rasa. 
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derivatives, consider a regulatory approach within the context of the rulemaking process 
(see Chapter 2). A regulation that has been published within a proposed rule may be 
subject to variation, selection, and retention in-full as rulemaking progresses to its final 
stage. This is because the proposed regulation may face contestation from both semiotic 
(e.g., outside party comments) and extra-semiotic (e.g., changes to the structure of agency 
leadership) sources, thereby inducing policymakers to revise the regulation (i.e., variation), 
to propose a new version (i.e., selection), and to retain and sediment it through the 
agency’s formal adoption of the final rule. In other instances, a regulation in a proposed 
rule (i.e., one that is selected) may not revert to variation as the rulemaking process 
progresses because neither the proposed rule’s semiotic nor extra-semiotic supports 
varied; thus, likely leading to the selected regulation’s unaltered retention and 
sedimentation in final rule form.  
 Along these lines, analyzing why a particular regulatory approach was selected and 
retained, or returned to the stage of variation, is vital to the application of CPE utilized for 
this research project. Herein, it is assumed that these occurrences are attributable to the 
interaction and co-evolution of semiosis and structuration. Thus, it is essential to consider 
both the semiotic and extra-semiotic elements that served to condition the selection and 
retention, or the return to variation, of OTC commodity derivative regulations as contained 
within their respective rules.90 From the standpoint of the semiotic, this includes those 
discursive influences on rulemaking that have been identified in the extant literature (see 
Chapter 3) – such as outside party comment letters and textual content supplied during 
documented ex parte communications between Commission officials and prospective 
 
90 Reference here is made to the discursive-material continuum discussed in the second section of 
this chapter. Again, implied by this continuum is that at certain moments, discursive factors may 
weigh more heavily in the selection and retention of a construal than their extra-semiotic 
counterparts, and vice versa.  
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regulatees – in addition to significant factors like the verbal or written speech acts of CFTC 
policymakers as well as those of other members of government regarding the Commission’s 
regulatory endeavors (e.g., questions at a Congressional hearing) and (existing) policy texts, 
among other items.91 And from the perspective of the extra-semiotic, this includes, where 
applicable, genuinely material considerations (discussed above), in addition to those 
influences as seen through lenses of the structural, discursive, technological, and agential 
selectivities (Belfrage and Hauf 2017: 255; Sum and Jessop 2013: 214-19).  
To remind the reader, the structural selectivity references the often asymmetrically 
structured constraints or opportunities that act on someone or something as that entity 
pursues a specific objective (Sum and Jessop 2013: 214). Discursive selectivity relates to the 
asymmetrical restraints and opportunities on discursive productions (i.e., speech acts) that 
are associated with the use of certain genres, styles, and/or discourses (see ‘order(s) of 
discourse’ in Chapter 5) (Sum 2015: 214). The notion of a technological selectivity involves 
the material and intellectual forces that create or shape something, their attendant social 
and technical relations, and the power/knowledge of an individual or institution to both 
discipline individuals or groups and to limit the imagining of alternatives to a way of acting 
(Jessop 2015: 21f). Finally, agential selectivity refers to the capacity of an individual or 
group to impact events at junctures in time (Sum and Jessop 2013: 217).  
As these definitions of the selectivities are abstract, their use in the forthcoming 
analysis can be more easily understood if they are conceptualized within the context of 
administrative agency rulemaking and as grounded in the rulemaking literature reviewed in 
Chapter 3.  
 
91 As can be gleaned from this list, the semiotic includes utterances of actors (e.g., policymakers, 
representatives of interest groups, and politicians) in addition to those presently inanimate sources 
of language (e.g., previously codified regulations). 
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 The structural selectivity can, in this context, be broadly conceived of as the bounds 
(e.g., delegated authority imparted by the Administrative Procedure Act – see Chapter 2 – 
as well as the statute authorizing rulemaking or a particular institutional design or 
constitution) within which an agency conducts its operations and proceeds with 
rulemaking. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act empowered and directed CFTC policymakers 
to draft rules implementing it. Nevertheless, while the Commission had latitude in carrying 
out this mandate, it could not exceed the regulatory limits established by Dodd-Frank (e.g., 
it could not draft definitions of financial products that did not correspond with those in the 
law). Other examples of the structural selectivity include the opportunities and constraints 
on rulemaking that are associated with an intra-agency delegation of authority to a specific 
rulemaking area, such as to an internal rulemaking team (i.e., its institutional design), and 
the reconstitution of CFTC leadership through the arrival or departure of commissioners 
and/or the chairperson (i.e., the agency’s voting members).  
 Meanwhile, the discursive selectivity can be seen as the limitations and 
opportunities afforded by different genres,92 styles,93 and discourses94 on the speech acts 
(including written rules) of policymakers involved in rulemaking. For instance, the language 
of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the discursive limits to and space within which CFTC 
policymakers draft OTC commodity derivative rules (e.g., the regulations implementing the 
Act must be compossible with the statutory language of the overarching law). This may 
preempt other textual sources (e.g., the arguments of regulatee comment letters) from 
being utilized in conjunction with the language of the Act to inform agency regulations. 
 
92 Genres, as mentioned to above, are the mediums through which discourses can be accessed, such 
as rule comment letters, yearly presidential addresses, or newspaper op-eds (Fairclough 2013: 179). 
93 Styles are understood to be expressed ways of being, such as the pedantic manner in which a 
business executive may interact (verbally and through physical expression) with low-level employees 
(Taylor 2004: 437; Fairclough 2003: 23). 
94 Discourses constitute semiotic representations of events, things, and relations in both how they 
are in the present moment, as well as their imagined future states (Fairclough 2003: 23). 
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Additionally, a regulatory vision articulated by Commission leadership endowed with 
bureaucratic discretion to impact the agency’s agenda and to condition a rule’s ultimate 
content may enable or restrict outside parties’ ability to influence, through their submitted 
comment letters, the character and content of the codified rule. A final example is that 
policymakers’ use of a particular regulatory textual genre – like an ‘interim final rule’95 – 
might afford outside interested parties the opportunity to continue to comment on the 
rulemaking issue at-hand, thus potentially leaving the regulatory matter open to revision. 
 The technological selectivity within the context of administrative agency 
rulemaking can be understood to denote the internal and external forces on the agency and 
its policymakers that support or restrict regulatory endeavors through the provision or 
withholding, respectively, of material and intellectual inputs now or in the future. Two 
examples stemming from this selectivity are as follows. First, Congress’s ability to grant or 
deny specific levels of monetary appropriations to the CFTC for its operation, the 
President’s authority to intervene in an administrative agency’s affairs, and the Judiciary’s 
prerogative, 96 upon formal legal request, to review agency rules. And second, the provision 
or withholding of data, information, and perspective (together, intellectual resources) by a 
regulatee or a non-regulatee (e.g., a public advocacy group) in connection with rulemaking 
– either by formal (i.e., comment letters) or informal (e.g., ex parte meetings) means. In the 
analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking that follows, the assessment of extra-
semiotic factors as seen through the lens of the technological selectivity will primarily 
 
95 A final rule that is not preceded by the issuance of a proposed rule, but one that is, nonetheless, 
open to comment and potentially subject to revision. 
96 This example can likewise be assessed through the technological selectivity insofar as judicial 
review, or even the threat thereof, is an invoked force capable of disciplining an administrative 
agency and impacting its rule-makings by possibly requiring “arbitrary and capricious” rules to be 
rewritten. Nevertheless, as stated in Chapter 2, the Chevron Doctrine – which involves the judicial 
review of agency rules when challenged in court – usually entitles a grant of deference to regulatory 
agencies’ understandings and interpretations of their own rules and regulations.  
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pertain to issues relating to the second example – the provision or restriction of intellectual 
resources by outside parties to CFTC policymakers. This is done because such resources can 
provide policymakers with a reservoir of content that can be used in the construction of 
regulations. Where applicable, however, Congressional, Presidential, and/or Judicial action 
will be contemplated in the discussions of the broader environment in which OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking transpired. 
 Finally, in this same context, the agential selectivity presents itself as the capacity of 
an agency official or groups of officials (or even external actors, such as the President) to 
influence rulemaking. An example of this being the Commission’s Chairperson exercising his 
or her bureaucratic discretion to set a regulatory agenda that reflects his or her vision (or 
specific policy preferences). Or more narrowly, it could also refer to a commissioner 
intervening in the formulation of a regulation on behalf of regulatees, like including in a 
rule’s content requested conditionality for regulatory compliance. Although, where 
applicable and significant to the construction of OTC commodity derivative rules, the 
impact of other (policymaker) actors on rulemaking as viewed through the agential 
selectivity – or in relation to contextual matters – will be discussed, the forthcoming 
analysis emphasizes assessing the influence of the CFTC’s Chairperson on rule-making. This 
emphasis is rooted in the notion of the bureaucratic discretion reviewed in Chapter 3, but 
done so as to further develop knowledge of this under-researched aspect of administrative 
agency rulemaking. 
The efficacy of employing these selectivities in a rulemaking analysis is that those 
factors that permit or deny a (construed) regulatory approach compossibility with the 
(semiotic and extra-semiotic) milieu in which it is embedded can be identified and explored. 
For an approach to OTC commodity derivatives to be selected, or to continue to be 
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retained, it must satisfy the conditions of compossibility. It should be noted, however, that 
compossibility does not denote the potential range of all possibility in this milieu, but, 
rather, comprises an “enforced selection” of a subset of its potential range. Nevertheless, 
while some regulatory approaches may be selected for their ostensible semiotic 
congruence (i.e., compossibility at the level of the discursive), these may not be continually 
validated by the extra-semiotic (e.g., not sustainably compossible at the level of the 
material). Yet, even if a material occurrence may seemingly negate the compossibility of a 
regulatory approach with a material reality, discursive strategies to mollify the apparent 
dissonance may be employed so as to grant the approach the appearance of compossibility 
with its extra-semiotic context. Examples of this can be seen above in the works of Sum 
(2015) and Heinrich (2015), wherein the economic arrangements largely responsible for 
financial crises are maintained after the crises, but are re-contextualized and re-articulated 
to give the appearance that the same arrangements are new, legitimate, and less risky (e.g. 
the post-Washington Consensus). A contemporary example of this comes from the 2016 US 
Presidential election, whereupon losing the popular vote, President Donald J. Trump 
intimated that he in fact won the popular vote because the margin of defeat comprised 
illegal, illegitimate votes.97 
 Analyzing OTC commodity derivative rulemaking also necessitates inquiring into the 
concept at the core of the CPE research program: a sedimented imaginary. As stated earlier 
in this section, the notion of sedimented should not be conflated with that which is 
material. Rather, this paper views that which is sedimented much in the same manner as a 
geologist would view a sedimentary rock: the rock has form and can influence other objects 
with which it comes into contact. But the properties of the rock indicate that its stable 
 
97 See Trump claims millions voted illegally in presidential poll, BBC News, 28 November 2016. 
Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38126438. 
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existence is a function of the continued deposition of matter, and that, should this process 
cease, the sedimentary rock is fully exposed to being weathered and eroded away (Haldar 
and Tišljar 2014: 122-144). Recall that a sedimented imaginary is neither fully separate from 
the discursive, nor capable of sustaining itself without its continued expression by 
individuals or groups. Thus, again, that which is determined to be sedimented will be 
viewed as if ‘material’, and subject to ‘weathering and erosion’, should its semiotic and 
extra-semiotic supports be contested.  
 In relation to OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, CPE’s notion of imaginaries 
can be understood to mean the relatively stable lenses through which policymakers 
perceive their regulatory task (i.e., a guide to their rulemaking endeavors).98 Imaginaries are 
formed under the influence of semiotic and extra-semiotic factors as a part of the co-
evolving complexity reducing processes of semiosis and structuration subjected to 
variation, selection, and retention (Jones 2009: 2525f). Because imaginaries are, however, 
the ultimate product of the complexity reduction, they are not assumed to be more than 
incomplete representations of the objects to which they refer. 
 As will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6, this thesis posits that CFTC 
policymakers were guided by a ‘Dodd-Frank imaginary’. This imaginary was a simplified 
outgrowth of the Dodd-Frank Act’s meaning as it pertained to the regulation of OTC 
derivatives. In short, the Dodd-Frank imaginary guided Commission officials towards 
developing OTC commodity derivative regulations which increased transparency into these 
financial products (i.e., through recordkeeping and reporting requirements) and reduced 
their attendant systemic risk (i.e., through clearing, margining, and position limits). As a 
 
98 In a non-CPE tradition, Beckert (2016) uses the notion of imaginaries to denote one’s fictional 
expectations of the future: imaginaries are used to treat an imagined future as if it is real. Due to 
this, imaginaries have a degree of performative influence on the object to which the gaze of the 
imaginary is focused (Beckert 2016; Beckert 2013: 336f). 
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part of this application of CPE to the case of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, this 
imaginary is engaged with throughout Part III of this study. In the event that the Dodd-
Frank imaginary is refined, or evolves, during rulemaking, exploring those semiotic and 
extra-semiotic factors influencing such changes99 is the final, yet nonetheless essential, 
component to examining CFTC officials’ regulation of OTC commodity derivatives within a 
CPE theoretical framework. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON CPE 
This chapter has presented the theoretical framework of Cultural Political Economy, 
discussed selected theory literature, and has proposed an approach to CPE to guide the 
analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission between 2010 and 2016. As stated in this chapter’s introduction, employing 
CPE in the study of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking can enable this research to fill 
the gaps in rulemaking literature that were identified in Chapter 3. Principally among these 
gaps is the need to provide an in-depth analysis of CFTC policymakers’ crafting of OTC 
commodity derivative regulations in a manner that moves beyond (and addresses the 
limitations of) existing analytical approaches to rulemaking – a gap which can be filled by 
following the CPE approach proposed herein. Nevertheless, selecting the proper approach 
to CPE is imperative to fulfilling this task. Thus, in addition to ‘practising’ CPE, this project, 
as detailed above, utilizes the CPE research program’s key concepts along similar lines to 
the reviewed work of Sum and Jessop (2013) and Mayblin (2016). Choosing this exact 
approach has the benefit of both grounding this project’s analysis in a well-developed 
 
99 A process advocated for by (Jessop 2016: 2545) when the author discusses examining the 
intersection of imaginaries and policymaking. 
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analytical framework and providing the basis for a thorough and intellectually defensible 
exploration of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking.  
 Before advancing to the ensuing chapter and delving into a discussion of this 
project’s methods and methodology, it is important to convey three noteworthy points 
regarding the use of CPE as a theoretical framework. First, as alluded to above, analyses 
grounded in CPE may ostensibly – and problematically – privilege semiosis over 
structuration, or, more broadly, the semiotic over the extra-semiotic (Staricco 2017: 339; 
van Heur 2010: 439). Although Jessop and Sum (2017) admirably argue that this 
phenomenon is neither inherently nor universally intrinsic to studies employing CPE, 
research that uses semiosis as the analytical entry-point can fail to analyze the interplay 
between semiosis and structuration over the course of inquiry. Therefore, to avoid this 
trap, and to assuage the criticisms of Staricco (2017) and van Heur (2010), the analysis of 
OTC commodity derivative rulemaking will move beyond its semiotic entry-point (i.e., the 
text of the rules) to incorporate both an analysis of semiotic and extra-semiotic 
considerations in regards to the analyzed regulations’ construction. 
 Second, while Sum and Jessop (2013) review possible methodological procedures 
for operationalizing CPE, these progenitors of this theoretical framework do not propose a 
prescriptive methodological formulation. Conceivably, this could help explain the diverse 
ways in which CPE-informed studies have been carried out, as alluded to earlier in this 
chapter. Although Sum and Jessop (2013) suggest ‘critical discourse analysis’ as a potential 
methodological avenue, researchers Belfrage and Hauf (2015; 2017) posit the efficacy of 
utilizing ‘critical grounded theory’ in conjunction with CPE, and yet still other authors – 
including, on occasion, both Jessop and Sum themselves – utilize no specific methodological 
procedure in their CPE-related research (Sum and Jessop 2013; Levy and Spicer 2013; 
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Grubbauer 2014; Heinrich 2015; Mayblin 2016). This implies that there is flexibility in 
selecting a methodological procedure when employing CPE, but that a CPE-based analysis 
must, nonetheless, engage with both semiosis and structuration. Thus, as will be presented 
in the next chapter, an eclectic methodological procedure will be developed that will enable 
an analysis of both those semiotic and extra-semiotic factors conditioning OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking. 
Third, the CPE framework can also be criticized for the inert effect that its 
corresponding analyses have in producing social and political change. As noted by Tyfield 
(2015: 537-540), the issue with utilizing CPE for social, political, and economic analyses is 
that while the findings its application generates may enrich general topical understanding, 
the results do not “approach” an ultimate perspective on the matter; thus, leaving CPE 
analyses with limited actionable epistemic value. While the use of CPE in connection with 
this project does further understandings of rulemaking – specifically at the CFTC – given 
Tyfield’s criticism, the results of this project are not overtly intended to effect change in the 
administrative regulatory process.  
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Chapter 5 – Data Collection and Methodology 
 
INTRODUCTION 
To analyze this project’s research focus – how CFTC policymakers constructed the regulation 
of OTC commodity derivatives between 2010 and 2016 – with the guidance of the CPE 
framework set forth in the preceding chapter, applicable data must be collected, and a 
methodological procedure for analyzing these data must be selected and followed, 
respectively. Moreover, through the development of the previous chapter’s discussion of 
CPE in conjunction with the case of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, four sub-
research questions can now be generated. These questions, including the central research 
question, are as follows:  
 
• How did CFTC policymakers construct the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives 
between 2010 and 2016? 
o What imaginaries pertaining to the regulation of OTC commodity 
derivatives were present during rulemaking? 
o To what regulatory considerations did CFTC policymakers grant significance 
during rulemaking?  
o Why were certain regulatory approaches selected and retained by CFTC 
policymakers when rulemaking, and what influenced this selection and 
retention? 
o Did the imaginaries change during the OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking process? If so, how?  
 
To answer the above questions, an in-depth account of the development of the 
CFTC’s OTC commodity derivative regulations between 2010 and 2016 will be undertaken. 
As stated earlier in this thesis, such an endeavor has not been pursued in previous research. 
Thus, this project makes novel contributions to research on OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking at the CFTC, specifically, and to scholarship on administrative agency 
rulemaking, more broadly. Moreover, as this instant research is guided by a CPE theoretical 
framework, analyzing rulemaking from this perspective both advances CPE into a novel 
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domain (i.e., rulemaking) and contributes, in a unique manner (i.e., through the 
employment of CPE), to current academic understandings of this administrative process.  
 Given the nature of the previously articulated research questions, and the CPE 
approach taken herein, this project on OTC commodity derivative rulemaking constitutes 
qualitative research. Qualitative data, such as documents and interviews, were collected for 
purposes of analysis. As elaborated below, the qualitative data for this research were 
selected based on their applicability to the case study of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking at the CFTC between 2010 and 2016. Furthermore, congruent with the nature 
of these data, qualitative methods are used to guide the analysis towards answering the 
research questions and, thus, to provide a thorough account of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking. 
Data selected for this study specifically pertain to the Commission’s rulemaking for 
the forward contract exclusion and for commodity (trade) options. Together, these rule-
makings comprise the CFTC’s determination (i.e., definition) of which OTC commodity 
derivatives would be regulated as ‘swaps’ and, thus, subject to the Dodd-Frank regulatory 
post-trade infrastructure.100 This combined rulemaking sequence, in its multiple stages, will 
serve as the focal point for the instant study’s analysis. 
To concisely summarize, the forward contract exclusion provides a framework for 
determining which OTC commodity derivatives can be considered regulatable ‘swaps’ and 
which are non-regulatable forward contracts. Meanwhile, the rules for commodity (trade) 
options distinguish between commodity options that are to be regulated as ‘swaps’, and 
trade options that are to constitute an exemption from some or all regulation as ‘swaps’. In 
 
100 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, this infrastructure includes reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, mandatory clearing, margin requirements for derivative instruments that would be 
regulated, and, to a certain extent, position limits. 
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the case of trade options, the rule(s) for commodity (trade) options grant(s) an exemption 
(i.e., the ‘trade option exemption’) to those OTC commodity derivative contracts containing 
an option – thus, qualifying as regulatable ‘swaps’ (i.e., commodity options). To so qualify, 
however, the option strictly must be used for commercial purposes and result in the 
physical delivery of the underlying commodity upon the exercise of the contracted option 
(i.e., therefore exempting them as trade options).  
The data relating to rulemaking for the forward contract exclusion and commodity 
(trade) options include their associated promulgated rules and corresponding comment 
letters. Taken together, the rules and comment letters comprise the totality of the formal 
documentation of rulemaking. Since these two rulemaking areas included the production of 
advance notices of proposed rulemaking, proposed rules, final rules, and revisions to the 
final rules, rule and comment related data from each of these stages are included in this 
study’s dataset. Additional data from policymaker speeches, policymaker Congressional 
testimony, agency meeting transcripts, and no-action letters101 relating to the two 
rulemaking domains has also been collected for this research into the regulation of OTC 
commodity derivatives. Each of these data are publicly available through either the U.S. 
Federal Register or through the CFTC, and are readily accessible online. 
Furthermore, to complement and enrich the rule-related data just referenced, 
interviews with Commission officials engaged in the development of OTC commodity 
derivative regulations were conducted. Although the principal source of data for the 
analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking are the rule-related documents, 
complementing these data with interviews of CFTC officials serves an important function. 
 
101 A letter written by an administrative agency’s staff for outside stakeholders notifying these 
parties that the agency (or a division within the agency) will not proceed with legal or regulatory 
enforcement of one, or more, regulation(s).  
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Namely, such interviews can provide insightful perspective on potentially significant aspects 
of Dodd-Frank era CFTC rulemaking which might not otherwise be expressed in the rules, 
comment letters, or other rule-related data. 
Answering the questions of this research effort requires that a methodological 
procedure to operationalize the overarching CPE theoretical framework be developed to 
guide the analysis of the collected data. As stated in the previous chapter, because CPE and 
its related scholarship do not prescribe a singular methodological approach, the procedure 
that will be elaborated on herein is eclectic. Broadly speaking, the methodological 
procedure that is developed will guide the analysis of this research project’s collected data 
to identify and assess the interacting and co-evolving semiotic and extra-semiotic factors 
which conditioned the construction of OTC commodity derivative regulations; thus, 
providing an answer to this study’s central research question. 
To expand on this discussion of data collection and methodology, this chapter has 
two sections. The first section – on data collection – will discuss the selection of data 
sources, as well as data collection methods. Additionally, a few reflexive remarks will be 
made regarding the selection and collection of these data. The second section – on 
methodology – will begin by critically enunciating the analytical grounding of the 
methodological procedure to be followed in the forthcoming rulemaking analysis. Finally, a 
detailed presentation of the precise methodological procedure followed in the analysis of 




As indicated above, the principal basis for selecting data is their relevance to this research’s 
focus – OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the CFTC between 2010 and 2016. Beyond 
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this general criterion, the features of administrative agency rulemaking (i.e., its rules and 
comment letters) should be seen as the well-spring from which data are selected. As such, 
the primary sources of data relating to formal rulemaking are rules adopted by the relevant 
government agency and the rules’ attendant comment letters.  
 For OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, the rules selected for this research 
project include those for the forward contract exclusion and those for commodity (trade) 
options. These rules determine (define) which OTC commodity derivative instruments will 
be subject to regulation as a ‘swap’. As it pertains to the forward contract exclusion, those 
rule releases issued by the CFTC that will be analyzed in this thesis are as follows: (1) the 
August 20, 2010 advance notice of proposed rulemaking, (2) the May 23, 2011 proposed 
rule, (3) the August 13, 2012 final rule, (4) the November 20, 2014 proposed interpretive 
guidance, and (5) the May 18, 2015 final interpretive guidance. With regard to the 
regulation of commodity (trade) options, the to-be-analyzed rule releases are: (1) the 
September 28, 2010 advance notice of proposed rulemaking, (2) the February 3, 2011 
proposed rule, (3) the April 27, 2012 final rule, (4) the May 7, 2015 proposed rule for trade 
options, and (5) the March 21, 2016 final rule for trade options. Comment letters of 
outside, interested parties on each applicable rule-making are also included as selected 
data. 
 To provide additional richness to the data on the above rule-makings, CFTC 
policymaker speeches, Congressional testimony, agency meeting transcripts, and no-action 
letters relating to the two rulemaking areas are included in the dataset. These data sources 
will provide further perspective on the perceptions of policymakers concerning the 
regulation of OTC commodity derivatives. As it specifically pertains to policymaker 
speeches, only those speeches between 2010 and 2016 that relate to OTC commodity 
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derivative rulemaking are selected. Nevertheless, since some applicable speeches may not 
overtly address OTC commodity derivative rules, speeches that refer to the regulation of 
‘commodity options’, ‘trade options’, ‘optionality’, and ‘forward contracts’, as well as those 
referencing ‘exclusion’, ‘exemption’, ‘end-users’ or ‘commercial users or participants’ in the 
context of OTC commodity derivatives, will qualify for selection into the instant study’s 
dataset.102 Moreover, because the CFTC only possesses records of public speeches given by 
commissioners and chairpersons, the selection of speeches will be limited to this 
policymaker cohort. 
 Table 1, below, provides a synopsis of the document types, their criteria for 
selection, and their source of access for OTC commodity derivative rule-related data used in 
this project. Furthermore, Appendix B lists all such rule-related documentation drawn on in 















102 As a heuristic, these terms serve as signifiers of a discussion pertaining to OTC commodity 
derivative instruments and marketplace participants.    
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Table 1 – Synopsis of Documentation 
Document Type Criteria for Selection Source of Access 
Rule 
Advance notice of proposed rulemaking, 
proposed rule, and final rule for determining 
which OTC commodity derivatives would be 
regulated (2010-2016) 




Comment letters on selected OTC commodity 
derivative rules (2010-2016) 
CFTC Website and/or 
Electronically from 
Federal Register 
Policymaker Speech  
Given by a CFTC chairperson or commissioner; 
either directly relating to the selected OTC 
commodity derivative rules or referencing 
'commodity options', 'trade option', 'optionality', 
'forward contracts', and ‘exclusion’, ‘exemption’, 
'end-users' or 'commercial users or participants' 
of commodity derivatives (2010-2016) 




Transcripts of CFTC meetings relating to 
rulemaking for the forward contract exclusion 
and commodity (trade) options (2010-2016) 




Made by CFTC policymakers concerning the 





No-action letters for the selected OTC 
commodity derivative rules (2010-2016) 




The final source of data to be utilized in this paper’s analysis are in-person 
interviews with CFTC officials. While the exact details of the methods for selecting interview 
participants and collecting interview data will be explored in the next sub-section, in 
general, interviews were sought with CFTC officials who worked at the CFTC between 2010 
and 2016. Moreover, interviews were principally sought with CFTC commissioners and 
those employees who worked directly on OTC commodity derivative regulatory issues (as 
evidenced by their names on related agency rules, letters, or policy statements). The 
inclusion of interview data into the broader rulemaking dataset should be viewed as 
complementary in nature. As noted above, the focal point of analysis are the 
aforementioned OTC commodity derivative rules, and complementary data, such as those 
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derived from interviews, serve to provide additional context, depth, and insight into the 
perceptions of CFTC policymakers when they developed these rules.   
 
Data Collection 
The collection of all data and information for rulemaking on both the forward contract 
exclusion and commodity (trade) options, including the rule-makings’ corresponding 
comment letters, was done through online governmental sources; most prominently, the 
CFTC’s website.103 All information relating to these two rulemaking areas is publicly 
available and is posted online by the Commission. As such, each iteration of the rules for 
the forward contract exclusion and for commodity (trade) options were collected through 
their respective rulemaking pages on the CFTC’s online site. Additionally, the comment 
letters associated with each of these rule-makings were collected from these same pages – 
repositories known as ‘comment files’. With regards to CFTC policymaker speeches, 
Congressional testimony, agency meeting transcripts, and no-action letters, these items are 
similarly found on the Commission’s webpage or, in the case of the Congressional 
testimony, through Congress’ website.  
As it pertains specifically to policymaker speeches, those speeches that were given 
between 2010 and 2016, and that directly related to rulemaking for the forward contract 
exclusion or commodity (trade) options, were collected as a part of this study into the 
regulation of OTC commodity derivatives. To determine these speeches’ potential 
applicability to this project’s research, a keyword search using the following terms was 
preliminarily undertaken: ‘commodity options’, ‘trade options’, ‘optionality’, ‘forward 
contracts’, ‘exclusion’, ‘exemption’, ‘end-users’ or ‘commercial users or participants’. For 
 
103 See https://www.cftc.gov/.  
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those speeches that included one or any combination of these terms, the speech was then 
read to ascertain its relevance to issues involving OTC commodity derivative regulation. 
 Interviews were also conducted as a part of this research project. Beginning July 
2017, emails were sent to over a dozen potential interviewees whose work was determined 
to have involved the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives between 2010 and 2016. The 
determination of an interviewee pool involved a couple of criteria, including: (1) if the 
individual was a CFTC commissioner between 2010 and 2016, or the individual was 
referenced in a policy document relating to the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives 
which dated from 2010 to 2016 and (2) if the interviewee’s contact information was 
publicly available. Those individuals in this pool were then contacted via email to inquire 
into their interest and availability to discuss their recollections of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking for either a face-to-face interview in Washington, D.C. or a telephonic 
interview. For those that responded, interview dates were arranged. And, for those who did 
not respond, subsequent attempts at email contact were made. (Of note, the size of the 
potential interviewee pool was not large to begin with, given the above conditions.) 
Included with the interview request email were an attached consent form (see Appendix C) 
and interview information sheet (see Appendix D).  
 While the above criteria for determining which individuals would be contacted for 
an interview were developed to capture interviewees whose work involved decision-
making on rules for OTC commodity derivatives (e.g., commissioners and other senior-level 
policymakers), it should be acknowledged that these criteria may prompt concerns about 
bias in the selection of interviewees. Given the above criteria, not all individuals who 
worked on OTC commodity derivative rulemaking were interviewed. In several instances, 
either contact information was not publicly available or the prospective interviewee(s) 
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never responded to this researcher’s inquiries. Thus, potentially important recollections on 
the rulemaking process may have been omitted from the interview dataset. Nevertheless, 
this should not be viewed as a significant limitation to this research project for two reasons: 
(1) the analytical focus of this study is the formalized rulemaking process, and not solely or 
even predominantly the recollections of (former) policymakers; and (2) the interviews that 
were conducted are, thus, only used to complement the data from this formalized process 
by being sources of information that the formal data on this process (i.e., rules and 
comment letters) may not contain. 
 In total, 7 interviews were conducted. Five of the interviews were face-to-face, held 
in either the offices of the interviewees or in a public setting in the Washington, D.C. area 
between October 1, 2017 – October 10, 2017. The remaining two interviews were 
conducted telephonically at later dates.104 The interviews were semi-structured, in that 
they were guided by a set of questions relating to OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, 
but also broached related topics as the interview unfolded. The interview questions sought 
to explore the interviewees’ experiences, views, and recollections on the regulation of OTC 
commodity derivatives. Each interview was audio-recorded with concomitant notes taken.  
 At the time the interviews were held, the consent forms were signed and returned 
to this author; thus, ensuring the participants’ informed consent. Notably, the interviewees 
gave, or withheld, their consent to both the transcription of the interview by a third-party 
and to the use of the interviewee’s name in this thesis.105 After the interviews were 
 
104 Although additional telephonic interviews were sought, no further prospective interviewees 
responded to interview requests.  
105 Five interviewees – constituting 6 of the interviews – gave their consent to have their interviews 
transcribed. The sixth interviewee did not return the consent form, although subsequent efforts 
were made to have the form remitted. Thus, this interview was not transcribed and data from it will 
not be used in this thesis. (This author, however, still possesses the audio recording of the interview.) 
Additionally, only 2 of the interviewees gave their consent to have their names used.  
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conducted, both emailed ‘thank you’ notes and posted ‘thank you’ cards were sent to the 
interviewees who partook in face-to-face interviews. The audio recordings of the 
interviews, for which consent to do so was obtained, were transcribed by a third-party. The 
transcriptions are available upon request with interviewee consent.  
 Ethical considerations relating to the interviews should also be mentioned here. For 
instance, prior to embarking on the interview fieldwork, a formal research ethics form was 
completed, submitted, and approved by the University of Edinburgh. Additionally, as 
elaborated in this university-provided pre-clearance form and in the interview information 
sheet given to the interviewees (see Appendix D), ethical guidelines pertaining to the 
handling and use of the interview data were stated and followed. Most importantly among 
these was the disclosure that for those participants who wanted to remain anonymous – 
should their interviews have been used in this thesis – anonymity could not be guaranteed, 
but reasonable efforts would be made to anonymize the interview data. Following Saunders 
et al. (2015: 134) for the group of participants wishing to remain anonymous, non-essential 
interviewee details have been altered.  
A final ethical consideration stems from what may be thought of as a power 
imbalance between the (relatively elite) interviewee and the student interviewer.106 While a 
power imbalance may nominally exist insofar as knowledge of and experience in OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking at the CFTC are concerned, in the interview space, an 
evident power imbalance was not perceived by this interviewer. Furthermore, this 
researcher was not your typical student novitiate with regards to OTC commodity 
derivatives, having previously worked in a regulatory compliance capacity with such 
instruments in the legal office of a U.S.-based energy company. Nevertheless, if such an 
 
106 See Smith (2006) for a critical discussion of power relations in the (elite) interview space and how 
they should not be assumed to be ubiquitous in such space.  
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imbalance existed, its effects would be tempered from significantly influencing this 
project’s analysis because of the use of the interviews as a secondary, complementary 
source of data and information.  
 Regarding the experience of holding these interviews, a few points are worth 
noting. First, although this researcher did partake in a one-day qualitative interview training 
course at the University of Oxford in May 2017, these were the first research interviews the 
researcher had conducted. Thus, possibly due to nerves, the intra-interview prompts for 
the first two interviews were not as analytically crisp – and capable of yielding insightful 
responses – as those in later interviews. Second, and disappointingly, while the contact 
information of other potential interviewees was procured from interview participants, and 
attempts to contact the potential interviewees were made, this ‘snow-ball’ method did not 
yield any additional interviews. Third, and finally, a significant personal expense was 
incurred to visit Washington, D.C. for the 10-day period during which face-to-face 
interviews were conducted. Because of the high cost of this visit, this researcher was 
neither able to return to Washington, D.C. nor visit any other city where potential 
interviewees (former CFTC officials) resided. In short, the high cost associated with holding 
face-to-face interviews limited the availability of such interviews; hence, in part, the 
relatively small number of face-to-face interviews.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, this section develops the methodological 
procedure that will guide the analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking. This section 
of the chapter is segmented into three subsections. The first subsection sets out the 
foundations for, and implications of, the methodological procedure that will be followed in 
the CPE-informed analysis of the case of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking. Then, the 
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second subsection will situate the upcoming analytical chapters of this thesis within the 
context of a case study. Finally, the third subsection will present the complete 
methodological procedure, linking it with CPE, the theoretical framework adopted herein 
for the analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking. 
 
Foundations of the Research Methodology for the Case Study of OTC Commodity Derivative 
Rulemaking  
The research methodology for this inquiry into OTC commodity derivative rulemaking is 
founded upon the CPE theoretical framework put forth in the preceding chapter. As such, 
this methodology seeks to operationalize a CPE approach to the analysis of rulemaking; 
using its analytical lenses to explore and assess the construction of OTC commodity 
derivative regulations. Flowing from the core of CPE, the hallmark of this approach is the 
analysis of both semiosis (i.e., the semiotic) and structuration (i.e., the extra-semiotic), as 
well as how these intersected to condition rulemaking. Any attempt to operationalize CPE 
for research purposes must, as noted by Thompson and Harley (2012: 1377f), examine the 
relationships between discourse (i.e., the semiotic), actors, institutions, and other extra-
semiotic “conditions and constraints” when formulating explanations and providing 
evidenced-based, analytical insight. The manner in which the semiotic and extra-semiotic 
are conceptualized for this rulemaking study has been explained in Chapter 4.  
 Since this study approaches the analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking 
from a CPE perspective, it is broadly deductive in nature. A deductive approach to analysis 
refers to the use of a pre-existing (or predetermined) theoretical framework through which 
to view and assess the collected data (Woiceshyn and Daellenback 2018: 185; Azungah 
2018: 391). Generally speaking, this entails moving an analysis from the conceptualizations 
advanced by the framework (or theory) to the particular phenomena observed in the data. 
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In relation to this research project, this means that CPE is utilized for initiating and guiding 
the exploration and analysis of the rulemaking case. (It should be noted, however, that 
while some deductive methods seek to test specific theoretically derived hypotheses, the 
approach taken herein does not attempt to directly formulate and tests theory-related 
propositions.)  
 While the case of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking is analyzed from the 
perspective of CPE, and, therefore, implies a deductive analytical approach, as stated 
immediately above, this implication must be qualified as broadly deductive. This is because 
a CPE-informed analysis necessarily implicates deductive and inductive research 
“moments” (Belfrage and Hauf 2015; Belfrage and Hauf 2017). For instance, in the analysis 
of CPE’s semiosis arm – or, of the semiotic – the methodological procedure (as detailed 
below) dictates an examination of the analyzed rule-making’s text followed by an 
exploration and assessment of the semiotic (discursive) factors (or influences) that 
conditioned this text. Such a part of the procedure implies induction (Azungah 2018). 
Furthermore, regarding CPE’s structuration arm – or, of the extra-semiotic – the specific 
influence of, for example, a CFTC policymaker on the construction of a regulation is inferred 
from the collected data as based on the individual’s recorded actions (or imposed policy 
preference) relating the regulation’s development. Nevertheless, the capacity for this actor 
to influence rulemaking is conceptualized – as done in Chapter 4 – and viewed through the 
lens of CPE’s agential selectivity; implying deduction. Thus, while this study of OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking has inductive analytical moments, its employment of CPE 
to guide the overall analysis also renders it broadly deductive in nature. 
 In light of the foregoing discussion, it is important to consider the issues of the 
internal and external validity of the instant study as well as its reliability. Regarding internal 
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validity, or correctly fulfilling the study’s investigation, this has been achieved by the 
rigorous data selection and collection procedures explicated in the previous section of this 
chapter, and will be maintained through the consistent use of diverse sources of data in 
informing the analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking (Malterud 2001; Maxwell 
2005). With regard to external validity, or the generalizability of the study’s findings, this 
will be achieved on a conditional basis. As a single-unit qualitative case study that is broadly 
deductive (as defined immediately above), the results of this project are not intended to 
confer universal knowledge that can be extrapolated in full to each and every rulemaking 
case. (To be sure, there will be instances wherein the semiotic and extra-semiotic factors 
that are explored in the instant study weight wholly differently in conditioning the 
construction of other regulations.) Rather, generalizability is attained as (1) the study 
provides “analytic generalizations” (Firestone 1993; Yin 2009) that can be used to inform, 
shape, and guide future (CPE-based) rulemaking research and (2) the inquiry’s findings can 
speak to phenomena of similar rulemaking cases, such as of other (CFTC) rulemaking 
sequences during the Dodd-Frank era. Finally, as it relates to the reliability of this study’s 
findings, the theoretical commitments adopted for this project have been explicated and an 
eclectic methodological procedure is developed and followed so as to ensure that should 
this research into OTC commodity derivative rulemaking need to be reproduced, another 
researcher who ascribes to these same commitments and follows the same analytical 
procedure on the same selected data will reliably reproduce the results arrived at herein 
(Yin 2009). 
 
A Case Study for OTC Commodity Derivative Rulemaking 
In analyzing this paper’s central research focus of how CFTC policymakers constructed the 
regulation of OTC commodity derivatives between 2010 and 2016, as well as the related 
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sub-research questions listed at the beginning of this chapter, the various chapters of Part 
III of this thesis will present a qualitative case study of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking at the CFTC from 2010 through 2016. As the regulation of these financial 
instruments was codified through the forward contract exclusion and commodity (trade) 
options rule-makings, this case study will comprise an in-depth, CPE-informed analysis of 
these rule-makings in each of their stages. Moreover, this account will follow an eclectic 
methodological procedure which guides the CPE-backed analysis of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking.  
Presenting OTC commodity derivative rulemaking in the form of a qualitative case 
study has several benefits. First, such a presentation enables an enunciation of an intensive 
account of the regulations’ development. The result being that a case study facilitates 
analytical depth (Widdowson 2011: 26). Second, utilizing a case study is efficacious because 
its structure necessarily allows for a straightforward combination of multiple data sources 
(e.g., rules, comment letters, interviews) to inform the study’s analysis (Yin 2009). This 
ensures that the study is robustly grounded and has empirical support. Third, a case study 
offers a certain ease in the presentation of the research material drawn upon. Thus, it 
conveys information to the reader in an accessible manner. Fourth, and finally, the use of a 
case study can prove effective in advancing the theoretical framework – CPE – into research 
on administrative agency rulemaking. As a result, this research project could serve as a 
guidepost for future CPE-informed scholarship on rulemaking as well as serving to enrich 
existing CPE literature.  
 
A Methodological Procedure for the Analysis of OTC Commodity Derivative Rulemaking 
This subsection of the chapter details the methodological procedure that will be followed to 
guide a CPE-informed analysis of the case study of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking. 
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As mentioned above, and as will be further explored below, the rulemaking analysis begins 
by engaging the rule-makings themselves, and the regulatory approaches that they convey, 
before exploring, as CPE necessitates, the semiotic and extra-semiotic factors that 
interacted and co-evolved to condition these rule-makings. This will also shed light on the 
Dodd-Frank imaginary, and whether its constitution varied. The factors conditioning the 
rule-makings, as well as the Dodd-Frank imaginary, are ascertained by analyzing the instant 
study’s collected data as informed by the CPE framework put forward in the preceding 
chapter. Through the eclectic methodological procedure set out below, the CPE-based 
framework for OTC commodity derivative rulemaking is operationalized so as to allow for 
the central and sub-research questions to be answered. 107 
The first item to be discussed concerning the methodological procedure followed in 
this research project relates to the case study’s structure. The text of the rule-makings for 
both the forward contract exclusion and the commodity (trade) options, in each of their 
iterations, will serve as the entry-point for analysis. This has been chosen as the analytical 
starting point because they provide the content of the actual regulations for OTC 
commodity derivatives that CFTC policymakers have codified, and because these are legally 
enforceable texts that have been formally reviewed, agreed to, and implemented by 
Commission policymakers.  
 The second item relates to the order of analysis. Given that rulemaking is subject to 
the processual strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act reviewed in Chapter 2, the 
analysis of forward contract exclusion and commodity (trade) options regulations will begin 
with the earliest rulemaking event (i.e., the advance notices of proposed rulemaking) and 
trace the regulations’ development through time. The rule-makings that will be analyzed 
 
107 The entirety of the below rulemaking analysis was done manually, or by hand. Corresponding 
hand-written and electronic notes were taken as the analysis was conducted.  
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will be presented sequentially. Setting out OTC commodity derivative rulemaking in a linear 
manner will aid with both an easy identification of how policymakers constructed 
regulations for OTC commodity derivatives at each rulemaking juncture (e.g., for the 
notices of proposed rulemaking and final rulemaking) and with an illumination of changes 
to these officials’ regulatory approaches as OTC commodity derivative rulemaking unfolded.  
 To these points, identifying and understanding alterations to the regulatory 
approaches towards OTC commodity derivatives taken in the rules serves to provide crucial 
insight into answering this study’s central and sub-research questions. Given that this 
project seeks to examine how CFTC policymakers constructed the regulation of OTC 
commodity derivatives, those instances in which agency officials changed their regulatory 
approach – as conveyed in the text of a rule-making – are assumed to reflect variation in 
the semiotic and/or extra-semiotic supports underpinning a selected and/or retained 
approach towards regulation (to use the vocabulary of CPE). Those occasions in which this 
occurs provide pivotal openings or portals for analyzing what (and how) semiotic and extra-
semiotic factors influenced such modifications and, thus, the construction of an updated 
regulatory approach.  
The case study of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking will begin with an 
exploration of the advance notices of proposed rulemaking for both the forward contract 
exclusion and for commodity (trade) options. The two releases that are specifically explored 
are the CFTC’s notice concerning the definition of a ‘swap’ (a notice serving as the 
predecessor to the proposed forward contract exclusion) and its promulgation regarding 
agricultural swaps (a notice which served as the predecessor to the proposed “Commodity 
Options” rule). Because these advance notices are limited to recitals of delegated 
regulatory authority, an overview of the administrative agency’s prior related regulatory 
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efforts, and a series of questions soliciting data and information from prospective rule 
stakeholders and other outside parties, the analysis of these advance notices is more 
restricted in nature than its succeeding counterparts (e.g., the proposed rules, and the final 
rules). The result of this being a simple presentation of these two advance notice releases 
followed by an engagement of their content and an assessment of the milieu in which the 
notices were developed. With regards to the engagement of the two advance notices’ 
content, this will be done by exploring the potential significance of the releases’ genre,108 
style,109 and embedded discourses (i.e., its content).110 As it relates to an exploration of the 
pre-proposal milieu, this information is generated by analyzing the main themes that 
emerged during a formal intra-agency rulemaking meeting in connection with the 
promulgation of the advance notices. 
The chief contribution of this discussion of the advance notices to the overall 
analysis is that it explores the key considerations informing Commission policymakers’ pre-
proposal OTC commodity derivative rulemaking efforts. In doing so, this chapter ascertains 
what CFTC policymakers viewed as significant and necessary to rulemaking as they began 
determining which OTC commodity derivatives would be regulated under Dodd-Frank. The 
data used here include the two advance notices, the transcript from the CFTC’s internal 
Agricultural Advisory Committee’s meeting relating to the issuance of the advance notices 
of proposed rulemaking, and interview data.  
  Continuing to the next stage of rulemaking, analyses of the proposed forms of the 
“Commodity Options” rule and the forward contract exclusion of the ‘swaps’ definition rule 
 
108 Genres are the mediums through which discourses can be accessed (Fairclough 2013: 179). 
109 Styles are understood to be expressed ways of being (Taylor 2004: 437; Fairclough 2003: 23). 
110 The term ‘discourse’ can be defined in slightly different ways. Generally, however, the term is 
understood to mean “language use in speech and writing” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Some 
researchers, such as Fairclough (2005: 916), extend the reach of this definition to include “visual 
images and ‘body language’.” 
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are conducted. In beginning the CPE-backed analysis of these two proposed rules, an 
overview of the political and institutional context in which they were crafted is first set out. 
(This segment of the chapter draws on interviews, newspaper articles, and select 
policymaker speeches.)  
Shifting to the analysis of the construction of the two proposed rule-makings 
themselves, their regulatory content serves as the entry-point for the CPE-informed inquiry. 
Beginning with semiosis, in analyzing the semiotic dimensions of the two proposed rule-
makings, their content is first reviewed and distilled to its core regulatory function(s) before 
close attention is paid to the intertextual111 and interdiscursive112 features of these 
releases’ regulations. This is done to identify the discursive inputs into (and discursive 
influences on) the regulations’ contents’ construction, be they the recontextualization of 
existing regulatory precedent, the use of language directly from the Dodd-Frank Act, or the 
appropriation of the commentary of external agency actors as procured through comment 
letters. The exact procedure for establishing discursive influence on the proposed 
regulations’ content (and, thus, its regulatory effect) is to examine them for either explicit 
or implicit references to other textual (or discursive) sources.113 In regard to the former, an 
explicit link to another textual source (i.e., a comment letter) can be established by 
identifying policymakers’ citation of this source as informative to the regulation (e.g., 
 
111 Intertextuality pertains to the way in which “social and historical foundations are combined or 
modified by texts, and how discourses and genres blend together” (Titscher, Meyer et al. 2007: 150). 
Put differently, intertextuality is the process by which the development of a text is done by drawing 
on other texts (Fairclough 1992; see Evans-Agnew). 
112 Interdiscursivity refers to how a text is constituted from different, yet occasionally overlapping, 
discourses and genres (i.e., mediums through which discourses are expressed, such as a policy memo 
or central bank minutes) (Fairclough 1993: 138). 
113 A similar, though differently named, approach is enunciated in, and followed by, Rashin (2020) in 
the author’s assessment of comment letter influence on regulatory content. Nevertheless, while 
alike in terms of procedure (i.e., seeking to link speech acts with rule text), adopting the 
‘intertextual’ and ‘interdiscursive’ nomenclature for the analysis of the rule-making’s pertinent 
discourses as done herein stems from its harmonious fit with assessing CPE’s semiosis arm as posited 
by Sum and Jessop (2013).  
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adopting regulatee language from a comment letter to inform a specific regulation, and 
citing the letter as the impetus for as much), and to the latter, an implicit link can be 
determined wherein the content of a regulation reflects – or even precisely mirrors – a (or 
the) discourse(s) advanced by a related source (e.g., the language of the overriding statute, 
the articulated regulatory vision of an agency’s chairperson, the industry practices depicted 
in a regulatee’s comment letter, or the existing regulatory approach for a similar and/or 
related derivative product).  
Moving from this entry-point, consideration is then given to CPE’s structuration 
arm. Here, the CPE-posited lenses of the four selectivities – structural, discursive, 
technological, and agential (as conceptualized in Chapter 4) – are used to explore the 
selected data for the proposed rule-makings. Through these lenses, extra-semiotic factors 
influencing rulemaking are inferred from the referenced data, and an assessment of how 
these factors interacted and co-evolved with their semiotic counterparts to condition the 
selection of the regulatory approach to OTC commodity derivatives constructed during 
proposed rulemaking is carried out.  
Additionally, the analysis of proposed rulemaking engages with the Dodd-Frank 
imaginary (as formally posited in Chapter 6), and discusses how this imaginary related to 
the initial regulatory approach to OTC commodity derivatives taken by Commission 
policymakers during this rulemaking period. 
 The CPE-informed analysis of the proposed forward contract exclusion and the 
proposed rule for commodity (trade) options thus contributes to an understanding of the 
main factors (and actors) conditioning the proposed rule-makings. The data sources 
contributing to this part of the case study include the two proposed rule-makings, 
associated comment letters, policymaker speeches, transcripts of the agency meetings for 
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proposed rulemaking, Congressional testimony of Commission officials, and interviews114 
with CFTC policymakers.  
  Analyzing the final rule-makings for the forward contract exclusion and for 
commodity (trade) options from the standpoint of CPE will approximately follow the same 
structure as that stated above for the proposed rules. This analysis, thus, engages the 
semiotic dimensions of the two final publications before considering the influence of extra-
semiotic factors on the construction of the codified regulatory approaches to OTC 
commodity derivatives contained therein. Because this final rulemaking stage – one 
characterized by Paroske (2011: 49) as involving “interpretive argumentation” – requires 
that policymakers critically address some outside party comment letters written in 
response to the promulgation of the proposed rule-makings, those arguments considered 
by CFTC policymakers to be substantive to final rulemaking115 are presented and examined 
in conjunction with the chapter’s broader analysis of semiosis (as described above). 
Together, the uncovered semiotic and extra-semiotic factors are then used to explain the 
regulatory construction for OTC commodity derivatives at this stage of rulemaking, and why 
the adopted approaches to regulation were selected and retained (to use the vocabulary of 
CPE). Furthermore, these factors will also be used to explicate any refinement that took 
place to the Dodd-Frank imaginary during final rulemaking.  
This analysis provides insight into how policymakers constructed OTC commodity 
derivative regulations during final rulemaking, and how the Dodd-Frank imaginary was 
refined during this period. The data used to inform this portion of the case study’s analysis 
 
114 Aside from transcribing the interviews and conducting a basic content analysis thereon, no formal 
methodological procedure has been applied to the interview data as the interviews are only used in 
a supportive capacity in this research.   
115 This is determined by whether or not agency officials directly reference (and/or address) an 
argument from a specific comment letter.  
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come from the following sources: the two final rule-makings, their related comment letters, 
policymaker speeches, transcripts of the agency meetings for final rulemaking, and 
Congressional testimony of Commission officials. 
In the last portion of this case study, the revisions to the forward contract exclusion 
and to the commodity (trade) options rule-makings are assessed from the perspective of 
CPE. These rule-makings reinterpreted what OTC commodity derivative transactions would 
be included under the regulatory umbrella of the Dodd-Frank Act. Because rulemaking for 
these regulatory areas involved both proposed and final forms, the analyses at these two 
rulemaking stages follow, as set out above, the same procedures for analyzing proposed 
and final rule-makings. Through analyzing these culminating or capstone rulemaking events, 
two key issues are presented: (1) the changing way in which CFTC policymakers constructed 
the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives, and (2) how the existing Dodd-Frank 
imaginary was subject to contestation and evolved to accommodate this new approach to 
regulation. The following data sources were used for this concluding part of the case study: 
the four combined rule-makings (2 proposed, 2 final), corresponding comment letters, 
policymaker speeches, transcripts of the agency meetings relating to the regulatory 
revisions, Congressional testimony of Commission officials, CFTC no-action letters, and 
interviews with Commission policymakers. 
The methodological procedure set forth herein presents how a CPE-informed 
analysis of the case study of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking will be conducted in the 
upcoming analytical chapters. This eclectic approach initiates the analysis of OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking at the level of the rule-makings, and examines the 
semiotic and extra-semiotic factors – as ascertained from the data collected and as 
conceptualized through the grounded CPE commitments enunciated in Chapter 4 – that 
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interacted and co-evolved to condition their construction. These same conditioning factors 
are also used to examine stability in, or changes to, the Dodd-Frank imaginary as the case 
study follows the progression of the analyzed multi-year rulemaking sequence. In carrying 
out this exercise, the CPE-backed analysis develops the requisite evidence and information 
for answering the instant study’s central and sub-research questions. How policymakers 









Having presented and critically discussed this project’s theoretical framework and 
methodological approach, this thesis turns to an analysis of the case of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking and a discussion of this study’s findings. In Part III of this study, how 
CFTC policymakers constructed their regulation of OTC commodity derivatives between 
2010 and 2016 will be explored. To support this endeavor, the case of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking is analyzed from the perspective of the CPE framework outlined in 
Chapter 4, with the support of the methodological procedure developed in Chapter 5. 
Analyzing the rulemaking case study in this manner serves to answer the central research 
question examined herein and will help to develop a thorough account of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking at the CFTC from 2010 through 2016. This analysis represents both a 
contribution to a previously unresearched domain of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking 
in the Dodd-Frank era – i.e., CFTC rulemaking defining the OTC commodity derivatives that 
would be regulated under Dodd-Frank – and a novel, CPE-based contribution to 
administrative agency rulemaking literature. 
 To assist with answering the stated central research question (along with the sub-
research questions) and in developing this CPE-informed study, the analysis of the case of 
OTC commodity derivative rulemaking is structured as follows.  
In prefacing the analysis and discussion of the 2010 through 2016 rulemaking 
period, the first chapter of this Part, and the sixth chapter of this thesis, reviews the CFTC’s 
historical involvement with the regulation of OTC derivatives, broadly, and OTC commodity 
derivatives, specifically. This review traces OTC (commodity) derivative regulatory 
developments from the time of the agency’s establishment in 1974 until the Dodd-Frank 
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Act’s enactment in 2010, and makes particular reference to the pivotal issue(s) that the 
Commission had faced in regards to regulating OTC (commodity) derivatives up to 2010, as 
well as introduces the ‘Dodd-Frank imaginary’ as a crucial guide for CFTC policymakers 
during Dodd-Frank era rulemaking as well as Chairperson Gary Gensler, who would first lead 
the Commission in implementing the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Chapter 7 discusses the two advance notices of proposed rulemaking that would 
serve as the foundational components to the first two proposed OTC commodity derivative 
rules. The two releases are the CFTC’s notice concerning the definition of a ‘swap’ and its 
promulgation regarding agricultural swaps (the predecessor notice to the proposed 
“Commodity Options” rule).  
Chapter 8 comprises analyses of the proposed forms of the “Commodity Options” 
rule and the forward contract exclusion of the ‘swaps’ definition rule. Then, Chapter 9 
analyzes the final rule for commodity options and the forward contract exclusion of the final 
rule defining ‘swaps’. Finally, Chapter 10 turns to analyzing the revisions made to the 
interpretive guidance on forward contracts with embedded volumetric optionality, and to 
the revisions made to the “Commodity Options” rule through no-action letters116 and a 
newly crafted “Trade Options” rule. 
Through this analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, the primary 
objective of this thesis will be accomplished. An answer to how CFTC policymakers 
constructed OTC commodity derivatives regulations between 2010 and 2016 will be 
provided. To foreground a simplified version of this answer, Commission policymakers’ 
construction of the rules governing OTC commodity derivatives was conditioned by an array 
 
116 As stated earlier, no-action letters represent a change in an administrative agency’s (or of a 
division within an agency) stance towards enforcement of its ratified regulations and can be issued in 
response to the agency’s post-final rule communications with stakeholders, among other reasons. 
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of interacting and co-evolving semiotic and extra-semiotic factors. This was evidenced in the 
evolving nature of the Dodd-Frank imaginary which guided these officials’ regulatory 
endeavors. The forthcoming chapters thoroughly explore the factors which influenced 
agency policymakers’ construction of the regulatory treatment of OTC commodity 
derivatives, thereby providing a robust account of Dodd-Frank era OTC commodity 







Chapter 6 – A Historical Review of the Foundations to Dodd-Frank Era OTC Commodity 
Derivative Rulemaking at the CFTC 
 
INTRODUCTORY MATTERS 
Having built a vocabulary concerning financial derivatives and the markets in which they are 
transacted, and having sketched the U.S. administrative agency rulemaking process, this 
chapter turns to particulars about the specific administrative agency responsible for 
developing and applying the OTC commodity derivative rules that are explored and 
analyzed in Part III – the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC, or the 
Commission). Broadly, the chapter lays out the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s 
history with the regulation of OTC derivatives and, in particular, OTC commodity 
derivatives. This exploration begins at the agency’s inception in the 1970s and ends with 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act’s mandate from the U.S. Congress that it adopt rules to regulate 
OTC (commodity) derivatives. In tracing the CFTC’s regulatory experience with OTC 
(commodity) derivatives, the chapter reviews pivotal moments of political contestation, 
bifurcations or departures from established regulatory norms, and the actions of 
policymakers at important regulatory and legislative junctures. Through this exploration, a 
central theme will emerge: that throughout the period leading up to the Dodd-Frank Act, 
CFTC policymakers continually wrestled with determining which OTC commodity derivatives 
could be regulated by the Commission.  
In discussing the CFTC’s historical experience with the regulation of OTC 
(commodity) derivatives, this chapter serves two purposes for this study’s wider analysis. 
First, it identifies and explains the key OTC regulatory issues that confronted Commission 
policymakers throughout the pre-Dodd Frank Act era, particularly in regard to the 
contested conceptions of what could be regulated in the OTC commodity derivatives space 
– issues that would ultimately be addressed in the analyzed 2010-2016 rulemaking period. 
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And secondly, having established the foregoing, the analysis of recent rulemaking for OTC 
commodity derivatives can then be situated within a broader context, thus adding 
contextual richness from which this subsequent analysis may draw. 
 The chapter begins with a discussion of the early issues that the CFTC faced in 
carrying out its regulatory objectives. From that point, the chapter progresses to exploring 
contestation of the regulation of the broad spectrum of OTC derivatives during the 
contentious policymaking period of the 1990s. Later, the chapter presents the post-
Commodity Futures Modernization Act era of non-regulation in which OTC commodity 
derivative trading flourished and experienced numerous crises; an era ending in financial 
crisis. The core aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act’s regulatory regime for OTC derivatives, 
enacted in response to the financial crisis, and the pivotal arrival of Chairperson Gary 
Gensler at the CFTC are then reviewed. In concluding the chapter, the ‘Dodd-Frank 
imaginary’ – a concept that will be referred to throughout the later analysis – is introduced. 
 
BACKGROUND: EARLY YEARS AT THE CFTC, THE ADVENT OF SWAPS TRADING, AND THE 
CFTC’S RESPONSE THERETO 
Early Years at the CFTC 
To explore the early years at the CFTC, and this agency’s relationship with OTC commodity 
derivative regulation, it is important to bear in-mind that, as noted in Chapter 2, the 
Commission’s regulatory mandate is to administer the Commodity Exchange Act. Likewise, 
it is vital to note that through the same legislative act that created the CFTC in the 1970s – 
the CFTC Act – the existing Commodity Exchange Act was amended in a couple of significant 
ways.  
First, Congress, codifying language submitted to it by futures industry officials 
(MacKenzie 2018: 1656f), expanded the Commodity Exchange Act’s definition of 
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‘commodity’ to include anything in which a “contract for future delivery”117 was or might be 
traded, with one exception: onions (Stassen 1982: 833f). This meant that products such as 
gold, silver, petroleum, coffee, interest rates, and tradable mortgage certificates would be 
statutorily defined as ‘commodities’ and subjected to regulation under the Act. Second, the 
Commission was given exclusive jurisdiction to regulate all futures contracts and options 
contracts on commodities, as newly defined in the Commodity Exchange Act (Lower 1978: 
1111).118 The ostensible effect of this was to make the CFTC the regulator of commodity 
derivatives and the SEC regulator of all other tradable financial products. 
Following from these amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act, the nascent 
CFTC was promptly faced with two significant problems relating to the regulation of OTC 
commodity derivatives. (Neither of these problems would, however, be comprehensively 
addressed until the Commission undertook rulemaking in connection with the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010 – the subject of this paper’s rulemaking analysis.) The first problem pertained 
to the agency’s regulatory approach to commodity options. Since the 1936 enactment of 
the Commodity Exchange Act, options trading on enumerated commodities119 had been 
banned (Dunn Jr. 1982: 107). Nevertheless, in the years before the passage of the CFTC Act, 
options trading on non-enumerated commodities was undertaken on a substantial scale, 
due in large part to the profitability of such transactions resulting from the commodity price 
inflation of the early 1970s (Lower 1978: 1102f). Cases of fraud involving the trading of 
 
117 See Commodity Exchange Act § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1976). 
118 By being the regulator of ‘commodities’ contracted ‘for future delivery’, the CFTC’s primary 
regulatory responsibility is to identify contracts that meet this definition and to require that these 
contracts be traded on a ‘contract market’ (i.e., an exchange market – not an OTC market). This is 
known as the ‘exchange-trading requirement.’  
119 In 1976, enumerated commodities were defined as: “wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, 
flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feed, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool 
tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil and all other fats and 
oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products, 
and frozen concentrated orange juice.” See Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). 
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these options were well-documented (Markham 2002: 43f; Stassen 1982: 839; Greenstone 
1977: 183). Under the amended Commodity Exchange Act, however, the CFTC was granted 
authority to regulate options transactions on non-enumerated commodities,120 and was 
tasked by Congress to study these transactions for possible regulation (Lower 1978: 1111f). 
Notwithstanding the creation of the CFTC and its new regulatory authority, the 
proliferation of commodity options continued. These commodity options were traded over-
the-counter and would often involve the option to buy or sell an underlying futures 
contract on a foreign exchange (i.e., London option) (Markham 1990: 16). While nearly a $1 
billion industry by 1978, widespread fraud beset trading in these options (Markham 2002: 
56). Due to this illegality and the agency handling of 200 investigations of commodity 
options trading firms between 1974 and 1978 (Markham 2002: 56), the CFTC banned, with 
two exceptions,121 over-the-counter trading of options on June 1, 1978 (Markham 1990: 16; 
Lower 1978: 1097). In September of the same year, through the enactment of the Futures 
Trading Act of 1978, Congress, however, instructed the CFTC to develop a pilot program for 
exchange-traded options on futures (Markham 1990: 16; Dunn Jr. 1982: 107f).  
Irrespective of this ban, commodity derivative trading firms developed new, 
futures- and option-like contracts – such as deferred delivery contracts122 and leverage 
contracts – and undertook their trading (Markham 2002: 56ff; Markham 1990: 17f), thus 
posing the CFTC with a second problem: determining the specific character of a regulatable 
derivative instrument. For instance, as noted by Clark (1978: 1176-79), the distinction 
 
120 The trading ban on the enumerated commodities was, however, continued under the CFTC Act. 
121 First, for ‘dealer options’: options offered by large institutions whose commercial activities deal in 
the physical commodities for which the option is offered. Second, for ‘trade options’: options offered 
between commercial entities which relate to their commercial purposes. See Markham and Bergin 
(1984: 24). 
122 Over-the-counter option contract marketed as a forward contract to qualify for the CFTC’s 
forward contract exclusion from regulation (Markham 2002: 56). 
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between a futures contract and a forward contract can be ambiguous, as in the case of 
leverage contracts, with differentiation hinging on physical delivery of the underlying 
commodity.123 If a contract qualified as a futures, then it was subject to CFTC regulation, 
but if it was a forward, then it was exempt from CFTC regulation. Further, as indicated by 
Markham (2002: 56), options contracts on commodities were masked as forward or 
deferred delivery contracts to avoid the aforementioned trading ban. Moreover, as argued 
by Clark (1978: 1192-98), there existed a distinction without a difference between options 
and futures contracts on commodities, as both qualified as regulatable instruments under 
the Commodity Exchange Act’s criterion of a “contract of sale of a commodity for future 
delivery,” with delivery rarely taking place.  
 
The Advent of Swaps Trading and the CFTC’s Response Thereto 
The early 1980s witnessed the commercial development of a new form of derivatives 
trading – swaps trading (Decovny 1998: 2). These new instruments likewise posed 
definitional issues relating to their regulatability for the CFTC. As explained in Chapter 1, in 
its basic form, a swap involves an exchange of future cash flows based on an asset referent. 
For instance, Party A may trade the percent increase (decrease) in price of Brent crude (oil), 
as settled on the last day of each month for a 6-month period, to Party B for a 3% interest 
rate paid on the last day of each month for the same period, both based on a $100 million 
principal. These derivative instruments, as well as other ‘hybrid instruments’, contained 
features of forward, futures, options, and, occasionally, securities (equity and bond) 
contracts (Markham 2002: 191), and were exclusively traded in OTC markets. 
 
123 The legitimacy of futures contracts as legally enforceable, non-gambling agreements had been 
contested around the turn of the 20th century. As explored in Levy (2006), these agreements secured 
their legality in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1905 Chicago Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co. 
decision. In its judgment, the Court reasoned that because futures contracts ‘contemplated delivery’, 
they were not illegal and unenforceable gambling agreements.  
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 Accurate data concerning the value of all swap transactions in the 1980s is sparse. 
Nevertheless, it was estimated that in 1982, the year after the anointed ‘first swap’ 
between IBM and the World Bank, the notional value124 of transacted swaps was $3 
billion.125 Then, by 1986, the notional value of all OTC transactions reached approximately 
$500 billion.126 Further, Decovny (1998: 11f) suggested a three-fold increase in the notional 
value of interest rate and currency swaps, and interest rate options, between 1987 and 
1990, from around $1 trillion to $3.4 trillion. Notwithstanding the limited availability of 
accurate data, it can be stated unequivocally that trading in OTC derivatives – due 
especially to the advent of swaps – witnessed near geometric expansion during the 1980s. 
Although characterized as being “awakened only slowly” (Markham 2003: 365) to this 
growth, in 1987, the CFTC began the rulemaking process to address its OTC derivative 
market concerns.  
 Since its 1984 Joint Policy Statement with the SEC specifically identifying derivative 
contracts suited for transacting on regulated exchanges, the CFTC had reviewed inquiries 
about the regulatory status of OTC derivative instruments on a case-by-case basis (Partnoy 
2001: 435).127 In December 1987, however, after investigating the commodity swaps 
business of Chase Manhattan Bank for possible violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, 
 
124 Again, this means the total face value of an asset position; not the amount of money paid for the 
asset position or owed to the counterparty. See the following: 
http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/SwapsReports/ExplanatoryNotes/index.htm. 
125 See William P. Rogers, Jr., ‘Interest Rate and Currency Swaps and Related Transactions’, in The 
Swap Market in 1990, at 7, 15 (Practising Law Institute Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook 
Series No. 689, 1990). 
126 See Peter Lee, ‘American Exchanges Plan to Fight Back’, in Euromoney, January 1993, at 46. 
127 A “written statement by the staff of a Division of the Commission or its Office of General Counsel 
that such staff will not recommend that the Commission commence enforcement action for failure 
to comply with a specific provision of the [Commodity Exchange] Act or Commission regulations. It 
binds only the staff of the Division that issued it or the Office of the General Counsel with respect to 
the specific fact situation and persons addressed by the letter, and third parties may not rely upon 
it.” See: http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/CFTCStaffLetters/index.htm. 
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the CFTC issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking128 for OTC swaps and hybrid 
instrument trading (Young and Stein 1988: 1918). In short, the CFTC proposed to arrange 
OTC derivatives into three categories and to exclude these from its jurisdiction or exempt 
them from its regulation, with all derivative instruments not falling into one of the three 
categories continuing to be subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction (Meer 1991: 411).  
As a result, the CFTC proposed that swap transactions could, under certain 
circumstances, be subject to a no-action “safe harbor” from the agency’s regulation (Young 
and Stein 1988: 1943). Implied by this proposal was that the CFTC viewed swaps as being 
within its regulatory jurisdiction and that swaps themselves were sufficiently futures-like to 
warrant exemptions (Young and Stein 1988: 1944f). To the former implication, the then-
named International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA), the principal OTC trading industry 
consortium, was critical of the Commission’s assumption of swaps into its regulatory 
purview (Meer 1991: 422). In its comment letter to the Advance Notice, ISDA stated that 
the regulatory expansion was “unwarranted” and that the Commission lacked a 
“compelling public policy” rationale and that “serious adverse effects” on U.S. and world 
swap markets “could result” if the CFTC regulated swaps trading.129 To the latter 
implication, commenters noted that the Commission did not have the legal authority to 
exempt financial instruments resembling futures contracts from the exchange-trading 
requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act; thus swaps, according to the commenters, 
were already subject to the Act’s exchange-trading requirement (Young and Stein 1988: 
1945).  
 
128 The use of an Advance Notice, rather than the traditional Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, allowed 
for a preproposal comment period in addition to the typical comment period on a proposed rule. 
129 See Letter from Mark C. Brickell, Chairman of the International Swap Dealers Association, Inc. to 
the CFTC (April 8, 1988) at 3; in Meer (1991: 240).  
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 In July 1989, in connection with the CFTC’s Advance Proposal, and in response to 
comments thereon, the Commission promulgated a policy statement concerning its 
treatment of swaps (Rauterberg and Verstein 2013: 15; Markham 1990: 51). While not an 
enforceable administrative rule, the policy statement granted swaps settled in cash130 with 
a “non-exclusive safe harbor” from the Commodity Exchange Act’s exchange-trading 
requirement, provided that the swap transaction met five criteria (Partnoy 2001: 436; Meer 
1991: 418f). Notwithstanding the issuance of this policy statement, no further clarity 
existed pertaining to the specific nature and regulatory classification of a swap contract, or 
to whether swaps were within the CFTC’s jurisdiction and thus legally able to be exempted 
from regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act. 
 A prime example of the CFTC’s nebulous position on its ability to regulate OTC 
commodity derivatives, irrespective of its 1987-1989 rulemaking efforts, came in 1990. 
After a U.S. Federal District Court in New York held that over-the-counter transactions 
involving 15-day Brent oil forward contracts could not qualify for the Commodity Exchange 
Act’s forward contract exclusion, and would thus have to be traded on a contract market, 
the CFTC issued a statutory interpretation – known as the Brent Interpretation – stating 
that Brent contracts were not subject to the exchange-trading requirement (Markham and 
Harty 2008: 895; Meer 1991: 408). At the core of the federal District Court’s decision was 
that the settlement of Brent oil forward contracts was done on a cash basis and not 
through physical delivery of the crude oil; thus, as the Court reasoned, the contracts were 
futures contracts (Albrecht 1995: 124; Meer 1991: 408). In its Brent Interpretation, the 
CFTC, however, contended that as forward contracts, the contracting parties maintained 
 
130 As opposed to those transactions that are physically settled by the delivery of the asset 
underlying the derivatives contract, cash settlement results in a party paying the counterparty the 




delivery obligations and other risks, which weighed greater than the practice of cash 
settlement when determining the nature of the derivative contract. Thus, in the 
Commission’s estimation, these contracts would be excluded from regulation.131 Regardless 
of this interpretation, the question of whether the CFTC had authority to exempt particular 
derivatives from the exchange-trading requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act 
remained unanswered (Markham 2002: 197). (It should be noted that the Brent 
Interpretation would be revisited in the context of the Commission’s Dodd-Frank era OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking and would serve as an important conceptual guide for 
policymakers during these efforts.)  
 
CONTESTED DEFINITIONS OF OTC DERIVATIVES: FROM THE FUTURES TRADING PRACTICES 
ACT (1992) THROUGH THE COMMODITY FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT (2000)  
The 1990s presented the CFTC with the same fundamental regulatory question as it had 
confronted since its inception: what qualified as a regulatable commodity for future 
delivery and, thus, a regulatable OTC (commodity) derivative? As was expressed in the 
preceding section, this issue directly posed regulatory identification and enforcement 
problems for the Commission. Moreover, the CFTC faced these issues at a time when OTC 
markets in the U.S. were experiencing rapid growth. Given continued ambiguity of the 
CFTC’s regulatory position in relation to OTC markets after its Brent Interpretation, at the 
Commission’s next reauthorization date, Congress intervened to provide some clarity. The 









The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 and OTC Exemptions 
Signed by Republican President George H.W. Bush in 1992, the Futures Trading Practices 
Act contained five titles (or major parts), of which Title V specifically addressed the extent 
of the CFTC’s exemptive authority over OTC derivatives.132 Under Title V, the Commission 
was granted authority to exempt from the exchange-trading requirement of the 
Commodity Exchange Act any agreement, contract, or transaction provided the following: 
(1) that the exemption is in the “public interest”; (2) that the exemption does not have a 
“materially adverse effect” on the Commission’s and regulated exchanges’ ability to 
perform their regulatory responsibilities; (3) that the exemption involves trades between 
sophisticated, knowledgeable, or institutional investors (i.e., “appropriate persons” in the 
language of the 1992 Act); and (4) that no exemption violates the jurisdictional delineation 
of the Shad-Johnson Accords (Lindholm 1994: 90f; Leon 1994: 335; Russo and Vinciguerra 
1992: 100f). This meant that for the first time, the CFTC had explicit authority to exempt 
from the exchange-trading requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act those derivative 
contracts that might be considered regulatable futures or options. Further, Title V similarly 
allowed the Commission the authority to exempt swaps, Brent oil contracts, and other 
similar OTC commodity derivative instruments. Nevertheless, it is important to note – and 
this cannot be emphasized enough – that the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 did not 
require the CFTC to use its exemptive power; rather, its use was at the Commission’s 
discretion (Russo and Vinciguerra 1992: 100). 
In mid-January 1993, the CFTC utilized its new authority to exempt from potential 
regulation a substantial portion of the swap market; this action representing an attempt to 
clarify which OTC derivatives the Commission viewed as regulatable. In presumed 
 
132 Pub. Law No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992). 
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accordance with the guidelines set forth in Title V of the Futures Trading Practices Act, the 
CFTC proposed on November 12, 1992, and finalized on January 22, 1993, the exemption, 
known as ‘Part 35’. While much speculation exists as to the political motives behind the 
expedited promulgation of Part 35, it is important to note that the Commission’s Chair, 
Wendy Gramm, left the CFTC immediately after the adoption of the rule, and within a 
matter of weeks joined the board of directors of Enron, an energy and derivatives trading 
company (Carruthers 2013: 395).133 The Part 35 exemption precluded swaps134 from being 
subject to the Commodity Exchange Act’s exchange-trading requirement if they met the 
following general criteria: (1) the swap is entered into between “eligible swap 
participants”135; (2) the creditworthiness of swap parties be a “material consideration” 
when drafting the swap contract; (3) the swap parties have no less than $5 million or $10 
million in total assets, depending on the trader’s line of business; (4) the swap not be part 
of a “fungible class of agreements that are standardized as to their material economic 
terms”; and (5) the swap not be transacted on a “multilateral execution facility.”136  
Part 35 was adopted as a retroactive rule, meaning that all qualifying swap 
transactions entered after the enactment of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Act of 1974 (October 23, 1974) were exempted from the exchange-trading requirement.137 
Notwithstanding the exemption, exempted swaps were still subject to the Commodity 
 
133 Of note, Democrat President Bill Clinton was inaugurated on January 20, 1993.   
134 The definition of a swap used in Part 35 was that listed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 
101(55) (Supp. IV 1992)) with the addition of a swap “master agreement” (Rechtschaffen 2014: 332). 
135 Defined to include: “(i) bank or trust companies (acting on their own behalf or on behalf of 
another eligible swap participant), (ii) savings associations or credit unions, (iii) insurance companies, 
(iv) investment companies, (v) commodity pools, (vi) corporations, partnerships, proprietorships, 
organizations, and trusts, (vii) employee benefit plans subject to ERISA, (viii) any governmental 
entities or political subdivision thereof, (ix) broker-dealers subject to regulation under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, (x) futures commission merchants, and 
natural persons” (Lindholm 1994: 92). 
136 Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. 5594 (1993). 
137 Ibid., at 5587. 
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Exchange Act’s anti-fraud and anti-manipulation regulations (GAO 1999: 10). The 1993 Part 
35 exemption went beyond the 1989 CFTC policy statement in that it provided swap market 
participants with an enforceable rule to prevent the exchange-trading of their transactions.  
 Pursuant to the exemptive criteria of the Futures Trading Practices Act, on January 
27, 1993 the CFTC proposed, and on April 20, 1993 it codified, a similar rule for OTC energy 
contracts, known as the ‘Energy Exemption’.138 In addition to formally exempting Brent oil 
contracts from the exchange-trading requirement,139 the rule extended to all OTC contracts 
involving crude oil, natural gas, and products derived therefrom or attained in the 
production thereof, irrespective of any degree of futures-like characteristics.140 Thus, the 
CFTC treated all energy contracts that were not already traded on a futures exchange as 
unregulatable forward contracts (or in some instances, as swaps). This rule, however, went 
further than the Part 35 exemption in that it waived the Commission’s application of 
Commodity Exchange Act anti-fraud (and thus anti-manipulation) regulations to the 
exempted energy contracts. Nevertheless, a degree of irony was imbedded in the 
Commission’s decision because if, as it had claimed since its Brent interpretation in 1990, 
OTC energy contracts were forwards, then they were already outside of the CFTC’s 
regulatory jurisdiction, and not subject to the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions 
of the Commodity Exchange Act. Accepting that there was, thus, neither authority to 
exempt these contracts, nor need to do so, as they were not even subject to regulation 
under the Act. 
 
138 Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 21286 (1993). The April 
13, 1993 vote on this rule was a 2-1 decision in favor of adoption. Two of the commissioner seats 
were vacant at the time of the vote. 
139 Recall that a Federal District Court ruled that Brent oil contracts were futures, but the CFTC issued 
an interpretation of the ruling which reasoned that the contracts were forwards and thus excluded 
from Commodity Exchange Act regulation. 




Legal Uncertainty and the Enactment of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
Between 1993 and 1998, no significant new OTC derivative regulations, or revisions to 
existing regulations, were crafted by the CFTC or directed by Congress. Regardless of this 
regulatory lull, OTC derivative markets continued to expand rapidly, with global notional 
value of all OTC derivatives reaching between $80-$90 trillion in 1998, and the notional 
value of OTC commodity derivatives exceeding $400 billion in the same year (BIS 2017).141  
 By the late-1990s, however, the stable regulatory landscape for OTC derivatives 
began to experience some tremors. Under Chairperson Brooksley Born, the CFTC 
promulgated in May 1998 a Concept Release concerning OTC derivative regulation.142 The 
Concept Release did not propose any new rules, but rather categorized areas of potential 
exemptive changes – such as modifying the non-standardization requirement for swaps, 
updating the definition of “eligible swap participants,” and altering the ban on the use of 
“multilateral execution facilities” and central clearing for which the Commission sought 
public comment.143 Further, the Release explicitly stated the following: (1) any new OTC 
market regulations would only be “applied prospectively”; (2) all current OTC derivative 
exemptions, interpretations, and policy statements remained in effect and could be relied 
upon by “market participants”; and (3) the Commission had “no preconceived result in 
mind” concerning maintaining the current regulatory framework, loosening the existing 
framework, or applying a more stringent regulatory architecture.144 Irrespective of its 
position of intellectual openness, the CFTC was promptly admonished by leaders of then-
 
141 In the first half of 1997, it was estimated that the market value of all globally outstanding OTC 
derivative contracts was $860 billion (GAO 1997). By comparison, world GDP in 1997 was estimated 
at $31.44 trillion (World Bank 2018). 
142 Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26114 (1998).  
143 Ibid., at 26115f. 
144 Ibid., at 26116. 
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President Clinton’s so-called President’s Working Group145 for what they perceived as 
potential threats to OTC derivative market growth and macroeconomic stability.146 
 Within several weeks of the Concept Release’s publication, the President’s Working 
Group (excluding Chair Born) successfully petitioned Congress to curtail the CFTC’s 
rulemaking authority over OTC derivative markets until March 30, 1999, and to ensure the 
enforceability of OTC derivatives under the 1993 Part 35 exemption and the 1989 policy 
statement (Working Group 1999b: 13). During corresponding U.S. Senate hearings on this 
curtailment of the Commission’s authority to potentially intervene in OTC derivative 
markets, Chairperson Born defended the agency’s decision to issue the Concept Release, 
and in doing so, provided important perspective on how CFTC policymakers viewed the 
matter of regulatability of OTC swaps and other similar derivative instruments. Specifically, 
in remarks before the Senate committee which addressed the historically recurring claim 
questioning the jurisdictional authority of the CFTC over OTC derivative instruments, Chair 
Born resolutely noted that “it is the nature of the instrument, and not where they are 
traded, that determines jurisdiction” under the Commodity Exchange Act; thus, implying 
that swaps were indeed regulatable derivative (i.e., futures) contracts.147 
 In the aftermath of the late-1998 failure of the “hedge” fund Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM), the President’s Working Group was again brought together and was 
tasked by Congress with examining the incident and providing recommendations to avert 
 
145 A group advising the U.S. President on economic and financial matters which comprised the 
Treasury Secretary, the Federal Reserve Chairperson, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Chairperson, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairperson.  
146 Notably, immediately after the promulgation of the Concept Release, Assistant Treasury Secretary 
Larry Summers phoned Chair Born telling her that he had “13 bankers” in his office who told him 
that what the CFTC proposed would “cause the worst financial crisis since the end of World War 
Two” (Johnson and Kwak 2010).  
147 See The Commodity Exchange Act and OTC Derivatives, Before the Committee on Agriculture, 




further systemic financial calamities (Greenberger 2011: 139). As LTCM was a significant 
OTC market participant, the Working Group’s April 1999 report seemingly reversed its 
earlier course and recommended, among other things, that federal agencies, including the 
CFTC, receive data and information related to credit risk and concentrations of OTC 
derivative positions, and the exploration of direct federal regulation of unregulated OTC 
derivative dealers (Working Group 1999a: 39f, 42f). Nevertheless, subsequent to 
Chairperson Born’s June 1999 resignation, the Working Group reversed course yet again in 
the November 1999 release of its year-long study entitled “Over-the-Counter Derivative 
Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act.” With the unanimous consent of the Working 
Group, the report recommended the following affecting OTC commodity derivatives: (1) 
Exclusion from the Commodity Exchange Act of “bilateral transactions between 
sophisticated counterparties (other than transactions that involve non-financial 
commodities with finite supplies)”; (2) exclusion from the Commodity Exchange Act of 
“electronic trading systems for derivatives, provided that the systems limit participation to 
sophisticated counterparties trading for their own accounts and are not used to trade 
contracts that involve non-financial commodities with finite supplies”; (3) amending laws to 
allow for the clearing of OTC derivatives; and (4) extending the exclusive jurisdiction over 
‘commodities for future delivery’ conferred by the Commodity Exchange Act onto the CFTC 
to only those futures contracts, and options on futures contracts, transacted on a contract 
market (regulated exchange) and not otherwise subject to another agency’s authority 
(Working Group 1999b: 2, 30f). 
 The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 codified many of the 
recommendations made in the November 1999 report and those from a similar February 
2000 CFTC-authored report affirming the Working Group’s conclusions (Wolkoff and 
Werner 2010: 357ff). This Act’s legislative history is famously subject to political intrigue 
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due to its being championed by Republican Senator Phil Gramm of Texas (husband of 
former CFTC Chairperson Wendy Gramm), the undebated revisions incorporated into it at 
the eleventh hour, and because it was attached and voted on as a codicil to an 11,000-page 
appropriations bill during a lame-duck session148 of Congress on December 15, 2000 
(Greenberger 2010: A8). In short, the Act statutorily excluded swaps and other similar OTC 
derivatives from the exchange-trading requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act – thus, 
predominantly ensuring the non-regulation of OTC derivatives – and allowed for central 
clearing of OTC products (Hazen 2005: 388-395). Furthermore, under the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act, a tiered-approach to regulation for differing asset markets – as 
based on sophistication and perceived risk to traders and the derivative marketplace – was 
created with corresponding regulatory principles developed for each of these tiers 
(Keaveny 2005: 1437; Rosenzweig 2001: 43). As it specifically relates to OTC commodity 
derivatives, the Act categorized them as ‘Exempt Commodities’ – a classification comprising 
energy and metal derivatives (Rosenzweig 2001: 44).149 (Going forward in this study, when 
the term ‘OTC commodity derivative(s)’ is utilized, it will be synonymous with the definition 
of ‘Exempt Commodities.’) 
 Although at odds with the spirit of the November 1999 report’s recommendation 
on the non-exclusion of finite commodities, several principles were established to exempt 
OTC commodity derivatives trading from regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act – 
each of which being an important legislative development in defining which, if any, OTC 
commodity derivatives the CFTC could regulate. First, trading could only involve “eligible 
 
148 A session of Congress after the election of a new President, but before the President-elect’s 
inauguration. 
149 Two other derivative classifications were developed: ‘Excluded Commodities’ (comprising interest 
rate, exchange rate, and credit derivatives, among other financial-based instruments) and 
‘Agricultural Commodities’ (Rosenzweig 2001: 44).  
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contract participants” (Kloner 2001: 288).150 Second, bilateral trades involving OTC 
commodity derivatives between eligible contract participants which were not transacted on 
an electronic trading facility were exempt from all regulatory oversight, except for limited 
application by the CFTC of anti-fraud and anti-manipulation regulations (Kloner 2001: 290f). 
Third, OTC commodity derivative trading between “eligible commercial entities”151 could be 
conducted on an “Exempt Commercial Market” – a new legally defined entity which 
operated as a look-alike electronic futures exchange – provided the trading was undertaken 
on a “principal-to-principal basis,” and that the Exempt Commercial Market was subject to 
limited CFTC oversight (Lukken 2010: 300).  
 
COMMODITIES AND CRISES: FROM ENRON-ONLINE THROUGH THE DODD-FRANK ACT OF 
2010 
In prefacing this section, it should be noted that from the adoption of the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 until the enactment of the post-financial crisis Dodd-
Frank Act in 2010, there were no significant changes to the treatment of OTC derivatives by 
regulators such as the CFTC (Spence 2009: 50). The Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
had provided legislative clarity concerning what could not be regulated by the Commission 
– in this case, essentially all OTC commodity derivatives, among other OTC products. 
Nevertheless, the historical fluidity regarding what constituted a CFTC-regulatable 
derivative contract – which has been covered in the preceding sections – must be kept in-
mind. This is because the developments of this culminating decade-long period highlight 
the individual and systemic consequences associated with having left unregulated futures-
 
150 Those qualifying for this definition included financial institutions, government entities, futures 
commission merchants, and, among other enumerated entities, any individual with total assets 
greater than $10 million (Lukken 2010: 297).  
151 Defined as an eligible contract participant that is also a “large dealer or a commercial participant 
in the commodity business” (Lukken 2010: 300).  
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like contracts traded in OTC markets; the effects of which would later be addressed by the 
Dodd-Frank Act and corresponding administrative agency rulemaking. The legislative 
approval in 2000 of the development of Exempt Commercial Markets for OTC commodity 
derivatives – such as EnronOnline – provides an excellent starting point for understanding 
this notion. 
 
Exempt Commercial Markets, Price Manipulation, and a Decade of Crises 
While the Commodity Futures Modernization Act legally established Exempt Commercial 
Markets through its Section 2(h)(3-5), in practice, one such electronic trading platform for 
OTC commodity derivatives was already in existence by November 1999 – EnronOnline. 
Operated by Enron Corporation, EnronOnline was an electronic global OTC commodity 
derivative trading platform that made its parent company party to the derivative purchase 
and sale agreements transacted thereon (Electric Light & Power 1999).152 This made Enron 
a de facto derivative dealer in OTC commodities, even though the platform mirrored the 
operations of a regulated futures exchange. The platform was an immediate success, 
transacting $336 billion in OTC derivatives in 2000 (Salter 2008: 26).153 Nevertheless, under 
commercial pressures, and stemming from ethical lapses precipitating accounting fraud, 
Enron Corporation filed for bankruptcy in December 2001 (McLean and Elkind 2003).  
 Notwithstanding its relatively short existence, EnronOnline had three significant 
impacts on OTC commodity derivative markets from 2000 onward. First, Enron intimately 
influenced the statutory development of Exempt Commercial Markets. As EnronOnline 
existed prior to the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, its design and the OTC 
 
152 See also: Hale, Briony. “Enron’s internet monster”. BBC News Online, 30 November 2001. 
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1684503.stm.  
153 Ibid. Per Briony Hale, in total, EnronOnline made Enron Corporation counterparty to roughly $880 
billion of OTC derivatives between 1999 and 2001. 
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derivative transactions it facilitated were arguably outside of the 1993 and 1989 CFTC 
exemptions for OTC derivatives; thus, making it an illegal contract market transacting 
derivatives that should be exchange-traded. Because of this risk, Enron, as indicated in 
emails made public after its bankruptcy, assiduously lobbied Congress – particularly Senator 
Phil Gramm – throughout the legislative process for the Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act.154 While the emails indicate Enron’s desire to have its EnronOnline platform exempted 
from core Commodity Exchange Act regulations through the Exempt Commercial Market 
provision, it also supported exempting bilateral OTC commodity derivative transactions and 
excluding credit derivative instruments from these regulations (Lipton 2008). For its 
lobbying efforts, the term “Enron Loophole” entered the political lexicon and became the 
source of occasional legislative attempts to regulate OTC commodity derivatives over the 
decade. 
 The second significant impact stems from the effects of codifying the Exempt 
Commercial Market provision. Beyond creating a new, exempt regulatory category of OTC 
commodity derivative trading which ensured the legal viability of EnronOnline, the inclusion 
of the provision permitted the development of other Exempt Commercial Markets. Most 
notable among these was Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). Fitting within the parameters of 
Section 2(h)(3-5), Exempt Commercial Markets (such as EnronOnline, DynegyDirect, and 
ICE) allowed commodity derivative trading participants access to predominantly 
unregulated future-style exchanges on which to transact derivative instruments. These 
were venues where regulations of traditional exchanges, such as position limits, were not 
applicable. With the proliferation of these largely unregulated trading venues, and their 
concomitant linkage to and influence on commodity spot markets and regulated 
 
154 See: Lipton, Eric. “Gramm and the ‘Enron Loophole’”. The New York Times, 14 November 2008. 
Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/business/17grammside.html.  
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commodity exchanges, the incidence of illegal and unethical trading practices likewise 
proliferated. 
 Along these lines, the third impact of EnronOnline was its involvement in the 
earliest noted attempts to manipulate energy prices through the use of an Exempt 
Commercial Market. The manipulation schemes involved electricity and natural gas prices 
in the Western U.S., especially in California (Markham and Harty 2008: 917; Brunet and 
Shafe 2007: 665). Although Enron was not the last derivative trading firm to manipulate 
energy prices between 2000 and the financial crisis of 2007-08, as the early-2000’s leading 
energy trading firm transacting derivatives through an Exempt Commercial Market, Enron’s 
precedent-setting speculative and illegal activity spurred calls for revisiting the non-
regulation of OTC commodity derivatives. Further, stemming from such behaviors, 
numerous financially punitive actions were brought against energy companies and energy 
trading firms by the CFTC during this time.155 These were undertaken in accordance with 
the limited anti-manipulation and anti-fraud regulations that remained available to the 
Commission by way of the Commodity Exchange Act. 
A final item to note regarding Enron was that even after its failure, OTC commodity 
derivative traders still sought to partake in markets for these instruments on platforms 
similar to EnronOnline. As such, many marketplace participants migrated to two venues: 
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) – a regulated exchange market – and 
Intercontinental Exchange – an Exempt Commercial Market (Penick 2010: 240). While 
NYMEX offered traders the relative safety of a CFTC-regulated futures and options market, 
and ICE offered traders many of the same benefits as EnronOnline, importantly, in 
responding to concerns about credit risk, by 2002, both exchanges introduced central 
 




clearing mechanisms for OTC commodity derivatives – NYMEX through its CFTC-approved 
ClearPort platform, and ICE through its ICE Clear facility (Overdahl 2010: 291; Brown-Hruska 
2010: 26f).  
With commodity trading crises in the political foreground, a few pieces of 
legislation aimed at addressing their perceived causes found their way before the U.S. 
Congress. For instance, initially introduced to the Senate in February 2002, but 
reconstituted as an amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 2003, Democrat Senator Diane 
Feinstein proposed a bill that sought, among other things, to impose large trader reporting 
on Exempt Commercial Markets – thus, moving them in the direction of being regulated 
exchanges – and to completely apply the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the 
Commodity Exchange Act to OTC derivatives trading – except for transactions in Excluded 
(financial) Commodities and metals (Brunet and Shafe 2007: 687). A further proposal, the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, provided the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with 
expanded authority to enforce prohibitions on manipulation of physical natural gas and 
electricity prices (Greenberger 2013: 743f). Nevertheless, this Act did not modify any of the 
statutory exemptive provisions on which OTC commodity derivative trading relied, and it 
facilitated a jurisdictional dispute between the CFTC and FERC involving cases where 
manipulation occurred from the use of natural gas futures contracts (Markham and Harty 
2008: 920).156  
The continuing lack of unqualified regulatory oversight regarding Exempt 
Commercial Markets – and the OTC commodity markets in general – was again brought to 
the fore after the August 2006 failure of the hedge fund Amaranth. This collapse was 
 
156 The question being as follows: If a party traded natural gas futures as a stratagem to manipulate 




precipitated by the firm losing $6 billion in one week while speculating on natural gas prices 
(Markham 2014: 297). After assuming exceptionally large natural gas positions on the CFTC-
regulated NYMEX exchange, which prompted the CFTC to call for a reduction of the size of 
its derivative positions, Amaranth moved its entire natural gas derivative portfolio into 
natural gas swaps on the largely unregulated ICE platform – an Exempt Commercial Market 
(Markham 2014: 297). A subsequent Senate investigation found that Amaranth’s trading 
activity prior to its failure, and the event of its failure, significantly affected physical natural 
gas prices in the U.S. (Jickling 2008a: CRS 5). Although lengthy court battles ensued due to 
the jurisdictional uncertainty between the CFTC and FERC, both administrative agencies 
attained multimillion-dollar settlements against Amaranth (Greenberger 2013: 744; 
Markham 2014).  
  As mentioned above, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act extended 
participation in Exempt Commercial Markets to large commodity dealers and commercial 
participants whose line of business was commodities. Amaranth, however, was not a 
company principally involved with physical commodities; it was a hedge fund. Its entry into 
OTC commodity derivatives trading was emblematic of a wider trend of financial 
institutions becoming increasingly active in OTC commodity derivative markets – partaking 
in both the Exempt Commercial Market and bilateral trading (Pirrong 2010: 132). The entry 
of these participants served to deepen the linkages between OTC commodity derivatives, 
physical and other financial markets, and the real economy; this being especially true for 
crude oil which, influenced by substantial speculative inflows of capital into crude oil 
derivatives, attained its all-time peak absolute price (both for Brent and West Texas 
Intermediate petroleum) in the summer of 2008 (Gkanoutas-Leventis and Nesvetailova 
2015). Aware of this trend of increasing physical commodity prices, and of the decade’s 
commodities trading crises, in the months preceding the September 2008 failure of Lehman 
161 
 
Brothers, the CFTC and Congress began reassessing the regulatory infrastructure for OTC 
commodity derivatives.  
On numerous occasions in 2007, including in testimony before Congress, Acting 
CFTC Chairperson Walter Lukken stated recurrently that commodity derivative instruments 
traded on Exempt Commercial Markets – such as ICE – and on regulated futures and 
options exchanges – such as NYMEX – had become so similar in nature as to be “virtual 
substitutes.”157 Moreover, Chair Lukken concurred with the argument advanced by NYMEX 
that even the two platforms could be viewed as substitutable and that many of the 
instruments traded on the platforms were tightly correlated with each other, thereby 
linking and affecting the instruments’ prices across platforms.158 Nevertheless, at his July 
2007 Senate testimony, Chairperson Lukken maintained that additional regulation of 
Exempt Commercial Markets – beyond the limited regulations of five-year record retention, 
weekly reporting of basic trade information (excluding the trader’s identity), and CFTC 
‘special call’ authority159 – was unnecessary. Notwithstanding this statement, later at the 
same hearing, the chief executive officer of ICE, Jeffrey Sprecher, testified that additional 
regulations were needed and that, personally, he was amenable, in principle, to further 
regulation of ICE.160 Eventually, CFTC leadership came to agree with Intercontinental 
 
157 For example, see, among others: Hearing to Examine Trading on Regulated Exchanges and Exempt 
Commercial Markets, September 18, 2007; Walk Softly and Carry a Big Stick, ISDA Energy, 
Commodities and Developing Products Conference, November 29, 2007; Opening Statement Before 
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 110th Congress (December 12, 2007). All statements available at: 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/lukken/index.htm. 
158 See Haldis, Peter. “NYMEX to Congress: Regulation of ICE Should Be Increased”. World Refining & 
Fuels Today, 13 July 2007, Vol. 2, Issue 134, at 8. 
159 A requirement that the receiver of the call (or letter) provide requested data and information to 
the CFTC. 
160 See Speculation in the Natural Gas Market, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 110th 
Congress (July 9, 2007). As per an interview with a former CFTC policymaker, the response to this 
statement was one of incredulity on the part of Senator Carl Levin: “…wait a minute, you got 
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Exchange’s CEO, after an internal agency study suggested that further regulation of Exempt 
Commercial Markets was warranted (The Monitor 2008). 
The results of this study were presented to Congress by the CFTC in October 2007 
in the form of new regulatory recommendations. Among other recommendations, these 
importantly included that, for certain derivative contracts determined to provide a 
“significant price discovery function” in the commodity derivatives space, large traders of 
such agreements be subject to CFTC reporting obligations and that Exempt Commercial 
Markets impose position limits on these same instruments.161 Broadly, these requirements 
were in-keeping with comparable regulations governing regulated exchange markets (Snow 
2007: 26). In the same month that the CFTC presented its recommendations to Congress, 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (successor to the General Accounting Office) 
released findings from a self-initiated study of OTC commodity derivatives. The findings 
encouraged Congress to explore altering the scope of the Commission’s authority over OTC 
commodity derivatives trading (GAO 2007). In May 2008, as part of the CFTC’s 
reauthorization under the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Congress passed 
into law the recommendations that the Commission had made the previous autumn as an 
amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act.162 
Irrespective of this amendment, it is important to reiterate that the regulatory 
provisions extended only to qualifying contracts on an Exempt Commercial Market, and not 
to the entire commercial marketplace for OTC commodity derivatives. Therefore, bilateral 
 
somebody that actually wants to be regulated and you’re saying that you don’t want to regulate 
them?” (Interview, 9 October 2017, Washington, D.C.).  
161 See Prepared Remarks, Acting CFTC Chairman Walt Lukken, Compliance and Enforcement in 
Energy Markets – The CFTC Perspective, FERC Compliance Summit, January 18, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/opalukken-
34.pdf. 
162 Pub. Law No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923 (2008).  
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OTC commodity derivative contracts – which would later become a major focus of Dodd-
Frank Act, post-financial crisis rulemaking – were not affected by this legislation. As 
indicated by Jickling (2008b: CRS-6), swaps and other bilaterally negotiated commodity 
derivative instruments comprised a “large and growing” market wherein the same parties 
transacting on Exempt Commercial Markets were “very likely” simultaneously transacting in 
other derivatives on an over-the-counter, bilateral basis. Nevertheless, owing to the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act, a substantial portion of all OTC (commodity) 
derivative activity remained beyond the view of the CFTC.163 It would not be until the 
adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010 that the veil mediating the gaze of regulators 
would undergo the process of being lifted. 
Coupled with an over-leveraged financial system engaged in systemic Ponzi 
financing, those OTC derivatives – in the category of Excluded Commodities – transacted in 
opacity from regulators helped push the U.S. economy into its worst crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1920s and 1930s. Credit defaults – like the one experienced by Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 – sent the fair value of derivative positions held by U.S. bank 
holding companies on an upward linear trajectory in 2008 (Abdel-khalik and Chen 2015: 
294). Under obligation to net out their OTC derivative positions and pay the balance on the 
positions to the contracts’ counterparties, banks and other financial institutions 
experienced extreme financial duress in meeting these commitments. As a result, beginning 
in 2008, the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve intervened, providing monetary 
injections (bailouts) and other forms of assistance to myriad banking, investment, and 
 
163 In the Commission’s October 2007 report, the agency concluded that bilateral over-the-counter 
trading – specifically in commodities, but one can assume that the statement may be read broadly to 
include all forms of OTC derivatives – had only limited impact on “other parties and markets” and 
that this trading’s “non-standardized form” and the “significant size and dispersion of [OTC] markets 
would make it extremely costly and difficult to extrapolate beneficial market surveillance 
information on a routine basis” (CFTC 2007: 20).  
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commercial enterprises (Schwarcz 2009). In this moment of crisis, political support for 
challenging the non-regulation of OTC derivatives had finally arrived. 
 
The Arrival of Chairperson Gensler and the Dodd-Frank Regime for OTC Derivatives 
The experience of a severe global financial crisis, coupled with the arrival of newly elected 
Democrat President Barack Obama in 2008 (in addition to a Democrat-controlled House of 
Representatives and Senate), brought OTC derivative market reform to the vanguard of 
financial policymaking agendas in the U.S. As such, two key developments for the CFTC took 
place between 2009 and 2010: the arrival of a new chairperson – the pro-financial reformer 
Gary Gensler – and the enactment of financial reform legislation – the Dodd-Frank Act; both 
of which were politically supported by the reform-minded Democrat-controlled Congress 
and Presidency. Although Chair Gensler’s influence on the Commission’s OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking will be examined more closely in chapters 8 and 9, his tenure at the 
CFTC – which spanned from May 2009 until January 2014164 – was characterized as 
reformist in nature,165 with some observers even going so far as to refer to Gensler as the 
Obama administration’s toughest regulator.166 This notwithstanding his pre-civil servant 
career as a Wall Street banker.167 Under Gensler’s leadership, the Commission would 
undertake multitudinous rule-makings to regulate OTC derivatives pursuant to the Dodd-
Frank Act. 
 
164 See: https://www.cftc.gov/About/Commissioners/FormerCommissioners/ggensler.html. 
165 See: Bowley, Graham. “Goldman Deal-Maker Now Advocates Regulation”. The New York Times, 
10 March 2010. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/business/11cftc.html. 
166 Yglesias, Matthew. “Timothy Massad Tapped as Chief Derivative Regulator”. Slate. 12 November 





Signed into law in July 2010 by President Obama, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act emerged from multiple earlier proposals168 and 
provided, among other things, a framework for the regulation of OTC derivatives.169 
Through Title VII of the Act, styled Wall Street Transparency and Accountability, Congress 
amended the Commodity Exchange Act to grant the CFTC regulatory authority over swaps, 
thus rescinding the ‘excluded’ and ‘exempted’ designations given to OTC derivatives under 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and, in the process, bringing these derivative 
instruments under the umbrella of regulatability. While the Dodd-Frank Act specifically 
used the term ‘swap’ in referring to those ‘swaps’ which are “commonly known” – e.g., 
credit default swaps, interest rate swaps, etc. – it instructed the CFTC to codify a rule 
precisely defining the term (Awrey 2012: 284).  
Through its ‘swap’ definition rulemaking, and given its newly acquired regulatory 
authority, the Commission would finally arrive at a decision concerning which OTC 
derivatives would be regulated. To venture beyond this chapter, note that the final rule 
adopted by the CFTC defined the term ‘swap’ broadly, in that it extended beyond the 
textbook definition of two parties exchanging cash flows at a future date to derivatives such 
as options and those instruments containing variants of optionality. The agency’s 
determination of which OTC commodity derivatives would be regulated under the Dodd-
Frank Act (i.e., the construction of OTC commodity derivative regulations) serves as the 
principal point of analytical inquiry moving forward throughout this Part of the thesis. 
 
168 These included, among others, a U.S. House of Representatives bill – the Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Congress – a U.S. Senate bill – the Restoring 
American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Congress – and a U.S. Treasury Department 
proposal – the Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation report. See Baker (2010: 1333-1336) 
for a discussion of key proposals, with emphasis on the Department of Treasury’s report.  
169 Pub. Law No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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 The Dodd-Frank Act also established the designations of ‘swap dealers’ and ‘major 
swap participants’ – with the CFTC and SEC again instructed to finalize the definitions of 
these terms. Generally, the relevant dealers and participants include those institutions who 
routinely make markets or transact swaps exceeding a de minimis monetary threshold 
(Rechtschaffen 2014: 220f). Both ‘swap dealers’ and ‘major swap participants’ are required 
to register with the CFTC and to uphold specified business conduct standards and minimum 
capital and margin requirements for their derivative trading (Rechtschaffen 2014: 220f, 
224). Further, the Act amended the Commodity Exchange Act by requiring that only those 
parties qualifying as ‘eligible contract participant(s)’ be legally permitted to transact swaps; 
excluding those transactions conducted on a registered (regulated) board of trade 
(exchange market).170 Again, the definition of ‘eligible contract participant’ – a term 
originating from the Commodity Futures Modernization Act’s efforts to exclude certain 
financially “sophisticated” entities from Commodity Exchange Act regulations (McBride 
2010: 1088) – was left to the CFTC (and the SEC) to define (Awrey 2012: 284). 
 Beyond requiring elaboration on important definitions, the Dodd-Frank Act 
mandated the development of a post-trading infrastructure for OTC derivative transactions. 
As with the above definitional issues, the full creation of this infrastructure was delegated 
to the CFTC for codification through its rulemaking power. The first facet of the 
infrastructure was the requirement that all OTC transactions qualifying as ‘swaps’ be 
reported into a Swap Data Repository. This reporting requirement served to amalgamate all 
data and information relevant to the swap transaction in a centralized, CFTC-accessible 
database. Furthermore, those ‘eligible contract participants’ transacting swaps were 
required to maintain records of the swap transaction.  
 
170 See Commodity Exchange Act § 2, 7 U.S.C. § 2(e) (2012). 
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 The second aspect of the post-trading infrastructure was the requirement that 
qualifying ‘swaps’, capable of and required to be cleared, be subject to central clearing 
through a CFTC-registered and approved clearinghouse. Broadly, this provision of the Dodd-
Frank Act sought to minimize credit risk associated with OTC derivative trades – a serious 
problem that financial institutions had confronted during the financial crisis. (Yadav 2013: 
390ff). The final facet of the post-trading infrastructure was the imposition of margin 
requirements on cleared and uncleared qualifying ‘swaps,’ with the clearing organization 
setting them, if the swap was cleared, and the CFTC setting the amount, if the swap was left 
uncleared (Rechtschaffen 2014: 224f). Although sometimes considered a part of a post-
trading infrastructure, the Dodd-Frank Act also mandated that the CFTC develop position 
limits specifying the maximum number of derivative contracts, or deliverable quantity of a 
commodity, that an ‘eligible contract participant’ may hold in the swaps market 
(Greenberger 2011: 152f). Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act established mandatory 
exchange-trading on a Designated Contract Market or a Swap Execution Facility for those 
‘swaps’ that the CFTC designated as qualifying to be exchange-traded (Ferrarini and 
Saguato 2015: 581). 
 Each of these new regulatory areas intimately affected OTC commodity derivatives. 
First, all commodity ‘swaps’ were to be reported to a Swap Data Repository. Second, those 
commodity ‘swaps’ eligible to be cleared, and not subject to a clearing exemption, were to 
be centrally cleared. Third, margin requirements applied to all cleared commodity ‘swaps’, 
and to some uncleared commodity ‘swaps.’ And, fourth, commodity ‘swaps’ would count 
towards the position limits on an ‘eligible contract participant’s’ trading portfolio.  
Nevertheless, to be subject to these regulatory requirements, an OTC commodity 
derivative would have to qualify as a ‘swap.’ Such qualification would occur against a 
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background where a commodity derivative contract’s unique attribute of potential physical 
deliverability of the asset referent rendered it prima facie a forward contract excluded from 
Dodd-Frank regulation, and where a commodity derivative contract’s commercial purpose 
to commodity-related businesses could well exist. The CFTC codified, both in its rule 
defining a ‘swap’, and in a separate series of rules under the headings of “Commodity 
Options” and “Trade Options,” its understanding of which OTC commodity derivatives 
would be regulated and how such an instrument would relate to the broader framework for 
regulated OTC derivatives. Exploring this understanding, and analyzing the influences upon 
it, serve as the focal points of this paper’s rulemaking analysis. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Emerging from the above review of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s 
regulatory history, arguably, the most impactful issue that the CFTC faced was ambiguity 
surrounding the definition of a regulatable derivative contract as defined by the Commodity 
Exchange Act. This issue began confronting the Commission in the years immediately 
following its 1974 inception and, as detailed by Clark (1978) and Markham (2002) often 
involved the nebulous distinction between an unregulatable forward contract and a 
regulatable futures contract (as well as a potentially regulatable swap or other hybrid OTC 
derivative instrument). Nevertheless, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
provided legal clarity to the Commission concerning its treatment of OTC derivatives; 
specifically, OTC derivatives were to (largely) be left unregulated. After the financial crisis, 
and through Title VII of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, Congress, however, ended the decade’s 
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long, legislatively established non-regulation of OTC derivatives by mandating that these 
instruments be subject to regulation.171  
This new regulatory regime would apply to those OTC contracts that qualified as 
‘swaps’, as broadly defined by the law (and as specifically defined in subsequent CFTC and 
SEC rule-makings). As explained in Chapter 1, a swap is generally conceived of as an 
agreement to exchange cash flows in the future (Hull 2014: 158). Title VII of Dodd-Frank, 
however, amended the Commodity Exchange Act to define a ‘swap’ not only in these terms, 
or in terms of instruments referred to as swaps in business practices, but also, in the 
context of OTC commodity derivatives. Dodd-Frank defined a ‘swap’ as any contract for the 
purchase or sale of a commodity which conveys an optional commitment to that purchase 
or sale.172 This meant that the Dodd-Frank era definition of a ‘swap’, and, therefore, a 
regulatable derivative, would extend to swaps, options, and those OTC contracts containing 
optionality, so long as the implicated derivatives were neither a regulated futures contract 
nor a forward contract (specifically, those forward “nonfinancial commodity” contracts 
intended to be physically delivered).173 
Notwithstanding uncertainty that would arise concerning regulatory treatment of 
OTC commodity derivatives that were physically settled, or of those OTC commodity 
contracts with embedded options or optionality (each subject to further rulemaking, as 
 
171 It should be noted that Dodd-Frank amended the Commodity Exchange Act by, among other 
ways, striking from the Act its Section 2(h)(1-7) language which had sanctioned the largely 
unregulated bilateral trading of OTC commodity derivatives and established Exempt Commercial 
Markets. Thus, through amending the Commodity Exchange Act, the Dodd-Frank Act subjected this 
form of trading to regulation and eliminated the legal recognition of these trading platforms. See 
Notice Regarding the Treatment of Petitions Seeking Grandfather Relief for Trading Activity Done in 
Reliance Upon Section 2(h)(1)-(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 56512 (2010) and 
Orders Regarding the Treatment of Petitions Seeking Grandfather Relief for Exempt Commercial 
Markets and Exempt Boards of Trade, 75 Fed. Reg. 56514 (2010). 




explored below), the broad ‘swap’ definition provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, in part, 
addressed the central issue that the CFTC had dealt with from the time of its formation. 
Dodd-Frank set out a framework for what OTC derivatives could be regulated by the 
Commission. In doing so, the legislation provided an answer to the debate regarding the 
defining characteristic of a regulatable derivative instrument. As can be gleaned from Dodd-
Frank’s definition of a ‘swap’, what principally renders an OTC derivative regulatable, 
according to the Act, is its nature, and not where or how it is traded. It is the presence in a 
derivative contract of optionality – often in terms of deliverability or the physical and 
financial quantity of the asset referent to be purchased or sold – which determines the 
contract’s initial fitness for regulation.174 
Moreover, it can be posited that an imaginary emerges from the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
central regulatory goals for OTC derivatives: the Dodd-Frank imaginary. This Dodd-Frank 
imaginary afforded regulators with a lens through which to view and guide their regulatory 
endeavors. The imaginary related to shining light on OTC derivatives and limiting systemic 
risk; thus, the corresponding regulations produced during rulemaking primarily sought to 
increase transparency and mitigate systemic risk in this marketplace. Over the course of the 
democratic process of rulemaking, however, CFTC policymakers’ conception of what the 
Dodd-Frank Act meant in regard to the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives (i.e., the 
Dodd-Frank imaginary) would be modified due to changing semiotic and extra-semiotic 
supports. Nevertheless, by employing a Dodd-Frank imaginary, policymakers were assisted 
in “going on” with their complex rulemaking task by crafting regulations which generally 
sought to bring transparency to OTC derivatives and to reduce their attendant systemic risk. 
 
174 As Chapter 10 of this thesis will show, the definition of regulatability at the administrative agency 
level would, however, expand to encompass whether a counterparty to an OTC commodity 




 Yet, determining precisely which OTC commodity derivatives would be regulated 
for the purposes of increasing transparency and reducing systemic risk required further 
definition. Given that transactions in OTC commodity derivatives contemplate – at least to 
some degree – delivery of a physical asset (e.g., crude oil or copper) and can be undertaken 
by heterogeneous marketplace participants for either commercial (e.g., delivery of the 
commodity, or hedging) or non-commercial (e.g., speculative) purposes, adequately 
enunciating a distinction between those OTC commodity derivatives that would be 
regulated as ‘swaps’, and those instruments that would be either excepted or exempted 
from Dodd-Frank regulation, was imperative to the CFTC’s regulatory mission. This was 
done through the CFTC’s codification of rules defining the term ‘swap’. Establishing this 
definition was foundational for qualifying OTC commodity derivatives to be in compliance 
with the Dodd-Frank Act’s two main objectives. These being bringing increased 
transparency to the OTC swaps marketplace through transaction reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements and reducing systemic risk by regulating swap dealers and 
major swap participants as well as through adopting futures-style trading requirements for 
many OTC transactions, which involved the imposition of central clearing, margining, and 
position limit mandates.175  
The remainder of this thesis’ Part III explores and analyzes the rules that brought 
OTC commodity derivatives under the CFTC’s regulatory umbrella. 
  
 
























Chapter 7 – The Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (2010) 
 
THE BEGINNINGS OF OTC COMMODITY DERIVATIVE REGULATION: A REVIEW OF THE 
ADVANCE NOTICES OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING  
Within weeks of President Obama’s July 21, 2010 signing of the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC 
began its Dodd-Frank era OTC commodity derivative rulemaking process by promulgating 
advance notices of proposed rulemaking; thus, initiating what Yackee (2011) terms the ‘pre-
proposal rulemaking phase’. The two releases that served as the Commission’s incipient 
foray into the construction of its approach to the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives 
were the August 20, 2010 joint advance notice with the SEC entitled “Definitions Contained 
in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” (hereinafter 
“Definitions”), and the September 28, 2010 “Agricultural Swaps” advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking. While the significance of the advance notices’ use will be discussed in 
greater detail below, the issuance of such, rather than the more customary notice of 
proposed rulemaking, typically occurs whenever the potential rule-making is anticipated by 
administrative agency policymakers to necessitate an additional stage of informational 
exchanges with prospective regulatees and other stakeholders.176 Also, it should be noted 
that while this review focuses on OTC commodity derivatives – the definition of which, as 
stated in Chapter 6, is synonymous with that of Exempt Commodities (i.e., energy and 
metals) – and not agricultural products, the “Agricultural Swaps” notice must be engaged 
because it was the initial rulemaking event from which the CFTC later developed its 
“Commodity Options” and “Trade Options” rules.177 This chapter explores the two 
aforementioned advance notices, and the milieu in which they were developed, to 
 
176 This is usually done in connection with the agency’s first sortie into the regulation of some object 
(Herz 2012: 643).  
177 After the “Agricultural Swaps” advance notice, the Commission included “Commodity Options” in 
the title of its subsequent proposed rule on agricultural swaps. These two components of the 
proposed rule were then bifurcated into separate final rules.  
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ascertain the key themes and considerations to Commission policymakers’ pre-proposal 
OTC commodity derivative rulemaking efforts, and in doing so, highlights the use of the 
advance notices as a tool to assemble intellectual resources from regulatee comments as 
well as discusses the possibility that, through their speech acts, some CFTC officials actively 
encouraged regulatees (i.e., businesses utilizing OTC commodity derivatives) to impactfully 
inform and influence (i.e., capture) early rule-making. 
 
The Advance Notices for OTC Commodity Derivative Rulemaking 
The “Definitions” advance notice, jointly codified and promulgated by the CFTC and SEC, 
solicited comments from outside parties concerning “all aspects” of the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
‘swap’ definition for which the agencies, in consultation with the Board of Governors of the 
U.S. Federal Reserve System, were responsible to further define.178 Through the notice, the 
agencies requested that commenters, over the course of a 30-day comment period, reflect 
“generally and specifically” on whether the regulators’ ‘swap’ definition “should be based 
on qualitative or quantitative factors,” in addition to asking the commenters to explain 
what such factors should be and the rationale for using them (i.e., “analogous areas of law, 
economics, or industry practice” and commenter experience with the to-be-regulated 
derivative instruments).179 Aside from these requests for input, the advance notice 
consisted of a recitation of various Dodd-Frank Act definitions literally cut-and-pasted from 
the law.180 No further guidance on the forthcoming ‘swap’ definition was given. 
Nevertheless, importantly for the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives, one of the 
quoted statutory definitions in the advance notice stated that sales of “a nonfinancial 
 
178 Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
75 Fed. Reg. 51430 (2010).  
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., at 51430-3. 
175 
 
commodity or security for deferred shipment or delivery, so long as the transaction is 
intended to be physically settled,” were to be excluded from the agencies’ ‘swap’ 
definition.181  
 The second rule-making relating to OTC commodity derivatives was the 
“Agricultural Swaps” advance notice. Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commission was 
required to develop regulations for agricultural swaps.182 This advance notice was produced 
by the CFTC’s self-styled ‘Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team’; led by senior special 
counsel (attorney) Donald Heitman of the Commission’s Division of Market Oversight.183 
The content of the release included an enumeration of the rationales for the enactment of 
the Dodd-Frank Act – among these being the enhancement of the CFTC’s “rulemaking and 
enforcement authorities” as a part of reducing risk, increasing transparency, and promoting 
market integrity “within the financial system”184 – and a review of both the existing 
statutory (Congressionally legislated) and regulatory (agency rule) frameworks governing 
transactions in OTC agricultural derivative instruments.  
One aspect of the policymakers’ assessment of these existing regulations is worth 
presenting here because of its relation to subsequent OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking: its regulatory treatment of trade options (i.e., permissible commodity options, 
or over-the-counter commodity contracts containing an option that are offered to 
 
181 This effectively created the forward contract exclusion from the ‘swap’ definition for certain 
qualifying OTC commodity derivative agreements. See Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 51430 (2010). 
182 Agricultural Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 59669 (2010). 
183 This is as stated by Heitman in his presentation before the CFTC’s Agricultural Advisory 
Committee. See Agricultural Advisory Committee Meeting, 5 August 2010, Washington, D.C., at 277. 
Transcript available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/aac_transcri
pt090510.pdf. As indicated by one CFTC interviewee, Heitman had been intimately working in the 
domain of agricultural commodities and their regulation since, at least, the 1970s (Interview, 3 
October 2017, Washington, D.C.). 
184 Agricultural Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 59667 (2010). 
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commercial marketplace participants). Even after the passage of the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act in 2000, the CFTC maintained plenary authority over OTC commodity 
options stemming from the agency’s Part 32 regulation. Flowing from this authority, the 
CFTC continued a general ban on OTC commodity option transactions, but exempted from 
the ban those OTC commodity option agreements that qualified as ‘trade options.’185 This 
Part 32 exemption extended to both ‘trade options’ on agricultural products and to ‘trade 
options’ on other physical commodities. Thus, as detailed in the “Agricultural Swaps” 
advance notice, the Commission, at the time of Dodd-Frank’s enactment, had existing 
regulatory schemes for trade options on both classes of consumable products.186  
 More specifically, as the advance notice stated, since 1998, the CFTC had allowed 
over-the-counter trading of ‘agricultural trade options’ pursuant to its Part 32 exemptive 
authority, provided that these ‘agricultural trade options’ were sold by a Commission-
registered ‘Agricultural Trade Option Merchant’.187 Additionally, under this same authority, 
transactions in ‘agricultural trade options’ were sanctioned by the CFTC if they were (1) 
offered to “a producer, processor, or commercial user of, or a merchant handling” the 
agricultural commodity, (2) entered into “solely for purposes related to” the 
aforementioned commercial entity’s business, and (3) contracted by parties whose 
individual net worth was “not less than $10 million.”188 The other part of the existing Part 
32 exemptive scheme allowed for ‘trade options’ on other physical commodities. In 
particular, Part 32.4 of the Commission’s pre-Dodd-Frank regulations permitted 
commodity-related trade options to transact so long as the option contract was “offered to 
a producer, processor, or commercial user of, or a merchant handling, the commodity” and 
 
185 Ibid., at 59667-8. 





entered into by this entity “solely for purposes related to its business as such.”189 The 
characteristics of these initial criteria for the regulation of trade options would later serve 
to inform (through an intertextual relationship), in part, the content of the subsequently 
analyzed trade (and commodity) option rule-makings. As will be discussed in the upcoming 
chapters, updating the Part 32 commodity option and trade option regulations to comply 
with the new Dodd-Frank Act would be a focal point in the CFTC’s efforts to cement the 
agency’s determination of which OTC commodity derivatives would be regulated.  
 Finally, like the “Definitions” release, the “Agricultural Swaps” advance notice 
solicited comments relating to the rulemaking from outside, interested parties. This notice, 
however, enumerated 27 questions directed at gathering data and information on 
agricultural swaps, ‘agricultural trade options’, and these instruments’ trading practices, in 
addition to asking the prospective commenters to provide insight into how the Commission 
should approach the regulation of these OTC derivative products.190 Nevertheless, and 
importantly for the subsequently produced proposed rule, none of these questions 
pertained to non-agricultural derivatives (e.g., on other physical commodities, such as OTC 
commodity derivatives) in spite of the fact that a proposed rule for commodity options (see 
Chapter 8) would emerge from the “Agricultural Swaps” advance notice and would address 
the regulation of commodity (trade) options on other physical commodities. This meant 
that while rule-making for agricultural swaps was privy to interested party comment at this 
developmental stage of rulemaking, perspective was not formally solicited concerning 
updates to commodity (trade) option regulations. As will be posited in the next chapter, the 
lack of feedback on commodity (trade) option regulations influenced the selected 
regulatory approach for these derivative instruments during proposed rule-making.  
 
189 Ibid. 




A DISCUSSION OF THE ADVANCE NOTICES OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING  
This section of the chapter examines the above cited advance notices, and related 
contextual considerations, to assess the key rulemaking themes that emerge during this 
pre-proposal stage of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking. 
Two main themes relating to the “Definitions” and “Agricultural Swaps” advance 
notices are worth introducing here in order to establish how policymakers approached the 
construction of OTC commodity derivatives regulations during this pre-proposal period. The 
first is that the use of an advance notice arguably signifies that policymakers anticipated a 
complex and complicated rule-making for which they sought substantial data, information, 
and perspective from parties interested in the regulations to be formed. In this regard, the 
advance notices deployed by CFTC policymakers can be seen as a tool used for 
apprehending the intricacies of an OTC commodity derivative marketplace into which they 
historically had (at most) limited visibility and familiarity. The second is that through these 
releases, and during the bureaucratic events that surrounded their codification, 
Commission officials made it known that they were explicitly interested in the commentary 
of prospective regulatees as a source of information for the content of ensuing rules; thus, 
leaving open the possibility that the proposed rule-makings could be influenced to the 
benefit of such outside parties (i.e., captured by the regulatees). This also shows that at this 
pre-proposal rulemaking phase, agency policymakers placed emphasis on the views of 
these regulatees to develop a reservoir of intellectual resources on which they could 
potentially draw in later rulemaking events.  
To the first of these two themes, the significance of the Commission’s issuance of 
advance notices of proposed rulemaking should be further investigated. Recall that an 
advance notice allows for an additional, pre-proposal rulemaking stage during which 
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interested parties can comment on the agency’s preliminary regulatory efforts. Not all 
rules, however, begin with an advance notice. As indicated by Nelson and Yackee (2012: 
344) and Yackee (2011: 379), in the absence of a Congressional directive, when an advance 
notice is used, it is often turned to because administrative agency policymakers perceive a 
need for further data and information or want to test the proverbial regulatory waters to 
seek an acceptable approach to regulation. Furthermore, as noted by Yackee (2014: 294), 
theoretically, the information procured from interested parties during this preliminary 
rulemaking stage can inform the content of the subsequent notice of proposed rulemaking.  
 Continuing with this analytical theme, the “Definitions” and “Agricultural Swaps” 
advance notices are a part of a particular documentary genre; one which both conveys 
significance when utilized and which conditions its textual contents. To the former, the 
significance of using advance notices of proposed rulemaking for the first forays into the 
regulation of swaps and OTC commodity derivatives stems from a perceived need for an 
additional rulemaking event to assist with fulfilling the regulatory mandates of the Dodd-
Frank law.191 As gleaned from the rulemaking summaries at the beginnings of both the 
“Definitions” and “Agricultural Swaps” releases, this perception is attributable to the 
following: the need for (1) the assistance in defining regulatory terms192 and (2) insight on 
the “appropriate conditions, restrictions or protections”193 of a regulatory structure. In 
short, the utilization of advance notices was viewed as necessary to procure outside party 
input requisite to developing proposed rules. To the latter aspect of the documentary 
genre, by its nature, an advance notice of proposed rulemaking circumscribes the extent of 
 
191 The Dodd-Frank Act did not require these rules to begin in advance notices. Thus, the use of this 
rulemaking tool was done out of the Commission(s) volition.  
192 Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
75 Fed. Reg. 51429 (2010). 
193 Agricultural Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 59666 (2010). 
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the potential content of which it is composed. This genre limits the content of an advance 
notice to discussions of legal authority, legislative and regulatory history, and importantly, 
various forms of solicitations (e.g., questions) prompting outside party comment on the 
regulatory matter(s). Given the above, an advance notice can, thus, be conceived of as a 
rulemaking tool utilized by policymakers in their effort to grasp the complexity and nuanced 
nature of their regulatory task. 
 As it relates to the style and content (i.e., the expressed discourse) of the 
“Definitions” notice itself, a couple noteworthy points about policymakers’ construction of 
the early OTC commodity derivative rules can be inferred. From the text of this advance 
notice, which is limited to this restatement and corresponding requests for comments, 
data, and information relating to relevant definitions, the document style conveys the 
sense that CFTC policymakers perceived detailed commentary from outside parties as a 
foundational component to a complex rule-making. Moreover, given the broad language of 
the solicitation for such commentary (i.e., its principal discourse), it can be presumed that 
policymakers also anticipated that a panoply of regulatory issues might affect potential 
regulatees in connection with rule-making, and that these officials actively sought – 
through an expansive solicitation for comments – to be apprised of all these possible 
effects. 
 Additional insights into initial OTC commodity derivative rule-making come from 
exploring the style and content of the “Agricultural Swaps” advance notice. Given the 
structure of the release and the scope of topics on which it requested outside party 
comment – ranging from precise requests for OTC agricultural swaps data, to historical 
recollections and information on trading relations and practices, to asking for perspectives 
181 
 
on how the Commission “should” regulate certain aspects of agricultural swaps trading194 – 
policymakers ostensibly thought that, as with the “Definitions” advance notice, developing 
a proposed agricultural swaps rule would require a substantial contribution of data, 
information, and other commentary from external sources. Such contributions were 
conceivably to then produce the intellectual resources that could be used to inform the 
forthcoming proposed regulations.  
Nevertheless, as the “Agricultural Swaps” notice contained an extensive review of 
the existing legislative and regulatory treatments for related OTC derivatives, it is apparent 
that CFTC policymakers were cognizant that some semblance of a regulatory structure for 
OTC (commodity) derivatives, such as trade options, was already available as a resource on 
which to base the Dodd-Frank compliant regulations of an eventual proposed rule. 
Although a precise enunciation of prospective regulatory treatments for these instruments 
was not included in the “Agricultural Swaps” advance notice, the acknowledgement by 
CFTC policymakers of various exemptive schemes already in-place for certain OTC 
commodity derivative instruments is, nonetheless, important. This is because subsequent 
rulemaking actions for commodity and trade options would include exemptive schemes 
similar to those discussed in this release and would not solely reflect the communications 
of interested party commenters.  
 Turning to contextual information that complemented the development of the two 
advance notices, the first item of relevance are the external meetings held by CFTC 
policymakers with outside parties. Although transcripts of these meetings do not exist, the 
Commission does make public a brief topical summary of such meetings, the meeting dates, 
the rulemaking(s) to which the meetings are connected, and a list of internal (CFTC) and 
 
194 Ibid., at 59669-70. 
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external parties attending such meetings. With regard to external meetings pertaining to 
definitional rulemaking(s), between July 21, 2010 – the date that Dodd-Frank was enacted 
into law – and the release of the “Definitions” notice, on at least two occasions, 
Commission officials met with outside parties.195 And, from this same July date until the 
September 28, 2010 publication of the “Agricultural Swaps” notice, CFTC policymakers and 
external participants conferred over agricultural swaps-related matters in at least eleven 
meetings.196 Notwithstanding the absence of meeting transcripts, it can still be surmised 
that, given the Commission’s numerous interactions with external parties throughout this 
pre-proposal rulemaking stage, CFTC policymakers likely perceived a need for these 
meetings and that such exchanges were plausibly useful to Commission officials in their 
rulemaking responsibilities.  
 Another source of information that can provide perspective on the milieu in which 
fledgling OTC commodity derivative rulemaking took place is the August 5, 2010 CFTC 
Agricultural Advisory Committee meeting. (Although attended by non-CFTC participants, 
this was not an external meeting, but was a relatively routine convocation of Commission 
and industry members.) As the date suggests, this meeting transpired several weeks prior 
to the publication of the “Agricultural Swaps” advance notice. In attendance were 
Commission officials as well as individuals from the United States Department of 
Agriculture, and representatives from a variety of agricultural and derivative trading 
 
195 This figure was generated by searching through the CFTC’s online ‘External Meetings’ database 
for results between the dates listed which the Commission identified as pertaining to “II. Definitions” 
rulemaking. Generally, financial firms and interest groups attended these meetings. This information 
can be accessed from the following: 
https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ExternalMeetings.  
196 This figure was generated by searching through the CFTC’s online ‘External Meetings’ database 
for results between the dates listed which the Commission identified as pertaining to “XIX. 
Agricultural Swaps” rulemaking. Generally, agricultural firms, interest groups, and financial firms 




businesses. Among topics covered at the meeting, which was chaired by CFTC 
Commissioner Michael Dunn, was a presentation by CFTC attorney Don Heitman 
concerning the agency’s Dodd-Frank rulemaking efforts on OTC agricultural derivatives.  
 While a complete recitation and analysis of Heitman’s remarks and ensuing 
participant comments will not be undertaken, it is, nonetheless, useful to present key 
threads of this portion of the meeting that are apposite to contributing to an understanding 
of those factors that may have influenced the construction of the new OTC commodity 
derivative regulations. The criterion used in selecting these motifs is their specific relation 
to the Commission’s inchoate rulemaking efforts affecting such derivative instruments. As 
such, two items are discussed below: Heitman’s remarks on the regulation of trade options, 
and the recurring solicitations of policymakers for prospective regulatee input.  
 Speaking in regard to how the Dodd-Frank Act’s inclusion of ‘options’ in its 
definition of a regulatable ‘swap’ could affect existing Commission exemptions for certain 
OTC derivative products, Heitman referenced the CFTC’s experience with trade options.197 
First mentioning ‘agricultural trade options’, Heitman stated that “the Commission’s Ag 
[(agricultural)] trade options rules” had been “a complete and total failure,” noting, as the 
corresponding advance notice of proposed rulemaking would later state, the 
ineffectiveness of the ‘Agricultural Trade Option Merchant’ program.198 From there, 
Heitman described the various criteria by which ‘agricultural trade options’ and ‘trade 
options’ on other physical commodities had historically been exempted from CFTC 
oversight.199 Yet, Heitman indicated that OTC trading in trade options on other physical 
commodities – such as “petroleum or gold or anything else” – would, under Dodd-Frank, no 
 
197 Agricultural Advisory Committee Meeting, 5 August 2010, Washington, D.C., at 272-5.  
198 Ibid., at 275.  
199 Ibid., at 275-6. 
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longer be covered by the “basic trade option provision” for exemption.200 Thus, the agency 
would have to adopt a new exemption for these commodity-related transactions to legally 
continue trading.  
 An additional aspect from this meeting that is pertinent to this discussion of pre-
proposal rulemaking is the repeated solicitation by CFTC officials for regulatee perspectives 
on the agricultural swaps rule-making task. At several junctures towards the end of 
Heitman’s presentation, both he and Commissioner Dunn intimated the need for regulatees 
to provide the Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team – and, thus, the Agricultural Advisory 
Committee and the Commission – with thoughts and comments concerning the 
“Agricultural Swaps” advance notice. Commissioner Dunn made a point of interjecting at 
four instances to request that potential regulatees be in contact with the rulemaking team. 
On one occasion, Commissioner Dunn intimated to these regulatees that it would be “much 
better” if the team heard “from you early on [about] what you’d like to see in there” so as 
to “ensure what you’d like to see” in the proposed rule is “part and parcel of that 
recommendation.”201 Furthering this sentiment, the Commissioner stated the following: 
 
So, you’re going to have direct input to the staff, and there are 30 of them, you’ll see 
[…] But they are there and that gives you the ground floor, and what I will commit to 
the members of the Advisory Committee is I’ll have my staff let you know when key 
thresholds are coming up so that you can get in there […] As they begin to take pen 
to paper, now is the time to get your comments in there, because, believe me, it’s a 
lot easier to get them in early on than after something is written. So, this is an 
opportunity and, as the Chair of the Ag Advisory Committee, I want to make sure that 




200 Ibid., at 276. 
201 Ibid., at 287. 
202 Ibid., at 291-3. 
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Don Heitman concurred with Commissioner Dunn’s intimation, and encouraged 
regulatees to provide the CFTC with insight into their businesses’ experiences with OTC 
derivatives so as to guide the Commission’s rulemaking efforts: “…because speaking from 
the perspective of trying to put these rules together, you know, […] you guys understand 
how your business works better than we ever could, and we’re trying to write rules that 
make sense for your businesses” (emphasis added).203 In giving rationale to this statement, 
Heitman continued: “The better we understand your issues, your concerns, your problems, 
then the better we are able to write a rule that makes sense and works for you. So, again, 
the more background information we can get, the easier it makes our job and the better 
the rules are going to look from your perspective.”204 Moreover, Heitman directed the 
potential regulatees to a CFTC-hosted agricultural swaps webpage through which interested 
parties could comment on future rule-makings.205 While the potential significance of these 
solicitations will be reviewed in the concluding remarks below, based on Heitman’s and 
Dunn’s statements, it is clear that those Commission policymakers involved in agricultural 
swaps rule-making perceived a critical need for informational input from prospective 
regulatees, and that these officials possibly facilitated an opportunity for such outside 
parties to impactfully influence the construction of the forthcoming (Commodity Options) 
proposed rule.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE ADVANCE NOTICES OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 
The above discussion of the “Definitions” and “Agricultural Swaps” advance notices of 
proposed rulemaking has explored these releases and the milieu in which they were crafted 
to ascertain those considerations important to pre-proposal OTC commodity derivative 
 
203 Ibid., at 293. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid., at 281-2 and 286-7.  
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rulemaking. In doing so, this chapter has opened the “black box” that, according to West 
(2009), characterizes this rulemaking phase.206 This has revealed that Commission 
policymakers viewed their regulatory task as complex and nuanced and that they actively 
sought, through the issuance of these advance notices, the commentary of interested 
parties – especially from prospective regulatees – to assist with these efforts (i.e., an 
attempt to simplify the complexity of rulemaking). Given the new regulatory mandates 
prescribed by the Dodd-Frank Act, coupled with the CFTC’s historical (in)experience with 
the direct regulation of OTC (commodity) derivatives (as reviewed in Chapter 6), 
Commission policymakers likely did not possess either the breadth or the depth of industry-
side perspective at the outset of Dodd-Frank rulemaking. To this point, one senior agency 
official intimated the following: “The regulations essentially put more meat on the bones of 
the law and fleshed it out. And in the case of Dodd-Frank, there were lots to flesh out 
because this was an entirely new area – the OTC market – that your regulators didn’t even 
fully understand, let alone members of Congress.”207 And, in light of the changes that this 
law brought to the regulatory infrastructure for OTC (commodity) derivatives, encouraging 
interested parties – and, in particular, potential regulatees – to communicate their 
experiences with the CFTC conceivably allowed agency officials to more fully carry out their 
rulemaking duties under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Two important items from this chapter’s discussion are worth restating. As 
indicated above, utilizing advance notices provided CFTC policymakers with tools to gather 
data, information, and other commentary that could then be used towards the creation of 
 
206 It is important to remember, however, that the two advance notices do not represent rules or 
even an enunciation of how policymakers envisioned or intended to regulate OTC commodity 
derivatives. Rather, the notices represent an elective step in the rulemaking process which could 
both generate outside party feedback and lay out the basis for future development of proposed 
regulations. 
207 Interview, 9 October 2017, Washington, D.C. 
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proposed rules. While the precise intentions behind the policymakers’ decision to utilize 
advance notices cannot be definitively established given the data reviewed herein, it can, 
nonetheless, be reasonably assumed that these officials understood the employment of 
advance notices as necessary and useful to their rule-making endeavors.  
 The other element pertains both to the significance of the numerous rule-related 
external meetings during the pre-proposal stage, and of the major theme of the Agricultural 
Advisory Committee’s meeting – the solicitation of prospective regulatee input. Again, 
though transcripts of these external meetings do not exist, their summaries depict a 
relationship in which outside parties exchanged data, information, and perspectives 
concerning their OTC derivative experiences with the Commission. Moreover, the verbal 
observations and pleas of both Heitman and Commissioner Dunn during the Agricultural 
Advisory Committee’s meeting imply that CFTC policymakers were actively seeking such 
input specifically from prospective regulatees. Considering that, as found by Yackee (2011), 
at this stage of rulemaking (i.e., pre-proposal/ advance notice) outside parties generally 
have success in influencing the nature of a subsequently proposed rule should they provide 
relevant commentary to an administrative agency, the intimations of these policymakers 
seemingly seek to encourage as much. Thus, these external meetings and the two 
policymakers’ utterances may suggest an administrative agency at risk of capture (see 
Chapter 3) because of policymakers’ seeming affinity for regulatee perspectives.  
Nevertheless, a couple of qualifications must be considered. First, solicitations for 
input, and even statements whereby policymakers portend to write rules that “make 
sense” for regulatees, may not in and of themselves mean that regulators base their rules 
on the commentary provided by prospective regulatees. Although such solicitations and 
statements are noteworthy because they represent an apparent need by policymakers for 
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external perspectives on rulemaking issues – thus, hypothetically, resulting in the creation 
of a reservoir of intellectual resources on which policymakers may draw when they draft 
regulations – these speech acts (i.e., observations, pleas, invitations) may in fact signify no 
more than an attempt to uncover the possible complexities of a regulatory task by 
encouraging regulatees to provide their insights on the matter at-hand (Jones 2007). 
Therefore, interactions between prospective regulatees and their future regulators – even 
when occurring to transmit intellectual resources – should not, on their surface, be 
assumed to signal some form of regulatory capture. Second, in some instances, 
policymakers craft rules that give substantial deference to potential regulatee comments 
and serve to advance these parties’ interests (see Chapter 10). On other occasions, the 
regulations substantially reflect considerations other than those discussed by prospective 
regulatees, like the language of an overriding and explicit statute, or the agency’s existing 
regulatory approach (see Chapter 8). As such, the actual regulatory content of the 
subsequently issued rules must be examined to determine the extent to which interested 
party commenters (or other influences) conditioned or affected an administrative agency’s 
regulations.  
The application of CPE to the ensuing phases of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking helps identify and assess those factors (semiotic and extra-semiotic) that 
conditioned or affected Commission policymakers’ construction – as well as their selection 
and retention – of OTC commodity derivatives regulations. In the next chapter, those 
significant influences affecting the proposed OTC commodity derivative rules are explored 
and analyzed. Overlying this inquiry is the notion of a Dodd-Frank imaginary which guided 
CFTC policymakers towards bringing transparency to OTC commodity derivative 
transactions and limiting the marketplace’s systemic risk.  
189 
 
Chapter 8 – The Proposed Rules for OTC Commodity Derivatives (2010-2011) 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Following the comment periods for the “Definitions” and “Agricultural Swaps” advance 
notices of proposed rulemaking, and stemming directly from these notices, two proposed 
rules were issued defining which OTC commodity derivatives would be subject to the Dodd-
Frank regulatory regime for swaps. In separate rulemaking actions, the CFTC proposed the 
“Commodity Options and Agricultural Swaps” (“Commodity Options”) rule on February 3, 
2011 and, jointly with the SEC, issued the “Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based 
Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap 
Agreement Recordkeeping” (“Further Definitions”) proposed rule on May 23, 2011. As 
concerns this chapter’s analysis, because both rules include regulations for financial 
products other than OTC commodity derivatives, only those parts of the rules pertaining to 
OTC commodity derivative regulation are analyzed and discussed. Thus, for the 
“Commodity Options” rule, the Commission’s proposed regulations associated with 
commodity options (i.e., over-the-counter option contracts on commodities such as energy 
and metals) are included the analysis, but those pertaining to agricultural swaps are 
omitted. Similarly, only the forward contract exclusion within the “Further Definitions” rule 
is made part of the below analysis. 
 Through an analysis of how the proposed “Commodity Options” rule and the 
proposed forward contract exclusion defined which OTC commodity derivatives would be 
regulated, this chapter shows that CFTC policymakers constructed the regulation of these 
instruments in a way that brought much of this derivative activity under the Commission’s 
purview and subject to Dodd-Frank swap regulations (i.e., compliance with reporting, 
recordkeeping, clearing, margining, and position limits requirements). As is presented 
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below, this selected regulatory approach was principally conditioned by the discursive 
content of the Dodd-Frank Act which interacted and co-evolved with the extra-semiotic 
elements of the milieu in which the regulations were formed, such as the influence of 
agency Chairperson Gary Gensler. Notwithstanding the statements of agency policymakers 
reviewed in Chapter 7, the sway of industry-related external parties on the composition and 
content of the proposed regulations was negligible. Through the expansive and stringent 
regulatory approach that was selected for commodity (trade) options and for the forward 
contract exclusion, CFTC officials proposed regulations which sought to broadly bring 
transparency to the OTC commodity derivatives marketplace and to reduce the systemic 
risk thereof (i.e., the Dodd-Frank imaginary). As has already been alluded to, subsequent 
rulemaking events would, however, refine this imaginary and redefine what OTC 
commodity derivative transactions would be regulated under the umbrella of this 
regulatory vision.  
 This portion of the case study on the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives is 
structured differently from that of the preceding chapter. The most notable difference is 
that the first item discussed is the broader context in which the Commission began drafting 
OTC commodity derivative regulations. The opening section of this chapter reviews CFTC-
specific considerations such as the leadership of Chair Gensler and the regulatory 
sentiments that he conveyed, the structure of intra-agency rulemaking teams, staffing and 
budget issues before engaging with the broader political environment in which the two 
proposed rule-makings took place. From there, the proposed “Commodity Options” rule 
and the forward contract exclusion of the “Further Definitions” rule are separately 
presented. Attached to this presentation are corresponding analyses of the rules’ 
construction which, utilizing the analytical lenses afforded by the CPE theoretical 
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framework, explore the semiotic and extra-semiotic influences thereon as well as the rules’ 
relation to the Dodd-Frank imaginary.  
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE PROPOSED RULES WERE CREATED 
Before engaging in an analysis of the proposed “Commodity Options” and “Further 
Definitions” proposed rule-makings, it is essential to discuss the immediate context in 
which these rules were drafted. The elements covered in this overview pertain to the CFTC 
as an institution – including the leadership of Chair Gensler – and to the political climate in 
which the agency was embedded (i.e., that of an elected U.S. government with authority 
over the Commission). These considerations will be later linked to the overall analyses of 
the two proposed rule-makings through the lenses of the four CPE selectivities: the 
structural, discursive, agential, and technological selectivities.  
 Beginning with the institutional-related variables present at the Commission during 
the proposed rulemaking stage, the initial factor to consider is that of agency leadership, 
and specifically, Chairperson Gary Gensler.208 Because Barack Obama, a Democrat, was 
president at the time that the CFTC began Dodd-Frank era rulemaking, his political party 
held a three (Democrat) to two (Republican) voting majority at the agency. Furthermore, in 
2009, Obama appointed Gary Gensler, a Democrat, to be Chairperson of the Commission. 
Although Gensler came from a professional background as a banker and former U.S. 
Treasury Department official, once confirmed into the position as head of the CFTC, he was 
a vociferous proponent of regulating the then (largely) unregulated OTC derivatives 
space.209 As stated in multiple interviews with CFTC officials, Chair Gensler even actively 
 
208 The influence of CFTC leadership, including that of Chair Gensler, on the rule-makings reviewed 
below will be examined in greater detail through the CPE lens of the agential selectivity in the 
analytical sub-sections of this chapter.  
209 See: Timms, Aaron. “New CFTC Boss Timothy Massad Goes Soft on Regulation”. Institutional 
Investor, 13 November 2014. Available at: 
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assisted Congress in its development of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act (i.e., the Act’s 
regulation of swaps).210 The vision that Gensler articulated for the Commission’s regulation 
of OTC derivatives (swaps) is most aptly described in his final remarks during a 2012 
interview with the then-prominent broadcast journalist Charlie Rose: As Gensler stated: “I 
do think that the American public will do best if we actually shine a light on these markets 
and lower the risk of them”211 (i.e., a regulatory agenda guided by the aforementioned 
Dodd-Frank imaginary). In short, and as previously mentioned in Chapter 6, Chair Gensler 
was a champion of implementing the Dodd-Frank reforms, and was thus, given his 
chairmanship, the preeminent institutional actor directing the Commission’s regulation of 
OTC derivatives under the Act during his roughly five-year tenure as leader of the agency.  
The next factor pertains to how the agency structured its Dodd-Frank rulemaking 
efforts. After the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law, the CFTC established 30 intra-agency 
teams that were responsible for writing Act-associated rules.212 Each team was charged 
with a particular regulatory subject, such as the above-mentioned Agricultural Swaps 
Rulemaking Team being tasked with drafting rules for agricultural swaps and related OTC 
derivative products. Furthermore, given the panoply of disparate regulations that would be 
 
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b14zbk4fxwzkmq/new-cftc-boss-timothy-massad-
goes-soft-on-regulation; Protess, Ben. “Regulator of Wall Street Loses Its Hard-Charging Chairman”. 
The New York Times, 2 January 2014. Available at: 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/regulator-of-wall-street-loses-its-hard-charging-
chairman/; and Warmbrodt, Zachary. “Obama picks Massad for CFTC”. Politico, 12 November 2013. 
Available at: https://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/barack-obama-timothy-massad-commodity-
futures-trading-commission-099705. 
210 Interview, 6 October 2017, Washington, D.C. and Interview, 10 October 2017, Washington, D.C. 
211 Gensler, G. (2012) Interviewed by Charlie Rose for Charlie Rose, 14 June. Available at:  
https://charlierose.com/video/player/14211?autoplay=true.  
212 CFTC Releases List of Areas of Rulemaking for Over-the-Counter Derivatives, Release Number 
5856-10, 21 July 2010. Available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5856-10. 
Another team was subsequently added to bring the total to 31 rulemaking teams, see: Remarks, 
Implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, FIA’s Annual International Futures Industry Conference, Chairman 




developed by the intra-agency teams, a member of the Commission’s Office of General 
Counsel was assigned to each team in order to limit the need for sequential rule reviews by 
the Office prior to the submission of the rule(s) to the agency’s Commissioners for a vote.213 
According to a CFTC official, this processual structure was unique to Dodd-Frank 
rulemaking, and was done to prevent bottlenecks in the rule review process conducted by 
the Office of General Counsel.214 Bearing these considerations in-mind is important because 
this structure may have, at times, facilitated what might be termed ‘siloed’ rule-making 
efforts within distinct groups, but at others, may have promoted inter-group coordination 
thorough Office of General Counsel members exposed to multiple rulemaking areas.  
A further institutional consideration is that of agency staffing. Because the Dodd-
Frank Act required that the CFTC assume added regulatory responsibilities in, among other 
areas, the domain of OTC derivatives (swaps), the Commission had to hire additional staff 
to assist in fulfilling its new rulemaking, oversight, and enforcement obligations.215 Resulting 
from this increase in agency staff, three matters relating thereto are important to highlight.  
First, although members of this newly hired staff presumably had diverse 
professional and educational experiences, as indicated in an interview with a CFTC official, 
the Commission had a proclivity towards hiring individuals who previously worked on Wall 
Street and whose backgrounds involved OTC derivatives (swaps). As the CFTC official 
stated: “Wall Street was laying people off. And we, in those early years, those very early 
years, the first few years of the Obama administration, where you had a sympathetic 
administration plus a Democratic Congress, we got the budget increases to hire-up so we 
 
213 Interview, 10 October 2017, Washington, D.C. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid., and see Opening Statement, Chairman Gary Gensler, Meeting of the Commodity Futures 




were able to hire-up off the Street and get people in some swaps expertise” (Interview, 10 
October 2017, Washington, D.C.). This phenomenon is noteworthy because of its potential 
to lay the foundation for possible regulatory capture. Specifically, ‘cultural capture’ (see 
Chapter 4) could be stimulated by these hiring practices because the new regulators – 
former Wall Street employees now with the CFTC – may continue sharing personal and 
professional identities with regulatees – businesses and their employees – and, thus, be 
inclined, as Kwak (2014: 83) suggests, to give deference, during rulemaking, to the 
perspectives of regulatees.  
Relating to this hiring of new CFTC staff, the second matter pertains to the efficacy 
of these individuals’ continuing knowledge of private industries’ financial market operations 
and to their lack of familiarity with the rulemaking process. To the former, one CFTC 
interviewee spoke directly of an awareness that the knowledge accrued by newly hired 
personnel from Wall Street would quickly be outdated and would not be able to bridge the 
informational and experiential chasm that existed between the CFTC as regulator and 
financial interests as regulatees: 
 
Now, it’s just inherent in any regulatory agency they’re going to be one step removed 
from the Street […] We’ll be behind the curve – the government’s going to be behind 
the curve. And it’s not a function of the people in government being more stupid, or 
more slow, or the best people not coming in. There is an incentive issue, too, in pay 
and all that [...] I would contend that you could take the brightest stars of Goldman 
Sachs and put them in a government agency and within a week their information is 
out dated and even they aren’t going to be up on the latest. And you put them in a 
regulatory role and there’s going to be a slight disconnect. It’s just the nature of the 
distance in different organizations. And part of that’s okay.  And part of it’s good in 
that you’re not so close to the activity and so vested in. But, there is a distance 
(Interview, 10 October 2017, Washington, D.C.). 
 
Therefore, while the new staff’s past experiences may be perceived by some as 
constituting knowledge of the to-be-regulated industry, at least one senior member of the 
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Commission’s Dodd-Frank rulemaking effort was skeptical of such a position and instead 
viewed the knowledge of these individuals as necessarily incomplete. And, to the latter 
item, another CFTC official posited that this fledgling staff’s inexperience in writing rules 
adversely influenced their thoroughness and quality, which, in part, later prompted the 
Commission to issue to regulatees notices of relief from compliance with some agency 
regulations: “So, we did, you know, we hired people from the outside […] And again, they 
had to learn. Some of them didn’t have any experience writing rules. I mean it was a very 
challenging process […] The combination of trying to do it quickly and then not having the 
knowledge, I think led to a lot of issues that needed to be addressed through the no-actions 
[letters]” (Interview, 3 October 2017, Washington, D.C.). These two caveats suggest that 
the CFTC’s hiring of new staff was not unconditionally beneficial to its rulemaking and other 
regulatory endeavors.   
The third staffing-related matter worth highlighting stands in slight contrast to the 
preceding caveats. As stated in interviews conducted for this research,216 and as 
communicated in policymaker speeches from the time of the proposed OTC commodity 
derivative rule-makings,217 some prominent CFTC officials believed that, notwithstanding 
the additional hiring done after Dodd-Frank’s enactment, the Commission lacked adequate 
staff to properly rule-make and to fully engage in subsequent regulatory oversight and 
enforcement. Thus, key CFTC policymakers held the belief that the agency was understaffed 
 
216 Interview, 3 October 2017, Washington, D.C and Interview, 10 October 2017, Washington, D.C. 
217 See, for instance, Remarks before the Institute of International Bankers, Chairman Gary Gensler, 
21 October 2010. Available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-56. 
See also Opening Statement, Commissioner Michael V. Dunn, Public Meeting on Proposed Rules 




relative to its increased regulatory responsibilities. (In fact, only in the months after Dodd-
Frank’s July 2010 adoption did the CFTC’s staff level return to its 1999 levels.218) 
Another institutional-related variable that should be kept in-mind is the 
Commission’s budget situation at the time of formal rulemaking. In addressing this during 
several speeches in 2010, Chairperson Gensler articulated a need for further monetary 
resources in order for the agency to implement prescribed Dodd-Frank Act regulations.219 
On these same occasions, Gensler indicated that while President Obama and the Democrat-
controlled Senate had each proposed appropriating more than $250 million to the CFTC for 
the fiscal year ending mid-2011, the Commission was, in fact, operating on an annualized 
budget of roughly $169 million, provided for by a Congressionally-enacted Continuing 
Resolution for government funding. This modest actual budget, relative to the proposed 
budgets of the President and the Senate, limited, among other things, the number of 
personnel that the CFTC could hire in conjunction with its expanded regulatory role over 
the OTC derivative marketplace. Although establishing a definitive link between specific 
agency funding levels and rulemaking outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper, it is, 
nonetheless, plausible that, as suggested by the Chair’s speeches as well as the above-
mentioned interviews, a restricted CFTC budget may have had some deleterious impact on 
the agency’s ability to meticulously rule-make. 
 
218 See: Protess, Ben. “Regulators Decry Proposed Cuts in C.F.T.C. Budget”. The New York Times, 24 
February 2011. Available at: https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/regulators-decry-proposed-
c-f-t-c-budget-cuts.  
219 See the following: Remarks before the Institute of International Bankers, Chairman Gary Gensler, 
21 October 2010; Testimony, Chairman Gary Gensler, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment and Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 8 
December 2010. Available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-63; 
Testimony, Chairman Gary Gensler, House Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on General 




Broader than these institutional variables, the political climate in which the 
Commission formulated proposed rules from late-2010 through mid-2011 is also important. 
Since the 2008 general election, the presidency, the House of Representatives, and the 
Senate were controlled by the Democrat party; the political party responsible for drafting 
the Dodd-Frank Act and a group often amenable to increasing government spending. In the 
autumn 2010 midterm election, however, Republicans took control of the House and made 
significant gains in the number of seats held in the Senate.220 Although the CFTC, as an 
administrative agency, is under the Executive Branch – thus Democrat-controlled even after 
the 2010 midterms – this election, nonetheless, had political implications for its operations. 
Of these, perhaps the most salient was found in the threats leveled by Republicans on the 
House Appropriations Committee to cut the Commission’s budget by a third.221 This 
proposed cut was in-keeping with the Republicans’ more general post-midterm push 
towards promoting deregulation and implementing fiscal austerity.222 Beyond rulemaking, 
the hypothesized effect of the budget cut would, as stated by Commissioner Chilton, likely 
render the CFTC unable to enforce the rules it was writing.223 With the experience of this 
change in political environment in-mind, as well as the change’s potential attendant 
material effects on the agency’s budget and its ability to carry out its regulatory mission, an 
 
220 In the House, the Republicans picked up 63 seats to attain a majority, and in the Senate, 
Democrats lost 6 seats to retain a slim majority of 51 seats (plus 2 Independents who caucused with 
them) out of 100. For election data on the House, see: 
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2010/results/house.html. For election data on the Senate, see: 
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2010/results/senate.html.  
221 See: Protess, Ben. “Regulators Decry Proposed Cuts in C.F.T.C. Budget”. The New York Times, 24 
February 2011. Available at:  https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/regulators-decry-proposed-
c-f-t-c-budget-cuts. Again, it should be reiterated that at the time this cut was proposed, the CFTC 
was functioning on a budget that was already more than $80 million less than those proposed by 
President Obama and the Senate.  
222 The push for fiscal restraint would, in-time, influence the discourses and policies of both political 
parties in favor of such austerity (Blyth 2013). 
223 See: Protess, Ben. “Regulators Decry Proposed Cuts in C.F.T.C. Budget”. The New York Times, 24 




ethos of urgency to complete Dodd-Frank rule-makings emerged at the Commission, given 
some policymakers’ concern that shifting political sentiments could result in their work 
going unfinished or, perhaps, even completely undone, if it was not quickly finalized.224 
 
THE PROPOSED RULES AND THEIR ANALYSES 
The Proposed Rule for Commodity Options 
Like its regulatory antecedent, the “Commodity Options” rule was produced by the CFTC’s 
Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team.225 As the proposed rule’s full title denotes, it dealt 
with the regulation of agricultural swaps and commodity options. The inclusion of 
commodity options226 in this proposed rule is noteworthy because although it was an 
outgrowth of the “Agricultural Swaps” advance notice, nowhere in that notice did 
Commission policymakers expressly contemplate revising commodity option regulations 
and, thus, comments relating to commodity options were not directly solicited by the 
agency. The matter of revisiting the agency’s regulation of commodity options was not, 
however, unwarranted. Adding these regulations to the proposed rule was undertaken 
after reflection by the Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team on the extent to which the 
‘swap’ definition in the Dodd-Frank Act included OTC commodity derivatives that were 
options, or that contained optionality (i.e., commodity options and trade options227).228 
 
224 Interview, 3 October 2017, Washington, D.C. and Interview, 4 October 2017, Washington, D.C. 
225 The “For Further Contact Information” entry for the proposed rule is the same as that of the 
advance notice; thus, referencing the same policymakers. See Commodity Options and Agricultural 
Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 6095 (2011). 
226 An option on a physical commodity (traded OTC) or on a futures contract for a commodity (traded 
on an exchange). See: 
https://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.htm#C. 
227 Trade options being commodity options that are transacted between commercial participants for 
commercial purposes (e.g., an option offered by an oil producer to a refinery for the purchase 50,000 
barrels of crude oil). Such transactions were allowed by the CFTC under the trade option exemption 
of its Part 32 regulations; see Commodity Options and Agricultural Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 6102 (2011). 
228 Commodity Options and Agricultural Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 6101 (2011). 
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 The regulations in the “Commodity Options” proposed rule mirrored this important 
aspect of Dodd-Frank’s ‘swap’ definition. The hallmark of this proposed rule was that it 
modified the CFTC’s Part 32 regulation of commodity (trade) options so as to treat these 
over-the-counter transacted instruments synonymously with swaps in the same manner 
stated in the Act.229 As a result, those OTC commodity derivative contracts which had 
historically transacted as commodity (trade) options would now be considered regulatable 
swap agreements and subject to Dodd-Frank’s post-trade regulatory infrastructure (i.e., 
reporting, recordkeeping, clearing, margining, and position limit regulations). 
 Beyond articulating the fungible nature of the terms option and swap,230 the 
proposed “Commodity Options” rule also revised the Commission’s existing Part 32 
regulations, which had governed over-the-counter trading in commodity options since the 
1970s. Several sections of the original Part 32 were suggested to be withdrawn because of 
either their contemporary irrelevance – such as regulations governing the defunct ‘dealer 
options’ market – or their preemption by the Dodd-Frank Act.231 What policymakers 
proposed to retain and amend in Part 32 were its applicable scope (i.e., to all commodity 
options other than those on futures contracts), the trade option exemption,232 consumer 
protection and anti-fraud provisions, and the grandfathering of existing commodity option 
transactions.  
Notwithstanding cosmetic changes to the scope, consumer protection, and 
grandfather sections of Part 32, the proposed “Commodity Options” rule, through its 
revision of the trade option exemption, accomplished two significant changes to the 
 
229 Ibid., at 6096-7, 6101. 
230 In accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC did not, however, consider options on futures 
contracts as swaps. See Commodity Options and Agricultural Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 6095 (2011). 
231 Commodity Options and Agricultural Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 6101-3 (2011). 
232 As previously discussed, this CFTC exemption allowed for commercial marketplace participants to 
transact otherwise banned over-the-counter commodity options.  
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regulation of commodity (trade) options. First, although commodity (trade) options would 
be allowed to legally transact under the amended trade option exemption, the nature of 
this exemption given the corresponding treatment of commodity (trade) options as swaps, 
meant that it did not exempt such transactions from regulation as swaps. In short, this 
proposed trade option exemption provided no exemptive relief from swap regulations to 
over-the-counter transacted commodity (trade) options, leaving these instruments subject 
to potentially costly regulatory compliance. Second, CFTC policymakers proposed revising 
the qualifying criteria for the trade option exemption to include that both purchasers and 
sellers of commodity (trade) options be ‘eligible contract participants’ as defined in and as 
required by law.233 This meant that only those commercial parties meeting a de minimis 
(minimum) financial criterion would be legally permitted to transact these OTC commodity 
derivatives; potentially leaving small commercial end-users of these contracts unable to 
lawfully transact them.  
 All five CFTC commissioners voted in the affirmative to ratify the proposed rule. In 
the only voting statement given, Chairperson Gensler voiced his support for treating 
commodity options (and agricultural swaps) the same as all other swaps, citing the 
“overwhelmingly” supportive comments for this equal regulatory approach received from 
interested parties after the publication of the “Agricultural Swaps” advance notice.234 A 60-
day comment period was then applied to the proposed “Commodity Options” rule. 
 
233 Commodity Options and Agricultural Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 6102 (2011). The initial definition of an 
‘eligible contract participant’ was understood to be that of a sophisticated investor, but following the 
adoption of the Dodd-Frank era rule concerning entities eligible to transact swaps, the definition 
changed to those businesses with $10 million or more in total assets, individuals with aggregate 
investments of $10 million or more (or $5 million of more if involved in hedging activities), and 
business entities involved in hedging commercial risk that have a net worth of at least $1 million, 
among other enumerated entities; see Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap 
Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract 
Participant”, 75 Fed. Reg. 80184-5 (2010).   




An Analysis of the Proposed “Commodity Options” Rule 
To reiterate, the proposed “Commodity Options” rule amended the Commission’s Part 32 
commodity options regulations in three substantial ways: (1) it proposed treating 
commodity options as regulatable swaps; which (2) meant that the trade option exemption 
did not exempt trade options from regulation as swaps; and (3) it included an ‘eligible 
contract participant’ requirement in the trade option exemption. In the instant sub-section 
of this thesis, the semiotic and extra-semiotic influences which conditioned CFTC 
policymakers’ selection of their proposed regulatory approach to commodity (trade) 
options will be analyzed, before engaging with how that regulatory approach related to the 
overarching Dodd-Frank imaginary guiding agency officials towards bringing transparency 
to OTC derivative markets and reducing their contribution to systemic risk. In doing so, 
insight will be gained into how policymakers, at the notice of proposed rulemaking stage, 
constructed their preliminary regulations for OTC commodity derivatives.    
In undertaking this proposed rule’s analysis, an essential item concerning the 
absence of one potential factor on its development must first be explored. Because 
Commission policymakers did not directly solicit comment on the regulation of commodity 
options in the “Agricultural Swaps” advance notice, no comment letters on the topic were 
ever submitted to the agency. As intimated above, notwithstanding this absence, the 
CFTC’s Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team proceeded to include commodity options in 
the proposed rule. The statements of agency policymakers within this rule’s text cite their 
post-advance notice realization that the Dodd-Frank Act would impact commodity options 
regulations as the justification for ultimately revising these regulations.235 As such, the 
formulation of proposed regulations for commodity options was done in an environment 
 
235 Ibid., at 6101. 
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which lacked the formally provided intellectual input (i.e., comment letters) of outside 
parties interested in these instruments’ regulation; the effects of which are most prominent 
in the proposed trade option exemption and will be analyzed below. Nevertheless, since 
the commodity options regulations emerged from the same rulemaking as those for 
agricultural swaps, in addition to being contemporaneously crafted by the same rulemaking 
team, the potential discursive influences of agricultural outside party comments to the 
broader commodity options and agricultural swaps rulemaking ecosystem can, where 
applicable, be considered as a part of the proposed commodity options regulations. This 
specifically pertains to those agricultural swap-related comment letters that articulated 
support for equal treatment of options as swaps across all asset classes (e.g., agricultural 
options and commodity options). 
 As it relates to the proposed “Commodity Options” rule’s treatment of commodity 
(trade) options as swaps, attention must preliminarily focus on Commission policymakers’ 
understanding of the extent of the Dodd-Frank Act’s ‘swap’ definition. The Act 
unambiguously states that “option[s] of any kind” on commodities are to be considered 
regulatable swaps.236 Additionally, as mentioned above, the CFTC policymakers responsible 
for developing the “Commodity Options” rule refer to the clear language of the Act as the 
justification for adopting this expansive position. This indicates that agency officials’ 
proposed treatment of commodity options as swaps was principally discursively 
conditioned by the language of the overarching Dodd-Frank statute. Moreover, this can be 
seen as resulting in an intertextual (and interdiscursive) relationship existing between the 
Act’s ‘swap’ definition, which included options, and Commission policymakers’ similar view 
codified by the CFTC in the proposed “Commodity Options” rule.  
 
236 See Commodity Exchange Act § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2010). 
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 A secondary semiotic influence on this element of the “Commodity Options” rule 
arises from the positions advanced in some of the agricultural swaps-related comment 
letters. Although such letters specifically pertained to agricultural derivative issues, when 
viewed holistically within the combined commodity options and agricultural swaps 
rulemaking organized by the Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team, they can be understood 
to provide positional discourses that correspond with the first change that Commission 
policymakers made to the agency’s Part 32 regulations. For instance, a consortium of 
agricultural interest groups urged the CFTC to “treat swaps for all commodities 
harmoniously”; thereby advocating for uniform regulations across commodity swap (and 
option) asset classes (e.g., OTC sorghum, wheat, crude oil, and electricity derivatives).237 
Furthermore, another letter by a group of large banks expressed to the Commission its view 
that swaps and options should be treated “consistently.”238 While the language of the 
Dodd-Frank Act was, arguably, the main semiotic influence on CFTC policymakers’ selection 
of an equivalent regulatory treatment for swaps and commodity (trade) options, the 
positional discourses in these agricultural swaps-related comment letters advocated for and 
affirmed an exact same view. 
 Similar semiotic relationships were plausibly present with the proposal to include 
an ‘eligible contract participant’ requirement in this rule’s trade option exemption. For 
instance, the Dodd-Frank Act stipulated that only those entities that qualify as ‘eligible 
contract participants’ may transact OTC swaps (e.g., commodity and trade options given the 
 
237 Letter from Christine M. Cochran on behalf the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American 
Soybean Association, the Commodity Markets Council, the National Association of Wheat Growers, 
the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, and the National Corn Growers Association, 28 October 
2010. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26350&SearchText=. 
238 Letter from Paul J. Pantano, Jr. McDermott, Will & Emery on behalf of the Agricultural Commodity 




CFTC’s proposed equivalence).239 As stated in the proposed “Commodity Options” rule, 
agency policymakers’ inclusion of this requirement in the trade option exemption was done 
under the rationale of harmonizing the content of the exemption with the overarching 
statute.240 Thus, here again, an intertextual (and interdiscursive) relationship likewise 
existed between the language of the Act and the addition of the ‘eligible contract 
participant’ requirement into the trade options exemption of the proposed rule. 
Furthermore, at least one agricultural swaps-related comment letter provided support to 
this addition, advocating for consistent regulatory treatment of swaps and option.241   
 It should be noted that although such stakeholders’ advocacy for this regulatory 
consistency can be understood as a function of their interpretation of Dodd-Frank, it can 
also be seen as advancing a position in their interest. Namely, pursuing a relatively 
simplified regulatory landscape that avoids having disparate rules governing the transaction 
of different OTC derivative asset classes; thus, possibly limiting some compliance costs for 
regulatees. While prior speech acts of Commission policymakers might suggest that the 
“Commodity Options” rule would, in part, be crafted to reflect the interests of potential 
regulatees (see Chapter 7), as this analysis has thus far shown, the dominant semiotic 
influence on these two analyzed aspects of the CFTC’s proposed commodity options 
regulations was the language of the Dodd-Frank Act; with the perspectives of agricultural-
related interested party commenters serving a complementary role. 
 Through this proposal to consistently apply the language of the Dodd-Frank Act in 
rule form, the proposed “Commodity Options” rule, as indicated above, would also treat 
 
239 Commodity Options and Agricultural Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 6097 (2011). 
240 Ibid., at 6102. 
241 Letter from Paul J. Pantano, Jr. McDermott, Will & Emery on behalf of the Agricultural Commodity 




trade options synonymously with swaps because of the presence of optionality in these 
OTC commodity derivatives. While the pre-Dodd-Frank trade option exemption had 
allowed for the unregulated transaction of trade options, given this proposed regulatory 
treatment, these derivative instruments would de facto no longer be unregulated and 
would be subject to the gamut of Dodd-Frank swap regulations. This marked a significant 
deviation in Commission policy towards trade options, rupturing decades of agency 
precedent. Moreover, in the context of the trade option exemption and its effects thereon, 
it also denoted a strict application of the meaning of the Dodd-Frank Act – i.e., bringing 
transparency to and mitigating the systemic of regulatable OTC derivatives, such as swap-
equivalent commodity (trade) options. As a consequence, even trade option transactions 
executed by commercial marketplace participants (e.g., a potash mining company) that had 
historically been unregulated for most of the CFTC’s existence would be treated 
equivalently with a credit default swap entered into by a systemically important financial 
institution. The primacy of the applied language of the Act can again be seen in these 
transformative effects on the Commission’s trade option exemption.  
  Nevertheless, it is essential to consider the impact that the above referenced lack 
of pre-proposal comment letters pertaining to the regulation of commodity (trade) options 
may have had on the CFTC’s selected regulatory approach. In short, because the 
“Agricultural Swaps” advance notice – from which the proposed “Commodity Options” rule 
emerged – did not solicit comment on commodity (trade) options, the agency effectively 
partook in proposed rule-making in a discursive environment in which the formal 
communications (i.e., comment letters) of parties interested in commodity (trade) options 
were non-existent. This implies that policymakers’ conception of how Dodd-Frank applied 
to these OTC commodity derivatives at this rulemaking juncture could neither be formally 
informed nor contested by the comments of stakeholders and other interested parties.  
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Evidence for this comes from the cost-benefit analysis conducted for this proposed 
rule by the Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team. As stated therein, policymakers did not 
overtly anticipate that the de facto withdrawal of the exemptive power of the trade option 
exemption, via the treatment of an option as a swap, would impose costs on those entities 
relying on the exemption.242 Furthermore, in discussing the possible benefits of this 
regulatory proposal, officials from this team overwhelmingly focused on the benefits that 
treating commodity (trade) options as regulatable swaps would provide to the public, such 
as the effects of transparency and systemic risk reduction intended by the Dodd-Frank 
imaginary.243 In neither the analyses of the costs nor of the benefits were the perspectives 
of prospective regulatees considered; there was no direct semiotic influence from these 
stakeholders. Yet, as will be seen in the next chapter, there were potentially significant 
costs to a multiplicity of such regulatees associated with the proposed regulations. And, as 
will also be seen, through comment letters, these parties did successfully advocate for a 
trade option exemption which removed commodity (trade) options from some parts of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  
 Turning to those extra-semiotic factors which likewise conditioned CFTC 
policymakers’ selection of the aforementioned proposed approach to the regulation of 
commodity (trade) options, and which interacted and co-evolved with the above discussed 
semiotic variables, these can be examined through CPE’s four posited selectivities: 
structural, discursive, agential, and technological (see Chapter 4). Beginning with the 
structural selectivity, three aspects should be explored. First, the statutory authority (and 
limitations) imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act on the Commission’s rulemaking efforts 
enabled (and circumscribed) the extent to which agency policymakers could regulate 
 
242 Commodity Options and Agricultural Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 6101 and 6105 (2011). 
243 Ibid., at 6105. 
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commodity (trade) options; thus necessitating compossibility between the content of the 
codified regulations of the proposed “Commodity Options” rule and the available 
regulatory structure allowable under the Act. Second, the composition of the CFTC’s 
commissioners was such that the typically pro-reform Democrats (including Chairperson 
Gensler) held a (3 to 2) majority in the agency. While all five commissioners voted in favor 
of adopting the proposed “Commodity Options” rule, it can be assumed that, given their 
votes, these policymakers, at this proposed rulemaking juncture, seemingly agreed that 
commodity (trade) options should be strictly regulated in accordance with Dodd-Frank. 
Third, and more narrowly, the existence of the Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking 
Team as a distinct entity may have, at times, precluded its members from fully grasping the 
complexities of related rule-makings done by other teams. The effect of this being that, at 
the stage of proposed rulemaking, team policymakers may not have completely 
appreciated the potential interactions with and ramifications of concomitantly crafted OTC 
commodity derivative regulations. For instance, as indicated in the text of the “Commodity 
Options” rule, the Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team did not factor into its decision-
making the potential impact of forward commodity contracts with embedded options (see 
below) on the proposed trade options scheme.244 This was because the team viewed such 
issues as being separate from its rulemaking responsibilities,245 even though the regulation 
of such forward contracts was intrinsically tied to regulating commodity options as similar 
regulatory issues arose for both OTC commodity derivative instruments. Additionally, this 
could have been exacerbated by the order in which the “Commodity Options” and “Further 
Definitions” rules were made. At the time that the proposed “Commodity Options” rule was 
passed by the CFTC, the proposed financial product definitions rule – i.e., the “Further 
 




Definitions” rule – had not yet been completed. Thus, by virtue of the order of rulemaking, 
the Agricultural Swaps Team had to draft its regulations with nebulous and fluid legal 
terminology; this limiting the possible completeness of the proposed “Commodity Options” 
rule. As one senior policymaker noted: “We didn’t start with the basic definitions, so it 
made everything very difficult because we hadn’t even defined certain things that we were 
then prescribing rules around” (Interview, 4 October 2017, Washington, D.C.). 
In terms of the discursive selectivity, the Dodd-Frank Act served as the wellspring 
from which CFTC policymakers drew language to modify the agency’s commodity (trade) 
option regulations and to broach such alterations in the proposed “Commodity Options” 
rule. While (agricultural derivative-related) comment letters advocating for equal treatment 
of options and swaps, and for the adoption of the ‘eligible contract participant’ 
requirement were cited in the proposed rule, ultimately, as the policymakers who drafted 
the rule stated, it was the need to comply with the language of the overarching statute that 
prompted the proposal of these regulatory modifications. Moreover, given the absence of 
comment letters from prospective regulatees to the proposed commodity (trade) option 
regulations, the language of the Act regarding the treatment of these OTC commodity 
derivatives was effectively unimpeded in achieving discursive hegemony over such 
regulations’ content. 
From the standpoint of the agential selectivity, the Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking 
Team that drafted the proposed commodity (trade) option regulations did not initially 
endeavor to do as much, but changed tune after further reflection on the matter. Thus, it 
can be assumed that this group of policymakers were both empowered and able to 
undertake this expansion in rulemaking responsibilities. While this may suggest that the 
team had autonomy over the development of the proposed “Commodity Options” rule, it 
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is, nonetheless, important to consider their rulemaking efforts in conjunction with the 
articulated Dodd-Frank era vision of Chairperson Gensler, which was to bring transparency 
to and reduce the systemic risk of OTC derivatives. As constructed, the proposed 
“Commodity Options” rule reflected the principles of the Chair’s mission for the regulation 
of OTC derivatives, and thus suggests the influence of Gensler’s broad regulatory vision on 
the Agricultural Swap Rulemaking Team’s drafting of this proposed rule.  
With regard to the technological selectivity, one major item should be noted: the 
lack of commodity (trade) option-related comment letters. As stated above, the absence of 
commodity (trade) option-related comment letters did significantly influence Commission 
policymakers’ rulemaking efforts. Without the intellectual resources and insight provided 
by these letters (i.e., data, information, and perspective  they convey), agency officials 
could not formally take into consideration the commentary of interested parties (and of 
prospective regulatees, in particular) when they drafted their regulations for commodity 
(trade) options; potentially leaving policymakers unaware of the efficacy of maintaining a 
trade option exemption from swap regulations for OTC commodity derivatives.  
Finally, as it relates to the Dodd-Frank imaginary that has been alluded in this 
chapter, the foregoing analysis indicates that this imaginary arguably guided the regulation 
of commodity (trade) options towards a regulatory structure that sought to bring 
transparency to these OTC commodity derivatives and to mitigate their contribution to 
systemic risk. The proposed “Commodity Options” rule intended this by subjecting 
commodity and trade options to the same regulations governing swaps through its proposal 
to treat these two classes of derivatives equivalently: they were all swaps because they 
contained optionality and would, thus, be subject to compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
transparency (i.e., reporting and recordkeeping) and systemic risk reduction (i.e., clearing, 
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margining, and position limits) requirements. The selection of this regulatory approach, and 
its overall construction, was influenced by interacting and co-evolving semiotic and extra-
semiotic variables present during the development of the proposed “Commodity Options” 
rule. As explored above, these comprised the Dodd-Frank Act in both its language and the 
statutory structure intersecting with a distinct, agriculturally-minded rulemaking team 
which sought to follow the Commission’s Dodd-Frank regulatory goals (as articulated by 
Chairperson Gensler), but did so without formally procured outside intellectual resources 
(i.e., comment letters from prospective regulatees and other stakeholders) pertaining to 
the matter for which the proposed regulations related (i.e., commodity/trade options).  
 
The Forward Contract Exclusion of the Proposed “Further Definitions” Rule 
The “Further Definitions” proposed rule provided, among other things, an initial definition 
of the term ‘swap’, and interpretive guidance on several corresponding and anticipated 
regulatory issues. Included in this proposed release was CFTC guidance on the applicability 
of the ‘swap’ definition to forward contracts in nonfinancial commodities (i.e., OTC 
commodity derivatives). This guidance took the form of a proposed forward contract 
exclusion.246 While a forward contract exclusion had traditionally been a part of the 
Commission’s futures regulatory infrastructure – whereby forward contracts would be 
excepted from the exchange-trading requirement applicable to futures contracts – the 
exclusion of the proposed “Further Definitions” rule sought to apply this system to forward 
agreements in the context of the new Dodd-Frank swap regulations. The CFTC’s 
recontextualization and interpretation of this exclusion was necessary given the Dodd-
 
246 Although SEC policymakers ostensibly consented to and partook in the development of this 
interpretive guidance, as the asset referent – nonfinancial commodities – for this regulatory 
guidance fell within the CFTC’s jurisdiction in accordance with the Commodity Exchange Act, the 
claim that this was ‘the CFTC’s guidance’ can be safely made.   
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Frank Act’s language that “a nonfinancial commodity or security for deferred shipment or 
delivery, so long as the transaction is intended to be physically settled,”247 could not be 
treated as a regulatable swap (see Chapter 7). Additionally, unlike the commodity option 
regulations put forth in the proposed “Commodity Options” rule, this forward contract 
exclusion was issued as interpretive guidance248 and was associated with a request for 
comment in the “Definitions” advance notice, and with comments received in connection 
with this release. 
 Two key aspects of the CFTC’s proposed forward contract exclusion to the ‘swap’ 
definition are important to discuss. The first of these deals with how the Commission 
proposed classifying forward contracts in nonfinancial commodities – such as crude oil and 
electricity – whenever trading in such might function like swap contracts.249 Policymakers 
prefaced their interpretation of this situation by stating that veritable OTC commodity 
forward contracts were “commercial merchandising transactions” – e.g., an order for 
replacement of home windows – whose primary purpose is to “transfer ownership of the 
commodity” and not “solely its price risk,” and that the CFTC had historically treated them 
as excluded from regulation derivative instruments (i.e., qualifying for the forward contract 
exclusion).250 These officials noted that while the Dodd-Frank Act now required an OTC 
 
247 Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
75 Fed. Reg. 51430 (2010). 
248 An interpretive guidance is a textual genre which consists of an administrative agency’s 
explanation or clarification of a statute or regulation. While there exists substantial debate among 
legal scholars as to whether such guidance creates a binding and enforceable regulation (see Epstein 
2016), because the forward contract exclusion was part of statutorily directed rulemaking, was 
contained within a rule, and was itself subject to notice-and-comment, it is arguably, when applied 
by regulatees, tantamount to an agency regulation.  
249 Recall that with the forward contract, a fixed amount of a commodity is purchased or sold at a 
specific future date. A swap, however, contains a variable (optional) commitment to at least one 
contractual component of an agreement for the future purchase or sale of a commodity. See 
Chapter 1 for further information.  
250 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29828 (2011).  
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commodity derivative be “intended to be physically settled” to qualify for the forward 
contract exclusion, given the Commission’s historical use of intention to deliver as a 
criterion to assess a contract’s fitness for the exclusion,251 the new language of the Act 
affirmed what the CFTC had practiced, and sanctioned the Commission’s use of this 
criterion to assess future OTC commodity derivative transactions.252 Thus, the CFTC would 
continue to exclude from its regulatory purview those OTC commodity derivative contracts 
which genuinely intended to deliver the contract’s underlying asset referent(s), subject to 
the application of a (traditionally applied) “facts and circumstances test” to discern the 
“expectations or intent” for physical settlement.253 
 Relating to this issue of delivery, and in response to commenter requests for 
clarification, Commission policymakers, in the proposed forward contract exclusion of the 
“Further Definitions” rule, provided guidance on the CFTC’s 1990 Brent Interpretation and 
its 1993 ‘Energy Exemption’ (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of both) in light of Dodd-Frank. 
In the case of the Brent Interpretation, commenters were concerned that ‘book-out’ 
transactions (i.e., cancellation agreements), which the Commission had determined in 1990 
to be excluded from regulation forwards (see Chapter 6),254 could fall within the scope of 
the ‘swap’ definition given that these transactions were often intentionally entered into to 
extinguish delivery obligations of Brent crude oil from a separate Brent contract (hence the 
term ‘book-out’).255 CFTC officials provided clarity to commenters by restating the 
 
251 As the CFTC was previously precluded from regulating swaps, these determinations concerning 
‘intent to deliver’ pertained to the occasionally nebulous distinction between futures and forward 
contracts (see Chapter 6). 
252 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29828 (2011). 
253 Ibid. 
254 Again, at the time that the Brent Interpretation was made, the issue was whether Brent crude oil 
contracts could be regulated as futures agreements.  
255 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29828-9 (2011). 
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Commission’s long-held opinion that the individual Brent contracts comprising a ‘book-out’ 
each created an obligation to deliver the underlying commodity – even though ‘booking-
out’ the contract rendered its delivery obligation optional, thus retroactively and 
collectively swap-like – and that if such ‘book-outs’ satisfied the requirements of the 1990 
Brent Interpretation and were effectuated as individual contracts, then these agreements 
“should” qualify for the forward contract exclusion.256 Regarding the 1993 ‘Energy 
Exemption’ (again, see Chapter 6), the CFTC proposed replacing it by extending the ‘book-
out’ provisions of the Brent Interpretation to all nonfinancial commodities, not just crude 
oil. Through this proposal, the Commission would treat all OTC commodity derivative 
transactions involving qualifying ‘book-outs’ (i.e., those which convey a delivery obligation 
or involve commercial participants that “regularly make or take delivery”) as unregulatable, 
excluded forward contracts.257 
 The second OTC commodity derivative-related aspect on which CFTC policymakers 
provided interpretive guidance was the case of forward contracts containing embedded 
options. Commenters requested that the Commission provide direction on this matter 
because the presence of an option within a forward contract meant, according to Dodd-
Frank’s ‘swap’ definition, that the derivative contract contained a swap, thus possibly 
preventing the whole instrument from qualifying for the forward contract exclusion and 
leaving it open to regulation as a swap.258 In response, policymakers indicated that they 
would continue to apply the CFTC’s traditional standard when determining if an OTC 
commodity forward contract with an embedded option could meet the criteria for 
exclusion from the ‘swap’ definition.259 For this standard to be met, the option within the 
 
256 Ibid., at 29829. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid., at 29829-30. 
259 Ibid., at 29830. 
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OTC commodity derivative contract (1) could adjust the contract’s price, but “not 
undermine the overall nature of the contract as a forward contract,” (2) must not “target 
the delivery term,260 so that the predominant feature of the contract is actual delivery,” and 
(3) cannot be “severed and marketed separately from the overall forward contract.”261 In 
codifying this 3-part test, CFTC policymakers noted that the Commission would look to the 
facts and circumstances of the transaction (or contract) when evaluating these three 
components and, therefore, the transaction’s (or contract’s) fitness for the forward 
contract exclusion.262 
 The proposed “Further Definitions” rule was adopted by the CFTC by a vote of 4 to 
1 and was given a 60-day comment period. In support of the rule, Chairperson Gensler 
stated that the Commission’s understanding of the forward contract exclusion for OTC 
commodity derivatives under the new Dodd-Frank regime was consistent with both what 
this law required for the regulation of swaps, and with how the agency had historically 
approached the exclusion of forward contracts from futures regulation.263 While 
Commissioner Sommers voiced dissent, the commissioner’s statement did not indicate 
disagreement with the CFTC’s proposed interpretative guidance.264 
 
 
260 While no definition of ‘delivery term’ is given in the proposed “Further Definitions” rule, the 
subsequently issued final “Further Definitions” rule clarified its meaning. In this latter release, the 
CFTC stated that ‘delivery term’ refers to the “delivery amount” (i.e., volume) of the transacted 
commodity; see Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap 
Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48240 
(2012). A narrow reading of this definition in the context of this 3-part test would imply that an 
option embedded within a forward contract which could adjust the amount of commodity for future 
purchase or sale (i.e., an embedded volumetric option) would render the overall agreement 
ineligible for the forward contract exclusion.    
261 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29830 (2011). 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid., at 29899. 
264 Ibid., at 29899-900. 
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An Analysis of the Forward Contract Exclusion of the Proposed “Further Definitions” Rule 
To succinctly recap the foregoing, the forward contract exclusion of the proposed “Further 
Definitions” rule made the following regulatory updates: (1) a recontextualization to 
account for new swap regulations, which thereby continued excluding from regulation 
those OTC commodity derivative contracts for which physical settlement (i.e., delivery) was 
intended; (2) a recontextualization and expansion of the Brent Interpretation to cover 
‘book-outs’ in all nonfinancial commodities; and (3) a codification of a three-part test 
focusing on a facts and circumstances methodology to judge whether a forward contract 
containing an embedded option or options qualified for the exclusion.   
 By using semiosis as a CPE analytical entry-point, several important insights into the 
semiotic influences on these three regulatory updates can be discerned. Starting with the 
first of the three items, the decision by CFTC policymakers to continue excluding from 
regulation certain OTC commodity derivative contracts intended to be physically settled 
corresponded directly to the Dodd-Frank Act’s extension of the forward contract exclusion 
(see above and Chapter 7) and the agency’s historical regulatory approach to such contracts 
(i.e., genuine forwards were excepted from regulation). Put simply, given the language of 
the overriding statute, Commission policymakers were obliged to continue excluding 
forward contracts from futures, and now swap, regulations.   
Nevertheless, these policymakers’ interpretation of this statutory provision for the 
forward contract exclusion was not only discursively informed by the language of the Dodd-
Frank Act265 and the Commission’s regulatory precedent,266 but was complemented by 
numerous comment letters to the “Definitions” advance notice. As cited by policymakers in 
 
265 Recall that Dodd-Frank added the “intended to be physically settled” language as a requirement 
for an OTC commodity derivative contract to qualify for the forward contract exclusion. 
266 Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act – thus, prior to the regulation of swaps – these practices involved 
excluding forward OTC commodity derivates from regulation as futures contracts.  
216 
 
the text of the proposed “Further Definitions” rule – and as independently reviewed – these 
letters uniformly recommended that the CFTC interpret Dodd-Frank’s language for swaps 
consistently with its existing exclusion of forwards from futures-style regulation (i.e., the 
exchange-traded requirement).267 Thus, an intertextual (and interdiscursive) web involving 
the statute, prior precedent, and outside party comments can be said to have existed in the 
text of the “Further Definitions” rule, with these interlinked semiotic elements affirming the 
decision of Commission policymakers to recontextualize the existing forward contract 
exclusion to accommodate the new swaps regulatory regime.268 
 The presence of a similar intertextual (and interdiscursive) relationship is also 
apparent in CFTC policymakers’ proposed application of the Brent Interpretation. Here, 
agency officials relied on the Dodd-Frank Act’s “nonfinancial commodities” language, the 
legislative history and stated Congressional intent of the Act, the Commission’s precedent 
of applying the Brent Interpretation to except certain physically-deliverable OTC commodity 
derivative contracts from future-style regulation, and outside party comments supporting 
the continued application of the Interpretation into the expanded swaps regulatory 
environment.269 Furthermore, the proposed withdrawal of the 1993 ‘Energy Exemption’ 
was cited by Commission policymakers as being the logical outgrowth of extending the 
scope of the Brent Interpretation to cover ‘book-outs’ in all nonfinancial commodities (e.g., 
electricity); which rendered the ‘Energy Exemption’ irrelevant.270 From a semiotic 
 
267 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29828 (2011). 
268 Ibid: “Therefore, the CFTC reads the ‘intended to be physically settled’ language in the swap 
definition with respect to nonfinancial commodities to reflect a directive that intent to deliver a 
physical commodity be a part of the analysis of whether a given contract is a forward contract or a 
swap, just as it is a part of the CFTC’s analysis of whether a given contract is a forward contract or a 
futures contract.”  
269 Ibid., at 29828-9. 
270 Open Meeting on the Fourteenth Series of Proposed Rulemakings under the Dodd-Frank Act, 27 
April 2011, Washington, D.C., at 39; transcript available at: 
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standpoint, this extension of the Brent Interpretation can be inferred as an offshoot of the 
decision to continue applying it, especially given Dodd-Frank’s “nonfinancial commodities” 
language. Nevertheless, the discursive influence of commenters cannot be discounted as, in 
at least one comment letter, it was suggested that the Commission apply the Interpretation 
to ‘book-outs’ in all nonfinancial commodities rather than to only petroleum and its 
associated and derived substances (as were covered by the 1993 ‘Energy Exemption’).271 
 Regarding the third and final update that CFTC policymakers made to the forward 
contract exclusion, the discursive origins of the statement on the Commission’s proposed 
handling of forward contracts with embedded (commodity) options must be explored. In 
defining which of these derivative contracts could be excepted from regulation as a swap, 
the agency’s policymakers drew on criteria located in a central textual source. As indicated 
in both the “Further Definitions” rule, and during the CFTC’s meeting to vote on the rule, 
the proposed 3-part test and facts and circumstances methodology used to determine a 
contract’s or transaction’s regulatability were taken from a 2010 Commission opinion on a 
legal case involving options embedded in forward contracts.272 Although outside parties 
provided comments to the CFTC on this matter,273 and while this topic ostensibly arose in 
external meetings with prospective regulatees, in the proposed “Further Definitions” rule, 




271 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29829 (2011); and see 
Letter from R. Michael Sweeney, Jr., David T. McIndoe, and Mark W. Menzes, Hunton & Williams, LLP 
on behalf of Working Group of Commercial Energy Firms, 20 September 2010, at 5-7. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26219&SearchText. 
272 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29830 (2011) and Open 
Meeting on the Fourteenth Series of Proposed Rulemakings under the Dodd-Frank Act, 27 April 
2011, Washington, D.C., at 48. 
273 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29829 (2011). 
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codification of an existing Commission policy opinion,274 and not the product of interested 
party input. To this point, changes to the CFTC’s historic approach to forwards containing 
embedded options were advocated by industry-related commenters – such as the 
suggestion that the agency view any OTC commodity derivative contract with an 
enforceable delivery clause as an excluded forward275 – but these did not translate into the 
text of the officials’ proposal.276  
 What this analysis of semiosis shows is that in their crafting of the forward contract 
exclusion to the proposed “Further Definitions” rule, Commission policymakers primarily 
used the language of the Dodd-Frank Act and existing agency precedent to make sense of 
the rule-making’s subject matter. As such, these sources were then utilized by agency 
officials to inform the content of the proposed forward contract exclusion. The discursive 
influence of comment letters from prospective regulatees and their representatives was, 
however, limited, and the content of these was only drawn on in a complementary 
capacity.   
 In keeping with the CPE theoretical framework, the above discussed semiotic 
factors interacted and co-evolved with their extra-semiotic counterparts to condition CFTC 
policymakers’ selection of a regulatory approach and, thus, the construction of the 
proposed forward contract exclusion. The influence of the extra-semiotic, as was seen 
 
274 Open Meeting on the Fourteenth Series of Proposed Rulemakings under the Dodd-Frank Act, 27 
April 2011, Washington, D.C., at 47-8.  
275 Letter from R. Michael Sweeney, Jr., David T. McIndoe, and Mark W. Menzes, Hunton & Williams, 
LLP on behalf of Working Group of Commercial Energy Firms, 20 September 2010, at 12. See also 
Letter from Matt Schatzman, BG Americas & Global LNG, 20 September 2010, at 9. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26165&SearchText. 
276 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29830 (2011). 
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earlier in connection with the “Commodity Options” proposal, can be uncovered by 
examining structuration through CPE’s four selectivities.  
To begin with, from the standpoint of both the structural and discursive 
selectivities, the Dodd-Frank Act (including its legislative history) and the Commission’s 
existing policies on excepting from regulation certain OTC commodity derivative 
agreements provided, respectively, the bounds within which the agency could determine its 
regulatory course, and the discursive basis for informing and legally justifying the content of 
the proposed forward contract exclusion. Additionally, as it pertains to the structural 
selectivity, those considerations discussed in connection with the proposed “Commodity 
Options” rule are also valid in regards to the proposed exclusion’s rule-making. Namely, as 
the proposed “Further Definitions” rule was drafted within the context of a distinct 
rulemaking team, its progenitors may have been potentially limited in having a full 
appreciation for the complexity of the forward contract exclusion and how it interacted 
with other regulatory domains (i.e., commodity options), thus limiting the scope of this 
proposed interpretive guidance. 
 Regarding the agential selectivity, although the rulemaking team for the proposed 
“Further Definitions” rule seemingly enjoyed – as a distinct intra-agency entity – a degree of 
leeway in undertaking its rule-making task, Chairperson Gensler’s general influence over 
the regulatory approach to the forward contract exclusion can be assumed. Recall that, as 
addressed early in this chapter, Chair Gensler openly advocated that the CFTC implement 
regulations that brought qualifying OTC (commodity) derivatives into compliance with the 
Dodd-Frank Act. In the case of the proposed forward contract exclusion, its spirit 
contemplates requiring that essentially all OTC commodity derivative contracts containing 
optionality comply with Dodd-Frank’s transparency and systemic risk reduction regime – a 
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regime both espoused by Gensler, and towards which policymakers were guided by the 
Dodd-Frank imaginary.  
Finally, concerning technological selectivity, outside parties – such as industry 
participants, parties representing their interests, and non-industry advocacy groups – did 
provide comment letters to the CFTC on the topic of the proposed forward contract 
exclusion. The provision of such outside party perspective – not all of which came from 
prospective regulatees – helped to establish a reservoir of intellectual insight and resources 
from which agency policymakers could draw for their rule-making. Nevertheless, as noted 
above, these formally provided resources did not inform the content of the exclusion, but 
rather were used in a supportive or corroborative role as part of justifying the exclusion’s 
proposal. 
Similar to the earlier discussion of the Dodd-Frank imaginary in the relation to the 
proposed “Commodity Options” rule, through the proposed forward contract exclusion of 
the “Further Definitions” rule, Commission officials sought to bring under their regulatory 
umbrella of promoting transparency and mitigating systemic risk many OTC commodity 
derivatives transacting as forwards, whenever such derivatives contained (or presented) 
some degree of optionality (which could affect delivery obligations). Depending on the 
intended definition of ‘delivery term’, the proposed forward contract exclusion could have 
been interpreted as not excepting from Dodd-Frank swap regulations any OTC commodity 
derivative contract with an embedded option affecting the agreement’s price or delivery 
amount. If this was indeed the CFTC’s intent, as the definition of ‘delivery term’ in the 
subsequent rule suggested, then, congruent with the above case of commodity (trade) 
options, Dodd-Frank’s transparency and risk reduction regime would be expansively applied 
to forward contracts with embedded optionality. This regulatory approach, guided by the 
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Dodd-Frank imaginary, was again influenced by the interaction and co-evolution of semiosis 
(the semiotic) and structuration (the extra-semiotic). As explored in this sub-section, this 
involved the predominance of the Dodd-Frank Act’s language and agency precedent 
intersecting with a rulemaking team seeking to follow the Commission’s (and their 
chairperson’s) Dodd-Frank regulatory goals.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE PROPOSED RULES 
This chapter has presented the two proposed OTC commodity derivative rules which 
initially defined what qualified for regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act. It has analyzed the 
semiotic and extra-semiotic factors that influenced the rules’ construction, and has 
explored the regulations’ relation to the Dodd-Frank imaginary. The principal rulemaking-
related takeaway from this undertaking is that Commission policymakers relied closely on 
the Dodd-Frank Act to inform and structure their proposed OTC commodity derivative 
regulations. While the solicitations by and speech acts of policymakers during the advance 
notice of proposed rulemaking period might have suggested that CFTC officials would be 
inclined to codify rules which reflected the perspectives of outside party commenters – 
particularly those provided by industry-related interests – given the presumed complexity 
of the rule-makings, this analysis suggests that the proposed “Commodity Options” rule and 
forward contract exclusion were overwhelmingly an outgrowth of an abidance to the 
overriding statute and, in the case of the exclusionary proposal, the recontextualization and 
continuation of agency precedent as well.  
Therefore, it can be stated that for the two proposed OTC commodity derivative 
rules, Commission policymakers were not beholden to the thoughts and representations of 
prospective regulatees and their representatives when these officials selected and 
constructed their proposed regulatory approaches to commodity and trade options as well 
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as to the forward contract exclusion. Rather, other semiotic and extra-semiotic factors – 
such as the language of the Dodd-Frank Act and its understood intent in the context of 
Chairperson Gensler’s regulatory vision for OTC derivatives – were key influences. This 
should not come as a surprise, however, as Gensler intimated at several Congressional 
hearings in 2011 that the first “guiding principle” of the agency’s proposed rulemaking 
efforts was “the statute itself,” with which he directed policymakers to “fully comply” in 
order to “lower risk and bring transparency” to OTC derivative markets.277 Largely because 
of this close adherence to the text of the Act – and its equation of options and swaps, in 
particular – the proposed regulations for OTC commodity derivative would be the most 
stringent that Commission policymakers would craft over the course of the six-year 
rulemaking period.  
 Viewing the findings of the above analysis from the broader perspective imparted 
by this paper’s CPE theoretical framework provides further insight into the two rule-
makings and the “black box” (West 2009) out of which these proposals arose. For instance, 
by approaching the drafting of the OTC commodity derivative regulations as a process 
involving inherent complexity reduction, it can be posited that the policymakers creating 
these two rules simplified their task by engaging in semiosis and structuration under the 
guidance of a Dodd-Frank imaginary which geared their efforts towards increasing 
transparency and mitigating systemic risk. As the results of the analysis suggest, this was 
accomplished through the utilization by Commission officials of the language of the Dodd-
 
277 See, for instance, Testimony of Chairman Gary Gensler before the House Committee on 
Agriculture, 10 February 2011. Available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-68; Testimony before the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Chairman Gary Gensler, 17 February 
2011. Available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-70 ; and 
Testimony of Chairman Gary Gensler before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 




Frank Act and, occasionally, existing agency regulations (semiosis), in addition to the 
compossible structural opportunities and constraints for/on new regulatory development 
afforded by the interfacing of the Act and prior regulations in the context of distinct 
rulemaking groups – with or without adequately provided external intellectual resources – 
that sought to adhere to the regulatory vision espoused by the CFTC’s chairperson 
(structuration). More simply, relying extensively on Dodd-Frank’s language and, in some 
cases, past agency policies and practices was an effective way for CFTC policymakers to 
craft proposed OTC commodity derivative regulations, given the bounds conveyed by these 
laws and the milieu of the agency’s rulemaking effort. In the words of one former high-level 
Commission interviewee: 
  
Well, regulators like a lot of people in government are creatures of habit and they’re 
not particularly innovative thinkers, and so they look at existing structures. You’ll find 
that government and laws are dotted with redundancy throughout history. So, in this 
case like many other cases, we looked at our existing regulations and tried to say, 
‘How do we fit in OTC into the existing regulations?’ And this is what regulators do. 
It’s what people in government do. And it’s the only guidepost that you have, so, 
rather than create things out of whole cloth, you go back to the same workshop. And 
it actually turned out that it was a good way to go in many instances with regard to 
OTC regulations. But it wasn’t ultimately a perfect fit for a lot of what we were doing 
(Interview, 9 October 2017, Washington, D.C.). 
 
Yet, as will be explored in the next chapter, the regulatory structures that were 
proposed (i.e., selected) in the “Commodity Options” and the forward contract exclusion of 
the “Further Definitions” rule would be viewed as unworkable to many OTC commodity 
derivative marketplace participants. Especially was that so with regard to commercial end-
users (e.g., electricity providers and oil pipeline companies), and would be contested (i.e., 
subject to variation in the terminology of CPE) by such entities through the formal provision 
of comment letters and through other informal forms of lobbying. The effect would be a 
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redefinition of which OTC commodity derivatives the CFTC would determine to regulate 
under Dodd-Frank. Flowing from this, the Dodd-Frank imaginary which guided Commission 
policymakers towards promoting transparency surrounding and mitigating systemic risk 
associated with OTC derivatives would be refined to account for this modified definition – 
one which provided some exclusionary and exemptive regulatory relief for certain OTC 
commodity derivative marketplace participants.   
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Chapter 9 – The Final Rules for OTC Commodity Derivatives (2011-2012) 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
After promulgating the proposed “Commodity Options” and “Further Definitions” rules and 
the elapse of their respective comment periods, the CFTC published the final versions of 
these rules. On April 27, 2012, the Commission issued the “Commodity Options” 
(“Commodity Options”) final rule,278 and, jointly with the SEC, on August 13, 2012, the CFTC 
released the final “Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based 
Swap Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping” 
(“Further Definitions”) rule. These rules, respectively, provided regulations for commodity 
and trade options and defined the term ‘swap’ while setting forth a formal exclusion from 
this definition for certain OTC forward commodity contracts. The production of the final 
rules emerged from a broader environment similar to that discussed in Chapter 8. 
Chairperson Gary Gensler remained at the Commission’s helm and was supported by the 
same cast of commissioners as during the preceding rulemaking period; the agency faced 
budgetary constraints (particularly relative to its Dodd-Frank rulemaking and oversight 
tasks)279; and the prospect of a general election and a new president from a different 
political party continued to loom.  
 This chapter analyzes OTC commodity derivative final rulemaking and explores how 
these final regulations were constructed by CFTC policymakers. The upcoming analyses of 
the regulations for commodity (trade) options, and of the forward contract exclusion, which 
utilize the analytical lenses provided by the CPE theoretical framework, show that outside 
 
278 Note that for the first time in its Dodd-Frank era rulemaking history, the regulation of commodity 
options was separate from agricultural swaps and took the form of a standalone rule. 
279 See Chairman’s Letter, President’s Budget and Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 2013, Chairman 




party comment letters received by the Commission served as the primary impetus for 
modifications made thereto during final rulemaking. Emerging from the intersection of the 
discourses advanced in these comment letters, the overarching Dodd-Frank Act, and 
several extra-semiotic factors (including the involvement and influence of CFTC Chair 
Gensler), alterations were made to the rule for commodity options to allow for a new trade 
option exemption, and were made to the forward contract exclusion to except, in limited 
instances, some OTC commodity derivative forward transactions containing volumetric 
optionality from swap regulations. Other elements of the earlier proposed “Commodity 
Options” and “Further Definitions” rules were, however, retained and finalized. While 
prospective regulatees were able to exert some influence over the production of OTC 
commodity derivative final rulemaking, CFTC officials continued to be guided by the Dodd-
Frank imaginary which directed their regulatory efforts towards bringing transparency to 
and reducing the systemic risk of OTC derivatives; albeit an imaginary refined in response to 
changes to its semiotic and extra-semiotic supports.  
 The structure of the instant chapter is as follows. To begin, the content of the final 
“Commodity Options” rule is reviewed and is followed by an analysis thereof. This 
exploration focuses on the retention of the regulatory position to treat commodity (trade) 
options as swaps, and on the granting of a new trade option exemption. Then, the forward 
contract exclusion of the final “Further Definitions” rule is presented and analyzed. This 
analysis consists of inquiring into the ‘intent to deliver’ standard at the heart of the rule’s 
forward contract exclusion, and assessing the exception’s inclusion of a 7-part test for 







THE FINAL RULES AND THEIR ANALYSES 
The Commodity Options Final Rule and its Interim Final Rule for Trade Options 
Written by the CFTC’s Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team,280 the final rule regulating 
commodity options effectively formalized two things. First, the “Commodity Options” rule 
adopted nearly all non-trade option related elements of its proposed form into a new Part 
32 regulation.281 As stated in the previous chapter, notwithstanding matters pertaining to 
trade options, the principal thrust of the proposed “Commodity Options” rule was to 
convey that the Commission intended to treat qualifying commodity options282 in the same 
manner as it would swaps.  
The final “Commodity Options” rule codified this view into law by formally 
permitting the transaction of commodity options subject to “the same rules applicable to 
any other swap.”283 This had the stated effect of providing “increased regulatory certainty 
to market participants transacting commodity options” by ensuring the legality of such 
transactions.284 Moreover, it meant that unless a commodity option qualified for either an 
exclusion (i.e., the forward contract exclusion) or an exemption (i.e., the trade option 
exemption), the post-trading regulatory infrastructure for swaps – i.e., reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, margining, clearing, and position limits (see Chapter 1 and 
Glossary) – would be applied to the contract. Such application possibly resulting in 
increased compliance costs for the firm trading the regulated contract. In the case of non-
financial entities not partaking in other forms of swap trading, such as some commercial 
 
280 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25320 (2012). 
281 Ibid., at 25321 and 25325f. 
282 The commodity option contracts that would qualify for the same regulations as swaps are those 
that met the ‘swap’ definition within the Dodd-Frank Act and as further defined in the final “Further 
Definitions” rule. See Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25321 at footnote 6 (2012). 




participants (e.g., a small commodity merchant transporting gold) and end-users (e.g., a 
natural gas-fired electrical power plant), these costs could be significant, as the firms may 
not otherwise have a compliance structure for Dodd-Frank swap regulations in-place. 
 Second, the final “Commodity Options” rule put forth a new trade option 
exemption – subsumed as an interim final rule – which would be available to qualifying OTC 
contracts in all nonfinancial commodities with the exception of ‘enumerated’ agricultural 
products and which would have actual exemptive power from some Dodd-Frank swap 
regulations.285 This interim final rule deleted the CFTC’s existing trade option exemption 
and replaced it.286 The term ‘interim’ did not, however, impact enforceability or 
compliance, but rather denoted that this new regulation would be subject to a 60-day 
comment period and potential subsequent amendment.287  
To understand the possible perceived need for a new trade option exemption, it is 
worth briefly revisiting the previously proposed modifications to the exemption. As noted in 
the Chapter 8, the proposed “Commodity Options” rule simply gave approval to the 
continued transacting of trade options, so long as the transactions’ parties were ‘eligible 
contract participants’, as that term is defined by law. Nevertheless, given the proposed 
rule’s treatment of commodity (trade) options as swaps, the proposed trade option 
exemption did not exempt trade options from being subjected to the post-trading 
 
285 The term ‘nonfinancial commodity’ is interpreted in the forward contract exclusion of the final 
“Further Definitions” rule. Broadly, it is defined as physically deliverable Exempt Commodities (i.e., 
energy and metals), non-enumerated agricultural commodities (e.g., coffee, sugar, cocoa, dairy, and 
lumber), or nonfinancial intangible commodities to which ownership can be conveyed and the 
commodity consumed (e.g., emission allowances); see Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based 
Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement 
Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48232f (2012). Although not included in the term ‘nonfinancial 
commodity’, ‘enumerated’ commodities include wheat, cotton, and livestock, among others, and are 
defined by the CFTC’s Agricultural Commodity definitional rule; see Agricultural Commodity 
Definition, 76 Fed. Reg. 41048 (2011). As utilized in this study, ‘nonfinancial commodity’ will refer to 
energy and metal commodities, and is treated as synonymous with OTC commodity derivative.  
286 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25321 (2012). 
287 Ibid., at 25320. 
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regulatory infrastructure (see above) for swaps (i.e., Dodd-Frank swap regulations). Thus, 
the proposed “Commodity Options” rule’s trade option exemption extended only to 
allowing trade options to be transacted while leaving them subject to the same intensive 
regulatory treatment as swaps. 
For instance, this meant that an over-the-counter derivative agreement wherein an 
eligible party had the option to purchase 10,000 tons of copper, to be delivered on a certain 
future date at a specified (or even variable) price, would qualify as a swap under Dodd-
Frank. For commercial marketplace participants (e.g., copper mining companies) and end-
users (e.g., electrical equipment manufacturers) of OTC commodity derivatives, such as 
physically settled commodity (trade) options, this proved to be a point of contention 
because of these entities’ routine use of such derivative contracts in their ordinary business 
operation (e.g., a wind energy company contracting to sell a residual amount of 
unforecastable, variable wind-produced electricity). As will be discussed in the next sub-
section, through the provision of comment letters to Commission policymakers, commodity 
industry interests expressed their discontent regarding the lack of exemptive relief and 
lobbied the agency for the adoption of a new trade option exemption. These comment 
letters were, in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirements (see 
Chapter 2), reviewed and responded to by CFTC officials. Thus, in the vocabulary of CPE, the 
rulemaking process for commodity (trade) options reverted to a stage of variation, as 
interested party comment letters contested the regulatory approach towards these 
instruments selected in the proposed rule version, and, then, provided the formal basis for 
policymakers to imagine alternative treatments of trade options (i.e., the selection of 
another approach stemming from, in part, a review of the letters received).  
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 The treatment that was selected in the new (interim) trade option exemption of the 
final “Commodity Options” rule stipulated that a commodity option transaction would be 
exempt from many aspects of Dodd-Frank’s post-trading infrastructure if it met three 
criteria (thus, rendering the transaction an exempt trade option). First, the offeror (grantor 
or seller) of the commodity option would have to be an ‘eligible contract participant’ or a 
“producer, processor, or commercial user of, or a merchant handling the commodity which 
is subject to the commodity option transaction, or the products or by-products thereof, and 
be offering or entering into the transaction solely for the purposes related to its business as 
such.”288 Notwithstanding the seeming complexity of the ‘eligible contract participant’ 
qualification, two straightforward examples of satisfying this criterion would be: (1) a 
copper mining company entering into an over-the-counter commodity option contract for 
the delivery (sale) of copper to a copper wire manufacturer and (2) a petroleum pipeline 
(transportation) business agreeing over-the-counter to a commodity option contract for the 
delivery (sale) of ethane transported on its pipeline network to a refinery.  
The second criterion was that the offeree (grantee or buyer) of the commodity 
option would have to be a “producer, processor, or commercial user of, or a merchant 
handling the commodity which is subject to the commodity option transaction, or the 
products or by-products thereof, and be entering into the transaction solely for the 
purposes related to its business as such.”289 Similar to the above illustrations involving 
sellers of a commodity, a simple example of achieving this second criterion would be a local 
utility co-op purchasing, through a commodity option contract with another party, 
electricity generated at a nearby hydroelectric dam. (Note that the interim final trade 
option exemption deleted the requirement that both the offeror and offeree be a ‘eligible 
 




contract participant’; this deletion allowed smaller commodity businesses access to the 
exemption.)  
The third criterion declared essential was that both parties to the agreement must 
intend that the commodity option be physically settled.290 Specifically, if the optional 
commitment within the contract was exercised – thus, obligating its performance – this 
exercise would have to result in the sale of the nonfinancial commodity for “immediate 
(spot) or deferred (forward) shipment or delivery.”291  
An example of a transaction meeting all three criteria, thus qualifying for the trade 
option exemption, is an OTC agreement that granted an oil terminal company, as a buyer, 
the option to purchase from a seller’s pipeline an additional 100,000 barrels of light sweet 
crude oil per month for actual delivery into the buyer’s tank farm. Conversely, an OTC 
agreement between commercial participants for the optional sale of 1,000,000 gallons of 
gasoline wherein delivery is not intended – and the contract is, thus, intended to be cash 
settled – would not qualify for the trade option exemption. Instead, it would remain a 
commodity option subject to applicable regulation as a swap. Moreover, if the buyer of an 
OTC option on gasoline was a pension fund with no commercial use for the commodity, the 
transaction would likewise be prevented from being exempted.  
Although OTC commodity derivatives which qualified for the trade option 
exemption would be exempt from the bulk of Dodd-Frank swap regulations, certain 
regulatory conditions were placed on these instruments. Chief among these were 




292 Ibid., at 25327f. Other conditions by which exempted trade options had to abide included 
antifraud and anti-manipulation provisions, anti-evasion language for swap dealers and major swap 
participants attempting to pass swap activity off in the form of less regulated trade options, and 
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illustrate Commission policymakers’ commitment to applying the Dodd-Frank imaginary’s 
notion of promoting transparency to exempted trade options.  
Concerning recordkeeping, trade option activity would have to be recorded by each 
party to the transaction. These records would have to comply with the CFTC’s Part 45 swaps 
recordkeeping and reporting regulation.293 Briefly, this meant that trade option 
recordkeeping requirements for entities not having significant positions in swaps were less 
stringent than for their more regulated swap dealer and major swap participant 
counterparts.294  
Also required was that trade option data and information be reported to the CFTC 
(sometimes through an electronic database known as a ‘swap data repository’).295 The 
exemption held that if a party to the trade option had in the preceding twelve months been 
required to report a (non-trade option) swap to the Commission, then the trade option 
would have to be reported by one of the transaction’s counterparties in real-time.296 For 
those trade options where neither counterparty reported (non-trade option) swaps over 
the prior twelve months (trades often between commercial commodity end-users), the 
agency required these transactions be documented and reported by each party on a 
standardized yearly filing known as Form TO.297 This form was novel in that the agency had 
never previously had a reporting structure for OTC commodity (trade) options, whereas it 
 
including trade option positions in assessments of entity compliance with the CFTC’s existing large 
trader reporting scheme. Also, through the final provision of the trade option exemption, the 
Commission retained general exemptive authority to grant regulatory relief to commodity (trade) 
option transactions. 
293 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25327 (2012). 
294 Ibid. 
295 Ibid. 
296 See, ibid., for the procedure to determine the reporting party. 
297 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25327 (2012). 
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had for agricultural trade options (see Chapter 7).298 On the form, parties to qualifying trade 
options were required to state the aggregate value of all exercised (not executed) trade 
options299 in nonfinancial commodities agreed to in a calendar year.300 
The final “Commodity Options” rule was unanimously approved by the CFTC’s 
chairperson and four commissioners.301 In his terse voting statement, Chairperson Gensler 
voiced support for treating commodity options as swaps, as the Dodd-Frank Act directed, 
and for the less stringent regulatory structure put in place for those commodity options 
qualifying for the new trade option exemption.302 Nevertheless, the chairperson 
acknowledged that further outside party comment on this interim final exemption rule 
would be forthcoming.303 
 
An Analysis of the Commodity Options Final Rule and its Interim Final Rule for Trade Options 
The CPE-informed analysis of the construction of the final “Commodity Options” rule begins 
with the first regulation that the rule formalized – treating commodity options as swaps. As 
stated above, the retention of this treatment by the Commission mirrored the approach 
 
298 The Form TO system resembled the reporting process for the Commission’s defunct ‘Agricultural 
Trade Option Merchant’ scheme discussed earlier in this thesis. Given that the Agricultural Swaps 
Rulemaking Team crafted Form TO and that the team had rulemaking experience with the 
terminated ‘Merchant’ program (as mentioned in Chapter 7), it is possible that Form TO, and the 
exempted trade option information that it sought to capture, was modelled after the disused 
scheme’s reporting guidelines. For ‘Agricultural Trade Option Merchants’, reporting had to be done 
quarterly and have to include information covering the commodity being traded and the trader’s 
position in that commodity. For a copy of this filing’s requirements, see: 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press99/opa4251-99-attch1.htm. 
299 For instance, a commodity option may be executed (entered into) in 2013, but its optional 
component not exercised until 2014. The value of the optional portion of the contract would only be 
disclosed, in aggregate, on Form TO when it was exercised.  
300 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25327f (2012). 





that the agency had put forth in the rule’s proposed form. Thus, from the proposed to the 
final stage of rulemaking, no changes occurred to this regulation.  
 Nevertheless, the CFTC’s position of classifying commodity (trade) options as swaps 
was challenged in comments to the proposed “Commodity Options” rule. Some 
commenters – such as those from the electricity generation sector – requested that the 
Commission delay the promulgation of its interpretation that commodity options were, in 
the first sense, swaps, at least until the term ‘swap’ had been defined in the final “Further 
Definitions” rule.304 Others argued that all commodity option transactions – by virtue of 
being options on deliverable commodities – unambiguously intended physical settlement 
and, therefore, could not be swaps as defined in the Dodd-Frank Act.305 It should be noted 
that these comments were produced by an array of commodity industry interests, including 
individual firms involved with various commodities and commodity-related ventures and 
industry trade groups representing amalgamations of swap dealers and end-users in a 
variety of commodities and related activities.306 Furthermore, there existed no consensus 
concerning the treatment of commodity options across the comment letters received by 
the CFTC. Some commercial firms and industry groups posited the equivalence of 
commodity options and swaps (e.g., the Working Group of Commercial Energy Firms), while 
others did not (e.g., Gavilon – an integrated agricultural and energy commodity company – 
 
304 See Letter from Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Resources, 11 March 2011; Letter from Catherine 
Krupka on behalf of Edison Electric Institute and Electric Power Supply Association, 4 April 2011; and 
Letter from Russell D. Wasson on behalf of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, American 
Public Power Association, and 
Large Public Power Council, 4 April 2011. Each available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1196. Also, see Commodity 
Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25323 (2012). 
305 See Letter from David Perlman, Bracewell & Giuliani on behalf of Coalition of Physical Energy 
Companies (COPE), 4 April 2011 and Letter from Lance Kotschwar, Gavilon Group, LLC, 4 April 2011. 
Both available at: https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1196. Also, see 
Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25323 (2012). 
306 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25322f (2012). 
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and the Coalition of Physical Energy Companies).307 Thus, the only common thread on this 
matter across the comment letters was that the arguments advanced by commenters 
reflected their own interpretations of the Dodd-Frank Act’s equivalence of (commodity and 
trade) options and swaps.   
 Commission policymakers’ retention of characterizing these options as swaps, 
irrespective of the arguments of some commenters, was significantly influenced by their 
conception of the Dodd-Frank Act. As indicated in Chapter 8, CFTC officials had, in the 
proposed stage of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, perceived that the Act intended 
for options to be analogous with regulatable swaps. This remained the prevailing 
interpretation of agency officials in the final rule release; thereby sedimenting the 
regulatory equivalence of (commodity and trade) options and swaps.308  
Given that the language of Dodd-Frank states, with one explicit exception for 
options on SEC-regulatable financial instruments, that options of any kind are swaps,309 it 
can be posited that this overarching statute provided both semiotic and extra-semiotic 
support to the CFTC’s regulatory position despite challenges by some outside parties. From 
a semiotic standpoint, Dodd-Frank’s language directly informed the Commission’s approach 
as codified in the proposed and final “Commodity Options” rules (i.e., an intertextual and 
interdiscursive relationship as the rules drew on the text of the Act), and in regards to the 
extra-semiotic, Dodd-Frank statutorily bound the agency to treat (commodity and trade) 
options as swaps (i.e., structuration as an enforced selection of this approach). To the latter 
point, this enforced selection can be seen as the product of the interplay between the 
structural and discursive selectivities in that Dodd-Frank empowered CFTC policymakers 
 
307 Ibid., at 25323. 
308 Ibid., at 25325f. 
309 Commodity Exchange Act § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(B) (2010). 
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with the legal authority to rule-make, while simultaneously providing the statutory 
discursive basis to treat options and swaps congruently.  
 Although the formal adoption of this approach meant that, in this first sense, 
commodity (trade) options were swaps, it had the concomitant effect of sanctioning these 
derivative instruments and, thereby, allowing the CFTC exemptive authority over them (as 
swaps on commodities fell within the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction). The Commission 
exercised this authority through its creation of a new trade option exemption from most 
swap regulations for qualifying OTC commodity derivatives. A trio of aspects related to the 
trade option exemption found in the final “Commodity Options” rule must be analyzed to 
wholly understand how policymakers constructed this part of the final rule. Those aspects 
include: (1) agency officials’ decision to grant an exemption, (2) the assembly of the 
exemption’s three specific qualifying criteria (a matter about which some thoughts already 
have been proffered), and (3) the application of recordkeeping and reporting requirements 
to exempted trade options. 
The decision to grant a trade option exemption was fully at the CFTC’s discretion. 
There was no statutory obligation to do so, with agency policymakers acknowledging as 
much: “…a plain reading of section 721 of the Dodd-Frank Act makes clear that all 
commodity options are swaps, without any special treatment of trade options.”310 
Nevertheless, as stated in the preceding sub-section of this thesis, Commission officials’ 
receipt and review of outside party comment letters to the proposed “Commodity Options” 
rule – many of which were submitted by commodity (trade) option commercial 
marketplace participants, end-users, or groups representing such entities’ interests – 
provided an impetus for the reimagining of the trade option exemption.    
 
310 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25332 (2012). 
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Since the trade option exemption of the proposed “Commodity Options” rule 
would not have prevented commodity (trade) options from being regulated as swaps, a 
variety of potential costs loomed large, especially for those firms not otherwise engaged in 
regulatable swap activities – often commercial marketplace participants and end-users. 
Stemming from the perceived threats posed by such regulatory costs, prospective 
regulatees communicated extensively with Commission officials following the publication of 
the proposed rule. The main aim of their efforts was to lobby the CFTC for a truly effective 
trade option exemption to be included in the final “Commodity Options” rule; an 
exemption which would preclude trade options from having to comply with the potentially 
costly post-trade infrastructure of Dodd-Frank.  
Communications between interested parties and agency policymakers took place 
formally through the submission of comment letters and informally in external meetings. In 
total, the Commission received 21 comment letters from a range of outside parties, 
including from the Hess Corporation (an energy company), the Edison Electric Institute and 
Electric Power Supply Association (an electricity trade association), the Financial Services 
Roundtable and ISDA (financial industry lobbying groups), and the American Petroleum 
Institute and the American Gas Association (energy industry trade groups), to name a 
few.311 Notably absent from the comment file to the proposed “Commodity Options” rule 
were letters by public interest groups and other entities and individuals advocating non-
industry perspectives.312 CFTC officials also held numerous external meetings with industry 
actors and their representative organizations.313 As mentioned later in this sub-section, 
 
311 Ibid., at 25323. 
312 See the comment file at: https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=968. 
313 For a database of the external meetings taking place between the proposed and final rule 
issuances, see: https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ExternalMeetings. 
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electricity companies and their related trade associations were prominent attendees of 
these meetings.  
The formal and informal lobbying efforts by such OTC commodity derivative market 
participants were successful in that the exemptive decision made by agency policymakers 
was prompted by such participants’ communications: “Upon consideration of the 
comments to the [proposed “Commodity Options” rule], the Commission […] is adopting an 
interim final rule that incorporates an exemption for ‘trade options’.” 314 In doing so, CFTC 
officials determined that issuing a new trade option exemption was in the public’s interest 
– a determination that, as discussed in Chapter 6, was required for a regulatory exemption 
to be granted. The agency’s stated justifications for this were that a trade option exemption 
provided “effective and efficient risk management tools to commercial market participants” 
– i.e., through their use of commodity (trade) options for presumably non-speculative 
commercial purposes – and that the Commission’s historical regulatory experience proved 
the “utility of a trade option exemption for physical delivery of options used by commercial 
parties.”315 
 Broadly, the CFTC’s adoption of a new trade option exemption indicates that 
prospective regulatees successfully managed to exert their instrumental power (i.e., lobby) 
in formal and informal settings to attain a desired regulatory outcome. To analyze this 
achievement from a CPE perspective, the semiotic and extra-semiotic influences that 
conditioned policymakers’ regulatory construction in favor of these parties’ requests for an 
exemption merit examination. 
 
314 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25331 (2012). 
315 Ibid., at 25334. 
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 Starting with the semiotic, two central arguments for a trade option exemption 
were advanced by commenters. These arguments were considered by agency officials in 
their decision-making and, as cited in the final “Commodity Options” rule’s text, were as 
follows: (1) having an exemption for physically settled commodity options better provides a 
multitude of users with essential tools to manage commercial risks and, (2) the Dodd-Frank 
Act did not intend for physically (as opposed to financially) settled OTC commodity options 
to be treated as swaps.316 (Although many industry commenters asserted that they, or the 
firms that they represented, would incur significant costs should a trade option exemption 
not be issued,317 this argument was not considered by policymakers in their exemptive 
determination because, as these officials stated, the argument was only supported 
anecdotally and was not accompanied by quantitative evidence of such costs.318)  
In justifying the granting of the new exemption, CFTC officials explicitly agreed with 
the first argument. As stated by agency policymakers in the final “Commodity Options” rule: 
“The trade option exemption provides an important hedging and risk management tool for 
commercial market participants.”319 This denotes an intertextual and interdiscursive 
relationship between the final rule and the comment letters. The significance of this 
relationship is that it implies Commission policymakers adopted and relied on the 
representations of interested party commenters as to the nature and function of 
commodity (trade) options as risk management tools (for commercial hedging purposes as 
opposed to being used for speculation; see Chapter 1). An inference that can be drawn 
from this is that, beginning with this particular rulemaking juncture, CFTC officials evidently 
 
316 Ibid., at 25324 and 25330f. 
317 Ibid., at 25323f. 
318 Nevertheless, from these accounts, CFTC policymakers did conclude that commercial users placed 
“great importance” on maintaining a trade option exemption; see Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 
25331 (2012). 
319 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25333 (2012). 
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differentiated between those risks associated with commercial commodity market activity, 
wherein delivery of the (optional) commodity is intended, and those activities of non-
commercial, financial actors who typically financially settle their OTC derivatives.  
Although the Commission’s position on the equivalence of commodity (trade) 
options and swaps precluded CFTC officials’ from accepting the second argument – due to 
this approach preventing a compossible combination with this commenter argument – 
agency policymakers did, however, accede to commenters’ view that physical settlement 
(delivery) of commodity (trade) options necessitated a different regulatory structure than 
for those financially settled swaps. As these Commission officials stated: “…the Commission 
could have elected to make the exemption available to trade options that, if exercised, 
result in either physical or financial settlement […] commenters [, however,] focused on the 
need for a trade option exemption specifically for physically delivered options. The 
Commission did not receive similar comments regarding financially settled transactions.”320 
To understand these arguments’ influence on CFTC policymakers’ decision to issue 
a new trade option exemption, they must be considered alongside the extra-semiotic 
variables with which they interacted and co-evolved. This can be accomplished by analyzing 
CPE-posited structuration through the four selectivities: technological, discursive, agential, 
and structural. From the standpoint of the technological selectivity, OTC commodity 
derivative industry interests were able to submit comment letters to the CFTC through the 
formal rulemaking process; thus, providing the agency’s policymakers with a pool of 
intellectual resources relating to industry’s experience with commodity (trade) options. 
Moreover, these resources were ostensibly supplemented during the informal exchanges 





to above, these parties achieved hegemony over the formally supplied intellectual 
resources (i.e., comment letters), as no non-industry entities participated in the comment 
period. 
Regarding the discursive selectivity, commenters on the proposed “Commodity 
Options” rule essentially unanimously requested a trade option exemption.321 This meant 
that numerous commodity industry participants supported an exemption, and that there 
was virtually no formally supplied countervailing data, information, or perspective on the 
matter for CFTC policymakers to evaluate during their final rule-making. Simply put, a 
singular line of commentary was ubiquitously expressed in the discourses of the comment 
letters received by the Commission: reinstate a trade option exemption. Another 
component of this selectivity is that the language Dodd-Frank Act and the agency’s stated 
equivalence of commodity (trade) options and swaps promoted a discourse which 
preempted the other request of commenters from being accepted – that physically settled 
options not be considered swaps. (This can also be seen in the same manner through the 
structural selectivity, as these same statutory and regulatory edicts bound CFTC 
policymakers in a manner which prevented them from agreeing with any conflicting 
request.)  
In relation to the agential selectivity, the Chairperson of the Commission, Gary 
Gensler, was involved in numerous external meetings relating to the regulation of 
commodity (trade) options with prospective regulatees, in particular, electricity suppliers 
and their trade associations.322 Involving the Chair in these meetings meant that interested 
 
321 Ibid., at 25324. See also, Open Meeting to Consider Two Final Rules, 12 April 2012, Washington, 
D.C., at 39. Transcript available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsub
mission2_041812-trans.pdf. 
322 Open Meeting to Consider Two Final Rules, 12 April 2012, Washington, D.C., at 51f. 
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parties had direct access to, arguably, the most influential policymaker at the agency when 
they discussed their position on exempting physically settled commodity options, or trade 
options. Thus, the potential existed for such parties to exploit this powerful relationship to 
their advantage, and thereby affect the content of any relevant rule. In fact, Gensler was in 
agreement with position expressed by prospective regulatees on the matter of re-issuing 
the trade option exemption.323 This is evidenced both by his vote in favor of the final 
“Commodity Options” rule and in his speech acts during the meeting in which this rule was 
voted on.324 Nevertheless, during this same meeting, the Chairperson restated his view that 
commodity options were – under the Dodd-Frank Act – regulatable swaps in the first 
sense.325 As such, in his opinion, trade options (as a form of commodity options) would still 
have to be subject to Dodd-Frank’s transparency (i.e., recordkeeping and reporting) 
requirements.326  
 Lastly, as it concerns the structural selectivity, it is worth considering the 
intersection of the semiotic (in the form of the commenters’ arguments) and the intra-
agency structure (see Chapter 8) of the CFTC’s OTC commodity derivatives rulemaking 
effort. As evidenced by the remarks of key members of the Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking 
Team responsible for drafting the final “Commodity Options” rule, while this rule was being 
finalized, there existed extensive coordination between its team members and individuals 
involved in drafting the final “Further Definitions” rule – usually attorneys from the 
Commission’s Office of General Counsel privy to the separate rule-makings.327 This is 
 
323 Ibid., at 13f: “We received a lot of feedback from commercial market participants that commodity 
options used by commercial entities to deliver and receive physical commodities in connection with 
their business don’t need the same level of oversight as swaps. I will say that I agree with that.” 
324 See Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25344 (2012) and Open Meeting to Consider Two Final 
Rules, 12 April 2012, Washington, D.C., at 13f. 
325 Open Meeting to Consider Two Final Rules, 12 April 2012, Washington, D.C., at 13. 
326 Ibid., at 14. 
327 Ibid., at 50f. 
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significant because it afforded a structural opportunity for differing conceptions of the 
regulatory intent of the Dodd-Frank Act to be exchanged from one rulemaking area to the 
next. The conception which flowed from the work done on the final “Further Definitions” 
rule (see below) – the forward contract exclusion, to be specific – was that Dodd-Frank did 
not intend to subject to regulation as swaps OTC transactions in nonfinancial commodities 
between commercial market participants, wherein the intended result of the transaction 
was the commodity’s delivery (i.e., physical settlement).328 Given the Agricultural Swaps 
Rulemaking Team’s consideration of this modified notion of a regulatable OTC commodity 
derivative, it can be posited that prospective regulatee arguments advancing a similar 
understanding of commodity (trade) options could be palatable to their regulator; thus, 
aiding these parties’ exemptive cause.  
 One final item to consider is that, as described in Chapter 8, the Commission had 
historically provided a trade option exemption. This past exemption permitted commercial 
parties to transact commodity options without regulatory oversight. As previously 
explained, through the proposed “Commodity Options” rule, the CFTC sought, in certain 
circumstances, to continue allowing such transactions, but would subject them to the 
gamut of Dodd-Frank swap regulations (i.e., reporting, recordkeeping, clearing, margining, 
and position limits). This proposal marked a significant deviation from historical agency 
precedent. Nevertheless, in the final “Commodity Options” rule, Commission policymakers 
acknowledged that they had traditionally provided a trade option exemption and that 
granting a new one – as encouraged in comment letters by interested parties – was 
 
328 See, ibid. at 49-51, for a recitation of how the Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team perceived the 
interplay between their final regulations for commodity options and the soon-to-be finalized 
definition of a ‘swap’.  
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consistent with its past regulatory approach and would not represent an unprecedented 
exercise of the agency’s exemptive authority.329 
 This analysis of the decision by CFTC officials to grant a new trade option exemption 
evidences a reimagining of how these policymakers sought to regulate commodity (trade) 
options from the proposed to final rulemaking stage. The ultimate regulatory approach 
expressed in the final “Commodity Options” rule was that a commodity option transaction 
would be exempt from most of the Dodd-Frank Act’s regulatory regime – i.e., given an 
exemption as a trade option – if the contract was between an ‘eligible contract participant’ 
or a commercial party (as offeror) and another commercial enterprise (as offeree) and the 
optional commitment in the agreement, if exercised, would be physically settled (i.e., 
delivery of the commodity asset referent). As shown above, the selection of this regulatory 
approach was influenced by interacting and co-evolving semiotic and extra-semiotic factors. 
Specifically, through formally submitted comment letters, outside party commenters – 
comprising only commodity industry affiliates – argued for the reinstatement of a genuine 
trade option exemption. Moreover, these arguments were, presumably, conveyed in 
informal meetings with influential Commission policymakers (who were open to such 
contentions) and were expressed in an institutional milieu in which cross-pollination of 
perspectives between rulemaking teams concerning the nature of a regulatable OTC 
commodity derivative was, arguably, occurring, and, further, a milieu that included 
historical agency precedent in which a trade option exemption had been accepted. The 
ultimate effect was one where the discourses advanced by prospective regulatees found an 
agency whose policymakers were amenable to reconfiguring the regulation of commodity 
(trade) options.  
 
329 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25334 (2012). 
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 The choice to issue a new trade option exemption can also provide insight into how 
CFTC policymakers conceived of the Dodd-Frank imaginary at this rulemaking stage. In the 
final version of the “Commodity Options” rule, as with this rule’s predecessor, the Dodd-
Frank imaginary principally guided policymakers towards bringing transparency to OTC 
markets and reducing their systemic risk. Nevertheless, due to those conditioning semiotic 
and extra-semiotic variables discussed immediately above, the manifestation of this 
imaginary in the context of OTC commodity derivative regulation was refined between the 
proposed and the final rule-making. Whereas in the proposed “Commodity Options” rule, 
all commodity and trade options would be treated as swaps and subject to all applicable 
transparency (i.e., reporting and recordkeeping) and systemic risk (i.e., clearing, margining, 
position limits) regulations, in the rule’s final version, qualifying trade options – typically 
transacted by commercial market participants and end-users and where the exercise of the 
option resulted in delivery  – were allowed safe harbor from systemic risk-related 
regulations, but were still mandated to comply with transparency requirements (see 
below). As such, the Dodd-Frank imaginary’s refined meaning in connection with the 
regulation of commodity (trade) options was that its systemic risk mandates would not 
apply to some OTC commodity derivative transactions between (predominantly) 
commercial parties who intended delivery of the underlying optional contracted 
commodity. 
 Turning to the assembly of the trade option exemption’s three specific qualifying 
criteria, it is imperative to ascertain the origins of these conditions. To begin with, the first 
two criteria of the final “Commodity Options” rule’s exemption are largely analogous to the 
two requirements of the Commission’s historical, pre-Dodd-Frank trade option exemption, 
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with one change.330 In the new trade option exemption, the offeror of the commodity 
option would have to be either an ‘eligible contract participant’ (i.e., an entity having a 
minimum level of net worth) or a commercial market participant of some form, whereas its 
pre-Dodd-Frank version had no restrictions on who could sell a trade option. Nevertheless, 
the standard that was applied to the offeree in the new exemption was a verbatim match 
to that of its historically applied predecessor, thus requiring that the offeree be some form 
of commercial market participant.331 Both of these criteria, however, marked a change from 
the exemption in the proposed “Commodity Options” rule as this version would have 
allowed only ‘eligible contract participants’ to be engaged in OTC commodity option 
transactions, thus possibly preventing some small commercial and end-users that had 
traditionally transacted trade options from continuing to use them. 
 The third element of the trade option exemption – requiring that the underlying 
commodity be delivered if the option is exercised – was a new addition. Two potential 
inputs into this criterion’s creation should be considered. First, as mentioned above, some 
commenters to the proposed “Commodity Options” rule expressed that the prospectively 
intentional and routine physical settlement of commodity options should be viewed 
differently than financial settlement.332 Second, the notion of limiting the scope of swap 
regulations to those transactions intended to be financially settled can be posited as an 
outgrowth of the above-mentioned intra-agency interactions between those individuals 
drafting the trade option exemption (i.e., members of the Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking 
Team) and those working on the forward contract exclusion to the final “Further 
 
330 Ibid., at 25324, footnote 28. 
331 Ibid. 
332 See, for instance, Letter from Catherine Krupka on behalf of Edison Electric Institute and Electric 




Definitions” rule. Although it cannot be conclusively discerned if either of these inputs took 
precedence over the other, given the above discussion, it is safe to assume that both served 
in tandem to influence the language of this last criterion.  
 This terse exploration of the trade option exemption’s three criteria reveals that 
while the exemption was requested by prospective regulatees, its textual contents cannot 
be solely attributed to the comments made by these parties. More specifically, although 
prospective regulatees and their representatives successfully lobbied the CFTC for a trade 
option exemption, they did not exclusively contribute to the language of its three qualifying 
criteria which defined what could be considered a fully regulatable swap and what could be 
considered an exempted trade option. Nevertheless, when taken together, the three 
requirements appear as an operationalized form of one aspect of the newly refined Dodd-
Frank imaginary – establishing regulatory boundaries when pursuing systemic risk 
reduction. Through the exemption’s qualifying conditions, financially settled commodity 
option transactions between non-commercial buyers and sellers were prohibited from 
accessing the trade option exemption, while commodity options intending to be physically 
settled and involving, at a minimum, a commercial buyer were allowed exemptive relief.333 
The three criteria for the trade option exemption present themselves as an offshoot of, and 
compossible with, the systemic risk mitigation function of the Dodd-Frank imaginary in that 
they deny safe harbor to transactions of non-commercial parties financially settling their 
OTC derivatives (e.g., systemically important financial institutions), while still providing a 
regulatory structure – albeit less stringent – for the heterogeneous transactions of 
commercial participants in the physically deliverable OTC commodity derivative space.   
 
333 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25332f (2012). 
248 
 
 The regulatory structure that was applied to exempted trade options required that 
these contracts comply with recordkeeping and reporting conditions. Through these 
requirements, the other aspect of the Dodd-Frank imaginary is apparent – the promotion of 
transparency in OTC (commodity) derivative markets, especially by way of recordkeeping 
and reporting of exempted trade option activity. Analyzing the application of these two 
regulatory requirements to exempted trade options comprises the last portion of the 
instant CPE-based analysis of the final “Commodity Options” rule. 
 On that score, until the new trade option exemption was issued by the CFTC, 
permitted OTC commodity (trade) options were transacted in opacity and away from the 
agency’s gaze. This meant that when Commission policymakers drafted their final 
commodity options regulations, they had “virtually no regulatory visibility into [the 
marketplace’s] composition and scope.”334 Nevertheless, as one of the two pillars of the 
Dodd-Frank imaginary was to guide agency officials towards bringing transparency to 
opaque OTC derivative markets, these policymakers undertook this endeavor in their 
development of the trade option exemption.  
 The manifestation of this aspect of the Dodd-Frank imaginary in regulatory form 
witnessed Commission officials craft a two-tier system for recordkeeping and reporting of 
exempted trade options. As stated earlier in this chapter, the tiers involved were as follows: 
(1) apply recordkeeping requirements based on whether the party is or is not a swap dealer 
or major swap participant, and on whether a party to a mere trade option is already 
reporting swaps (if the latter, then the trade option must be reported as would be a generic 
swap (i.e., in real-time)); and (2) where neither party to a trade option is reporting swaps, 
then the parties to the trade option are required to simply file a yearly Form TO. Here, the 
 
334 Ibid., at 25330. 
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Dodd-Frank imaginary can be seen as facilitating the structure of the two-tier 
recordkeeping and reporting scheme for exempted trade options. Congruent with the 
imaginary’s focus on transparency and systemic risk reduction, the recordkeeping and 
reporting conditions for trade options necessitated that systemically risky firms, as well as 
those entities already transacting swaps, comply with stricter regulations than commercial 
market participants not engaged in potentially systemically risky swap activities. Thus, this 
imaginary’s influence is, arguably, apparent in policymakers’ application of transparency 
requirements subject to a risk-weighted, two-tier compliance structure for recordkeeping 
and reporting of trade option transactions.335 
 It is vital to note that in their comment letters, prospective regulatees and their 
representatives did not encourage the CFTC to apply recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements to exempted trade options.336 Although a trade option exemption was issued, 
it carried with it recordkeeping and reporting requirements, which meant that no trade 
option users would escape compliance costs associated with these instruments’ use. As 
such, it can be surmised that the application of this regulatory framework was not the 
outgrowth of formal or informal lobbying done by prospective regulatees or by their 
representatives.  
 Instead, the key to understanding the imposition of recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements on exempted trade options lies in policymakers’ explicit intent to bring 
 
335 Nevertheless, as stated by a fellow commissioner at a CFTC meeting, Commissioner O’Malia 
allegedly introduced the concept of a two-tiered approach to recordkeeping and reporting 
compliance during the final rule-making. While this tiered approach was plausibly conditioned by the 
Dodd-Frank imaginary, the administrative decision to have two tiers of recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements for exempted trade options – one for those entities either engaged in swap activity or 
qualifying as a swap dealer or major swap participants and one for commercial parties who do and 
are neither – could be attributable to a senior policymaker’s intervention during rule-making. See 
Open Meeting to Consider Two Final Rules, 12 April 2012, Washington, D.C., at 54. 
336 See the comment file at: https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=968. 
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transparency to the historically opaque OTC commodity options marketplace – a core 
aspect of Chair Gensler’s regulatory vision for all regulatable OTC derivatives. As CFTC 
policymakers stated in the final “Commodity Options” rule: “Given that one of the purposes 
of the Dodd-Frank Act is to increase market transparency and regulatory visibility into OTC 
markets, however, the Commission does not believe an exemption with no attendant 
recordkeeping or reporting requirements for commercials is a reasonable alternative.”337 
Thus, the introduction of a recordkeeping and reporting framework was an expression of 
CFTC policymakers’ view – influenced by the articulated regulatory perspective of the 
agency’s chairperson – that the transparency requirements of Dodd-Frank – and its related 
imaginary – were applicable to even exempted trade options, and not just plain swaps.   
 
The Forward Contract Exclusion of the Further Definitions Final Rule 
The final forward contract exclusion to the ‘swap’ definition was issued as interpretive 
guidance within the final “Further Definitions” rule. This exclusion constituted a 
restatement of its proposed form with several clarifications which were developed by 
policymakers in response to outside party comments. As with its earlier version, this 
forward contract exclusion stopped qualifying transactions from being regulated as a swap 
(or as a futures contract), and, therefore, having to comply with the above discussed Dodd-
Frank post-trading regulatory infrastructure.  
 In the final “Further Definitions” rule, several key components of the proposed 
forward contract exclusion were sedimented in law. These components were: (1) extending 
the Brent Interpretation to apply to the ‘swap’ definition, (2) withdrawing the 1993 ‘Energy 
Exemption’ and allowing all nonfinancial commodities – not just energy commodities – 
 
337 Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25333 (2012).  
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access to the regulatory safe harbor of the Brent Interpretation, and (3) applying the CFTC’s 
traditional 3-part test, referenced above, as well as the Commission’s facts and 
circumstances approach to determine whether a forward agreement with an embedded 
option qualifies for the forward contract exclusion. Additionally, in this release, the 
Commission reiterated that it would interpret the exclusion, including all associated legal 
precedent, consistent with its historical interpretations (in relation to futures contracts) and 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s legislative history.338 This meant that the CFTC would view the intent 
to deliver a commodity as the primary, though not only, consideration when assessing 
whether an OTC commodity derivative could qualify as an excluded forward contract, and 
that it would look to the transaction’s “facts and circumstances” to assess the “parties’ 
expectations or intent regarding delivery” of that commodity.339 
 To this point, in connection with extending the Brent Interpretation and 
withdrawing the 1993 ‘Energy Exemption’, the guidance given by Commission policymakers 
provides perspective on the considerations to which they would grant significance when 
determining whether an OTC commodity derivative transaction (e.g., a ‘book-out’; see 
Chapter 8) would find safe harbor (as a forward contract) and be excluded from regulation 
as a swap. For such a transaction to qualify for this safe harbor under the Brent 
Interpretation, the parties thereto would have to be commercial market participants that 
“regularly make or take delivery of the referenced commodity in the ordinary course of 
their business,” with delivery of this commodity being possible and ultimately intended 
throughout the duration of the agreement.340 Although this safe harbor extended only to 
 
338 Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed 
Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48227f (2012). 
339 Ibid., at 48228. 
340 Ibid., at 48228-30. 
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‘book-outs’ trades, it evidences that physical settlement would a significant component to 
the forward contract exclusion.  
 The focus on delivery intention was also broadly emphasized through the final 
forward contract exclusion’s formalization of the 3-part test for forward contracts with 
embedded commodity options (see Chapter 8), and more specifically through the 
Commission’s creation of a follow-on 7-part test.341 Here again, the CFTC would look to the 
facts and circumstances of a transaction to evaluate whether the agreement in question 
satisfied all elements of the test(s) and could, thus, be treated as an excluded forward 
contract. The newly created 7-part test – developed in response to outside party comments 
received by the agency – would assess the applicability of the exclusion to those otherwise 
forward contracts in nonfinancial commodities containing volumetric options.342 This 7-part 
test would be available, on a supplemental basis, for those OTC commodity derivative 
transactions between commercial parties which failed the second element of the 3-part 
test because of the presence of embedded volumetric optionality.343 An example of such an 
instrument would be an agreement between two commercial parties where a buyer agrees 
to purchase 10,000 tons of iron ore at a future date, to be delivered at a designated 
location for a specific price, but can elect to purchase an additional 5,000 tons of the ore.  
 In addition to a commercial market participant requirement, elements one through 
six of the 7-part test required that the seller and buyer always intend to make or take 
delivery, respectively, that the embedded option not undermine the transaction’s nature as 
 
341 Ibid., at 48237. 
342 To clarify this term once more, embedded volumetric optionality refers to the variable amount of 
a commodity to be delivered (sold) or received (purchased) as stipulated in the terms and conditions 
of an OTC forward contract. 
343 See Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48238-40 (2012). This 
failure being attributable to the embedded option targeting the contract’s “delivery term” (i.e., the 
amount of commodity delivered); thus, creating volumetric optionality.  
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a forward agreement (so that its predominant feature remains actual delivery), and that the 
embedded optionality not be “severed and marketed” separately from the overall forward 
contract.344 The seventh element of the test, whose ambiguous language would prompt 
myriad communications from prospective regulatees, conveyed that if the exercise of 
embedded volumetric optionality was at the option holder’s full discretion, this would 
preclude a contract from qualifying for the forward contract exclusion. More specifically, 
this seventh part required that “the exercise or non-exercise of the embedded volumetric 
optionality is based primarily on physical factors,345 or regulatory requirements,346 that are 
outside the control of the parties and are influencing demand for, or supply of, the 
nonfinancial commodity.”347  
This meant that, in the case of the above iron ore example, if the embedded 
volumetric option for 5,000 additional tons of ore is exercised (or not) by the purchaser for 
economic reasons alone, it would fail this last element of the 7-part test and would not be 
eligible for the forward contract exclusion. Nevertheless, if the option for the 5,000 
additional tons was, for instance, not exercised due to a catastrophic fire at the buyer’s 
ironworks (i.e., a physical factor), or if the buyer exercised the option because the 
government demanded increased production from the ironworks for purposes of urgent 
national defense (i.e., a regulatory requirement), then the agreement would qualify for the 
 
344 Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed 
Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48238 (2012). 
345 Although a formal definition is not provided, in its understanding of the term ‘physical factors’, 
the CFTC references things such as weather and operational considerations. See Further Definition of 
‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based 
Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48238 at footnote 399 (2012).  
346 Similarly, no definition is given, but the term is assumed to reference volumetric optionality which 
a commercial entity is mandated by law to maintain. See Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-
Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement 
Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48238 at footnote 340 (2012).  
347 Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed 
Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48238 (2012). 
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exclusion due to meeting, among other requirements, the seventh element of the above 
test. By tying the exercise or non-exercise of an option within a forward contract to factors 
for which the party holding the option may not have control, the CFTC would look to the 
facts and circumstances behind the intentions of exercising (or not) the option when testing 
the OTC commodity derivative contract’s fitness to be excluded from regulation as a swap 
(or futures). In general, the 7-part test put forth a limited range of criteria that would allow 
a transaction containing volumetric optionality access to the forward contract exclusion.  
 As a part of their guidance concerning which contracts may or may not qualify for 
the forward contract exclusion, agency officials made it clear that neither the titular name 
on an agreement nor the Commission’s guidance pertaining to specific types and kinds of 
OTC commodity derivative transactions would prospectively prescribe exclusion from swap 
(and futures) regulations.348 Rather, CFTC policymakers repeatedly stated that it would look 
to the facts and circumstances of each OTC commodity derivative transaction as a whole 
when assessing the applicability of the forward contract exclusion.349 Nevertheless, the 
omnipresent thread found in the agency’s guidance was that to qualify for the exclusion, an 
intention to physically settle the volumetric option within a forward contract must, at the 
very least, be evident and demonstrable.350  
 To summarize, as interpretive guidance, the forward contract exclusion of the final 
“Further Definitions” rule advised OTC commodity derivative users to the combination of 
factors signifying whether such instruments would be treated as swaps or as excluded 
forward contracts. Through the provision of an expanded Brent Interpretation and the 
 
348 Ibid., at 48241.  
349 Ibid. This meant that parties to forward contracts with embedded options would need to apply 
this same standard to determine if the transaction necessitated further compliance with swap 
regulations.  
350 See Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; 
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48239-44 (2012). 
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narrow criteria of the two tests, the Commission highlighted that optionality – often 
relating to the intent to deliver the agreement’s underlying commodity – would be the 
prevailing variable in any regulatory determination. Additionally, the guidance indicated 
that the CFTC would not grant prescriptive exceptions to OTC commodity derivative 
transactions, but would instead look to the transactions’ facts and circumstances when 
assessing a contract’s fitness for the forward contract exclusion.  
 Voting to adopt the final “Further Definitions” rule was successful by a margin of 4 
to 1, but the Commission requested comment by interested parties on its interpretation 
regarding forward contracts with embedded volumetric optionality.351 The lone dissenting 
vote was cast by Commissioner Bart Chilton.352 In the Commissioner’s statement of dissent, 
Chilton indicated that his sole objection to the rule was what he perceived as an 
insufficiently critical regulatory approach to certain transactions claiming the forward 
contract exclusion and being excepted from regulation under Dodd-Frank.353 
 
An Analysis of the Final Forward Contract Exclusion 
In beginning a CPE-informed analysis of the construction of the final “Further Definitions” 
rule’s forward contract exclusion, it is imperative to reiterate that, as stated above, the 
three components of the exclusion’s proposed form were adopted in its final version. This is 
evident from a couple of facts. For starters, in the end the CFTC ultimately adopted its 
original proposal of an extension of the Brent Interpretation granting certain OTC 
commodity derivative trading practices safe harbor from Dodd-Frank swap regulations and 
its expansion to cover such trading practices in all nonfinancial commodities. Added to this 
 
351 Ibid., at 48363. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Ibid., at 48363-6. 
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is the Commission’s adoption of its proposed 3-part test to determine the regulatability of 
forward contracts with embedded options. All this indicates that, through the period 
between the issuance of the proposed and final interpretive guidance, the way in which 
CFTC policymakers conceived of these facets of the forward contract exclusion remained 
largely unchanged. Moreover, the retention of these originally proposed (i.e., selected) 
approaches indicates that, from the vantage of CPE, their semiotic and extra-semiotic 
supports were overwhelmingly maintained from one rulemaking stage to the next. 
Although Commission officials further elaborated their guidance on the expanded Brent 
Interpretation and the 3-part test in response to the remarks of interested party 
commenters, the core of these proposals were, nonetheless, sedimented in the final 
“Further Definitions” rule because of the continuity provided their basis being neither 
contested by prospective regulatees nor at odds with the Dodd-Frank Act and agency 
precedent.  
Two additional items from this final iteration of forward contract exclusion require 
analysis from the standpoint of the CPE-posited lenses of semiosis and structuration: (1) the 
reinforcement of an ‘intent to deliver’ standard and (2) the creation of the 7-part test. 
In the context of Dodd-Frank, the ‘intent to deliver’ standard ensured that 
transactions in nonfinancial commodities for future delivery were free from swaps 
regulations, so long as the transaction was intended to be physically settled. Implied by this 
– and essential to the ‘intent to deliver’ standard – are that the transaction create a binding 
delivery obligation and that parties thereto must be capable of and actively participating in 
making or taking delivery. Thus, in principle, the exclusion encompasses OTC commodity 
derivative transactions normally entered into by end-users and commercial market 
participants – some of whom may coincidentally be swap dealers, such as the energy 
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company BP. Moreover, by requiring intention of delivery, the forward contract exclusion, 
again, in principle, precludes financially settled agreements – e.g., swaps between non-
commercial entities – from gaining access to the exception’s regulatory safe harbor. 
The inclusion of an ‘intent to deliver’ standard as the basis for evaluating if an OTC 
commodity derivative agreement would qualify for the forward contract exclusion stems 
from, as discussed in Chapter 8, both CFTC precedent in relation to futures regulations, and 
the explicit provision by Dodd-Frank that “a nonfinancial commodity or security for 
deferred shipment or delivery, so long as the transaction is intended to be physically 
settled[,]”354 cannot be regulated as a swap. This standard, as alluded to in the previous 
chapter, thus derives its principal semiotic influence from Dodd-Frank and historic agency 
precedent. Comment letters of prospective regulatees also provided discursive support to 
this regulatory approach. A review of the comment file reveals backing for the continuation 
of excluding contracts from swap regulations where there is intent to deliver the underlying 
commodity,355 signifying that this key element of the forward contract exclusion was 
palatable to prospective regulatees. For instance, in their comment letter, the American 
Gas Association – a natural gas industry trade group – agreed that “the definition of a 
‘swap’” excluded those OTC commodity derivative transactions where delivery was 
intended and that this standard should be central to the forward contract exclusion.356 
Likewise, in its letter, energy company ONEOK supported this standard and further 
communicated to the CFTC its view that through the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress specifically 
 
354 Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
75 Fed. Reg. 51430 (2010). 
355 See comment file, available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1032. 




excluded from any prospective definition of a ‘swap’ those OTC commodity derivative 
contracts where the parties thereto intended physical settlement.357 
It should be noted, however, that one non-industry commenter, Better Markets, 
expressed in its comment letter to the agency its reservations concerning the ‘intent to 
deliver’ standard as crafted in the forward contract exclusion to the proposed “Further 
Definitions” rule. Although Better Markets, a non-industry, public advocacy group that 
routinely contributes its perspectives on financial regulatory matters, supported applying 
an ‘intent to deliver’ standard in a forward contract exclusion, after the CFTC’s publication 
of the proposed exclusion, it asked agency policymakers to take a more precise stance on 
the standard’s meaning.358 Better Markets suggested that the Commission include 
evidentiary requirements for entities claiming that they intended to deliver a commodity 
under a forward contract exclusion.359 This was requested because, in the organization’s 
opinion, the proposed forward contract exclusion was unclear in its exposition on the 
notion of ‘intent’ and could, thus, be exploited as a loophole by business.360 While the 
request for a specific evidentiary requirement to determine intent was not included the 
forward contract exclusion of the final “Further Definitions” rule, at least in the spirit of the 
expanded and elaborated final forward contract exclusion, particularly with its relatively 
limited exclusionary criteria and restrictive tests, at least a modicum of discursive influence 
from this letter can be posited.  
 
357 See Letter from Paul M. Architzel, WilmerHale, on behalf of ONEOK, Inc., 22 July 2011, at 7. 
Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=47923&SearchText=. 




360 Ibid., at 5f. 
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The decision by Commission policymakers to retain and elaborate on the ‘intent to 
deliver’ standard as an element central to their understanding of the final forward contract 
exclusion must also be considered alongside several extra-semiotic factors.  
In considering such factors from the perspective of the discursive selectivity, as 
alluded to above, the Dodd-Frank Act provided the initial language for intention to deliver 
to be a part of a forward contract exclusion, and, thus, set the discursive boundaries within 
which rule-making on this topic could carried out. In regards to the structural selectivity, 
Dodd-Frank’s provision that ‘intent to deliver’ be used as a standard in determining the 
constitution of an excluded forward contract is also noteworthy because it bound CFTC 
policymakers to its use as the basis upon which to issue further interpretive guidance. 
Furthermore, agency precedent and the Commission’s historic use of an ‘intent to deliver’ 
standard – particularly stemming from its 1990 Brent Interpretation and subsequently 
promulgated related guidance – can also be seen as a wellspring for discursive and 
structural support to this aspect of the forward contract exclusion in the final “Further 
Definitions” rule. As noted by Commissioner Chilton in his voting statement on the final 
rule: “The Commission […] is now adopting an approach to the forward contract exclusion 
that draws on ‘the principles underlying’ the Brent Interpretation.”361 
Regarding the technological selectivity, comment letters on the forward contract 
exclusion of the proposed “Further Definitions” rule from industry interests and other 
outside parties produced a reservoir of intellectual resources that policymakers could draw 
on when gauging the efficacy and possible effects of the ‘intent to deliver’ standard as 
applied to OTC commodity derivative transactions. This pool of intellectual resources 
included information on an array of OTC commodity derivative contracts in use by 
 
361 Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed 
Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48363 (2012). 
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prospective regulatees for which these commenters sought interpretation as to the 
instruments’ regulatability. The information about these contracts and transactions 
provided by prospective regulatees in comment letters was ostensibly used by agency 
policymakers to develop their novel interpretive guidance concerning how such OTC 
commodity derivative activity would fit within their conception of the ‘intent to deliver’ 
standard as expressed in the final forward contract exclusion. 
The final extra-semiotic factor to considered can be approached from the matter of 
the agential selectivity. As stated in the previous chapter, CFTC Chairperson Gensler’s 
approach to Dodd-Frank era rulemaking was characterized, by no less than himself, as 
closely following the strictures and dictates of the statute. Being that Gensler, arguably, had 
the most influence of any policymaker over the agency’s regulatory agenda, the primacy of 
the ‘intent to deliver’ standard in the forward contract exclusion – one which finds its 
discursive basis in the language of Dodd-Frank – fits with this conception of Gensler’s 
influence in guiding rulemaking efforts. To this point, in the meeting during which 
commissioners voted on the final “Further Definitions” rule, Gensler implied that he 
approved of the rule’s close adherence to Dodd-Frank and agency precedent. As he put it: 
“I believe that what we’re doing today, the interpretation and the exclusions therein, are 
consistent with our precedent and consistent with what Congress laid out.”362 Moreover, as 
evidenced in several his speeches,363 Chairperson Gensler was amenable to the concerns of 
 
362 Open Meeting to Consider Final Rule on Further Definition of the Term “Swap,” Final Rule on the 
End-User Exemption to Clearing, and Proposed Rule to Exempt from Clearing Certain Swaps by 
Cooperatives, 10 July 2012, Washington, D.C., at 50. Available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsub
mission11_071012-trans.pdf. 
363 See, for instance, Testimony Before the U.S. House Committee on Agriculture, Chairman Gary 
Gensler, 21 June 2011. Available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-88; Remarks on Dodd-Frank 
Financial Reform at George Washington University Law School, Chairman Gary Gensler, 2 March 
2012. Available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-106; and 
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OTC commodity derivative marketplace participants, and was supportive of clarifying the 
final forward contract exclusion364; a task undertaken through final rule-making.   
Placing an ‘intent to deliver’ standard at the center of the forward contract 
exclusion was influenced by the intersection of the semiotic and extra-semiotic factors 
reviewed above. The principal consideration from the foregoing analysis, however, is that 
emphasizing delivery intention, in any assessment of an OTC commodity derivative 
transaction’s qualification for the forward contract exclusion, emerged from the text of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, and both corresponded to existing agency regulatory practices, and found 
broad support among outside parties and influential Commission policymakers, such as 
Chair Gensler. Nevertheless, from the proposed to the final stage of this rule-making, an 
elaboration of what this ‘intent to deliver’ standard meant was undertaken in response to 
numerous interested party comment letters. This suggests that these letters prompted 
some degree of variation in the discursive basis for the regulatory approach, but a variation 
which served only to expand on (and not contest) the selected and retained notion of 
‘intent to deliver’.  
 The other item in the final forward contract exclusion that requires analysis is the 7-
part test for forward contracts containing volumetric optionality. Within this new test, 
intention of delivery – particularly the circumstances in which delivery might or might not 
occur – likewise factored prominently. The impetus for the test’s creation is explored 
below. 
 
Remarks on Dodd-Frank at the 6th Annual Capital Markets Summit, Chairman Gary Gensler, 28 March 
2012. Available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-110.  
364 Open Meeting to Consider Final Rule on Further Definition of the Term “Swap,” Final Rule on the 
End-User Exemption to Clearing, and Proposed Rule to Exempt from Clearing Certain Swaps by 
Cooperatives, 10 July 2012, Washington, D.C., at 50. 
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 To restate, the 7-part test was developed in response to outside party comments to 
a CFTC solicitation for perspective on the applicability of the forward contract exclusion to 
those forward contracts with embedded volumetric options – a topic not addressed in the 
forward contract exclusion of the proposed “Further Definitions” rule.365 Prospective 
regulatee commenters argued that although forward contracts containing volumetric 
optionality might not satisfy all elements of the finalized 3-part test – because these 
agreements targeted the “delivery term” of the underlying commodity and not its 
contracted price, which meant that they failed this test’s second condition – such 
instruments still warranted exclusion from swap regulations because they were intended to 
be physically settled.366 CFTC policymakers agreed that forward contracts containing 
volumetric options could qualify for the exclusion, and affirmatively codified this 
understanding through the 7-part test.367 These officials’ decision was plausibly supported 
by both the language and the structure of the Dodd-Frank Act for the same reasons 
reviewed above in the case of the ‘intent to deliver’ standard. To be excepted from swap 
regulations, delivery of the exercised option – irrespective of its nature as volumetric or 
otherwise – had to be intended.   
 Insofar as prospective regulatees were successful in having a business practice (i.e., 
the use of forwards with embedded volumetric optionality) codified into agency policy, it 
can be argued that the CFTC’s inclusion of this practice in its interpretive guidance on the 
final forward contract exclusion represents a fruitful exercise of these parties’ instrumental 
power (i.e., lobbying). This was specifically facilitated through prospective regulatees’ 
provision of comment letters and the intellectual and discursive resources stemming 
 
365 Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed 





therefrom. Entities providing such resources included, among others, public utilities, private 
energy firms, and energy industry trade groups. Nevertheless, as the 7-part test facilitated 
only a narrow set of potential circumstances under which an OTC commodity derivative 
contract containing volumetric optionality might attain an exception from swap regulations, 
neither the test’s seven elements, nor the function of the test as a whole appear to favor 
the interests of these prospective regulatees. This notwithstanding the fact that the 
linchpin of the test – its seventh element – contains two exclusionary circumstances – 
uncontrollable physical factors and regulatory requirements – which derived from disparate 
comment letters expressing their authors’ experiences with and interpretations of ‘intent to 
deliver’ under these two circumstances.368 (These two circumstances are limited in scope to 
those situations largely outside of a party’s control. As such, their inclusion in the 7-part 
test cannot be considered evidence of an agency beholden to industry interests.) 
 As with the final “Commodity Options” rule, through the forward contract exclusion 
of the final “Further Definitions” rule, the Dodd-Frank imaginary underwent refinement. 
The modifications to the forward contract exclusion analyzed above indicate that the Dodd-
Frank imaginary was refined such that a narrow segment of OTC commodity derivative 
transactions (containing some form of optionality) between commercial entities where 
delivery was intended would be excluded from the transparency and systemic risk 
reduction regime towards which the imaginary guided Commission policymakers. Should an 
OTC commodity derivative not qualify for the forward contract exclusion, it would, 
however, be subject to transparency (i.e., reporting and recordkeeping) and systemic risk 
 
368 For discussions of physical factors, see Letter from Lisa Yoho, BG Americas & Global LNG, 22 July 
2011; and for regulatory requirements see Letter from Mary Anne Mason, HoganLovells, LLP on 
behalf of Southern California Edison Company, Pacific Gas and Electric Company and San Diego Gas 




mitigation (i.e., clearing, margining, and position limits) regulations. The alterations to the 
meaning of this imaginary in the context of the forward contract exclusion were an 
outgrowth of the interacting and co-evolving semiotic and extra-semiotic variables 
discussed in this sub-section.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the CPE-informed analyses of the final “Commodity Options” rule and the forward 
contract exclusion of the “Further Definitions” final rule, this chapter has explored how 
Commission policymakers constructed the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives during 
final rulemaking. In regard to the former rule, policymakers retained their approach to 
treating commodity (trade) options as swaps, but their stance on trade options changed 
after contestation from prospective regulatees, which prompted the CFTC to grant a new 
trade option exemption. To access this exemption, a compliance structure was established 
to ensure that parties to trade options were by and large commercial market participants 
who intended to deliver the contract’s underlying commodity and to provide the agency 
with insight into the marketplace through recordkeeping and reporting obligations. 
Concerning the forward contract exclusion, its proposed form was retained in the final 
“Further Definitions” rule with a few clarifications and included a newly created 7-part test 
for forward contracts containing embedded volumetric options. Through these, agency 
policymakers elaborated, respectively, on the “intent to deliver” standard used to assess an 
OTC commodity derivative’s qualification for the exclusion, and on the conditions under 
which a forward contract with embedded volumetric optionality would be excluded from 
swap regulations. 
 From the standpoint of this paper’s CPE theoretical framework, two aspects of the 
foregoing analysis are important to restate. First, the regulations for OTC commodity 
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derivatives underwent a process of variation, selection, and retention as rulemaking 
progressed from the proposed stage to the final rule stage. What has been discussed 
suggests that outside party comments were the primary, though not the only, impetus for 
variation (e.g., a reconsideration or elaboration of a regulatory approach). Furthermore, 
both the selection of a regulatory approach and its retention were contingent on an array 
of co-evolving semiotic and extra-semiotic factors. These included a consistent message 
expressed by outside party commenters coupled with access to and the influence of 
influential policymakers (e.g., Chair Gensler) within the bounds afforded by the terms of the 
Dodd-Frank Act itself. While the foregoing analysis might suggest that commodity industry 
actors were able to influence some aspects of OTC commodity derivative final rulemaking – 
such as the addition of a trade option exemption or the inclusion of a 7-part test – 
wholescale capture of the rulemaking effort by industry is not apparent. This is because 
neither the decision to issue a new trade option exemption, nor the content of and 
regulations associated with the two most important features of the final rules – the trade 
option exemption and the 7-part test – were either fully attributable to or beneficial to 
(from a cost reduction vantage) prospective regulatees.   
The second item warranting mention is that, with regards to the Dodd-Frank 
imaginary, its meaning in the context of the OTC commodity derivative marketplace was 
refined between the publication of the proposed and final rules. As is suggested by the 
foregoing discussion of this imaginary, and its relation to the final “Commodity Options” 
rule and the final forward contract exclusion, there was cross-rule convergence as to the 
imaginary’s refined meaning. Specifically, while all options (and optionality) would, in the 
first sense, qualify an OTC commodity derivative as a swap, and, thus, leave it subject to 
transparency and systemic risk reduction regulations, through the reviewed final rule-
makings, Commission policymakers added two caveats. These were that transactions by 
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commercial parties, such as commodity end-users, where delivery of the contracted 
(optional) commodity was intended, would be either exempted from systemic risk 
regulations or, in limited circumstances, excepted from regulation as a swap. The 
refinement of the Dodd-Frank imaginary in this manner was, as suggested in this chapter, 
prompted by the comment letters of prospective regulatees and other interested parties, 
and propelled by other semiotic influences intersecting with their extra-semiotic 
counterparts.  
 Although in the final rule for commodity options, and the final interpretive 
guidance on the forward contract exclusion, the CFTC moved to finalize its regulatory 
approach to OTC commodity derivatives, their issuance would not mark the end of 
rulemaking. Comment periods would be left open for both the interim final trade option 
exemption and the nebulous 7-part test, therefore allowing the rule-making process for 
these issues to ostensibly return to – in the terminology of CPE – a stage of variation as a 
result of outside party comment. This meant that an opening existed for regulatees to 
further contest Commission policymakers’ construction of OTC commodity derivative 
regulations. Nevertheless, as the next chapter of this thesis will explore, major changes to 
the composition of CFTC leadership, and in the articulated regulatory vision that this group 
expressed, fomented an evolution in the regulatory approach to OTC commodity 
derivatives and the Commission’s Dodd-Frank imaginary. What would emerge from this 
ultimate rulemaking period would be regulations which further exempted or excepted the 
activities of OTC commodity derivative commercial marketplace participants and end-users.   
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Chapter 10 – Revisiting the Regulation of OTC Commodity Derivatives (2012-2016) 
 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Between 2012 and 2016, the CFTC revisited its interpretive guidance on the matter of 
forward contracts containing embedded volumetric optionality (as codified within the 
forward contract exclusion), as well as the trade option exemption of its rule for commodity 
options. As noted in the previous chapter, the issues of embedded volumetric optionality 
and trade options were subject to an additional post-rule adoption comment period. (The 
other components of the final forward contract exclusion and the final “Commodity 
Options” rule were not, however, open for comment and remained unchanged.) Therefore, 
the Commission left available the possibility of a return to rulemaking to revise both its 
treatment of forward contracts with embedded volumetric optionality and that of trade 
options. With Chairperson Gensler’s 2014 retirement from the agency, and the with the 
arrival of a new Chair and new commissioners shortly thereafter, CFTC personnel, guided by 
newly confirmed Chairperson Timothy Massad, undertook a review of the Commission’s 
existing OTC commodity derivative regulations which affected commercial end-users369 
(and particularly non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants). 
 Formal amendment of the aforementioned regulations began with the November 
20, 2014 publication of the standalone proposed interpretation for “Forward Contracts with 
Embedded Volumetric Optionality” (“Proposed Guidance”), and continued with the May 18, 
2015 release of the final interpretation for “Forward Contracts with Embedded Volumetric 
Optionality” (“Final Guidance”). Together, these modified the qualifying criteria for the 
 
369 This term is used to denote both true end-users of nonfinancial commodities – such as a natural 
gas-fired electrical plant – and commercial marketplace participants/commercial parties – such as 
nonfinancial commodity wholesalers, nonfinancial commodity storage and transportation 
companies, and energy and metals producers and processors.  
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forward contract exclusion for those OTC commodity derivative contracts containing 
volumetric optionality. The trade option exemption was changed through the May 7, 2015 
proposed “Trade Options” rule, and ultimately by the March 21, 2016 final “Trade Options” 
rule.  
 Following the CPE theoretical framework, this chapter analyzes these particular 
rule-makings in an effort to elucidate how CFTC policymakers constructed the regulations 
for OTC commodity derivatives during this terminal rulemaking sequence. After this 
introduction, Chapter 10 begins with a concise exploration of the institutional context in 
which the forward contract exclusion and the regulations for trade options were revised, 
and in doing so, highlights the importance of the arrival of new leadership at the 
Commission on the agency’s regulatory mission. Utilizing the specific rule texts as entry 
points for analysis, the chapter then reviews the rulemaking sequence and analyzes those 
semiotic and extra-semiotic factors which interacted and co-evolved to condition the 
codified amendments to the forward contract exclusion and the new rule for trade options.   
Through analyzing the revised forward contract exclusion and trade option 
exemption rule-makings from a CPE perspective, it is shown that substantive changes to the 
way in which policymakers approached the construction of their rules for the regulation of 
OTC commodity derivatives occurred. In particular, Commission policymakers reoriented 
their approach to the exclusion and exemption as part of an amended regulatory mission – 
articulated and advanced by new agency leadership (particularly new Chair Massad) with 
the capacity to set the institution’s agenda – which sought to address the concerns of OTC 
commodity derivative commercial end-users and to create a different regulatory standard 
for such marketplace participants. This new standard was informed by the comment letters 
submitted by commercial end-users, and groups representing their interests, and had the 
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effect of either excepting or exempting many OTC commodity derivative transactions of 
commercial end-users (especially non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants) from 
compliance with Dodd-Frank era swap regulations (i.e., the post-trade regulatory 
infrastructure: recordkeeping, reporting, margining, clearing, and position limits). From this, 
it is argued that the Dodd-Frank imaginary of CFTC policymakers was, through the CPE-
posited process of variation, selection, and retention, reimagined to reflect changes to the 
significance these officials now gave to a party’s status as a commercial end-user (or a non-
swap dealer and non-major swap participant). In this, the Dodd-Frank imaginary evolved to 
reflect a new understanding of the Dodd-Frank Act’s meaning in relation to OTC commodity 
derivatives. That understanding was one which guided policymakers towards improving 
transparency and reducing systemic risk of OTC commodity derivative transactions, at least 
insofar as marketplace participants were not commercial end-users. 
 
A SUCCINCT OVERVIEW OF THE REVISED RULEMAKING CONTEXT 
Before analyzing the revisions to the forward contract exclusion and to the trade option 
exemption, it is worth briefly remarking on the broader context in which revised rulemaking 
occurred. Following the final rulemaking events discussed in Chapter 9, there was 
continuity both in terms of the U.S. President – Barack Obama was reelected – and CFTC 
funding limitations. Nevertheless, in leading up to the 2014 restart of formal OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking, two noteworthy contextual changes occurred: one to 
the agency itself, and one to the composition of the legislative branch of government. 
Between 2012 and 2014, the Commission had experienced significant turnover both in 
leadership (chair and commissioners) as well as in other key policymaking divisions, such as 
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at the Office of General Counsel (i.e., the CFTC’s legal department).370 And, in late 2014, a 
midterm (non-presidential) election resulted in the Senate – and the CFTC’s governing 
Senate Agriculture Committee – slipping into the control of the  Republican party for the 
first time since Dodd-Frank OTC commodity derivative rulemaking began.371  
 A major change to Commission leadership took place in January 2014 with the 
resignation of Chairperson Gary Gensler. With his departure, the agency lost, as the 
investment news publication Institutional Investor characterized him, “one of the most 
aggressive U.S. financial sector regulators in recent history.”372 To fill this opening at the 
CFTC, President Obama nominated Timothy Massad to replace Chair Gensler.373 Prior to his 
nomination, Massad’s professional career included political activism with pro-consumer 
protection leader and occasional politician Ralph Nader,374 two decades at a major U.S. law 
firm specializing in investment securities matters, and a position in the U.S. Treasury 
Department overseeing the financial crisis era bank bailout scheme known as the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP).375 Whereas Gensler’s position on OTC derivative regulation 
was characterized by its aggressiveness and its demand for OTC marketplace-wide 
adherence to the spirit of the Dodd-Frank Act, as will be discussed in greater detail below, 
Massad arrived at the CFTC seeking to review OTC commodity derivative regulations 
 
370 See Appendix A. See also, CFTC Announces Departure of General Counsel Dan M. Berkovitz, 8 
March 2013. Available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6528-13. 
371 For election data on the Senate, see: https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2014/results/senate. 
372 Mossman, Matt. “As New CFTC Head, Timothy Massad Would Have to Play Enforcer”. Institutional 
Investor, 5 February 2014. Available at: 
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b14zbgtwjfrkpy/as-new-cftc-head-timothy-massad-
would-have-to-play-enforcer.  
373 Warmbrodt, Zachary. “Obama picks Massad for CFTC”. Politico, 12 November 2013. Available at: 
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/barack-obama-timothy-massad-commodity-futures-
trading-commission-099705. 
374 Ackerman, Andrew. “Challenges Await Commodity Futures Trading Commission Pick”. The Wall 
Street Journal, 12 November 2013. Available at:  https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-to-nominate-
massad-to-head-cftc-1384253414. 
375 Ibid.  
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specifically affecting commercial end-users and articulating a regulatory vision which 
espoused differentiating the fit of these entities within Dodd-Frank’s post-trade 
infrastructure from financial entities (e.g., banks) as well as swap dealers and major swap 
participants.376 
 Although the exact origins of Massad’s policy preference for differentiation 
between commercial end-users and financial entities engaged in transacting regulatable 
swaps cannot be definitively established as he was unable to be reached for an interview, 
two items relating to this preference should be considered here.377 First, Chairperson 
Massad was of the view that commercial end-users of derivative instruments were not the 
cause of the 2007/2008 financial crisis that prompted the Dodd-Frank OTC derivative 
 
376 Applying a fully different regulatory standard to commercial end-users (e.g., a small energy 
company) that transact swaps was not seen as a viable approach during Gensler’s tenure as head of 
the CFTC. As noted by one agency official: “So, you know, in the energy space – you’re going to 
regulate banks that do energy; well aren’t you going to regulate the energy companies that are 
essentially doing the same things like banks? And it’s very difficult to say like, these things like, trade 
options, you know, you get into these – you try to make – and that’s why you see it like in trade 
options, like the definition, in volumetric options and in the swap definition, you get these – like the 
five-part test or the seven-part test on the third factor of the five-part – and all that stuff is, you’re 
chopping it so finely, you’re trying to make these precise things when it’s something in this category 
versus that category […] It’s not so simple as just saying, ‘Well one sector shouldn’t be regulated.’ 
Like I say, ‘Why if a bank does energy – is a bank, that’s regulated, that does energy, is sort of the 
same thing, it’s not.’” (Interview, 10 October 2017, Washington, D.C.) 
377 Another perspective here is that Massad’s nomination, and the adoption of his particular views 
towards regulation, could reflect, or in the case of the latter, flow from, a political preference on the 
part of President Obama (i.e., the President sought to nominate a candidate who either shared his 
regulatory vision or who would adopt it; which in this case, would correspond to relaxing regulations 
on end-users as evidenced by Massad’s actions while serving as Commission Chair). Nevertheless, 
there is an absence of empirical evidence to support this position, and the anecdotal evidence to 
support such an assertion is tenuous. For example, it has been asserted that Obama’s selection of 
Massad was a tacit renunciation of Gensler’s tenure as CFTC Chair (even though Gensler was likewise 
an Obama selection); see Eisinger, Jesse. “Obama’s Mystery Man for Derivatives”. ProPublica, 20 
November 2013. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/obamas-mystery-man-for-
derivatives. Yet, in an exit interview, when asked about possible presidential political motivation as a 
factor behind his resignation, Gensler asserted that this was not the case and that his departure was 
voluntary; see Ashbrook, Tom. “Gary Gensler, Obama’s Toughest Fighter for Wall Street Reform”. 




reforms.378 Thus, to follow this proposition, the full weight of the Dodd-Frank Act should 
not fall upon the shoulders of commercial end-users of OTC commodity derivatives 
(regulatable swaps) who were, presumably from Massad’s perspective, bystanders to a 
banking-driven financial crisis. As he stated before a group of natural gas industry 
participants shortly after commencing his tenure as Chair of the CFTC:  
Commercial end users were not responsible for that crisis. And our challenge today 
is to implement this new regulatory framework in a way that achieves the important 
goals of bringing some transparency, sensible oversight, and prevention of excessive 
risk, while making sure that these markets still function effectively and efficiently for 
the many commercial firms that depend on them. After all, that should be the 
ultimate purpose of the derivatives markets – to help commercial companies 
manage their risks.379 
 
And second, it is worth considering contemporaneous Congressional action 
directed at the CFTC’s regulation of OTC commodity derivatives as a supplement to engage 
with the broader political-economic ethos of the post-final rulemaking period. Prior to 
Massad’s assumption of the Chairpersonship at the Commission in 2014, members of the 
U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate put forth bills to statutorily address the 
concerns of OTC commodity derivative commercial end-users and to provide these entities 
with regulatory relief.380 While the Senate bill was never brought to a full vote, and the 
House bill was not taken up by the Senate,381 the proposed legislation does provide 
evidence of an ethos of awareness within Congress concerning commercial end-users. As 
will be discussed in the analysis to follow, these perspectives were pressed upon Massad, 
 
378 See Remarks of Chairman Timothy Massad before the Natural Gas Roundtable (Washington, D.C.), 
Chairperson Timothy Massad, 26 May 2015. Available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-23.  
379 Ibid.  
380 For the House bill, see H.R. 4413 – Customer Protection and End User Relief Act. Available at: 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4413. For the Senate bill, see S. 2330 – 





and the two other nominated commissioners, during their Senate confirmation hearings. In 
those instances, Massad and the other nominees expressed openness to revisiting the 
CFTC’s regulatory treatment of OTC commodity activities of commercial end-users. Thus, it 
is plausible that, if incoming Chair Massad looked to the actions and interpreted intent of 
Congress concerning commercial end-users of OTC commodity derivatives as well, those 
actions and intent could have served as an additional guide to the development of, and 
legitimation for, the policy preferences expressed in his regulatory vision.382 
 While exploring the development of this Congressional ethos is beyond the scope 
of this paper’s inquiry into OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, one key insight should be 
mentioned. As indicated by an interviewee during research for this thesis, in the period 
after the Commission’s adoption of the final “Commodity Options” rule and the forward 
contract exclusion of the final “Further Definitions” rule, commodity industry participants 
and representative trade groups did lobby Congress to intercede in CFTC rulemaking: 
 
Interviewee: And then you know they could also - and this happened a lot with the 
energy constituencies – go to Congress and say, ‘Can you believe what these guys are 
doing?  Why don’t you write a letter to the CFTC saying’: Don’t do this or ask some 
of these questions at the authorization hearing, why are you doing this? Why are you 
penalizing all these hardworking American’s who are growing the economy? They’re 
not the big bad bankers. They’re people on Main Street and – jobs – if you make them 
buy all these expensive systems for keeping track of their swaps, they’re not going to 
be able to hire as many people and it will affect jobs. And there won’t be as many – 
you know, natural gas won’t come out of the ground and all this stuff. These are real 
companies. You know, this is real America. These financial regulations, you’re hurting 
the real economy, not all these Wall Street people. Regulate Wall Street, don’t 
regulate Main Street. The crisis was Wall Street’s problem, not Main Street’s. These 
are hardworking Americans trying to build up the country and they shouldn’t be 
subject to all this excessive stuff.  
Interviewer: Is that the line that they were actually taking? 
Interviewee: Yeah. Yeah. (Interview, 10 October 2017, Washington, D.C.) 
 
382 Supporting this notion are the findings of Yackee and Yackee (2016) and Shipan (2004), both 




ANALYZING THE REVISIONS TO THE FORWARD CONTRACT EXCLUSION AND THE TRADE 
OPTION EXEMPTION 
Revisiting Embedded Volumetric Optionality in the Forward Contract Exclusion 
Following the textual genre of the previously issued forward contract exclusion, the CFTC’s 
reinterpretation of its regulatory treatment of forward contracts with embedded 
volumetric optionality came in the form of interpretive guidance. Through this guidance, 
both in its proposed and final forms, the agency amended portions of the 7-part test (see 
Chapter 9) and further clarified when an OTC commodity derivative agreement with an 
embedded volumetric option could be considered an excluded forward rather than a 
regulatable swap. The effect of this was the transformation of the ‘intent to deliver’ 
standard discussed in Chapter 9, thereby allowing for a wider range of facts and 
circumstances to meet the qualifying threshold for the forward contract exclusion.383 
 The Commission’s “Proposed Guidance” altered its existing regulatory approach to 
forward contracts containing volumetric optionality in two significant ways. First, agency 
policymakers proposed rewording portions of the 7-part test. The principal change to this 
test was an adjustment of the seventh part. In the forward contract exclusion of the final 
“Further Definitions” rule, the seventh element read as follows: “The exercise or non-
exercise of the embedded volumetric optionality is based primarily on physical factors, or 
regulatory requirements, that are outside the control of the parties and are influencing 
demand for, or supply of, the nonfinancial commodity.”384 The “Proposed Guidance” 
modified this element’s language to the following: “The embedded volumetric optionality is 
primarily intended, at the time that the parties enter into the agreement, contract, or 
 
383 Albeit indirectly, this action would help to either reduce or eliminate potential Dodd-Frank 
compliance costs associated with excepted forwards containing volumetric optionality.  
384 Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed 
Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48238 (2012). 
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transaction, to address physical factors or regulatory requirements that reasonably 
influence demand for, or supply of, the nonfinancial commodity.”385  
Whereas in the former, the CFTC interpreted the exercise or non-exercise of an 
embedded volumetric option due to those physical and regulatory events outside of the 
contracting parties’ control as contributing to an agreement’s status as an excluded forward 
contract, in the latter, the agency broadened the seventh element’s exclusionary criteria to 
allow for the intentional inclusion of volumetric optionality into forward contracts for 
limited purposes. Put differently, this new seventh part expressed the Commission 
policymakers’ perspective that volumetric optionality in a forward contract would not 
prevent a transaction from being excluded from swap regulations, so long as the embedded 
option was principally directed at increasing or decreasing the volume of commodity 
delivered and mainly dependent on anticipated physical or regulatory variables, and not 
principally on commodity price considerations. In essence, this portion of the “Proposed 
Guidance” loosened the criteria necessary for an OTC commodity derivative to qualify for 
the forward contract exclusion.  
 The second way the “Proposed Guidance” modified the agency’s treatment of 
forward contracts with embedded volumetric options was through CFTC policymakers’ 
explication of how they perceived the meaning of their changes to the 7-part test. (Because 
this was expressed as interpretive guidance, regulatees could rely on it when they assessed 
a transaction in light of the test and, thus, its qualification for the forward contract 
exclusion.) As a part of this explication, Commission officials stated that the seventh 
element’s notion of “physical factors” should be changed to broadly encompass not only 
“environmental factors” like weather, but also considerations ranging from “the availability 
 
385 Forward Contracts With Embedded Volumetric Optionality, 79 Fed. Reg. 69074 (2014). 
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of reliable transportation or technology” to “changes in demographics or geopolitics.”386 
Additionally, CFTC policymakers indicated that, should an embedded volumetric option be 
included in a forward contract, because either party anticipated the occurrence of an event 
over which they may have some control and which could affect the underlying commodity’s 
supply or demand, such as industrial repairs or anticipated business growth, the 
optionality’s inclusion at the agreement’s initiation would not preclude the contract from 
satisfying the seventh element.387 Finally, agency officials advised regulatees that they 
could rely on the representations of counterparties as to the purpose of the embedded 
volumetric option, so long as they were either unaware or “should not reasonably have 
been aware” of any fact contradicting such stated purpose.388 Essentially, this meant that if 
one counterparty represented that the optionality satisfied the test’s seventh element, the 
other generally could base its regulatory assessment on that statement. 
 Through these changes, the Commission conveyed an expanded understanding of 
the increased facts and circumstances leading OTC commodity derivative agreements with 
embedded volumetric optionality to qualify for the forward contract exclusion. In short, 
relative to its final “Further Definitions” rule predecessor, the “Proposed Guidance,” ceteris 
paribus, allowed more transactions with such optionality access to the exclusion and, 
therefore, indirectly limited or eliminated potential Dodd-Frank compliance costs. With 
only four voting members on the CFTC at that time, the guidance was agreed to 
unanimously.389  
 
386 Ibid., at 69075. 
387 Ibid. 
388 Ibid. 
389 Ibid., at 69076. 
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 After a 30-day comment period, the “Final Guidance” wholly adopted the language 
of the modified 7-part test.390 In this ultimate release, Commission officials affirmed the 
above discussed aspects of their proposed interpretive guidance with one notable 
clarification. Through the “Final Guidance,” agency policymakers reminded commercial 
parties that they generally could rely on the representations made by their contractual 
counterparties concerning the purpose of an embedded volumetric option, but clarified 
that no performance of due diligence into such statements was necessary.391 This meant 
that if a party to a forward contract with an embedded volumetric option represented to 
the contract’s commercial counterparty that the purpose of including the option satisfied 
the seventh element’s conditions, then the counterparty essentially could rely on this 
representation without having to further inquire into its validity. As with its proposed form, 
the “Final Guidance” passed with the unanimous support of its four available voting 
members.392 
 To reiterate, these combined rulemaking events changed the qualifying criteria of 
the forward contract exclusion from that enunciated in the final “Further Definitions” rule 
for those forward OTC commodity agreements containing volumetric optionality. The chief 
modification in this revised interpretive guidance was to give approval to end-users’ and 
commercial parties’ intentional inclusion of such optionality into a deliverable forward 
contract, so long as the rationale for doing so predominantly related to broad categories of 
physical factors and regulatory requirements. While, if exercised, the embedded option 
would still be intended to result in delivery, this ultimate guidance expanded the conditions 
 
390 Forward Contracts With Embedded Volumetric Optionality, 80 Fed. Reg. 28241 (2015). 
391 Ibid., at 28242. 
392 Ibid., at 28243. 
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giving rise to such physical settlement that were deemed to be permissible under the 
forward contract exclusion. 
 
Analyzing the Proposed and Final Guidance for the Forward Contract Exclusion 
This analysis investigates how Commission policymakers constructed the changes that the 
“Proposed Guidance” made (and that were later adopted into the “Final Guidance”) to the 
CFTC’s previous position concerning the regulatory treatment of forward contracts with 
embedded volumetric optionality. As listed above, the principal alterations comprise 
modifying the 7-part test and redefining its meaning. Key to this CPE-informed analysis are 
assessments of two items. First, an exploration of the influences on CFTC policymakers’ 
reinterpretation of its guidance on forward contracts with embedded volumetric 
optionality. Second, an examination of how this reimagined guidance intersected with a 
Dodd-Frank imaginary whose meaning, as manifested in regulations, was to bring 
transparency to OTC derivative markets and to mitigate systemic risk emanating from this 
marketplace.  
 In assessing the first of the foregoing two items, it is imperative to begin by briefly 
offering some observations on the significance of the request in the final “Further 
Definitions” rule for comment on the issue of embedded volumetric optionality. While the 
rule had been finalized as the Commission’s assessment of forward contracts with 
volumetric options and then sedimented into regulatory text, the conceptual foundation 
upon which it rested was, nonetheless, subject to erosion through potential contestation. 
The Commission’s request for comment left this matter open meant that the possibility 
existed for the agency to recast its guidance on such forward contracts in response to 
commentary of interested parties. Using the language of CPE, this denotes that a structural 
opportunity was in place for the rulemaking process to return to a stage of variation, 
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wherein a variety of discourses and construals relating to the CFTC’s regulatory approach 
towards forward contracts containing such optionality would be made available to contest 
existing regulations and/or inform further rule-making. Not only could these discourses and 
construals be provided by external, interested parties through comment letters, but, as 
explored below, these could also come from members of the agency itself.  
 Semiotic influences from both of the aforementioned sources played important 
roles in contributing to Commission policymakers’ reinterpretation of the regulatory 
position on forwards with embedded volumetric optionality. Starting with those sources 
internal to the CFTC, the views of new Chairperson Massad and other commissioners, 
relating to the applicability of OTC commodity derivative regulations to end-users (e.g., a 
tire manufacturer using petroleum in production processes) and commercial market 
participants (e.g., a propane gas wholesaler), are essential components to understanding 
the Commission’s change in regulatory stance. As can be gleaned from the preceding 
discussion of the “Proposed Guidance” and “Final Guidance,” this change reflected a 
broader interpretation of the ‘intent to deliver’ standard explored in Chapter 9; one 
expanding the permissible facts and circumstances available for an OTC commodity 
derivative to access the forward contract exclusion. Because this exclusion excepts certain 
contracts from regulation as a swap, it is particularly useful to end-users and commercial 
parties who may not otherwise need to comply with the (potentially costly) post-trade 
infrastructure of the Dodd-Frank Act. The discourses advanced by Massad and fellow 
commissioners directly pertained to alleviating presumed Dodd-Frank regulatory burdens 
on these marketplace participants by modifying the regulation of the OTC commodity 
derivative instruments that they routinely used. 
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 A prime example of this view comes from the U.S. Senate Agricultural Committee’s 
March 2014 confirmation hearing for Obama-nominated Chairperson Massad, and 
Commissioners Bowen and Giancarlo. In his opening remarks to the Committee, the CFTC’s 
future Chair intimated his intention to review the agency’s OTC commodity derivative rules 
in light of end-user interests:  
 
As we implement important reforms, we must make sure the markets continue to 
serve their essential functions of providing hedging and price discovery for end-users. 
In this regard, I look forward to listening to the concerns of traditional end-users such 
as agricultural stakeholders, as well as participants in the markets newly subject to 
the CFTC’s jurisdiction.393  
 
Furthering this sentiment, in response to Senator Saxby Chambliss asking about his 
satisfaction with the Commission’s granting of exemptions and exceptions to OTC 
commodity derivative end-users in the Dodd-Frank era, Massad emphatically stated that 
these parties should receive different regulatory treatment from significant participants in 
swap markets:  
 
Well, Senator, if confirmed, I want to make absolutely sure that we have. I think that 
is part of Congress’s direction to us in providing the statutory basis to recognize that 
end-users, particularly non-financial commercial end-users, who are hedging 
commercial risk are treated differently than the financial entities that may be dealers 
or other participants in these markets.394  
 
 
393 United States. Senate. Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission Nominations of Timothy G. Massad, Sharon, Y. Bowen and J. Christopher 
Giancarlo. Hearings, March 6, 2014. 113th Congress 2nd Session. Washington: GPO, 2015 (statement 
of Timothy G. Massad at 7). Available at: https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CHRG-
113shrg93026.pdf. 
394 Ibid. (statement of Saxby Chambliss, Senator, at 19f). 
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Nominated Commissioners Bowen and Giancarlo expressed similar opinions in their 
Committee testimony and in answers to Senators’ questions. For instance, in regard to the 
CFTC’s regulation of OTC commodity derivatives and their end-users, Bowen commented 
that regulatory costs on these parties should be limited: “Our markets need to work for […] 
end-users. So, our rules must be balanced and not create undue costs and burdens.”395 
Giancarlo, meanwhile, indicated that the concerns of end-users would be “foremost” on his 
list of regulatory items to address once confirmed to the Commission.396 Along these lines, 
he stated that he would “commit [himself] to attending to concerns of end-users.”397 
 Together, these speech acts convey that key CFTC policymakers entering leadership 
positions in 2014 intended to emphasize the perspectives of OTC commodity derivative 
commercial end-users and to treat their trading activity differently in agency reviews of 
existing regulations. This is important because, first, it meant that high-level policymakers 
provided an opening for these entities to communicate their interests and to potentially 
influence any revision of the forward contract exclusion (and the trade option exemption). 
And second, it signified that an OTC commodity derivative party’s status as a commercial 
end-user was becoming the principal consideration as Commission policymakers 
redetermined the extent to which Dodd-Frank era swap regulations applied to OTC 
commodity derivative transactions. 
Additionally, incoming Chairperson Massad’s answer to the question posed by 
Senator Chambliss is especially illuminating because it evidences his view that “non-
financial commercial end-users” (e.g., a small potash mining company or a local electricity 
cooperative) occupied a different regulatory category – with potentially less stringent 
 
395 Ibid. (statement of Sharon Y. Bowen at 15).  
396 Ibid. (statement of J. Christopher Giancarlo at 14).  
397 Ibid., 10f.  
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regulations – than their swap dealing and major swap participating counterparts. The 
Chair’s response previews the justification that he would give for agency policymakers’ 
reinterpreting the CFTC’s guidance on forward contracts with embedded volumetric 
optionality:  
 
One of my priorities has been to fine-tune our rules to make sure they work as 
intended and do not impose undue burdens or unintended consequences, 
particularly for the nonfinancial commercial businesses that use these markets to 
hedge commercial risks [...] This proposal is part of that effort.398  
 
From these speech acts, as well as from numerous other public statements made 
between 2014 and 2015,399 Massad arrived at the Commission advancing a discourse which 
espoused further differentiating the application of swap regulations based on a regulatee’s 
standing as a commercial end-user of nonfinancial commodities (i.e., OTC commodity 
derivatives).  
Moreover, as the last quotation suggests, the Chairperson’s view of commercial 
end-user OTC commodity derivative activity as designed to “hedge commercial risks” can 
be seen as a reflection of a similar regulatory understanding that served as one of the bases 
for the CFTC’s issuance of the trade option exemption in the final “Commodity Options” 
rule (see Chapter 9). The notion that at least some trading activity of OTC commodity 
derivatives could be categorized as ‘commercial risk management’ had been expressed 
 
398 Forward Contracts With Embedded Volumetric Optionality, 79 Fed. Reg. 69076 (2014). 
399 See, for instance: Testimony of Chairman Timothy Massad before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Washington, DC, Chairman Timothy Massad, 9 September 
2014. Available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaomassad-1. Remarks 
of Timothy G. Massad at the CME Global Financial Leadership Conference, Chairman Timothy 
Massad, 18 November 2014. Available at:   
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-5. Remarks of Timothy G. Massad 
before the Coalition for Derivatives End-Users, Chairman Timothy Massad, 26 February 2015. 
Available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-12.  
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already by agency regulations. Nonetheless, as conveyed in the previous section, around 
the time of Chair Massad’s arrival at the Commission, Congress was clearly signaling that it 
interpreted these parties’ activities as fundamentally serving a ‘risk management’ function. 
Given the Chairperson’s above quoted understanding that Congress was directing the CFTC 
to provide a disparate regulatory structure for OTC commodity derivative commercial end-
users, and Congress’s overt attempts to legislate to do just that, it is plausible that the 
Chair’s articulated regulatory vision was solidified and legitimated in this environment. As 
the changes to the forward contract exclusion indicate, it can be assumed that Massad was 
effective in implementing his policy preference for those entities which, in his view, were 
not responsible for the financial crisis (i.e., commercial end-users of OTC commodity 
derivatives) from bearing the full weight of the Dodd-Frank reforms; thereby establishing a 
regulatory approach towards forward contracts that was seemingly more palatable to 
commercial end-users. 
Turning now to those external semiotic influences on CFTC policymakers’ revisions 
to the forward contract exclusion. Here, the communications of interested parties must be 
considered. Prior to the release of the “Proposed Guidance,” and in addition to the 
comment period immediately succeeding the agency’s 2012 publication of the exclusion in 
the final “Further Definitions” rule, the Commission afforded outside parties the 
opportunity to provide their perspectives on volumetric optionality through an April 2014 
“end-users issues” public roundtable meeting, and a corresponding solicitation for 
comments on this gathering. The predominant perspective expressed by regulatees and 
their representatives at each of these three junctures was that the seventh element of the 
7-part test should either be deleted or clarified. For instance, in its 2012 comment letter, 
ConocoPhillips, an integrated petroleum company, intimated that “Part 7 should not be 
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included in this test.”400 Furthermore, in its 2014 comment letter, Plains All American 
Pipeline, a petroleum transportation and storage company, stated that while it preferred 
that the agency delete the seventh element, it would be amenable to a more commercial 
end-user-friendly modification of this element’s criteria.401   
This view was typically justified by industry commenters’ argument that the 
seventh element of the 7-part test created regulatory uncertainty surrounding which OTC 
commodity derivative contracts could be treated as excluded forwards, and which as 
regulatable swaps. As argued by the American Petroleum Institute, a petroleum industry-
centric trade group, this element of the test was “vague and unworkable” and did not 
account for the “complex motivations for exercising volumetric optionality.”402 Moreover, 
industry-related commenters posited that this uncertainty imposed substantial costs (e.g., 
from compliance, protracted contract negotiations and due diligence, and occasionally from 
the loss of business) on commercial end-users. For example, the Edison Electric Institute 
and the Electric Power Supply Association, and electric company trade group, indicated to 
the CFTC that the above depicted uncertainty “increase[d] transaction costs” for its 
members and “for consumers,” affected electricity supply contract negotiations, and, in 
some cases, caused “parties to walk away from transactions that would have served a 
 
400 Letter from Janet Kelly, ConocoPhillips Company, 23 August 2012, at 4. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58427&SearchText=. For the 
same request, see also: Letter from Robert Pickel, International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), 12 October 2012. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58889&SearchText=. 
401 Letter from Sweta Sethna, Plains All American Pipeline, L.P., 17 April 2014, at 4. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=59824&SearchText=. See the 
following for a similarly expressed opinion: Letter from David McIndoe, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, 
L.L.P., on behalf of The Commercial Energy Working Group, 17 April 2014; and Letter from David 
Perlman, Bracewell & Giuliani, on behalf of the Coalition of Physical Energy Companies, 17 April 
2014. Both available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1485&ctl00_ctl00_cphContentM
ain_MainContent_gvCommentListChangePage=1_20. 




legitimate commercial purpose.”403 Thus, from these commenters’ standpoint, an 
elimination or an amenable clarification of the seventh element would serve to mollify 
what they viewed as relevant concerns.  
 Those entities requesting a revision of the 7-part test and its corresponding 
interpretive guidance in connection with the 2012 comment period, and the 2014 
roundtable meeting, comprised a variety of OTC commodity derivative users and trade 
groups. These included individual natural gas transportation companies (e.g., Atmos Energy 
Holdings, Inc.), electricity providers (e.g., Portland General Electric Company and Southern 
California Edison Company), major integrated petroleum firms (e.g., ConocoPhillips), and 
both industry consortiums representing amalgamations of commercial end-users – such as 
the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America and the Coalition of Physical Energy 
Companies – and consortiums representing general OTC derivative interests – such as the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).404 The common thread tying these 
commenters and meeting participants together was that they were routinely involved in, or 
represented interests directly engaged in, the utilization of deliverable OTC commodity 
derivatives containing volumetric options. Financial entities, such as banks, neither 
participated in the aforementioned comment periods nor in the roundtable meeting.405 
As explored in the pages that follow, many of the changes made to the interpretive 
guidance on volumetric optionality correspond with the content of participating parties’ 
 
403 Letter from Lopa Parikh, Edison Electric Institute and Electric Power Supply Association, 17 April 
2014, at 3. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=59816&SearchText=. 
404 For comment letters to the 2012 final “Further Definitions” rule, see: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1256&ctl00_ctl00_cphContentM
ain_MainContent_gvCommentListChangePage=2_50. For comment letters on the 2014 meeting, see: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1485&ctl00_ctl00_cphContentM
ain_MainContent_gvCommentListChangePage=1_20.  
405 Ibid. See the comment files.   
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comment letters. This provides evidence of an intertextual (and interdiscursive) relationship 
between the “Proposed Guidance” and the “Final Guidance” and much of the material 
formally submitted to the CFTC by commercial end-users of OTC commodity derivatives and 
their representatives. Additionally, this indicates a fruitful exercise of commercial end-
users’ (and their representatives’) instrumental power. Evidence of this appears in that 
Commission policymakers gave deference to these commenters’ representations and 
arguments and, in some cases, even relied on the content of these comments to directly 
inform aspects of CFTC interpretive guidance. Moreover, the extensive utilization of this 
content in the formulation of the guidance in its proposed and final forms might suggest 
that these rulemaking efforts were subject to capture by the regulatees; whereby CFTC 
officials utilized the information provided by, in this case, commercial end-users and their 
representatives, to ease perceived regulatory burdens on these OTC commodity derivative 
participants. Nevertheless, given Commission leadership’s directive to address the concerns 
of these commodity industry parties, the presence of regulatee capture manifests itself as 
an intentional by-product. After all, under Chairman Massad, the CFTC was committed to 
revisiting the matter of forward contracts with embedded volumetric optionality from the 
standpoint of making this part of the forward contract exclusion amenable to commercial 
end-users. In the end, its use of the solutions proffered by those entities appears to have 
simply coincided with CFTC thinking as directed by the Chair.   
Examples of the strength of industry’s voice include the amended seventh element 
of the 7-part test reflecting the views articulated by the Commodity Markets Council (an 
industry trade group) and Plains All American Pipeline. In the estimation of both these 
entities, to be eligible for forward contract exclusion, this element should allow for facts 
and circumstances that may be within an end-user’s control, and which may impact the 
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volume of commodity delivered.406 Another example is the permission discussed in the 
above sub-section for a party to rely on its counterparty’s representations as to an OTC 
commodity derivative agreement satisfying the elements of the 7-part test. In allowing for 
this, the Commission appropriated industry practice, wherein parties give representations 
concerning a transaction satisfying the 7-part test. These representations often appear in a 
‘Representations and Reporting Amending Agreement’, included as a codicil and used to 
contractually represent that a transaction meets the seven parts of the exclusion test.407 
Similarly, a final illustration involves EDF Trading North America (an energy marketing 
company). It requested that parties not be required to conduct due diligence on such 
representations, and such an approach was accepted and included in the CFTC’s “Final 
Guidance.”408 
It should be noted, however, that one non-industry public interest group, Better 
Markets, commented in support of, and suggested no modifications to, the CFTC’s 2012 
final “Further Definitions” guidance concerning volumetric optionality (which, as reviewed 
above, was codified during Gensler’s tenure as agency Chair).409 In its 2012 comment letter, 
Better Markets argued that the 7-part test, as presented in and discussed above in Chapter 
9, with its requirement that volumetric optionality be exercised due primarily to factors 
outside of a party’s control, “adequately” ensured that a “narrow” forward contract 
 
406 Letter from Ryan Barry, Commodity Markets Council, National Corn Growers Association, and 
Natural Gas Supply Association, 17 April 2014, at 3 and Letter from Sweta Sethna, Plains All American 
Pipeline, L.P., 17 April 2014, at 4. Both available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1485&ctl00_ctl00_cphContentM
ain_MainContent_gvCommentListChangePage=2_20. 
407 See Letter from Arushi Sharma, American Gas Association, 17 April 2014, at 7. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=59821&SearchText=. 
408 Letter from Paige J. Lockett, EDF Trading North America, LLC, 22 December 2014, at 22f. Available 
at: https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=60094&SearchText=. 




exclusion was “faithfully implemented” as the language of Dodd-Frank Act intended.410 
Nevertheless, in commenting on the “Proposed Guidance,” which broadened the qualifying 
criteria for this exclusion, Better Markets argued that this proposed expansion was 
“reminiscent of the infamous ‘Enron Loophole’” (discussed in Chapter 6) in that by 
expanding such criteria and, thus, potentially excluding a growing number of OTC 
commodity derivatives from all regulatory oversight,411 including the Commission’s anti-
fraud and anti-manipulation protections, the agency “inappropriately” enlarged the 
forward contract exclusion irrespective of its “statutory mandate to regulate swaps” and in 
contravention of its limited statutory authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to exclude 
forward contracts from swap regulations.412  
Two additional non-industry advocacy groups – Public Citizen, and Americans for 
Financial Reform – similarly opposed changes made to the forward contract exclusion in the 
“Proposed Guidance.” The central argument expressed by these two commenters was that 
broadening this exclusion would erroneously except from regulation derivative instruments 
that should be considered regulatable options (swaps), thus precluding CFTC oversight as 
required by Dodd-Frank.413  
Nowhere in the “Final Guidance” did Commission policymakers address or utilize 
the perspectives of these three non-industry groups.414 The text of this final release 
 
410 Ibid., at 4.  
411 Recall that the act of excluding an object from regulation means that it is fully outside of an 
administrative agency’s regulatory jurisdiction. Exempting an object from regulation, however, 
implies that it remains within an agency’s purview, although the object is left mostly unregulated.  
412 Letter from Dennis Kelleher, Better Markets, 22 December 2014. Available at:  
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=60108&SearchText=. 
413 See Letter from Bartlett Naylor, Public Citizen, 19 December 2014 and Letter from Marcus 
Stanley, Americans for Financial Reform, 22 December 2014. Both available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1541&ctl00_ctl00_cphContentM
ain_MainContent_gvCommentListChangePage=3_50. 
414 See Forward Contracts With Embedded Volumetric Optionality, 80 Fed. Reg. 28239-44 (2015). 
289 
 
exclusively revolved around the commentary of commercial end-users or their 
representatives. Notwithstanding the three public interest groups’ comments – which 
indirectly contested those enunciated by industry interests – the agency amended its 
interpretive guidance on forwards with volumetric optionality in favor of an expanded 
forward contract exclusion that could be more readily accessed by end-users and 
commercial market participants.415 This implies that Commission officials intentionally 
granted commercial end-users and their representatives hegemony in terms of discursively 
conditioning the content of the ultimate revisions to the forward contract exclusion; an 
intention which stemmed from agency leadership’s desire to revise the forward contract 
exclusion from the point-of-view of commercial end-users. Additionally, the inability of the 
aforementioned non-industry groups to similarly influence the amended exclusion indicates 
that, contrary to the findings of Ziegler and Woolley (2016) (see Chapter 3), members of 
these authors’ self-styled ‘stability alliance’ were ineffective in thwarting industry’s 
influential position during this terminal rulemaking sequence. 
 The internal and external (industry-related) semiotic influences reviewed above 
can, from the viewpoint of the CPE framework, be understood as the contributing 
discursive factors enabling CFTC policymakers’ selection of the agency’s modified regulatory 
treatment of embedded volumetric optionality in the forward contract exclusion. From a 
broad standpoint of semiosis, the rule revision and end-user deferential discourse advanced 
by incoming Commission leadership in 2014, including Chairperson Massad, and the 
 
415 In comment letters to the “Proposed Guidance,” commodity industry commenters expressed 
their general approval of the changes to the forward contract exclusion and its regulatory treatment 
of forwards contracts containing volumetric optionality. See, for instance: Letter from Lisa Jacobson, 
Business Council for Sustainable Energy, 22 December 2014; Letter from Ryan Barry, National Corn 
Growers Association & National Gas Supply Association, 22 December 2014; and Letter from Stephen 





comment letters and other meaningful communications of end-users and commercial 
parties – which had been provided to the agency as this regulatory matter remained open – 
created a symbiotic discursive environment. In that environment, the CFTC could legitimate 
a process of reinterpretation and use the perspectives of end-users to inform its “Proposed 
Guidance” and “Final Guidance” on volumetric optionality. As stated in the preceding sub-
section of this chapter, the outgrowth of this guidance was a more commodity industry-
friendly forward contract exclusion.  
Furthermore, the amended forward contract exclusion reflects an assumption by 
Commission policymakers of an understanding of the regulatability of forward contracts 
containing volumetric options. This assumption was semiotically informed by the internal 
discourses of incoming CFTC leadership and the interests of regulatees and their 
representatives as formally expressed through comment letters. Although regulatee 
interests were, as indicated above, contested during rulemaking interludes by the 
communications of non-industry advocacy groups, the discourses articulated by these 
groups failed to guide the Commission’s selected regulatory approach. Rather, commercial 
market participants and end-users, whose perspectives on the forward contract exclusion 
were expressly sought and whose concerns were intently subject to remedying, found 
favorable reception by a CFTC actively seeking to recast its Dodd-Frank era OTC commodity 
derivative regulations to be more palatable to industry. These findings corroborate those of 
Yackee and Yackee (2006), in that industry – specifically, OTC commodity derivative 
commercial end-users and their representatives – successfully attained a desired final 
regulatory outcome by virtue of the discursive influence of its comment letters. 
Nevertheless, the caveat to this that must be kept in-mind is that industry interests were 
pushing on an open door, since the Commission, under the leadership of Chairperson 
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Massad, saw its mission as facilitating industry palatable revisions of the forward contract 
exclusion.  
 The influence of semiotic factors on the CFTC’s reinterpretation of its guidance on 
forward contracts with embedded volumetric optionality must also be analyzed alongside 
those extra-semiotic variables with which they interacted and co-evolved. Drawing on CPE’s 
notion of structuration, these variables can be discussed through the lenses of the four 
selectivities: structural, agential, technological, and discursive. Exploring the extra-semiotic 
provides further insight into those factors which enabled the above discussed discursive 
influences to condition agency policymakers’ revision of the forward contract exclusion 
and, thus, their selection and retention of a new regulatory approach for OTC commodity 
derivatives containing volumetric optionality. 
 Viewing the “Proposed Guidance” and “Final Guidance” rule-makings through the 
lens of the structural selectivity reveals three significant impacts of the extra-semiotic. First, 
as stated earlier, by leaving open the interpretive guidance on forward contracts with 
embedded volumetric optionality in the final “Further Definitions” rule, a structural 
opportunity existed for Commission policymakers to permissibly amend this interpretation 
through future guidance. Second, the changing composition of leadership at the CFTC – 
including a new chairperson and commissioners – introduced fluidity into the regulatory 
mission of the agency and facilitated its change in direction. When the “Final Guidance” 
was adopted by the Commission, only one commissioner – Mark Wetjen – who was 
involved in rule-making for the “Further Definitions” rule remained a member of the CFTC. 
Notwithstanding Wetjen, the two new commissioners and Chairperson Massad opened the 
Commission to and guided it towards, as alluded to above, a regulatory agenda aimed at 
reducing perceived burdens on commercial end-users of OTC commodity derivatives. Third, 
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the attempts by Congress to amend the Dodd-Frank Act (through amending the Commodity 
Exchange Act), and thereby statutorily address the concerns of commercial end-users of 
OTC commodity derivatives, is also a noteworthy structural consideration because such 
action plausibly signaled to the agency that an opportunity existed for the CFTC to recast its 
forward contract exclusion interpretive guidance. The congressional action indicated that 
the scope of Dodd-Frank was open to further interpretation irrespective of Congress’s 
ability to enact new legislation.  
 Along these lines, the ability of policymakers, particularly Massad, to direct the 
CFTC towards this regulatory mission serves as an example of their (and his) power to 
influence events as seen through the agential selectivity. Especially in the case of Chair 
Massad, his influential post within the Commission as its leader afforded him a position 
from which to set and guide the agency’s agenda of revising those regulations affecting 
end-users and commercial parties – such as the forward contract exclusion. It is worth 
noting that, although former Chairperson Gensler expressed a degree of openness to the 
concerns of OTC commodity derivative end-users (see Chapter 9), Massad’s stance on this 
matter went beyond in that one of his main goals as Chair was to have CFTC policymakers 
review the agency’s rules and interpretations that affected commercial end-user 
regulatees. The objective was to ensure a regulatory regime that accommodated such 
regulatees’ interests.416 As indicated in an interview with one former Commission official, 
the regulatory vision of the Chairperson is of preeminent significance in setting and guiding 
 
416 See, for instance: Remarks of Timothy G. Massad before the Coalition for Derivative End-Users, 
Chairperson Timothy Massad, 26 February 2015. Available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-12; Remarks of Chairman 
Timothy Massad before the National Energy Marketers Association, Chairperson Timothy Massad, 30 
April 2015. Available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-18; 
Remarks of Chairman Timothy Massad before the Energy Risk Summit USA 2015, Chairperson 




the CFTC’s rulemaking agenda: “Everything is who’s running the agency […] By the 
Administrative Procedure Act, every comment – material comment – needs to be 
answered. So, you can answer them all, but the end-product is, ‘Where does the 
Commission want to be?’” (Interview, 6 October 2017, Washington, D.C.). In the instances 
of the “Proposed Guidance” and the “Final Guidance,” the place where Chair Massad 
wanted the agency to be (as supported by the other agency commissioners) was the 
performance of a systematic review of regulations affecting OTC commodity derivative 
commercial end-users, such as the forward contract exclusion, all towards the goal of 
addressing the concerns voiced by these entities.    
 Seen through the technological selectivity, policymakers’ ability to revise the 
forward contract exclusion to remedy regulatee concerns was supported by the voluminous 
intellectual resources supplied to CFTC by end-users, and entities representing their 
interests, through comment letters and during external meetings occurring between the 
publication of the final “Further Definitions” rule in 2012 and the 2015 promulgation of the 
“Final Guidance.” These readily available resources allowed Commission policymakers 
straightforward access to information that could be used to inform the content of the 
agency’s reinterpreted guidance on volumetric optionality. Put simply, the CFTC had an 
abundance of intellectual resources at its disposal that its policymakers could utilize to 
advance the agency’s adjusted regulatory mission through the construction of an amended 
forward contract exclusion.  
Finally, in regard to the discursive selectivity, as many of the aforementioned 
intellectual resources were provided to the Commission in the form (genre) of comment 
letters – such as those submitted in connection with the final “Further Definitions” rule, the 
2014 roundtable meeting, and the promulgation of the “Proposed Guidance” – 
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policymakers were afforded the opportunity to justifiably draw on the letters’ contents 
when codifying the amended guidance. This is an important consideration because the 
rulemaking process, as discussed in Chapter 2, is one in which agency policymakers are 
obliged to respond to pertinent comment letters, and in this case of the forward exclusion, 
replying to regulatee comments could provide CFTC officials with justification for changing 
their guidance on this matter. Furthermore, given the new regulatory vision for commercial 
end-users articulated by Commission leadership – in particular, Chairperson Massad – such 
intimations can be seen as both opening an opportunity for commodity industry parties to 
influence the discursive constitution of the revised forward contract exclusion, while also 
precluding non-industry points of view from conditioning the exception’s content. In this 
way, the discourses advanced by top CFTC officials (such as Massad) during the rulemaking 
sequence for the revised exclusion can be understood to have enforced the selection of 
industry-related comments in agency policymakers’ recasting of the forward contract 
exclusion. Stated simply, for Commission policymakers to meet their newly established 
regulatory objective of alleviating perceived burdens on commercial end-users, they had to 
rely on the comments (and general communications) of these OTC commodity derivative 
marketplace participants and their representatives which expressed alternative and less 
burdensome ways of regulating relevant trading activities. 
  In summary, the new regulatory approach towards embedded volumetric 
optionality taken in the modified forward contract exclusion was influenced by interacting 
and co-evolving semiotic and extra-semiotic variables. The routinely expressed desire of 
regulatees for an expanded and more industry-friendly forward contract exclusion 
intersected with the arrival of new Commission leadership which advocated for a different, 
less stringent regulatory treatment of end-users of OTC commodity derivatives, and which, 
under the direction of Chairperson Massad, intended to undertake a revision of regulations 
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affecting these same parties. Thus, a synchronicity of interests between regulatees and the 
CFTC was produced whereby regulatory modifications favoring regulatees became a viable 
prospect. As Commission policymakers amended the forward contract exclusion, they used 
the formally submitted commentary of these regulatees to inform their modified 
interpretive guidance; that of non-industry, public advocacy groups, however, was not 
incorporated. The result being a broader exclusion which could be more easily accessed by 
OTC commodity derivative end-users and commercial market participants. 
 The foregoing findings can also shed light on the evolving nature of the Dodd-Frank 
imaginary. The relation between changes in CFTC policymakers’ interpretation of 
volumetric optionality in the forward contract exclusion and the Dodd-Frank imaginary 
explored in previous chapters is essential to consider here. In Chapter 9, the argument was 
made that the Dodd-Frank imaginary was refined during final rule-making, but still retained 
its two-pronged form (i.e., emphasizing OTC marketplace transparency and reducing 
systemic risk); a form with which the exclusion of the final “Further Definitions” rule was 
compossible. By contrast, the concluding rulemaking events with which we are here 
concerned point to a significant evolution in the meaning of the Dodd-Frank Act to 
Commission officials; one which was necessary for the Dodd-Frank imaginary to maintain its 
compossibility with the revised forward contract exclusion. Rather than viewing the 
regulation of OTC commodity derivatives through an imaginary with two aspects, the 
agency’s reinterpretation of the forward contract exclusion reveals that policymakers 
perceived their regulatory task as expanding to three considerations: promoting said 
transparency and mitigating systemic risk through regulation, provided that the activities of 
commercial end-users are (largely) excepted. Adopting this tripartite Dodd-Frank imaginary 
meant that CFTC policymakers could further reduce the complexity of their regulatory 
endeavors in the heterogeneous OTC commodity derivative marketplace by partitioning it 
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and, then, (mostly) excluding the application of Dodd-Frank era swap regulations (i.e., the 
post-trading regulatory infrastructure) to commercial end-users. 
 It is also worth considering that this modified Dodd-Frank imaginary is the 
outgrowth of intentional utterances and acts of Commission policymakers subjected to, in 
the vocabulary of CPE, a process of variation, selection, and retention. In particular, this 
imaginary emerged from the above analyzed interplay of semiotic and extra-semiotic 
variables. The imaginary’s prior two-pronged meaning was subject to contestation with the 
arrival of new CFTC leadership articulating a discourse of a different regulatory vision for 
OTC commodity derivatives, for which they had the ability and intention to carry out, and 
which found support in regulatee comment letters. Through the “Proposed Guidance” and 
the “Final Guidance” rule-makings, agency policymakers selected and then retained, 
respectively, a new imaginary through which they could view their regulation of forward 
contracts with embedded volumetric optionality (i.e., the forward contract exclusion). The 
emergence of a tripartite Dodd-Frank imaginary now meant that an OTC commodity 
derivative market participant’s status as a commercial end-user took a step towards 
becoming the primary factor in determining the applicability of swap regulations to OTC 
commodity derivative transactions; with the final step being amending the trade option 
exemption.  
 
Revisiting the Trade Option Exemption 
A few months after publishing the final “Commodity Options” rule and its interim final rule 
for trade options, CFTC policymakers initially began revisiting the trade option exemption in 
a series of no-action letters. These letters, issued by the Commission’s Division of Market 
Oversight, granted degrees of regulatory relief to trade option market participants. 
Between the promulgation of the final rule for commodity options in 2012 and the final 
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“Trade Options” rule in 2016, three no-action letters were issued by this agency division in 
connection with trade options. 
 Promulgated on August 14, 2012, the first of these releases allowed eligible trade 
options (i.e., those that met the exemption’s 3-part test) to be transacted without 
compliance with the exemption’s recordkeeping and reporting requirements.417 This relief 
was granted to all trade option marketplace participants and was effective through the 
Division’s next release.418 On April 5, 2013, the Division of Market Oversight issued its 
second trade option-related no-action letter.419 In it, the Division emphasized that the only 
reporting requirements which some non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants 
(e.g., commercial market participants and end-users) transacting trade options had were 
the annual filing of a Form TO (see Chapter 9) beginning in 2014, and the prompt 
notification of the Division via email if, at any point in the calendar year, they entered into 
an aggregate of $1 billion worth of trade options.420 Specifically, these limited reporting 
requirements exclusively extended to those non-swap dealers and non-major swap 
participants that were otherwise reporting unrelated swap activities in real-time.421 The 
final no-action letter, published on February 18, 2016, affirmed the Division’s April 2013 
 
417 CFTC No-Action Letter No. 12-06, 14 August 2012. Available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/12-
06.pdf. 
418 Ibid.   
419 CFTC No-Action Letter No. 13-08, 5 April 2013. Available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/13-
08.pdf. 
420 Ibid.  
421 As stated in the previous chapter, irrespective of its categorization as a swap dealer or major 
swap participant, if a party to a trade option was already reporting its swap activities in real-time, 
then its trade option activities would likewise have to be reported in such a manner. Through this 
no-action letter, if a non-swap dealer or non-major swap participant was engaged in reportable swap 
trading and trade option transactions, it would now only have to report the swaps in real-time, not 
the trade options.  
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release.422 Moreover, in this last letter, the Division stated that non-swap dealers and non-
major swap participants could forego their 2016 Form TO submission without threat of 
regulatory enforcement actions.423 
 Combined, the above three no-action letters reveal that within the CFTC, increasing 
emphasis was being placed on the nature of a party to a trade option agreement (i.e., 
whether or not it was a swap dealer or major swap participant) in the agency’s assessment 
of the regulatory infrastructure applicable to such a contract. These changing conceptions 
were also evident in the Commission’s ensuing revision of the trade option exemption. 
Through its proposed and final “Trade Options” rule, the CFTC reduced certain regulatory 
requirements with which non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants transacting 
trade options had had to comply. 
 The proposed “Trade Options” rule put forth four substantive modifications to the 
compliance structure of the final “Commodity Options” rule’s trade option exemption. First, 
non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants that were reporting other swap trading 
activity in real-time would no longer have to report their trade options in that same manner 
(i.e., no real-time reporting of trade options).424 Second, all Form TO reporting obligations 
were withdrawn for non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants, and the Form itself 
was deleted from the Commission’s Part 32 commodity (trade) options regulation (i.e., no 
reporting of trade options through Form TO).425 Third, non-swap dealers and non-major 
swap participants would be required to promptly notify the agency’s Division of Market 
Oversight if they had or expected to enter into trade options having an “aggregate notional 
 
422 CFTC No-Action Letter No. 16-10, 18 February 2016. Available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/16-
10.pdf. 
423 Ibid.   




value in excess of $1 billion” over the course of a calendar year.426 Fourth, non-swap dealers 
and non-major swap participants would only be required to “maintain full and complete 
records”427 of their trade option activities – which could be accessed by the CFTC at its 
request – pursuant to the agency’s Part 45 Dodd-Frank recordkeeping and reporting 
regulations, and to obtain (purchase) a ‘legal entity identifier’ number428 which could be 
provided to a trade option counterparty that is a swap dealer or major swap participant.429 
 Through these changes to the trade option exemption, qualifying trade options 
transacted by non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants (e.g., commercial market 
participants and end-users) were effectively exempted from all significant Dodd-Frank 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements. Nevertheless, those trade option transactions 
by and between swap dealers and major swap participants (e.g., BP and Macquarie Energy) 
continued to be subject to the recordkeeping and reporting standards set out in the final 
“Commodity Options” rule and under the agency’s Part 45 Dodd-Frank regulations. The 
commissioners of the CFTC accepted the proposed “Trade Options” rule by a vote of four to 
zero and subjected it to a 30-day comment period.430  
 In the final version of the “Trade Options” rule, the Commission finalized its 
proposals to not require that non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants real-time 
report their trade options and to delete Form TO and all corresponding reporting 
requirements.431 The final “Trade Options” rule, however, withdrew the $1 billion trade 
 
426 Ibid., at 26203f. 
427 Ibid., at 26203. 
428 A company-specific unique identification number required by the Dodd-Frank Act for those 
entities transacting swaps. See Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 
2160 (2012).  
429 Trade Options, 80 Fed. Reg. 26204 (2015). 
430 Ibid., at 26209. 
431 Trade Options, 81 Fed. Reg. 14969 (2016). 
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option notification proposal.432 Thus, the reporting of any trade option data or information 
by non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants was not required; only those entities 
qualifying as swap dealers or major swap participants would be responsible for any 
reporting pursuant to the agency’s Dodd-Frank reporting structure (e.g., the Commission’s 
Part 45 regulations). Finally, the rule modified part of the proposed recordkeeping 
requirements for non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants. Although the final 
“Trade Options” rule still required that such entities attain and provide a ‘legal entity 
identifier’ number, it deleted any reference to Part 45 recordkeeping requirements for this 
class of parties, and specified that they would only need to maintain records of trade option 
activities as done “in the ordinary course of business.”433 
 The final rule for the trade option exemption was similarly approved by the CFTC by 
a unanimous four to zero vote.434 Its promulgation marked the terminal event in Dodd-
Frank commodity and trade options rulemaking. In summary, through the final “Trade 
Options” rule, Commission policymakers eliminated and reduced reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, respectively, for trade options transacted by non-swap 
dealers and non-major swap participants; effectively exempting these transactions by such 






432 Ibid., at 14969f. 
433 Ibid., at 14970f. While the term “ordinary course of business” is not defined in the rule’s text, it 
can be assumed that this means document retention as compliant with a company’s internal records 
retention policy. It should be noted, however, that some firms may not have such a written policy 
and may retain records in their ordinary course of business in an ad hoc, non-standardized manner. 
434 Ibid., at 14974. 
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Analyzing the Trade Option Exemption 
Before assessing CFTC policymakers’ construction of the revised trade option exemption, it 
is worth briefly commenting on the Division of Market Oversight’s issuance of no-action 
letters. The regulatory relief granted through these letters was done in response to external 
communications with regulatees separate from comment periods relating to either the 
rules for commodity options or those for trade options. As an agency official indicated, in 
the case of the trade option exemption, the no-actions were promulgated because certain 
marketplace participants – non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants – were 
unable to comply with Dodd-Frank trade option reporting requirements:  
 
[…] the no-action letters came after the rule is final and people said, “Wait a minute, 
this doesn’t make sense, we can’t do it, or we can’t do it in the time frame you’re 
saying.” So, that would be in a meeting, people would come in up in arms, “How in 
the heck are we supposed to do this?” The industry would get together, or you would 
get individuals coming in and saying, “You know, I can’t comply with this part of the 
reporting rules” [...] (Interview, 3 October 2017, Washington, D.C.) 
 
 This evidences that within the CFTC – the Division of Market Oversight, specifically 
– there was an awareness that compliance with the trade options regulatory scheme of the 
final “Commodity Options” rule was ostensibly proving impractical for those entities for 
whom the no-action relief was given: non-swap dealer and non-major swap participant 
commercial end-users. Moreover, it depicts a Commission whose policymakers were both 
considering the nature of a trade option party as an important variable in determining the 
applicability of Dodd-Frank swap regulations to related transactions, and who were 
addressing, in part, some of the concerns of these entities. Through rulemaking, this 
consideration of a party’s status as a non-swap dealer and non-major swap participant 
would, for reasons analyzed below, principally underpin the changes to the regulation of 
trade options. The issuance of no-action relief also indicates that the regulatory approach 
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taken by agency officials in the interim final rule for trade options in the final “Commodity 
Options” rule was – to use the language of CPE – not yet sedimented. From soon after its 
adoption by the Commission, the viability of this interim final trade option exemption was 
being contested internally by the Division of Market Oversight through its communications 
with regulatees, and in this regard the exemption was subject to variation, with the 
potential existing for a new treatment of trade options to emerge.   
 Turning to an analysis of the revised trade option exemption, two aspects are 
essential to assess in order to understand how agency policymakers constructed their 
revisions to this exemption and, thus, their regulatory approach towards trade option. First, 
as the CPE theoretical framework demands, an exploration of the semiotic and extra-
semiotic influences on CFTC policymakers’ recasting of trade option exemption. And 
second, an examination of what the alterations to the exemption mean for the modified 
Dodd-Frank imaginary. As the proposed and final “Trade Options” rule-makings occurred 
within the same immediate context as the earlier analyzed reinterpretation of the forward 
contract exclusion, the first item’s analysis engages with many of those influences 
previously discussed. Similarly, the examination of the exemption and the Dodd-Frank 
imaginary expands on several of the analytical themes already presented above in the 
exploration of the analogous topic. 
 To begin, it should be noted that, as was the case with the forward contract 
exclusion, the ’interim final’ rule designation for trade options (i.e., its textual genre) also 
provided interested parties with an opportunity to comment. Thus, prior to the issuance of 
the proposed “Trade Options” rule, the matter of the Commission’s treatment of trade 
options within the Dodd-Frank regulatory framework was likewise left open and, when 
coupled with the effects of the no-action letters discussed above, an opening was again in 
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place (as viewed through the lens of CPE’s discursive selectivity) for the rulemaking process 
to return to a stage of variation through external (e.g., comment letters) and internal (e.g., 
the no-action letters of the Division of Market Oversight) discursive contestation. Outside 
parties took advantage of this opportunity to influence the agency to revise the trade 
option exemption by submitting 11 letters to the CFTC immediately following the 
publication of the interim final trade option exemption in the final “Commodity Options” 
rule.435 Ten of these comment letters were from trade groups representing commodity 
industry interests, and one was from an individual commodity trader; however, neither 
commodity companies (e.g., a natural gas producer) nor non-industry advocacy groups 
(e.g., Better Markets) commented on the interim final trade option exemption.436 Of the 
comment letters received, several suggested that the Commission either not treat trade 
options as swaps437 or that the agency generally reduce reporting requirements by allowing 
all trade options transacted by non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants to be 
reported yearly on Form TO.438 Only one comment letter asked for yearly reporting Form 
TO to be discarded.439 
 
435 See comment file, after 27 April 2012: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1196&ctl00_ctl00_cphContentM
ain_MainContent_gvCommentListChangePage=1_50. 
436 Ibid.   
437 See, for instance: Letter from David Perlman, Bracewell & Giuliani, on behalf of the Coalition of 
Physical Energy Companies, 7 June 2012; Letter from Craig G. Goodman, National Energy Marketers 
Association, 26 June 2012; and Letter from Andrew K. Soto, American Gas Association, 26 June 2012. 
Each available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1196&ctl00_ctl00_cphContentM
ain_MainContent_gvCommentListChangePage=1_50. 
438 See, for instance: Letter from Michael Sweeney, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, L.L.P., on behalf of 
the Commercial Energy Working Group, 26 June 2012 and Letter from Lopa Parikh, Edison Electric 
Institute, 26 June 2012. Both available at:  
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1196&ctl00_ctl00_cphContentM
ain_MainContent_gvCommentListChangePage=2_50. 
439 Letter from Phillip Lookadoo, International Energy Credit Association, 26 June 2012, at 2. 




These comments did not, however, induce CFTC policymakers to revisit, through 
rulemaking, the interim final trade option exemption. The same can be said of those 
comments solicited by the agency in a December 2012 public request for further 
perspective on reporting Form TO; comments which, made exclusively by industry trade 
groups, essentially recited the positions previously expressed during the earlier 2012 
comment period for the interim final rule on trade options.440 It was not until after the 
arrival of new Commission leadership that, as with the forward contract exclusion, revisions 
to the trade option exemption, through rulemaking, were initiated. This indicates that the 
comment letters of commercial end-users and groups representing their interests were, on 
their own, insufficient to prompt CFTC policymakers to formally revise the trade option 
exemption. Essentially, the agency acquitted itself as not beholden to its regulatees. In 
order for that sort of path to be trod, an additional variable was necessary: an articulated 
and implemented regulatory agenda seeking to accommodate the suggestions of OTC 
commodity derivate commercial end-users and groups representing the interests of those 
end-users. 
As such, it is vital to note another similarity with the above analyzed revised 
forward contract exclusion. Namely, the modifications to the trade option exemption, 
through the proposed and final “Trade Options” rule-makings, were made in the same 
institutional context wherein CFTC leadership – and Chair Massad in particular – explicitly  
advocated for a regulatory approach to OTC commodity derivatives which both 
differentiated commercial end-users from other parties, and sought to address the 
concerns of such marketplace participants through further rulemaking. Because a trade 
option, by definition, is transacted by at least one commercial entity, the review of this 
 
440 See comment file: https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1305. 
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derivative instrument’s regulation was, therefore, a part of the emendation program 
advanced by Chairperson Massad:  
 
In sum, we have been very focused on fine-tuning the rules to make sure they work 
for commercial end-users, and we will continue to do so. For example, I know several 
of your companies are working on submitting Form TO to report trade option 
positions […] I’ve asked the CFTC staff to look at the usefulness of this information 
and we will consider changes to reduce the reporting currently required for trade 
options.441 
 
 From the standpoint of semiosis, the changes made to the trade option exemption 
in the proposed and final “Trade Options” rules broadly reflect the influence of Massad’s 
articulated position on reducing perceived regulatory burdens for commercial end-users in 
conjunction with the perspectives of regulatees and their representatives exercising 
instrumental (lobbying) power. For example, the deletion of Form TO – the effect of which 
was to relieve non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants from all yearly reporting 
requirements relating to their trade option activities – emerged as a response to regulatees 
(and their representatives) communicating to the CFTC their experience with the (apparent) 
high cost of Form TO compliance.442 The discourse advanced by Chairperson Massad, which 
communicated an intention to mollify the concerns of commercial end-users, and to 
“consider” reducing trade option reporting obligations, intersected with the perspectives of 
these OTC commodity derivative marketplace participants.  
 Another example is the new exemption’s elimination of the need for any non-swap 
dealer or non-major swap participant to report trade option transactions in real-time. This 
can first be seen as the codification in the genre of a textual rule (i.e., recontextualization) 
 
441 Remarks of Timothy G. Massad before the Coalition for Derivative End-Users, Chairperson 
Timothy Massad, 26 February 2015. Available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opamassad-12. 
442 See Trade Options, 80 Fed. Reg. 26203 (2015).  
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with the Division of Market Oversight’s April 2013 no-action letter granting similar relief, an 
action taken to accommodate the ostensible inability of some non-swap dealers and non-
major swap participants to comply with the trade option exemption’s real-time reporting 
requirement. It can also be viewed as an outgrowth of commodity industry parties’ 
comment letter requests that trade options not be required to be reported in real-time443 
given (at the direction of Chair Massad) the Commission’s intended end-user focused rule 
revisions. 
Two other instances of commercial end-users and their representatives exercising, 
through formally submitted comment letters, instrumental power to affect the trade option 
exemption include the final “Trade Options” rule’s withdrawal of the proposed $1 billion 
trade option notification scheme, and its limited trade option recordkeeping requirements 
for non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants. In regard to the former, 
Commission policymakers explicitly adopted the perspective of the self-described Electric 
Association, an electric power consortium comprising five regional electricity supply 
associations. That group asked that CFTC officials fully delete the $1 billion notification 
scheme.444 The justifications for this position given by the Electric Association – which were 
subsequently appropriated by CFTC policymakers as part of their own justifications for 
eliminating the requirement445 – were that the scheme could possibly impose significant 
costs on non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants, and that the data and 
 
443 See, for instance: Letter from Diane Moody, American Public Power Association, National Rural 
Electric Cooperative Association, Edison Electric Power Institute, and Electric Power Supply 
Association, 15 February 2013, at 7f and Letter from David Perlman, Bracewell & Giuliani, on behalf 
of the Coalition of Physical Energy Companies, 15 February 2013, at 2f. Both available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1305. 
444 See Trade Options, 81 Fed. Reg. 14970. (2016) and Letter from Russell Wasson, American Public 
Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electric Power Supply Association, Large Public Power 
Council, and National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 19 June 2015, at 3. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=60437&SearchText=. 
445 See Trade Options, 81 Fed. Reg. 14970 (2016). 
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information collected therefrom would not provide “any meaningful regulatory benefits” to 
the Commission’s mission of increasing OTC market transparency.446 To the latter, the final 
“Trade Options” rule’s limitation of recordkeeping requirements to transactions done in the 
“ordinary course” of a non-swap dealer’s or non-major swap participant’s business 
represents a recitation of the views expressed in comment letters of the aforementioned 
electric consortium and Southern Company Services (an electric power conglomerate).447 
This stands in contrast to the “full and complete records” obligation of the proposed “Trade 
Options” rule, and the even more stringent partial Part 45 compliance of the final 
“Commodity Options” rule. In accepting this recordkeeping standard, CFTC policymakers 
reasoned that – as similarly argued by the commenters448 – a limited standard would 
reduce costs to non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants.449 
 Stemming from this, it can be surmised that the contributing semiotic influences on 
the selection of a revised trade option exemption were the stated regulatory agenda of 
Commission leadership, and the comment letters of relevant parties and their 
representatives. Where these contributing influences intersected, and where the comment 
letters provided intellectual resources that agency policymakers could use to rationalize 
carrying out their new regulatory vision, the new trade option exemption naturally 
reflected the interests of industry. (Of note, countervailing perspectives were not formally 
available to CFTC officials in the comment file, as no non-industry, public advocacy groups 
 
446 Letter from Russell Wasson, American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electric 
Power Supply Association, Large Public Power Council, and National Rural Electric Cooperative 
Association, 19 June 2015, at 4. 
447 Letter from Paul Hughes, Southern Company Services, Inc., 22 June 2015, at 4f and Letter from 
Russell Wasson, American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electric Power Supply 
Association, Large Public Power Council, and National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 19 June 




449 See Trade Options, 81 Fed. Reg. 14971 (2016). 
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commented on any trade option-related solicitations.450 And further, as suggested by 
McKay and Yackee (2007), and as reviewed in Chapter 3, commenting groups forming a 
dominant proportion of a rule’s comment file and advancing the same or similar objectives 
can influence policymakers to respond positively to their requests.)  
The above analysis shows that the changes to the trade option exemption made in 
the proposed and final “Trade Options” rules came directly from the comment letters of 
commercial end-users (and non-swap dealers or non-major swap participants) of OTC 
commodity derivatives and their representative trade groups. This evidences an 
intertextual (and interdiscursive) relationship between the content of the CFTC’s 
regulations and the observations offered in these entities’ comment letters. It should be 
specified again, however, that although interested parties provided the Commission with 
comments on several occasions between the agency’s 2012 publication of the final 
“Commodity Options” rule, and the 2016 issuance of the final “Trade Options” rule, it was 
not until Chairperson Massad instructed Commission policymakers to re-examine the trade 
option exemption that such comment letters were able to tangibly inform the nature of a 
new exemption. Similar to the forward contract exclusion, this ostensibly implies that under 
Massad’s leadership, trade options rule-making was subject to capture by regulatees. 
Nevertheless, the same caveat that was made in the above analysis of the revised forward 
contract exclusion can likewise be made in relation to the proposed and final “Trade 
Options” rules. Namely, that this deference to industry commentary was intentional, and 
directed by the Chair so as to allay the concerns expressed by OTC commodity derivative 
 
450 See comment files. For that on the interim final trade options rule, see: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1196. For the December 2012 
Form TO comment request, see: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1305. For the proposed “Trade 





end-users regarding their perception of burdensome regulations. This phenomenon 
corroborates the notion in the literature review of Chapter 3 – e.g., Yackee and Yackee 
(2006) – that interested parties can achieve desirable final rulemaking outcomes through 
their provision of comment letters, and, when taken in conjunction with similar findings for 
forward contract exclusion rule-making, suggests that over the course of these rule-
makings, a symbiotic relationship existed between Commission policymakers’ (and their 
demand for intellectual resources to craft the Chairperson-directed rulemaking revisions) 
and regulatees (and their representatives) who supplied these officials with the textual 
content requisite to accomplish their regulatory mission. 
 The extra-semiotic considerations – as examined through the four selectivities 
posited by CPE – with which these semiotic influences interacted and co-evolved are nearly 
identical to those analyzed in the earlier discussion of the revised forward contract 
exclusion. Through the lens of the structural selectivity, the fact of leaving open the interim 
final rule on trade options, and the recomposition of CFTC leadership, both served to 
cultivate an environment wherein alterations to the trade option exemption, through 
rulemaking, could take place given the Commission’s plenary authority in that realm. 
Furthermore, while the previous commodity (trade) options-related rule-makings were 
drafted within an Agricultural Swaps Rulemaking Team led by Don Heitman, the proposed 
and final “Trade Options” rule-making efforts were not done in this same structural context. 
In particular, the new rule-makings were undertaken separate from that agricultural team, 
by individuals who were not responsible for the previous commodity options rules.451  
 
451 As based on the ‘For Further Information Contact’ listings in the preface to the proposed and final 
“Trade Options” rules. See Trade Options, 80 Fed. Reg. 26200 (2015) and Trade Options, 81 Fed. Reg. 
14966 (2016), respectively. 
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From the standpoint of the agential selectivity, as with the forward contract 
exclusion, Massad’s ability as Chairperson to set the agency’s regulatory agenda was again 
an essential factor in prompting and guiding the recasting of the trade option exemption. 
This agenda – informed by his regulatory vision – was one of modifying those OTC 
commodity derivative regulations that affected commercial end-users of these instruments. 
As such, Chair Massad directed the CFTC to revise the trade option exemption to be less 
burdensome to these same business entities, like through the elimination of required Form 
TO filing.452 
 With regard to the technological selectivity, a plethora of formal comment letters 
and other informal communications from regulatees and their representatives were already 
available. These could thus serve as intellectual resources on which Commission 
policymakers could draw as the Commission undertook exemption revisions in connection 
with the agency’s reconceptualized regulatory mission. Finally, as it relates to the discursive 
selectivity, here again, CFTC policymakers were afforded the opportunity to justifiably 
utilize the commentary of interested party comment letters to modify the trade option 
exemption in their development of the proposed and final “Trade Options” rules. 
Nevertheless, unlike with the case of the revisited forward contract exclusion, no non-
industry advocacy group commented on the matter of trade options at any of the 
rulemaking junctures discussed in this current chapter. Simply put, external intellectual 
resources concerning the regulation of trade options were exclusively provided by OTC 
commodity derivative industry interests.  
 
452 See: Remarks of Chairman Timothy Massad before the Natural Gas Roundtable (Washington, 





 In summary, the foregoing CPE-backed analysis has shown that Commission 
policymakers’ construction of the regulatory approach taken in the revised trade option 
exemption was conditioned by interacting and co-evolving semiotic and extra-semiotic 
factors. Guided by an amended regulatory mission articulated by new CFTC Chairperson 
Massad and other leadership, agency policymakers proceeded to revise the trade option 
exemption in a manner that sought to address the concerns expressed by commercial end-
users. When rule-making, such officials relied on the commentary provided by these 
participants, or by those who represented their interests. That commentary informed the 
changes to the reporting and recordkeeping requirements of the trade option exemption. 
As a result of this process, the regulation of trade options notably pivoted to differentiating 
non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants from other entities, and to a position 
which favored the regulatory positions advocated by commercial end-users. Through the 
final form of the trade option exemption, commodity (trade) option transactions by non-
swap dealers and non-major swap participants were exempted from compliance with 
essentially all Dodd-Frank swap regulations.  
 The revisions made to the trade option exemption further support the above 
argument concerning the evolving nature of the Dodd-Frank imaginary. As was the case 
with the modified forward contract exclusion, through trade option rulemaking, CFTC 
policymakers imparted to the Dodd-Frank imaginary a third lens through which to view 
their regulatory endeavors: exempting non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants 
(together, a subset of commercial end-users). This had the effect of freeing such entities 
from OTC commodity derivative regulations seeking to promote transparency and reduce 
systemic risk. The existing Dodd-Frank imaginary was subject to multiple sources of 
variation – most notably from the arrival of new Commission leadership which sought to 
revise OTC commodity derivative regulations affecting commercial end-users. Evidenced by 
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the proposed and final “Trade Options” rule-makings, agency policymakers then selected 
and retained a modified, tripartite Dodd-Frank imaginary which was compossible with the 
CFTC’s new regulatory vision, and which could reciprocally legitimate the agency’s 
regulatory reforms. By adopting this Dodd-Frank imaginary, Commission policymakers 
reduced the complexity of their regulatory endeavors in the heterogeneous OTC 
commodity derivative marketplace through a differentiated application of Dodd-Frank swap 




Through the above CPE analyses of the revised forward contract exclusion and trade option 
exemption, this chapter has explored how CFTC policymakers constructed the regulation of 
OTC commodity derivatives during the course of these terminal rulemaking events. In the 
case of the reinterpreted forward contract exclusion, policymakers expanded the qualifying 
facts and circumstances that a commercial-end user could rely upon when assessing the 
fitness for exclusion of a forward contract with embedded volumetric optionality. With 
regards to the revisions to the trade option exemption, agency officials removed effectively 
all reporting and recordkeeping compliance requirements for those trade options 
transacted by non-swap dealers and non-major swap participants. As discussed throughout 
this chapter, the principal regulatory thrust in the domain of OTC commodity derivatives 
during this ultimate rulemaking period was to revise those regulations affecting 
commercial-end users, and to provide these parties with concomitant regulatory relief. 
When taken together, the amended forward contract exclusion and the trade option 
exemption allowed for commercial end-users – and for non-swap dealers and non-major 
swap participants in particular – to effectively transact their OTC commodity derivatives 
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outside of the bounds of Dodd-Frank’s post-trade regulatory infrastructure (i.e., its swap 
regulations). 
 Although the exclusion and exemption produced this result, it is worth noting that 
Commission policymakers did not express in their rule-makings for these regulations any 
consideration of redefining as non-swaps so-called “intended-to-be-delivered” OTC 
commodity derivatives containing optionality. Rather, these officials elected to continue 
treating all OTC commodity derivatives containing optionality as swaps – in accordance with 
their interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act which defined a swap as, among other things, an 
“option of any kind” (emphasis added).453 During rulemaking for the new forward contract 
exclusion and trade option exemption, several industry commenters asked that the CFTC 
not treat some derivatives containing optional commitments as swaps in the first sense454; 
the desired outcome being that an instrument’s qualification for either the exclusion or 
exemption would be a superfluous aside. Nevertheless, Commission policymakers did not 
to select this approach and, thus, maintained their understanding of OTC commodity 
derivatives with embedded optionality as swaps in the first sense, notwithstanding the 
intended delivery of the exercised embedded option. This is significant because it illustrates 
that not all views expressed by industry commenters were accepted by CFTC officials. It also 
means that agency policymakers’ conception of what resulted in an OTC commodity 
derivative being a swap (i.e., optionality) remained unchanged, irrespective of outside party 
 
453 See Commodity Exchange Act § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2010). 
454 See, for instance: Letter from Amy Fisher, Cogen Technologies Linden Venture, L.P., 22 December 
2014. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=60092&SearchText=; Letter 
from Christina Crooks, National Association of Manufacturers, 28 January 2015. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=60357&SearchText=; Letter 
from Paul Hughes, Southern Company Services, Inc., 22 June 2015. Available at: 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=60452&SearchText=; and 




contestation and an institutional shift towards promoting regulations allaying the concerns 
of commercial end-users. One possible explanation for the retention of this approach is that 
Commission officials viewed the equivalence of swaps with all forms of options as 
statutorily determined by the Dodd-Frank Act, thus preventing the notion’s recasting 
through administrative agency rulemaking.455 Nonetheless, since Dodd-Frank specified that 
transactions in nonfinancial commodities where physical settlement was intended were to 
be excepted from definition as swaps, CFTC policymakers then relied on this qualification as 
the basis for crafting the forward contract exclusion as a subsidiary exception to the 
statutorily mandated definition of a swap.  
 In regard to this project’s CPE theoretical framework, the above analyses show that 
the process of constructing OTC commodity derivative regulations was one denoted by 
variation, selection, and retention. Variation arose from open comment periods on the 
issues of volumetric optionality and trade options, in addition to the arrival of new agency 
leadership which articulated and implemented an agenda of regulatory reform. The 
subsequent selection and retention of regulatory approaches towards forward contracts 
with embedded volumetric options and trade options were contingent on interacting and 
co-evolving semiotic and extra-semiotic influences. As such, the amended regulatory 
treatments of volumetric optionality and trade options were selected and retained because 
they were compossible with the pro-reform discourse of CFTC leadership (especially that of 
Chairperson Massad) subject to the constraints and opportunities afforded by the four 
selectivities as discussed above. Through this process, the Dodd-Frank imaginary was 
modified to reflect a new, tripartite understanding of the Dodd-Frank Act’s meaning in 
relation to OTC commodity derivatives. That imaginary was one which differentiated the 
 
455 See Forward Contracts With Embedded Volumetric Optionality, 80 Fed. Reg. 28240 (2015). 
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application of the Act’s swap regulations to OTC commodity derivatives as based on a 











Through a CPE-informed analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the CFTC 
between 2010 and 2016, this research project has examined how Commission policymakers 
constructed the regulation of these derivative instruments. As chapters 7 through 10 show, 
during each of the demarcated junctures in the rulemaking process (i.e., advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking, proposed rulemaking, final rulemaking, and the revisions to prior 
rulemaking), CFTC officials constructed their regulatory approaches to OTC commodity 
derivatives in slightly different ways. Those differing constructions were, in the vocabulary 
of CPE, influenced by the variable interaction and co-evolution of semiosis (semiotic 
factors) and structuration (extra-semiotic factors). Moreover, as rulemaking progressed, the 
Dodd-Frank imaginary, which served as the lens through which agency policymakers viewed 
their regulatory endeavors, itself evolved through the same dynamical changes to these 
intersecting influences. The Dodd-Frank imaginary that emerged at the terminus of 
rulemaking – and the one that, from the standpoint of CPE, was ultimately selected and 
retained by Commission policymakers – reflected the view that OTC commodity derivative 
transactions of commercial end-users456 (particularly non-swap dealers and non-major swap 
participants) would be either largely excluded or exempted from Dodd-Frank Act swap 
regulations (i.e., its post-trade regulatory infrastructure). 
 From the perspective of the CFTC’s historical experience with regulating OTC 
commodity derivatives (see Chapter 6) and the broader political economy, the analyzed 
rulemaking sequence has two significant implications. The first is that the agency’s 
longstanding question as to which OTC commodity derivative would be regulated was 
 
456 As noted in Chapter 10, this term is used to denote both true end-users of nonfinancial 
commodities (i.e., energy and metals) as well as commercial marketplace participants/commercial 
parties who produce, process, or handle nonfinancial commodities.  
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resolved. Through the CFTC’s forward contract exclusion and commodity (trade) options 
rulemaking, Commission policymakers defined, in the first instance, an OTC commodity 
derivative that would be regulated (i.e., a ‘swap’) as a contract for future delivery which 
contained optionality, principally relating to the intent to deliver the underlying asset 
referent, but also to the commodity’s price and quantity. Nevertheless, and as expressed by 
their revised regulatory approach (see Chapter 10), ultimately, the extent to which OTC 
commodity derivatives would be regulated as ‘swaps’ was contingent on a transacting 
party’s status as a commodity commercial end-user (predominantly unregulated), or as a 
non-commercial end-user (regulated). Thus, the OTC commodity derivative transactions of, 
for instance, a municipal tidal energy producer would generally be excepted or exempted 
from these regulations, whereas similar activities of systemically important financial 
institutions would not. 
 The other significant implication concerns the multi-year rulemaking sequence’s 
meaning from the standpoint of its broader political economy. Across the arc of OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking, the regulatory structure in-place at the end of 2016 for 
OTC commodity derivative market participants who were commercial end-users (and non-
swap dealers and non-major swap participants) resembled the mostly unregulated OTC 
commodity derivative space that characterized the pre-Dodd-Frank period discussed in 
Chapter 6. While highly levered banks and other financial institutions were the primary 
facilitators of the instability which typified the OTC derivatives marketplace during the 
2007/2008 financial crisis, as illuminated in Chapter 6, OTC commodity derivative 
commercial marketplace participants – such as Enron – had been at the core of other OTC 
derivative-related instability in the lead-up to that crisis. The Dodd-Frank Act sought to both 
bring transparency to OTC derivative markets and to reduce the systemic risk which 
emerged therefrom – thereby addressing problems central to the financial crisis and, in 
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part, to the historical crises in OTC commodities trading. Despite this, the terminal OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking events covered in Chapter 10 seemingly indicate that 
these goals would not apply to commercial, non-financial enterprises. Thus, OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking between 2010 and 2016 arguably resulted in the 
perpetuation of a potentially crisis-prone regulatory regime, but one that beneficially (from 
the standpoint of costs and expenses) limited commercial end-users’ need for regulatory 
compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act. 
In the balance of the materials that follow, thoughts and observations on three 
particular items are put forward. First, through answering this project’s guiding sub- and 
central research questions, a recapitulation of the basic findings revealed in the previous 
chapters is presented. Included therein is a discussion of the possible limitations associated 
with these findings. Second, the findings addressed are then used to comment and expand 
on applicable literature reviewed in Chapter 3, and to elucidate what this project 
contributes to the scholarly research on the CFTC’s OTC derivative rulemaking, specifically, 
and on the process of administrative agency rulemaking, generally. And finally, a brief 
recitation of potential further research opportunities is offered. 
 
ENGAGING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS, REVIEWING THE FINDINGS, AND POSSIBLE 
LIMITATIONS 
With specific regard to the four sub- and central questions, as well as with regard to the 
essential findings of this thesis, and the potential limitations generally faced by this project, 
the following comments are in order.   
 First among sub-research questions concerns the CPE-posited imaginaries present 
during rulemaking. As stated throughout the above analytical chapters, Commission 
officials viewed their regulatory endeavors through the lens of a Dodd-Frank imaginary 
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whose applied meaning was to bring transparency to OTC derivative markets, and to reduce 
corresponding systemic risk. This imaginary emerged from the directives of the Dodd-Frank 
Act and was operationalized through the Commission’s regulations of OTC (commodity) 
derivatives. Both the analyses of the proposed (Chapter 8) and final (Chapter 9) rule-
makings indicate that this two-pronged Dodd-Frank imaginary served as a guide for 
policymakers as they constructed their approach to the regulation of OTC commodity 
derivatives. Nevertheless, as noted in the analysis of the revised rule-makings (Chapter 10), 
and as will be further elaborated on below, this initial Dodd-Frank imaginary was contested 
and evolved to take on a tripartite form whose meaning included the exclusion or 
exemption of OTC commodity derivative transactions of most commercial end-users from 
Dodd-Frank’s transparency and systemic risk mitigation infrastructure. 
 The second sub-research question pertains to the regulatory considerations to 
which CFTC policymakers granted significance during rulemaking as they, in the vocabulary 
of CPE, developed ‘construals’, or their regulatory approaches. From the broad perspective 
of the entire rulemaking sequence, the main considerations to which policymakers granted 
significance when crafting their OTC commodity derivative regulations were the presence 
of optionality in the derivative instruments (thus, rendering them a swap per the Dodd-
Frank Act); the nature of a party transacting an OTC commodity derivative (e.g. a 
commercial end-user, a swap dealer, etc.); the regulatory constraints and opportunities 
afforded by the overarching Dodd-Frank Act; the agency’s existing regulatory precedent in 
the marketplace; the communications of outside parties (typically through comment 
letters); and, the Commission’s regulatory mission or vision. Across the analyzed rulemaking 




 More specifically, the analyses of the preceding chapters show that within each 
rulemaking event, agency policymakers gave significance to particular subsets of these 
items. For instance, through the two advance notices of proposed rulemaking, the provision 
of commentary by outside parties concerning how the Dodd-Frank Act would affect existing 
OTC derivative regulations and how the Act should guide the development of new 
regulations (though not as it related to commodity and trade options) was overtly 
encouraged by policymakers, both in the notices themselves as well as in the external 
communications of Commission officials. During the development of the proposed rules, 
while comment letters of interested parties were considered by policymakers, officials 
primarily emphasized a narrow interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act and agency precedent 
to inform and structure proposed regulations for those OTC commodity derivatives 
containing optionality (i.e., swaps); a path plausibly conditioned by Chair Gensler’s 
expressed desire for proposed rule-makings to closely adhere to the Act, and a tendency by 
policymakers to recontextualize aspects of existing regulations into new domains to 
expediently perform their tasks. While the communications of outside parties were a 
significant consideration as CFTC policymakers crafted a nuanced approach in the final rules 
to treating optionality within forward contracts and deliverable commodity (trade) options, 
the Gensler-led rulemaking efforts reflected his regulatory vision in that policymakers still 
relied on the Dodd-Frank Act and agency precedent as a central source informing final 
regulations. In the end, the revised rulemaking period evidences that policymakers granted 
especial significance to the perspectives of commercial end-users and their representatives 
in response to the articulated regulatory vision of new Commission leadership, and, in 
particular, that of new Chairperson Massad. The outcome of these revisions was to 
transform the regulatory structure for OTC commodity derivatives to one in which the 
nature of the party transacting these instruments was of central importance. 
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 The issue of why certain approaches to the regulation of OTC commodity 
derivatives were selected and retained, and what influenced this selection and retention, 
comprises the third sub-research question. CPE-informed analyses of the proposed, final, 
and revised rulemaking periods suggest that a regulatory approach was selected and 
retained by Commission policymakers in response to the interaction and co-evolution of 
extenuating influential semiotic and extra-semiotic factors. For instance, the selection of 
the proposed regulatory approaches to commodity (trade) options and the forward 
contract exclusion, as explored in Chapter 8, reflects policymakers’ reliance on existing 
regulatory precedent and the language of the Dodd-Frank Act, especially in light of the 
relatively limited availability of outside party perspective on the subtleties of deliverable 
optionality embedded in forward contracts and commodity (trade) options. Moreover, as 
discussed in conjunction with CPE’s agential selectivity, the proposed regulations were 
influenced by the regulatory vision (or policy preference) and actions of Chairperson 
Gensler who, in an effort to increase transparency and reduce the systemic risk of OTC 
commodity derivatives, articulated a narrow interpretation of the Dodd-Frank imaginary’s 
meaning at this rulemaking juncture.  
As the subsequent comment period made available more detailed commentary on 
the perceived effects of the proposed regulations, policymakers responded in their final 
rules (see Chapter 9) by opting to reinstate a trade option exemption, and by elaborating 
on their understanding of an ‘intent to deliver’ standard central to the final forward 
contract exclusion, as well as developing a 7-part test for forward contracts with embedded 
volumetric optionality. Together, these responses were conditioned by several factors that 
were identified through an exploration of CPE-posited semiosis and structuration. Included 
among the factors were a consistent message expressed by outside party commenters 
requesting a trade option exemption (as discussed through semiosis and the technological 
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selectivity), interactions between intra-agency rulemaking groups (as discussed through the 
structural selectivity), the bounds afforded by the Dodd-Frank Act and the availability of 
existing agency regulatory precedent (as discussed through the discursive selectivity), and 
the influence of Chairperson Gensler who adjusted his position on the regulatory matters 
covered in the final rules after consulting with actors external to the CFTC (as discussed 
through the agential selectivity). This particular juncture in the rulemaking process had the 
effect of refining the Dodd-Frank imaginary, though the imaginary generally maintained its 
applied two-pronged meaning of increasing OTC marketplace transparency and reducing 
systemic risk. The revisions to the forward contract exclusion and the trade option 
exemption (see Chapter 10) were an outgrowth of an adjusted regulatory mission 
pronounced by new Commission leadership – especially new Chair Massad – that sought, 
through its (and, specifically, his) ability to both set the agency’s regulatory agenda and to 
exercise discretion over regulations’ content, to revisit regulations affecting commercial 
end-users of OTC commodity derivatives. This nascent vision – one which conveyed an 
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank imaginary different than that expressed by previous Chair 
Gensler – intersected with regulatees’ oft-expressed desire for policymaker amenability 
towards revising OTC commodity derivative regulations in their (financial) favor, and the 
availability of intellectual resources (supplied through comment letters of regulatees and 
their representatives) necessary to inform the changes to regulations’ content. Out of all 
this, the Dodd-Frank imaginary ultimately evolved.   
 Relating to this last rulemaking stage, the fourth sub-research question enquires 
into whether the Dodd-Frank imaginary changed over the course of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking and, if so, how. The answer to the “whether” part of this question 
can be stated as an affirmative. In the end, the Dodd-Frank imaginary transformed to 
assimilate a third condition from which CFTC policymakers viewed their regulatory 
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endeavors: promoting transparency and mitigating systemic through regulation, provided 
the OTC commodity derivative activities of commercial end-users were either largely 
excluded or exempted. 
 With respect to the “how” part of this fourth question, the two-part Dodd-Frank 
imaginary was transformed through the CPE-posited process of variation, selection, and 
retention in response to the same interacting semiotic and extra-semiotic factors covered 
immediately above. Moreover, as explained in Chapter 4, notwithstanding an imaginary’s 
status as being sedimented, its continuation as such is dependent on the replication of its 
semiotic and extra-semiotic supports. Therefore, this two-pronged imaginary was unable to 
maintain its form in the revised rulemaking period, specifically due to the erosion of its 
supports caused by the presence of new influences. Chief among these was the arrival of 
Chairperson Timothy Massad, who articulated an adjusted regulatory mission of revising 
OTC commodity derivative regulations affecting commercial end-users – and who was 
endowed with the capacity and discretion to set and then carry out a rulemaking agenda to 
this end. 
 Through the findings of the analytical chapters of Part III, and the heretofore review 
of the sub-research questions, the answer to the central research question of how agency 
policymakers constructed the regulation of OTC commodity derivatives can now be 
summarized. The analyses of the proposed, final, and revised rule-makings, as informed by 
CPE, demonstrate that the construction of OTC commodity derivative regulations stemmed 
from an array of interacting and co-evolving semiotic and extra-semiotic factors (as 
reviewed above) which conditioned the variation, selection, and retention of these 
policymakers’ regulatory treatment of these same instruments. While the analyses of the 
proposed (Chapter 8) and final (Chapter 9) rulemaking reveal that Commission officials 
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crafted regulations which approximately followed two central themes emerging from the 
Dodd-Frank Act itself – the promotion of OTC marketplace transparency and the reduction 
of associated systemic risk – the revised rulemaking events (Chapter 10) indicate a 
significant transformation in how Commission policymakers constructed the regulation of 
OTC commodity derivatives. This transformation meant that the reach of what would be 
regulated by the CFTC as a ‘swap’, and thus subject to the two Dodd-Frank themes listed 
above, was extended only to those marketplace participants who were non-commercial 
end-users (e.g., financial firms, swap dealers, and major swap participants). As highlighted 
by the disjuncture in the adopted regulatory approach that transpired between the final 
and revised rule-makings, and as can be gleaned from the earlier analyses of each 
rulemaking event, the directional course of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking followed 
closely the articulated interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s meaning (i.e., the Dodd-Frank 
imaginary) by the Commission’s chairpersons. For Chair Gensler, it meant accepting no less 
than transparency into the OTC commodity derivative activities of all marketplace 
participants. For Chair Massad, the implementation of Dodd-Frank’s transparency and 
systemic risk reduction protocols were not to affect commercial end-users of OTC 
commodity derivatives, whom he viewed as not responsible for the financial crisis which 
precipitated the enactment of the Dodd-Frank law (see Chapter 10).  
 Before turning to how this research contributes to existing scholarly literature, four 
limitations associated with this project should be noted. First, the relatively small number 
of policymaker interviews conducted could mean that potentially significant details 
concerning OTC commodity derivative rulemaking within the CFTC were missed. Although 
such details remain in the realm of ‘unknown-unknowns’, should they be in existence, they 
could impact the findings herein arrived at. Attempts were, however, made to contact 
additional interviewees for in-person or telephonic interviews, but to no avail. Second, the 
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findings of this study could be sensitive to the data on which the analysis sampled. 
Nevertheless, to mitigate these potential limitations, the instant study has drawn on 
manifold rulemaking-related documentation and followed a consistent CPE-based analytical 
approach to the individual rulemaking cases so as to ensure its claims to internal validity. 
Furthermore, where unknowns exist, or where there is an absence of evidence in the 
utilized data, their hypothesized presence is made known.  
The third potential limitation is that the eclectic methodological approach to 
operationalizing CPE in the context of administrative agency rulemaking may be perceived 
as having resulted in the above analyses privileging certain semiotic or extra-semiotic 
influences over others, and/or semiosis over structuration. To alleviate this potential 
concern, the analytical chapters have sought to explore both the semiotic and extra-
semiotic dimensions of rulemaking, and how they intersected, in-detail. Finally, given that 
this research is structured as a single-unit case study that focuses on a subset of overall 
Dodd-Frank Act era rulemaking in a regulatory domain characterized by idiosyncrasies, fully 
generalizing its findings to other cases of Dodd-Frank rulemaking, and to the more general 
rulemaking literature, could, as alluded to in Chapter 5, be limited. In light of this, should 
any generalizations be made, any reference to this paper’s findings must make abundantly 
clear that the results are situated within the specific context of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking at the Commission between 2010 and 2016. 
 
RETURNING TO THE EXISTING LITERATURE AND THIS RESEARCH’S CONTRIBUTIONS  
Here, the Conclusion to this thesis employs the study’s results to comment on the extant 
scholarship on Dodd-Frank era rulemaking at the CFTC and on that from the field of 
administrative agency rulemaking.  
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 The findings of this study on OTC commodity derivative rulemaking directly 
contribute to the emerging body of existing literature on the Commission’s Dodd-Frank-
related rulemaking. Take, for example, the work of Ziegler and Woolley (2016) on CFTC 
rulemaking in the OTC derivatives space. Recall from Chapter 3 that these authors posited 
the existence of a ‘stability alliance’ – comprising non-industry, public advocacy groups – 
that was able to thwart the influence of derivative industry interests and to provide usable 
intellectual resources to Commission policymakers across multiple post-Dodd-Frank rule-
makings. As noted by Ziegler and Woolley (2016), Better Markets, Inc. and Americans for 
Financial Reform were prominent members of this ‘stability alliance’, and routinely supplied 
intellectual resources, through comment letters, to the CFTC. Moreover, their study went 
so far as to imply the existence of a symbiotic relationship between the comment letters of 
Better Markets and the agency’s OTC derivative regulations, in that Commission 
policymakers would cite the content of this advocacy group’s letters to justify their 
regulatory positions (Ziegler and Woolley 2016: 270f). 
 Given the results of this inquiry into OTC commodity derivative rulemaking at the 
CFTC between 2010 and 2016, Ziegler and Woolley’s position on the influence of a ‘stability 
alliance’ should be approached with a modicum of skepticism. While it is possible that a 
melding of non-industry, public advocacy group interests operationalized in comment letter 
form may have, to some extent, conditioned the rules targeted in Ziegler and Woolley 
(2016: 277) – none of which pertained to definitional aspects of swaps or those parties who 
trade swaps – a similar outcome cannot be seen in the context of revised OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking. Notwithstanding Better Markets supporting the final form of 
forward contract exclusion (see Chapter 9), CFTC policymakers revised its treatment of 
embedded volumetric optionality in a way that privileged the interests of commodity 
industry actors (see Chapter 10) as during this revision to the forward contract exclusion, 
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Better Markets, Americans for Financial Reform, and Public Citizen – a conceivable ‘stability 
alliance’ in its own right – petitioned the Commission to reconsider its revisions to the 
exception, but to absolutely no avail. If the concept of a ‘stability alliance’ took form during 
Dodd-Frank era rulemaking, it is possible that it only existed as a researcher-construed 
coalition affecting the narrow range of rules over the specific time period studied in Ziegler 
and Woolley (2016). Thus, the positions advanced by Ziegler and Woolley (2016) may not 
be generalizable across other Dodd-Frank-related CFTC rulemaking endeavors.  
 Other literature to which the findings of this study on OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking can contribute include the works of Krug (2015) and Peirce (2014). The notion 
advanced by Krug (2015) that Commission policymakers viewed swaps as instruments of 
“pretending” can, to an extent, be supported by the case of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking. This is because, in the derivative rulemaking context, agency officials viewed 
those OTC commodity instruments which may or may not result in delivery (i.e., not binding 
a party to a fixed investment of capital), or which vary in terms of quantity delivered and 
price, as, at least in the first sense, regulatable swaps. Nevertheless, as pointed out in 
Chapter 3, and as implied by this project’s overall findings, the concept of “pretending” 
should be seen as an outgrowth of the contractual feature of optionality; a highly salient 
characteristic of transactions in the OTC commodity derivative space and one omitted in 
Krug’s construction of the conception of “pretending.” For OTC commodity derivative 
transactions, “pretending” (as opposed to “investing”) arises because of an embedded 
optional feature within a contract (e.g., delivery or non-delivery upon exercise of the intra-
contractual option) for which one party maintains the right to exercise this feature, and the 
other party the obligation to perform, but for which this exercise remains an uncertain 
possibility (i.e., a pretense) until either done, or the contract expires.  
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 With regards to Peirce (2014), this author’s position that CFTC policymakers 
experienced internal and external pressures to hastily draft and finalize Dodd-Frank era 
rules does have credence, given the data presented in the analytical chapters of this thesis. 
Peirce (2014) is correct to posit that Commission officials may have put forth incomplete, 
expediently crafted rules for which they had to return through further rulemaking, or 
through other agency actions. A prime example of this in OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking was explicated in Chapter 10 and involved the Division of Market Oversight 
issuing multiple no-action letters providing some regulatory relief to marketplace 
participants who were ostensibly unable to comply with regulations that would later be 
subject to revision. These no-action letters are a clear indication of the CFTC returning to a 
matter that may have been thought of as unfinished business. 
 As for the work of Helleiner (2018), one of this author’s key propositions is that 
Commission rulemaking in the domain of OTC commodity derivatives reflected, in part, 
agency-specific “historical norms” and “distinct institutional environments.” This notion can 
be supported by the findings of this thesis, particularly insofar as the recontextualization of 
existing regulatory precedent is concerned. For instance, in the Commission’s efforts to 
define which OTC commodity derivatives would be regulated, CFTC policymakers 
recontextualized the Brent Interpretation and, through the agency’s plenary authority, re-
proposed a trade option exemption. And, to Helleiner’s second point, as discussed in the 
above analytical chapters, distinct CFTC rulemaking groups impacted both commodity 
(trade) options and forward contract exclusion rulemaking. This suggests that factors such 
as agency norms, historical regulatory precedent, and intra-agency institutional design (i.e., 
the establishment or dissolution of rulemaking groups) played a part in conditioning OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking. 
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 Regarding the research of Pagliari (2018), this researcher posited that across many, 
though not all, Dodd-Frank era rules promulgated by the CFTC (and the SEC), business 
coalitions influenced regulatory outcomes in their favor. While the instant study on OTC 
commodity derivative rulemaking has shown that commodity business interests and trade 
groups did achieve, from their perspective, some positive regulatory outcomes, as analyzed 
herein, this was not universally the case at each stage of rulemaking. (And as will be 
discussed below, the positive outcomes that were achieved by industry were contingent on 
additional considerations.) Furthermore, the research herein has highlighted the 
importance of a variety of other semiotic and extra-semiotic factors – such as the 
availability and recontextualization of existing regulatory precedent, changes to the 
composition of Commission leadership, and the exercise of bureaucratic discretion by an 
agency chairperson to purse his or her regulatory vision (or policy preferences) which 
coincides with the interests of business coalitions – that conditioned OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking; factors notably absent from the narrowly-focused research of 
Pagliari (2018). This highlights the efficacy of taking an expansive analytical approach – i.e., 
one that can consider a multitude of significant actors and factors, such as CPE – to the 
analysis of rulemaking and regulatory construction.  
 Now shifting away from how this study contributes to the existing scholarly 
literature on OTC derivative rulemaking, and commenting, instead, on the relationship 
between this CPE-backed study and the broader rulemaking scholarship covered in Chapter 
3. A few remarks should be made concerning the intersection of the instant study and of 
theories of capture. While this research into OTC commodity derivative rulemaking has not 
sought to assess the efficacy of theories of capture, the findings of this study do, 
nonetheless, imply that regulators were not unintentionally captured by regulatees (and 
their representatives) over the course of rulemaking.  
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The complex matter of the regulatory treatment of forward contracts with 
embedded volumetric optionality best highlights this point. As stated in Chapter 9, outside 
industry parties were successfully able to attain an exclusion from regulation for some of 
these OTC contracts after they provided Commission policymakers with comment letters. 
Nevertheless, the exclusionary language that was adopted in the final rule-making proved 
largely unpalatable to these same participant – suggesting that while the agency was open 
to altering its selected regulatory approach on request from industry actors, the actual 
content of the regulation was not captured by these same external entities. With the arrival 
of Chairperson Massad and new CFTC leadership, however, the issue of volumetric 
optionality was revisited. The analysis conducted in Chapter 10 showed that the content of 
the revised exclusion for forward contracts containing volumetric options stemmed directly 
from some, though not all, comment letter requests made by commercial end-users and 
their representatives.  
Although using external actor-provided commentary to inform the content of the 
revisions to regulation suggests capture by regulatees, the precondition to such capture 
must not be diminished in importance: newly-minted Chairperson Massad directed agency 
officials to review OTC commodity derivative regulations in an effort to allay the expressed 
concerns of commercial end-users. This meant that the discursive material which 
policymakers would utilize to inform the content of their revised regulations would 
necessarily come from these entities or their representatives. In this case, should a claim to 
capture be made, it is contingent on it being intentional in that the pre-existing regulatory 
beliefs of Chair Massad were compatible and intersected with the expressed interests of 
the regulatees whom the Chair sought, through rulemaking, to assist.  
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Even from the standpoint of cultural capture (Kwak 2014), the above analysis 
suggests that the agency’s chairs were not captured. While Chairperson Gensler came from 
an executive-level position at the banking group Goldman Sachs, in addition to time spent 
at the U.S. Treasury Department, there is no evidence that he sought to direct the 
regulation of OTC commodity derivative users in a manner that could be considered wholly 
accommodating, and this despite his apparent congruent ‘cultural’ background. Considering 
his reputation in business circles as generally hostile to financial and business interests,457 
the regulatory actions of this powerful actor do not fit with the propositions of cultural 
capture.  
Likewise, the Commission’s rulemaking direction, and regulatory outcomes 
achieved, under Chair Massad, a former Treasury Department official, corporate attorney, 
and organizer for consumer rights’ activist and Presidential candidate Ralph Nader, cannot 
be explained by the precepts of cultural capture. Here, Massad’s regulatory mission to 
review OTC commodity derivative regulations affecting commercial end-users was 
articulated prior to his assumption of power within the CFTC (see Chapter 10). The direct 
implication of this extant disposition is that his eventual decision to overhaul OTC 
commodity derivative regulations was not driven by experienced ‘cultural’ affinities once in 
a position of influence. 
These examples suggest that theories of capture have limited ability to provide 
idiosyncratic explanations of rulemaking outcomes, and that any ability to do so is not 
universally applicable to all rulemaking cases. The analyses of the OTC commodity 
derivative rule-makings, and the discussion provided immediately above, highlight that 
capture can be circumstantial and contingent; the capacity for capture should not be 
 
457 Chon, Gina. “Gary Gensler defends record as he leaves CFTC”. Financial Times, 30 December 2013. 
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/90de8f24-6c1d-11e3-a216-00144feabdc0.     
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conflated with the manifestation of capture. This is especially evident during multi-phased, 
multi-year rulemaking – such as for OTC commodity derivatives – wherein changes to the 
milieu in which an agency undertakes rulemaking, and, also, to its relationship with 
regulatees, can be commonplace. 
 Continuing on to articulate something about this project’s contributions to the 
research field of administrative agency rulemaking generally, a few items should be 
referenced. As it relates to the central proposition of Yackee’s literature on external 
stakeholder impact on regulations through rule comments (see Chapter 3), outside party 
comments – specifically those of industry or its representatives provided at various 
moments during rulemaking – can influence the nature (i.e., content) of prescribed 
regulations. It should be noted that similarly to Rashin (2020), the instant study has gone 
beyond the works of Yackee and others reviewed in Chapter 3 in that it has sought to 
definitively establish – in this case through the analysis of intertextual, interdiscursive, and 
recontextualized dimensions of regulatory texts – the discursive links between the speech 
acts of external agency actors (among other things) and the content of drafted regulations. 
Nevertheless, as the findings of this study on OTC commodity derivative rulemaking 
indicate, such influence is neither universal in power, nor exclusive in terms of being a 
conditioning factor for regulatory development. Moreover, and, importantly, through this 
CPE-informed analysis, it has been shown that the ability of regulatees and their 
representatives to influence (and in some cases inform) the content of regulations can be 
contingent on other factors, such as synergy with a chairperson’s expressed policy 
preferences and the discursive bounds afforded by the overriding statute.  
 For example, in regards to the absence of outside comments’ universal power, 
notwithstanding the submission of comments by industry interests advocating the exact 
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opposite, Commission policymakers steadfastly maintained their codified view that 
regulatable swaps were, in the first sense, synonymous with an option of any kind (i.e., a 
commodity, trade, or embedded volumetric option). And to the absence of exclusivity as a 
conditioning factor, while comments received were a contributing factor to the CFTC’s 
reinstatement of a trade option exemption in its final Commodity Options rule (see Chapter 
9), this exemption already had historically existed in agency rules, and its re-granting was 
accompanied by the application of reporting and recordkeeping requirements on trade 
option transactions (a potential cost to industry actors). Even in the case of the revised 
rulemakings (see Chapter 10), commodity industry commenters had provided their 
perspectives to Commission policymakers for a couple of years prior to the rule review, but 
with no alterations to regulations. Here, the impetus for change was the entry into a 
position of power of new CFTC leadership – principally Chairperson Massad. This official 
consistently articulated a modified regulatory vision for OTC commodity derivatives, a 
vision then exemplified by a new regulatory approach. 
 To this point, the findings from this inquiry into the case of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking suggest the importance of the Commission’s Chairperson in 
influencing the character of the constructed regulations. While some of the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3 posits that agency bureaucrats serve as the de facto agents of 
external principals (i.e., Congress, the President, and regulatees), the above analyzes have 
indicated that there does exist bureaucratic discretion on the part of the CFTC’s Chair when 
acting within the bounds of an authorizing statute (e.g., the Dodd-Frank Act). This is 
particularly apparent insofar as setting a regulatory agenda and conditioning rule content 
(i.e., the selection of certain discourses used to inform rule-making) are concerned. As 
explored above, Chair Gensler and Chair Massad were each actively involved in directing 
the OTC commodity derivative rulemaking process, and both articulated distinct regulatory 
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visions regarding the character of the prospectively constructed OTC commodity derivative 
regulations. In the end, the adopted regulatory approaches to these instruments taken 
during these internal agency actors’ tenures mirrored the corresponding policy preferences 
that they expressed. Given this, scholarship on rulemaking should take seriously the 
influence of an agency’s chairperson on rulemaking. (Nevertheless, as imparted by the 
literature reviewed earlier in this thesis, the discretion that a chair has over rulemaking can 
be tempered by the political actions of external actors – e.g., Congress and the President – 
but in the analysis of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking, this was not significantly the 
case.)  
 The case of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking can also provide an interesting 
reflection on the notion of ‘structural prominence’ – briefly reviewed in Chapter 3 – and its 
impact on administrative agency rulemaking as posited by Young (2015). While swap 
dealers and major swap participants (e.g., multinational, integrated energy companies BP 
and Shell) would likely be deemed ‘structurally prominent’ actors in the OTC commodity 
derivative space, and, thus, potentially better able to attain regulatory protections from 
policymakers, the revisions to the trade option exemption were simply not made applicable 
to such entities. Rather, Commission officials sought to reduce regulatory burdens on non-
swap dealers and non-major swap participants through the modified exemption; potentially 
meaning that the extent of the influence of ‘structural prominence’ may be contingent on 
other factors, such as the policy preferences of an agency’s chairperson (or of a voting 
majority of an agency’s leadership). Additionally, further refinement of the ‘structural 
prominence’ concept could be made, especially given that, in the case of OTC commodity 
derivative rulemaking, some of the leading interested parties seeking to influence the 
CFTC’s regulations were trade groups (without large numbers of employees or monetary 
assets in their own right; hence, possessors of neither structural power nor ‘structural 
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prominence’). These parties represented entities ranging from small commodity end-users 
to registered swap dealers. Despite such trade groups’ apparent lack of actual structural 
prominence, Commission policymakers, nonetheless, utilized the content of some of these 
groups’ comment letters to inform the agency’s regulatory approach. Obviously, this leaves 
open the question of how diversely constituted trade groups, who themselves lack 
structural prominence, might fit within Young’s administrative agency rulemaking model.  
 In addition to the above contributions to knowledge of Dodd-Frank era rulemaking 
and to some of the particulars of this administrative process, this project also makes 
contributions to the broad field of rulemaking in two further ways. First, by employing a 
longitudinal, qualitative study, this project has been able analyze a very particular and 
limited rulemaking subject in each of its distinctive iterations: advance notices of proposed 
rulemaking, notices of proposed rulemaking, final rules, and revised rules. As such, this 
research into OTC commodity derivative rulemaking reveals the importance of examining 
each of the individual steps along the entire rulemaking spectrum. Such is necessary to 
formulate a completely understanding of the construction of regulations given, as what 
Wilson (1980) intimated, that rulemaking is a heterogeneous process with manifold 
contingent contributing influences and factors to consider. By virtue of undertaking the 
inquiry into OTC commodity derivative rulemaking in this manner, this study contributes a 
possible framework for how to structure qualitative research into the creation of rules and 
regulations. 
 The second of these contributions is through this study’s advancement of CPE into 
the scholarly domain of rulemaking. In applying this theoretical framework, multiple 
analytical strands concerning this administrative process have been woven together and 
examined. The central additions to rulemaking literature made by having explored OTC 
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commodity derivative rulemaking from the perspective of CPE are as follows: (1) CPE’s 
analytical lenses (i.e., semiosis and structuration through the four selectivities) have 
allowed for a novel exploration of a multiplicity of interlinked influences on rule 
development (including those referenced in the extant rulemaking literature), (2) the CPE-
informed analyses conducted above have gone beyond existing approaches to rulemaking 
analysis, such as the ACF, in that CPE has facilitated a coherent, interwoven assessment of 
micro-level considerations (e.g., the content of rules, comment letters, and policymaker 
speech acts) through to those at the macro-level (e.g., historical as well as contextual 
matters of political economy and relating to a policy ‘imaginary’), (3) utilizing CPE has 
introduced the concept of a guiding (policy) ‘imaginary’ into scholarship on U.S. 
administrative agency rulemaking, and (4) CPE has facilitated an efficaciously structured 
analysis of rulemaking (i.e., one utilizing rule content as the analytical entry-point before 
moving onto an assessment of those multi-level semiotic and extra-semiotic influences that 
interacted and co-evolved – in conjunction with the process of variation, selection, and 
retention – to condition regulatory construction). 
 Furthermore, this study of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking also contributes 
to the growing body of CPE literature. This is the case because this inquiry advances CPE 
into a research domain – that of administrative agency rulemaking – left untouched by 
existing CPE scholarship, and because the study further refines the CPE theoretical 
framework through its application to analyzing rulemaking. As such, this project provides a 
possible guide for future CPE-based rulemaking research. 
 
AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
Several further research opportunities involving CPE and the field of administrative agency 
rulemaking exist. Most directly, CPE-informed analyses of other Dodd-Frank era rules – 
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whether crafted by the Commission or SEC, among others – could be pursued to enrich the 
literature. Among such opportunities could be research into the formation of the 
regulations constituting the CFTC’s post-trade regulatory infrastructure (i.e., rules for 
reporting and recordkeeping, clearing, margining, and position limits).  
 Another potential vein for exploring in further research could be the development 
of a firm set of procedures for best operationalizing CPE in the context of administrative 
agency rulemaking. Although the instant study has set out its own methodological 
procedure for doing as much in the narrow domain of OTC commodity derivative 
rulemaking, future research employing CPE as a theoretical framework for guiding analyses 
of rulemaking could endeavor to build a more universally-minded set of procedures. This 
could take the form of a critically derived ‘how to’ guide to operationalizing CPE in the 
context of rulemaking.  
 Furthermore, future studies of financial regulatory rulemaking might benefit from 
an integration of, or marriage between, the various theories of capture and an applied 
research program such as CPE. For instance, a synthesis of knowledge capture and the CPE 
framework in the context of a qualitative rulemaking study might use semiosis as an entry-
point to analyze how the expressed perspectives of ‘knowledgeable’ outside party 
commenters achieve intellectual hegemony over the content of financial regulations. Still 
yet other rulemaking research might seek to similarly incorporate CPE with other analytical 
perspectives, such as the ACF, to analyze cases pertaining to this administrative process. 
 Finally, since this study of OTC commodity derivative rulemaking has highlighted 
the significant influence that the CFTC’s Chairperson had on the character of regulation for 
these financial instruments, additional research examining this phenomenon across other 
administrative agencies and rulemaking events is warranted. As noted in Chapter 3, there 
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exists scant scholarship on this issue. Thus, inquiring into the influence of chairpersons on 
rulemaking could enrich knowledge in regard to this administrative process as well as to the 
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Rulemaking-related Documents Cited in the Analyses of Part III 
 
Document Name Document Type 
Agricultural Advisory Committee Meeting, 5 August 2010 Agency Meeting 
Open Meeting on the Fourteenth Series of Proposed Rulemakings under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 27 April 2011 
Agency Meeting 
Open Meeting to Consider Final Rule on Further Definition of the Term 
“Swap,” Final Rule on the End-User Exemption to Clearing, and Proposed 
Rule to Exempt from Clearing Certain Swaps by Cooperatives, 10 July 2012 
Agency Meeting 
Open Meeting to Consider Two Final Rules, 12 April 2012 Agency Meeting 
Opening Statement, Chairman Gary Gensler, Meeting of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, December 16, 2010 
Agency Meeting 
Opening Statement, Commissioner Michael V. Dunn, Public Meeting on 
Proposed Rules Under Dodd-Frank Act, 19 November 2010 
Agency Meeting 
Letter from American Gas Association, 23 March 2012 Comment Letter 
Letter from Amy Fisher, Cogen Technologies Linden Venture, L.P., 22 
December 2014 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Amy Fisher, Cogen Technologies Linden Venture, L.P., 22 June 
2015 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Andrew K. Soto, American Gas Association, 26 June 2012 Comment Letter 
Letter from Arushi Sharma, American Gas Association, 17 April 2014 Comment Letter 
Letter from Bartlett Naylor, Public Citizen, 19 December 2014 Comment Letter 
Letter from Catherine Krupka on behalf of Edison Electric Institute and 
Electric Power Supply Association, 4 April 2011 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Christina Crooks, National Association of Manufacturers, 28 
January 2015 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Christine M. Cochran on behalf the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, the American Soybean Association, the Commodity Markets 
Council, the National Association of Wheat Growers, the National 
Cattlemen’s Beef Association, and the National Corn Growers Association, 
28 October 2010 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Craig G. Goodman, National Energy Marketers Association, 26 
June 2012 
Comment Letter 
Letter from David McIndoe, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, L.L.P., on behalf of 
The Commercial Energy Working Group, 17 April 2014 
Comment Letter 
Letter from David Perlman, Bracewell & Giuliani on behalf of Coalition of 
Physical Energy Companies (COPE), 4 April 2011  
Comment Letter 
Letter from David Perlman, Bracewell & Giuliani, on behalf of the Coalition 
of Physical Energy Companies, 15 February 2013 
Comment Letter 
Letter from David Perlman, Bracewell & Giuliani, on behalf of the Coalition 




Letter from David Perlman, Bracewell & Giuliani, on behalf of the Coalition 
of Physical Energy Companies, 7 June 2012 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Dennis Kelleher, Better Markets, 12 October 2012 Comment Letter 
Letter from Dennis Kelleher, Better Markets, 22 December 2014 Comment Letter 
Letter from Dennis Kelleher, Better Markets, Inc., 22 July 2011 Comment Letter 
Letter from Diane Moody, American Public Power Association, National 
Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Edison Electric Power Institute, and 
Electric Power Supply Association, 15 February 2013 
Comment Letter 
1Letter from Janet Kelly, ConocoPhillips Company, 23 August 2012 Comment Letter 
Letter from Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Resources, 11 March 2011 Comment Letter 
Letter from Lance Kotschwar, Gavilon Group, LLC, 4 April 2011 Comment Letter 
Letter from Lisa Jacobson, Business Council for Sustainable Energy, 22 
December 2014 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Lisa Yoho, BG Americas & Global LNG, 22 July 2011 Comment Letter 
Letter from Lopa Parikh, Edison Electric Institute and Electric Power Supply 
Association, 17 April 2014 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Lopa Parikh, Edison Electric Institute, 26 June 2012 Comment Letter 
Letter from Marcus Stanley, Americans for Financial Reform, 22 December 
2014 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Mary Anne Mason, HoganLovells, LLP on behalf of Southern 
California Edison Company, Pacific Gas and Electric Company and San Diego 
Gas and Electric Company, 22 July 2011 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Matt Schatzman, BG Americas & Global LNG, 20 September 
2010 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Michael Sweeney, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, L.L.P., on behalf 
of the Commercial Energy Working Group, 26 June 2012 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Paige J. Lockett, EDF Trading North America, LLC, 22 December 
2014 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Paul Hughes, Southern Company Services, Inc., 22 June 2015 Comment Letter 
Letter from Paul J. Pantano, Jr. McDermott, Will & Emery on behalf of the 
Agricultural Commodity Swaps Working Group, 29 October 2010 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Paul M. Architzel, WilmerHale, on behalf of ONEOK, Inc., 22 July 
2011 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Phillip Lookadoo, International Energy Credit Association, 26 
June 2012 
Comment Letter 
Letter from R. Michael Sweeney, Jr., David T. McIndoe, and Mark W. 
Menzes, Hunton & Williams, LLP on behalf of Working Group of Commercial 
Energy Firms, 20 September 2010 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Robert Pickel, International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), 12 October 2012 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Russell D. Wasson on behalf of National Rural Electric 
Cooperative Association, American Public Power Association, and Large 




Letter from Russell Wasson, American Public Power Association, Edison 
Electric Institute, Electric Power Supply Association, Large Public Power 
Council, and National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 19 June 2015 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Ryan Barry, Commodity Markets Council, National Corn 
Growers Association, and Natural Gas Supply Association, 17 April 2014 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Ryan Barry, National Corn Growers Association & National Gas 
Supply Association, 22 December 2014 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Shane Skelton, American Petroleum Institute, 11 October 2012 Comment Letter 
Letter from Stephen O’Connor, International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, 22 December 2014 
Comment Letter 
Letter from Sweta Sethna, Plains All American Pipeline, L.P., 17 April 2014 Comment Letter 
Testimony Before the U.S. House Committee on Agriculture, Chairman Gary 
Gensler, 21 June 2011 
Congressional Testimony 
Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, Chairman Gary Gensler, 17 February 2011 
Congressional Testimony 
Testimony of Chairman Gary Gensler before the House Committee on 
Agriculture, 10 February 2011 
Congressional Testimony 
Testimony of Chairman Gary Gensler before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 12 April 2011 
Congressional Testimony 
Testimony of Chairman Timothy Massad before the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Washington, DC, Chairman Timothy 
Massad, 9 September 2014 
Congressional Testimony 
Testimony, Chairman Gary Gensler, House Committee on Agriculture, 
Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities and Risk Management, 15 
December 2010 
Congressional Testimony 
Testimony, Chairman Gary Gensler, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment 
and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 8 December 2010 
Congressional Testimony 
United States. Senate. Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Nominations of Timothy G. 
Massad, Sharon, Y. Bowen and J. Christopher Giancarlo. Hearings, March 6, 
2014. 113th Congress 2nd Session 
Congressional Testimony 
CFTC No-Action Letter No. 12-06, 14 August 2012 No-Action Letter 
CFTC No-Action Letter No. 13-08, 5 April 2013 No-Action Letter 
CFTC No-Action Letter No. 16-10, 18 February 2016 No-Action Letter 
Chairman’s Letter, President’s Budget and Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 
2013, Chairman Gensler, 13 February 2012 
Policymaker Speech 
Gensler, G. (2012) Interviewed by Charlie Rose Policymaker Speech 
Remarks before the Institute of International Bankers, Chairman Gary 
Gensler, 21 October 2010 
Policymaker Speech 
Remarks of Chairman Timothy Massad before the Natural Gas Roundtable 




Remarks of Chairman Timothy Massad before the Energy Risk Summit USA 
2015, Chairperson Timothy Massad, 12 May 2015 
Policymaker Speech 
Remarks of Chairman Timothy Massad before the National Energy 
Marketers Association, Chairperson Timothy Massad, 30 April 2015 
Policymaker Speech 
Remarks of Timothy G. Massad at the CME Global Financial Leadership 
Conference, Chairman Timothy Massad, 18 November 2014 
Policymaker Speech 
Remarks of Timothy G. Massad before the Coalition for Derivative End-
Users, Chairperson Timothy Massad, 26 February 2015 
Policymaker Speech 
Remarks on Dodd-Frank at the 6th Annual Capital Markets Summit, 
Chairman Gary Gensler, 28 March 2012 
Policymaker Speech 
Remarks on Dodd-Frank Financial Reform at George Washington University 
Law School, Chairman Gary Gensler, 2 March 2012 
Policymaker Speech 
Remarks, Implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, FIA’s Annual International 
Futures Industry Conference, Chairman Gary Gensler, 16 March 2011 
Policymaker Speech 
Agricultural Commodity Definition (2011) Rule 
Agricultural Swaps (2010) Rule 
Commodity Options (2012) Rule 
Commodity Options and Agricultural Swaps (2011) Rule 
Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (2010) 
Rule 
Forward Contracts With Embedded Volumetric Optionality (2014) Rule 
Forward Contracts With Embedded Volumetric Optionality (2015) Rule 
Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based 
Swap Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement 
Recordkeeping (2011) 
Rule 
Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major 
Swap Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible 
Contract Participant” (2010) 
Rule 
Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based 
Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement 
Recordkeeping (2012) 
Rule 
Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements (2012) Rule 
Trade Options (2015) Rule 






Informed Consent Form  
 
Informed Consent Form  
I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate): 
 
1. I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in 
the Information Sheet referenced to me by the Researcher. 
 
 




3. I voluntarily agree to participate in the project. 
 
 
4. I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and that I will 




5. The procedures regarding confidentiality have been clearly explained (e.g. 
use of names, pseudonyms, anonymisation of data, etc.) to me. 
 
 
6. The use of the data in research, publications, sharing and archiving has been 
explained to me. 
 
 
7. I agree to allow the Researcher to have the interview transcribed by a 
transcription service provider. 
 
 
8. Select only one of the following: 
• I would like my name used and understand what I have said or written 
as part of this study will be used in reports, publications and other 
research outputs so that anything I have contributed to this project 
can be recognised.  
 









Participant:   
________________________ __________________________     ________________ 
Name of Participant  Signature    Date 
 
Researcher: 
________________________ ___________________________  ________________ 







Interview Information Sheet, 2017 
Information Sheet 
 
Research project title: The U.S. Regulation of OTC Commodity Derivatives, 1992-2017 
Research investigator: Bryce Zedalis 
Contact details of research investigator: s1419822@sms.ed.ac.uk 
  
 
About the Project 
 
• This project explores and analyzes changes in OTC commodity derivative regulation 
in the United States between 1992 and 2017. Further, this project will present the 
contextual setting in which the OTC commodity derivative markets and their 
regulation evolved, and will critically analyze the discourses, ideas, and imaginaries 
(together, semiotic practices) that have informed OTC commodity derivatives 
policymaking since 1992. As a result, interviews concerning the experiences, 
accounts, and reflections of policymakers and other stakeholders involved in 
regulating OTC commodity derivative markets are necessary to complete this 
research endeavor.  
 
Who is responsible for the data collected in this study? 
 
• Bryce Zedalis is the researcher and data collector for this project. 
• Data for this project, specifically the interviews, will be stored electronically and will 
be transcribed so as to use in the final thesis. Upon the completion of the thesis, 
the electronic data will be deleted.  
• The data collected through the interviews will be kept private and will only be 
utilized for research relating to the thesis.  
 
What is involved in the interviews? 
 
On our previously agreed upon date, we will engage in a qualitative interview. The data 
from this interview will be utilized in connection with the research project and will partially 
serve as the basis for critical analysis. Please note that as a part of this analysis, I will 
approach the interview data with a critical eye – thus, critiques of your accounts, 
recollections, and thoughts may be offered in the thesis.  
 
Our interview will be loosely guided by an interview schedule with pre-set questions. 
Nevertheless, insofar as our conversation is germane to the topic of OTC commodity 
derivative regulation, I will encourage flexibility in conversation direction throughout the 
interview. Further, this interview will be audio recorded and I will take notes.  
 
Post-interview correspondence may take place, should you be amenable to as much. 
Additionally, upon transcription of the interview, please feel free to request a copy of the 
interview transcript. With your approval, I may enlist the support of a transcription service 




The projected completion date for this research project is the autumn of 2019. 
 
What are the risks involved in this interview? 
 
Two risks exist in connection with these interviews: (1) confidentiality of the interviewee 
and (2) discussions of topics which may be confidential.  
 
To the first, you have the right to request that your interview be anonymized – a request 
that if made, I will make all reasonable efforts to anonymize the interview data. The 
techniques for anonymization include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) altering 
non-essential interviewee details and (2) employing multiple pseudonyms for an 
interviewee. Further, I am open to discussing any issues relating to the anonymization of 
the data with you at any point prior to, during, or after the interview. Nevertheless, please 
bear in-mind that while the data will be anonymized, anonymity cannot be guaranteed.  
 
To the second, should our conversation include topics that you are aware could be 
considered confidential, two procedures will be followed. First, throughout the interview, I 
will seek to clarify the confidentiality of any such topics or statements. If need be, we can 
transition that segment of the interview to non-audio recorded. Second, after my review of 
the interview transcript, I may contact you with any concerns that I may have relating to 
possible confidential disclosures. This would allow for your input on the matter to clarify 
whether the disclosure was confidential. 
 
What are the benefits for taking part in this interview? 
 
As part of taking part in this research project, you are free to request and to receive a final 
copy of the approved thesis. 
 
What are your rights as a participant? 
 
Taking part in the study is voluntary.  You may choose not to take part or subsequently 
cease participation at any time. Further, you have the right to request that your interview 
be anonymized, and we can discuss the process by which the interview will be anonymized. 
Nevertheless, please bear in-mind that while reasonable efforts will be made to anonymize 
your interview, anonymity cannot be guaranteed. Additionally, you may request copies of 
the interview transcript and of the final results of this project.  
 
Concerning payment or monetary benefits 
 
You will receive no payment for your participation.   The data will not be used for 
commercial purposes.  Therefore, you should not expect any royalties or payments from 
the research project in the future. 
 
 
For more information 
 
You may contact this project’s supervisors: 
             Dr. Jay Wiggan 
             15a George Square 
             +44 131 650 3939 
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             J.Wiggan@ed.ac.uk 
 
 Dr. Donald Mackenzie  
 15a George Square 









Glossary of Financial and Rulemaking Terms459 
 
Brent Interpretation – “The Brent Interpretation, developed by the CFTC in 1990, provides 
a facts and circumstances test in determining whether a particular transaction constitutes 
an excluded forward contract” (Sar 2017: 612) 
Central Counterparty – “A clearing organization”; see Clearinghouse (CFTC 2019) 
Clearing – “The procedure through which the clearinghouse becomes the buyer to each 
seller of a futures contract or other derivative, and the seller to each buyer for clearing 
members” (CFTC 2019) 
Clearinghouse – “An entity through which futures and other derivative transactions are 
cleared and settled. It is also charged with assuring the proper conduct of each contract's 
delivery procedures and the adequate financing of trading. A [clearinghouse] may be a 
division of a particular exchange, an adjunct or affiliate thereof, or a freestanding entity. 
Also called a clearing [organization], multilateral clearing organization, central 
counterparty, or clearing association” (CFTC 2019) 
Collateral – Assets pledged to back a privately negotiated contract 
Commercial End-User – True end-users of nonfinancial commodities – such as a natural 
gas-fired electrical plant – and commercial marketplace participants/commercial parties – 
such as nonfinancial commodity wholesalers, nonfinancial commodity storage and 
transportation companies, and energy and metals producers and processors. 
Commercial Marketplace Participant – a nonfinancial business or actor that produces, 
utilizes, or handles a commodity; see Commercial End-User 
Commercial Party – a nonfinancial business or actor (e.g., not a bank or pension fund) 
Commodity – “A physical commodity such as an agricultural product [other than onions] or 
a natural resource as opposed to a financial instrument such as a currency or interest rate” 
(CFTC 2019) 
Commodity Option – “An option on a commodity”; see Trade Option (CFTC 2019) 
Commodity Swap – A swap on a commodity, such as crude oil 
Counterparty – “The opposite party in a bilateral agreement, contract, or transaction, such 
as a swap” (CFTC 2019) 
Delivery – “The tender and receipt of the actual commodity”; see Physical Settlement (CFTC 
2019) 
 
459 Citations found in References list. 
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Derivative – “A contract the price of which is derived from the price of an underlying 
[asset]; examples of derivatives are futures, forwards, options and swaps” (Pilbeam 2018: 
470) 
Equity (stock) – “Share which represent ownership of a company” (Pilbeam 2018: 471) 
Exchange Market – “A central marketplace such as a designated contract market with 
established rules and regulations where buyers and sellers meet to trade futures and 
options contracts or securities” (CFTC 2019) 
Exchange-traded – A derivative traded on an exchange 
Exclusion – A statutory requirement that something (e.g., a derivative contract) not be 
regulated by an administrative agency 
Execution – The purchase or sale of a derivative contract, typically an option 
Exempt Commercial Markets – Established by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
of 2000, a new legally defined entity which operated as a look-alike electronic futures 
exchange, but whose derivative transactions thereon were exempt from most CFTC 
regulation 
Exempt Commodity – A commodity in energy and metals; see OTC Commodity Derivative 
Exemption – An administrative agency’s decision to exempt something (e.g., a derivative 
contract) – which is within its statutory jurisdiction – from regulation 
Exercise – The invocation of the optional right to buy or to sell an asset 
Financial Settlement – “A method of settling futures, options and other derivatives 
whereby the seller (or short) pays the buyer (or long) the cash value of the underlying 
commodity or a cash amount based on the level of an index or price according to a 
procedure specified in the contract” (CFTC 2019) 
Forward Contract – “A contract to buy [or] sell a security or commodity at a predetermined 
price and at a predetermined date in the future” (Pilbeam 2018: 473) 
Futures Contract – “[An exchange-traded,] standardized agreement to buy [or] sell a 
security [or a commodity] at a predetermined price at a given date in the future” (Pilbeam 
2018: 473) 
Hedging – “The process of undertaking a [derivative] transaction to reduce or eliminate 
risk” (Pilbeam 2018: 474) 
ISDA Agreement – The master agreement used to govern swap transactions 
Major Swap Participant – “1) A person that maintains a 'substantial position' in any of the 
major swap categories, excluding positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk 
and positions maintained by certain employee benefit plans for hedging or mitigating risks 
in the operation of the plan; (2) A person whose outstanding swaps create 'substantial 
counterparty exposure that could have serious adverse effects on the financial stability of 
the United States banking system or financial markets'; (3) Any 'financial entity' that is 
'highly leveraged relative to the amount of capital such entity holds and that is not subject 
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to capital requirements established by an appropriate Federal banking agency' and that 
maintains a 'substantial position' in any of the major swap categories.” (CFTC 2019) 
Margin – “The amount of money or collateral deposited by a customer with [its] broker, by 
a broker with a clearing member, or by a clearing member with a clearing organization” for 
a derivative transaction (CFTC 2019) 
Nonfinancial Commodity – See OTC Commodity Derivative 
Notional Value – Total nominal value of a derivative contract’s asset position  
Optionality – The quality of a derivative contract to contain some form of option (e.g., in 
regard to delivery obligation, commodity price, or commodity volume) 
Options Contract – A contract for “the right but not the obligation to buy [or] sell shares, 
bonds, foreign exchange, commodities and so on at a given (exercise/strike) price at or 
before a predetermined date in the future” (Pilbeam 2018: 479) 
OTC Commodity Derivative – A derivative contract in energy or metals that is traded over-
the-counter 
Over-the-counter Derivatives – “’Tailor made’ derivative contracts that are not traded on 
organized exchanges but rather [directly between parties]” (Pilbeam 2018: 479) 
Over-the-counter Market – “The trading of commodities, contracts, or other instruments 
not listed on any exchange. OTC transactions can occur electronically or over the 
telephone” (CFTC 2019) 
Physical Settlement – “A provision in a futures contract or other derivative for delivery of 
the actual commodity to satisfy the contract”; see Delivery (CFTC 2019) 
Position Limits – “The maximum position, either net long or net short, in one commodity 
future (or option) or in all futures (or options) of one commodity combined that may be 
held or controlled by one person (other than a person eligible for a hedge exemption) as 
prescribed by an exchange and/or by the CFTC” (CFTC 2019) 
Premium – “The payment an option buyer makes to the option writer for granting an 
option contract” (CFTC 2019) 
Speculation – “The undertaking of a long or short position in the financial [or commodity] 
markets in the [simple] hope of making a profit” (Pilbeam 2018: 483) 
Swap Contract – A contract for “an exchange of cash flow obligations between two parties” 
(Pilbeam 2018: 484) 
Swap Dealer – “The Dodd-Frank Act and subsequent CFTC rules, in general, identify a ‘swap 
dealer’ as any person who: 1. holds itself out as a dealer in swaps, 2. makes a market in 
swaps; 3. regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary course of business 
for its own account, or 4. engages in activity causing itself to be commonly known in the 
trade as a dealer or market maker in swaps. The CFTC requires that persons engaged in 
these activities register as swaps dealers after they have reached a ‘de minimis’ 
[(minimum)] threshold, meaning that, the aggregate gross notional amount of the swaps, 
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with certain exceptions, that the person enters into over the prior 12 months in connection 
with dealing activities exceeds $3 billion. (This threshold is currently set at $8 billion, as part 
of a phase-in period.)” (CFTC 2019) 
Systemic Risk – “The risk that a default by one market participant will have repercussions 
on other participants due to the interlocking nature of financial markets. For example, 
Customer A’s default in X market may affect Intermediary B’s ability to fulfill its obligations 
in Markets X, Y, and Z” (CFTC 2019) 
Trade Option – “A commodity option transaction in which the purchaser is reasonably 
believed by the writer to be engaged in business involving use of that commodity or a 
related commodity”; see Commodity Option (CFTC 2019) 
